COMMENTARY: A German brigade in Lithuania: the taboo of 1945 broken

A deployment without historical precedent

In 2026, for the first time since the end of World War II, Germany is deploying a complete Bundeswehr brigade outside its national borders, on the soil of a sovereign allied country: Lithuania. This is not a temporary exercise or a symbolic rotation of a few hundred soldiers. It is a permanent, structured presence with real combat capabilities — tanks, artillery, air defense systems, thousands of men and women in uniform.

To understand why this event is historic, you must understand the weight of 1945 in the German political consciousness. Since the defeat of the Third Reich, Germany built its democratic identity on a profound renunciation of any form of militarism. The Bundeswehr existed — but it was designed as a territorial defense army, never a force for power projection. Permanently stationing German soldiers on foreign soil was an absolute taboo. That taboo has just been broken.

Why Lithuania, why now

Lithuania is one of NATO's most exposed countries. It shares a border with Belarus — a Russian satellite state — and is separated from Kaliningrad, Russia's military enclave, by a narrow land corridor. The «Suwalki Corridor», between Poland and Lithuania, is identified by strategists as the most vulnerable point on NATO's eastern flank.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 transformed these theoretical calculations into a concrete political urgency. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia immediately demanded a permanent NATO military presence on their territory. Germany, as the leading European military power, was given responsibility as the framework nation for Lithuania — a decision that took years to materialize but is now a reality.

I will not hide my emotion about this event. Germany deploying soldiers to defend a Baltic state against the Russian threat — that is a sentence I would never have believed possible in my lifetime. It is also, paradoxically, proof that history can produce good surprises, even when they emerge from bad news.

The weight of German memory

The Grundgesetz — Germany's Basic Law — was written in 1949 with the explicit intention of preventing any return to militarism. The Bundeswehr, created in 1955 in the context of the Cold War, was conceived as a NATO army, integrated into multilateral structures to prevent any unilateral nationalist adventure. For decades, this constraint was experienced as a virtue — living proof that Germany had turned the page on its past.

This culture of restraint translated into concrete political decisions: refusal to deliver lethal weapons to conflict zones, limiting military engagements to peacekeeping missions, resistance to any significant increase in the defense budget. For a long time, a large part of Germany's political class viewed these positions not as weaknesses, but as hallmarks of a morally responsible Germany.

The Zeitenwende: Scholz's turning point

February 24, 2022 changed everything. Three days after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivered a historic speech to the Bundestag, calling the invasion a «Zeitenwende» — a turning point in time. He announced a special fund of 100 billion euros for the modernization of the Bundeswehr and a commitment to reach 2% of GDP in defense spending. These announcements stunned Europe — and triggered an unprecedented German rearmament process.

The brigade in Lithuania is the most visible materialization of this Zeitenwende. It represents the transformation of a political declaration into a military reality. Thousands of German soldiers leaving their barracks to establish themselves permanently in a country that was occupied by the Soviet Union until 1991 — that is an image that would have seemed impossible five years ago.

Scholz's Zeitenwende was the moment of truth for German foreign policy in decades. For the first time, Berlin looked reality in the face and decided to act accordingly rather than taking refuge in the reassuring comfort of its culture of restraint. Better late than never — but it took Ukrainian blood to get there.

A credible combat force

The Bundeswehr's Lithuanian brigade is not a symbolic presence. It is organized for high-intensity combat with Leopard 2 tanks, Puma armored infantry vehicles, artillery systems, air defense units, and a complete logistics battalion. The goal is to have a brigade capable of intervening immediately in case of attack, without transit delay from Germany.

The brigade will ultimately comprise around 5,000 soldiers — a considerable number for a permanent peacetime deployment. These soldiers are accompanied by their families, which required the construction of housing, schools, medical facilities, and services on Lithuanian soil. It is a complete German military community establishing itself permanently in the Baltic.

Integration into the NATO framework

The German brigade integrates into NATO's enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework, which also includes multinational battalions in the Baltic states and Poland. Unlike existing eFP battalions, the German brigade in Lithuania is designed as a unit large enough to conduct an autonomous initial defense — not just to «trigger» NATO's Article 5, but to hold the ground until reinforcements arrive.

This autonomous defense capability is crucial for deterrence credibility. Deterrence theory requires the potential aggressor to believe the cost of an attack would be prohibitive. A complete combat brigade, already on the ground, is far more deterring than a promise of future reinforcement.

The difference between a symbolic battalion and a full combat brigade is exactly the difference between a promise and a guarantee. Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians do not need anyone to explain this distinction. They learned it at the highest possible price.

Infrastructure to build from scratch

Deploying a permanent brigade in a foreign country is not solely a military decision — it is a colossal logistical and administrative challenge. The Bundeswehr had to negotiate with Lithuanian authorities on dozens of practical questions: basing rights, use of existing infrastructure, construction of new facilities, access to roads and training areas, and the legal status of soldiers and their families.

The cost of this deployment is substantial. Germany is investing several billion euros in the construction of necessary infrastructure — modern barracks, medical centers, an international school for soldiers' children. Lithuania is also contributing with land and access facilities. It is a complex financial and logistical partnership that reflects the depth of mutual commitment.

Domestic political resistance

Within Germany, this deployment was not without resistance. Voices from the left and pacifists criticized what they perceive as a militarization of German foreign policy. Minority parties called for dialogue rather than confrontation. But the reality of the war in Ukraine has marginalized these positions — it is difficult to preach de-escalation when a European neighbor is bombed daily by a nuclear power.

The German government's response to these critics has been clear: the military presence in Lithuania is not a provocation toward Russia — it is a response to Russian provocation. NATO is a defensive alliance. The Bundeswehr in Lithuania is there to defend an ally, not to attack an adversary. This distinction is fundamental and must be repeated without relent.

German pacifists opposed to this deployment have a short memory. Peace is not maintained through prayer — it is maintained through deterrence. European history in the twentieth century is a stinging lesson in what happens when democracies believe that goodwill alone is enough to stop autocrats.

The «existential threat» rhetoric

Moscow reacted to the German brigade's deployment in Lithuania with predictable rhetoric: «existential threat», «escalation», «militarization of the eastern flank». These accusations deliberately ignore the context: it is Russia's invasion of Ukraine that forced NATO to reinforce its presence on its eastern flank. Russia cannot complain about the consequences of an aggression it initiated.

Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko also protested, threatening «appropriate response measures». These threats are largely political theater — Minsk has neither the capability nor the will to initiate direct military conflict with NATO. But they contribute to an escalatory rhetoric that Moscow uses to sow fear in Western public opinion.

The real deterrence effect

Behind the official rhetoric, the German brigade's deployment modifies the Russian strategic calculus. Attacking Lithuania or another Baltic state now means immediately confronting German soldiers on the ground — which would automatically trigger NATO's Article 5 and involve the Alliance's full military power in a conflict. This scenario is costly enough to make deliberate aggression very unlikely.

Deterrence operates on the psychology of the adversary as much as on real military capabilities. The German presence in Lithuania sends a clear message: Europe is ready to defend its most vulnerable members, even at the cost of direct military engagement by its largest economic power. This message is heard in Moscow, even if it is publicly dismissed.

Deterrence is exactly like health: you only notice it when it is missing. The German brigade in Lithuania is working to make a Russian attack costly enough that it is never launched. If it succeeds — and I believe it will — nobody will talk about it, because nothing will have happened.

Toward European strategic autonomy

The German brigade's deployment in Lithuania is part of a broader movement toward European strategic autonomy. Faced with uncertainty about long-term American engagement — reinforced by the contradictory signals sent by the Trump administration — Europeans understand that they must be capable of defending their own continent without depending exclusively on Washington.

Germany is at the heart of this project. As the largest European economy and the most populous country in the European Union, its military contribution is indispensable to any credible European defense. The brigade in Lithuania is a signal that Berlin is ready to assume this role — not just with checks, but with soldiers.

A model for other deployments

The German deployment model in Lithuania could inspire other permanent presences on NATO's eastern flank. France leads a battle group in Romania, the United Kingdom is present in Estonia, Canada in Latvia. But these deployments remain below critical mass. The ambition is to bring the entire forward presence framework up to full brigade levels in each country on the eastern flank.

This evolution would represent a structural change in NATO's defensive posture in Europe — from deterrence by reinforcement (sending reinforcements in a crisis) to deterrence by presence (already being there, in sufficient numbers, before the crisis erupts). It is more expensive, but also infinitely more credible.

Europe's defense is no longer a pious wish — it is a strategic necessity being built under pressure from events. I would have preferred it to be built in serenity and foresight. It is being built in urgency and fear. The result may be the same, but the price paid in Ukrainian lives to get there is unbearable.

The Lithuanian perspective

For Lithuania, hosting a permanent German brigade is the realization of a demand pressed for years. President Gitanas Nausėda and the Lithuanian government have consistently insisted on the need for a permanent NATO military presence — not simply rotations — on Lithuanian soil. The German brigade represents a validation of their strategic position.

Lithuanian society welcomes this deployment warmly. Polls show broad support for a foreign military presence on national soil — a position that may seem paradoxical in other contexts, but is entirely consistent with the Lithuanian memory of a Soviet occupation that lasted 50 years. For Lithuanians, an allied foreign army is protection, not a threat.

Vilnius's expectations and requirements

But Lithuania is also a demanding partner. Vilnius requires that the brigade be not only present but fully operational, that equipment be modern and maintained, and that training exercises reflect the real threats identified by Lithuanian intelligence services. Lithuania is simultaneously investing in its own armed forces — building a defense in depth that combines its own capabilities with allied support.

The German-Lithuanian partnership has become a model for bilateral defense cooperation within NATO. The two armies train together, share intelligence, and develop joint doctrines for combat in the particular geographical and climatic environment of the Baltic. It is an alliance within the Alliance — concrete, operational, and alive.

There is something deeply symbolic about Germany — the country that occupied and devastated so many European states in the twentieth century — now being the guarantor of a Baltic state's security. It is European history's most eloquent reconciliation: not in speeches, but in uniforms.

A long-term undertaking

The German brigade's deployment in Lithuania is just one piece of a larger puzzle: the reshaping of European security architecture for the century ahead. NATO is transitioning from an alliance designed for the Cold War to one adapted to the threats of the 21st century: hybrid wars, cyberattacks, disinformation, conventional aggression, and nuclear threats at a lowered threshold. This undertaking is colossal and will take decades to complete.

Investments in infrastructure — military roads, bridges capable of supporting heavy tanks, forward ammunition depots, interoperable command systems — are just as important as troop deployments. Military mobility within Europe remains a major challenge: the European Union and NATO are working together to remove regulatory and infrastructure obstacles that slow troop movement in a crisis.

The question of European nuclear deterrence

One subject that the German brigade in Lithuania indirectly raises is that of European nuclear deterrence. If the United States were to reduce its engagement in Europe, French nuclear capability becomes the backbone of the continent's nuclear deterrence. President Macron raised the possibility of a «strategic dialogue» with European partners on this sensitive subject. The question remains open — but it is less taboo than it was five years ago.

Germany, as a non-nuclear country participating in NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, is at the center of this debate. Its growing conventional capabilities — illustrated by the Lithuanian brigade — complement nuclear deterrence by demonstrating that Europe possesses a credible response across the full spectrum of threats.

The European nuclear question is the great unspoken in all these defense debates. We talk about brigades, tanks, drones — but behind the scenes, strategists are asking how Europe will ensure its deterrence if Washington genuinely disengages. It is the most difficult question, and no one yet dares to ask it publicly with full candor.

What this deployment means for Europe

The German brigade in Lithuania is far more than a military deployment. It is a political declaration of major historical importance: Europe is ready to defend its own values and borders without delegating entirely to Washington's goodwill. It is the strategic maturity of a continent that long delegated its security to others.

The taboo of 1945 was grounded in an understandable historical necessity. But times have changed. Democratic Germany of 2026 is not Nazi Germany of 1939. To pretend otherwise — to cling to military restrictions grounded in a collective guilt belonging to another century — is to deprive oneself of an essential defense instrument in a profoundly degraded security environment.

The message to Putin and his allies

The message sent by the German brigade in Lithuania is simple and strong: NATO is not disintegrating, Europe is not capitulating, and eastern flank countries are not being abandoned to their fate. Putin bet that Western democracies lacked the will and consistency to sustain their commitments in the long term. The German brigade in Lithuania is the most concrete answer to that bet.

For Zelensky and the Ukrainian people, this deployment is also a signal of hope. It shows that Europe learns not only from speeches — it also learns from actions. And every concrete act of Atlantic solidarity strengthens the Ukrainian conviction that its resistance is not in vain, that its fight for freedom is supported by allies who take their responsibilities seriously.

I will close with a thought for the German soldiers who will settle in Lithuania with their families. They carry the weight of history on their shoulders — not as guilt, but as responsibility. Defending the freedom of a Baltic state while wearing a German uniform, in 2026, is one of the finest chapters the Bundeswehr has ever had the opportunity to write.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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