COMMENTARY: Gaza phase 2 — disarmament, governance, reconstruction: the impossible triangle

October 2025 – June 2026: from a historic agreement to a documented deadlock

In October 2025, President Donald Trump announced what he presented as the most transformative agreement for the Middle East in decades: a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, accompanied by a 20-point peace plan aimed at demilitarizing Gaza, establishing a new Palestinian civilian government, and launching a massive reconstruction effort. Hostilities largely ceased — the bombs largely stopped falling, and hostages were released in January 2026. But eight months later, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), the situation in Gaza has not fundamentally changed.

Hamas still controls approximately 40% of the Gaza Strip — the half where two million civilians still live. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) occupy the other 60%, a division marked by what Israel calls the Yellow Line. The International Stabilization Force (ISF) supposed to count 20,000 personnel has only a handful — delegations from Kosovo and Albania have visited a logistics site, and Egypt has just committed. The Palestinian civilian government, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), administers nothing concrete for the time being.

The impossible triangle: three mutually exclusive demands

Phase 2 of Trump's plan for Gaza demands three things simultaneously: the complete disarmament of Hamas, the establishment of a new non-Hamas Palestinian governance, and the launch of massive reconstruction. The problem is that each of these three objectives is conditioned by the other two in circular loops that no one can break unilaterally. Israel refuses to withdraw without disarmament. Hamas refuses to disarm without Israeli withdrawal. Reconstruction cannot begin under the American plan except in disarmed zones. And the NCAG can only govern in areas where neither Hamas nor the IDF hold military dominance.

It is a logical triangle perfectly designed for deadlock. Every actor can block the other two by maintaining their precondition. And that is precisely what has been happening for several months, while two million Gazans live simultaneously under Hamas rule, Israeli precision strikes, and a reconstruction that never begins.

One can attribute this deadlock to Hamas's bad faith, Israel's intransigence, Trump's inexperienced diplomacy, or the plan's own inherent contradictions. Probably all of the above at once. What I know with certainty is that the two million Gazan civilians living in the zone still controlled by Hamas deserve better than being permanent hostages in a dispute over the order of concessions.

What Mladenov demands and why Hamas refuses

Nickolay Mladenov, senior representative of Trump's Board of Peace for Gaza, presented a five-phase disarmament plan spanning eight months. The most controversial phase — the third — requires Hamas to hand over all its heavy weapons, permit the destruction of its tunnels and military infrastructure, and have all armed factions cease their military activities. The final phase calls for full verification of Gaza's demilitarization before any complete Israeli withdrawal.

Hamas responded by demanding an Israeli withdrawal prior to any disarmament — a condition Israel immediately rejected. Clause 8 of the peace plan, which defines the terms of disarmament and control of military installations in post-conflict Gaza, is the heart of the deadlock. Hamas expressed "high positivity" toward certain elements of that clause according to Al Jazeera — accepting for the first time the surrender of its heavy weapons stockpiles — but only on condition of a simultaneous Israeli military withdrawal, which Israel categorically refuses.

The demand for a tunnel map: The provocation too far

In an escalation of demands, Mladenov added in June 2026 two further requirements that hardened all positions: the handover of detailed maps of Hamas's tunnel network, and the collection of all personal weapons held by Palestinian civilians in Gaza. This latter demand — registering and controlling all rifles and firearms in households — was perceived by Palestinian factions as a demand for total submission that goes beyond demilitarization and aims to establish a permanent security presence over civilian populations.

The demand for tunnel maps is even more sensitive: Hamas's tunnels represent not only military infrastructure but also a tool of survival, informal commerce, and resistance that the civilian population has associated with Palestinian resistance for decades. Demanding them without prior guarantees of Israeli withdrawal is like asking Hamas to strip itself bare before the adversary has even agreed to leave the room.

I am not defending Hamas. It is a terrorist organization that committed atrocities on October 7, 2023, and maintains its grip on Gaza through executions, according to a June 2026 UN report. But I can analyze the negotiating logic without endorsing the actors. And the logic here is simple: you cannot demand the total disarmament of one party without offering it a credible security guarantee in return. That holds true in every negotiation, including with terrorists.

A phantom government in a divided territory

The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) — the United States- and UN-backed Palestinian technocratic civilian government meant to replace Hamas in governing Gaza — has existed on paper since January 2026. In practice, it administers nothing. To govern, it would need a secure zone outside the control of both Hamas and the IDF. That zone does not yet exist.

The paradox is Kafkaesque: the NCAG can only begin to function where there is security, but security can only be established by the International Stabilization Force, which can only deploy with the consent of all parties, which Hamas will not give until its disarmament conditions are satisfied. Every link in the chain depends on the previous one — which in turn depends on the next.

The Palestinian Authority: The absent party at the table

A further irony: the Palestinian Authority (PA), based in Ramallah and governing the West Bank, is theoretically the only Palestinian entity internationally recognized as a legitimate interlocutor. But its President Mahmoud Abbas, at 90 years old, leads an institution widely perceived as corrupt and ineffective by Palestinians themselves. The PA has refused to play a role in Gaza without prior guarantees over its authority and the end of Israeli military operations in both territories.

The Trump plan essentially bypassed the PA by creating the NCAG as an alternative — a decision that alienated the PA while creating a phantom government that neither Hamas, nor Palestinians living under its control, nor a significant portion of the international community fully recognizes as legitimate. Building stable governance on that foundation is a Sisyphean task.

The question no one wants to ask out loud: can Gaza actually be governed without Hamas, or without something that replaces it with equivalent legitimacy among the population? Mladenov and the Board of Peace may be right that Hamas must disarm. But if the Gazan population does not recognize the NCAG's authority, even a disarmed Hamas could maintain de facto control through sheer social network alone. Governance cannot be decreed.

Reconstruction tied to a disarmament that never comes

Gaza was massively destroyed by two years of intensive conflict. Infrastructure damage estimates exceed $50 billion. Reconstruction is urgent for the two million civilians living in precarious conditions. But under the Trump plan, reconstruction can only begin in disarmed and verified zones — which, under current conditions, means it begins nowhere.

The cycle is perfectly vicious: Gazans need reconstruction now. Reconstruction can only begin after disarmament. Disarmament can only be negotiated after guarantees of Israeli withdrawal. Guarantees of withdrawal can only be given after disarmament. And in the meantime, destruction accumulates, frustration mounts, and the recruitment conditions for Hamas within its own population paradoxically improve.

International donors: Between commitment and hesitation

Several Persian Gulf countries — including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar — have expressed readiness to fund post-Hamas reconstruction. But these commitments are conditional on the establishment of a credible governance framework and an inclusive political process. Kosovo and Albania have sent delegations — important political symbols, but with limited operational capacity. Europe is prepared to contribute under certain conditions. But without the security the ISF was supposed to provide and has not yet provided, no major reconstruction program can begin.

The secretary of state for development of a major European country confirmed to me — informally and without being able to be named — that significant funds are mobilized but that no one knows to whom to hand them in the current framework. The NCAG lacks sufficient legitimacy. The PA has declined. International organizations lack secure access. It is money ready to be deployed with no window through which to deliver it.

I must be honest: I am not sure there is a short-term solution to Gaza. The problem is not a lack of goodwill or funds — it is a structural contradiction between actors whose interests are fundamentally incompatible. Israel cannot accept an armed Hamas on its border. Hamas cannot disarm and survive politically. And Gazan civilians are caught between these two logics.

Daily strikes against a strategic vacuum

In June 2026, the IDF continues near-daily precision strikes against Hamas commanders and leaders in the zones it controls. These strikes maintain operational pressure on the organization and eliminate key figures. But according to the FDD, they do not constitute a long-term strategy: Hamas rebuilds its networks even under pressure, and no political replacement solution is emerging.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, facing contradictory internal pressures — the right wing of his coalition wanting full reoccupation of Gaza, the hostages' families wanting negotiations, the military wanting a coherent strategy — oscillates between options without firmly choosing one. General Aharon Haliva's remark about the need to expand from 70% to 60% control of Gaza, reported by Secretary of State Rubio, suggests Israel is considering an expansion of its territorial grip — which contradicts the American plan.

The Yellow Line that keeps moving

Reports from humanitarian organizations and satellite imagery document that the Yellow Line — the boundary meant to separate Israeli-controlled and Hamas-controlled zones — has in fact shifted deeper into Gaza's territory since the October 2025 agreement. This gradual creep represents a silent violation of the ceasefire framework that erodes the credibility of American guarantees in the eyes of Palestinians and Arab mediating nations.

Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar — the main mediators of the process — are pessimistic about the prospects, according to Arab diplomats cited by the Times of Israel. When the mediators lose confidence in the good faith of the main parties, the peace process is in structural peril, not merely a temporary standstill.

Netanyahu is playing a domestic political game that is extremely dangerous for Gaza's civilian population and for Israel's long-term future. Maintaining a deadlock that satisfies the right wing of his coalition while resolving nothing — that is choosing short-term political survival at the expense of a durable solution. I am not naive: wartime politics always works this way. But the human consequences of that calculation are enormous.

An innovative concept, a stumbling implementation

The Board of Peace — the international organization created by Trump to oversee the transition in Gaza — was an ambitious idea: take the management of peace out of the often-paralyzed UN structures and create an agile mechanism equipped with real resources and authority. Eight months after its creation, its operational record is thin. The International Stabilization Force it was supposed to coordinate barely exists. The NCAG it supervised administers nothing.

Nickolay Mladenov, its senior representative, found himself in an impossible position: he had to demand Hamas's disarmament — which made him unacceptable in the eyes of Palestinian factions — while maintaining the trust of Arab mediators who judge his conditions too aligned with Israeli positions. His cryptic tweet — "He who will not cross the river will drown in the sea" — reveals a skilled communicator but a negotiator whose room for maneuver is extremely limited.

Washington's interest: Trump and the midterms in his sights

The Trump administration was absorbed by negotiations with Iran for several weeks, reducing its attention on Gaza. This strategic distraction allowed the deadlock to crystallize further. With the November 2026 midterms in his sights, Trump needs either a visible victory on Gaza or a way to exit the file without appearing responsible for failure. Neither is easily accessible under current conditions.

The most likely dynamic according to FDD analysts is a continuation of stagnation: sporadic Israeli strikes, Hamas holding its control zone, a waiting NCAG, a reconstruction that never starts. That is the status quo as default policy — uncomfortable but preferable, from each actor's perspective, to making the concessions necessary to break the deadlock.

I am among those who believe Trump's roadmap for Gaza had real merits — removing Hamas from power, rebuilding Gaza under non-Islamist governance, normalizing regional relations. The problem is not the goal — it is the absence of a credible mechanism to achieve it without imposing on Palestinians a transition they did not choose and that cannot hold by external force alone.

Humanitarian flow as a negotiating lever

Humanitarian aid to Gaza has itself become a political negotiating chip — which represents a profound perversion of its primary purpose. Israel controls the entry points and regulates the flows according to security considerations. Hamas taxes and redistributes a portion of the aid according to its own political priorities. International humanitarian organizations — UNRWA, WFP, the Red Cross — navigate between these two constraints with insufficient resources and inconsistent access. The result is a humanitarian system that functions, but chronically inadequately given the scale of need.

Trump's phase 2 plan envisages $300 billion in conditional reconstruction — conditional on Hamas's disarmament and the establishment of alternative governance. This conditionality is politically understandable. It is humanitarianly problematic: it means that real reconstruction will not begin until political conditions are in place — and those conditions may take months or years to materialize. In the meantime, two million people live in precarious conditions generating lasting trauma, particularly for children.

Humanitarian organizations under pressure

UNRWA — the UN agency for Palestinian refugees — has faced unprecedented pressure since October 7, 2023. Israel suspended its cooperation with the agency, accusing it of infiltration by Hamas members. The United States temporarily suspended its funding. These accusations have a partial factual basis — investigations confirmed that some employees had links to Hamas — but the proportionate response to an internal governance problem within an agency cannot be the elimination of aid to refugees who depend on that agency for survival.

The UNRWA crisis reveals a deeper problem: the international humanitarian architecture built after 1948 to manage the Palestinian question is no longer suited to the reality of 2026. It has perpetuated a hereditary refugee status across multiple generations without resolving the underlying political questions. Reforming that architecture is necessary — but not by cutting off supplies during an active war.

I am not an unconditional defender of UNRWA — the agency has real governance problems. But eliminating humanitarian aid to civilians during an active war in order to punish a failing institution is to confuse objectives. The children of Gaza are not responsible for UNRWA's institutional flaws. They deserve to eat, regardless of the politics of their rulers or the quality of the administration of the agency that serves them.

Saudi Arabia between normalization and public opinion

Normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia — the great diplomatic objective of the Trump administration in the Middle East — is directly conditioned on resolving the Gaza question. Riyadh cannot sign a normalization agreement with Tel Aviv as long as images of destruction in Gaza circulate in Arab media and feed a public opinion that overwhelmingly supports the Palestinian cause. King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman understand the economic and strategic opportunity that normalization represents. They also understand the domestic political risks of an agreement signed in a context of active conflict.

The deadlock in Gaza therefore blocks not only Palestinian reconstruction but also the most ambitious regional diplomatic architecture since the Camp David Accords. That is one reason American pressure for a solution in Gaza is so intense — not only for humanitarian reasons, but because Saudi normalization is a major strategic objective that would benefit both Israel, the United States, and regional stability.

The UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco: Abraham's normalizers under pressure

The Arab countries that normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords of 2020 — the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan — have faced significant domestic pressure since October 7, 2023. Arab public opinions, already skeptical about these agreements, have hardened their positions in the face of conflict images from Gaza. The governments concerned formally maintain their diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv while limiting the visibility of this cooperation. This partial retreat in public space illustrates the fragility of normalizations that were not accompanied by substantial progress on the Palestinian question.

The political lesson is clear: a durable Arab-Israeli normalization requires a credible horizon for Palestinians — not necessarily an immediate state, but a political trajectory that allows Arab leaders to defend normalization before their own populations. Without this component, the Abraham Accords will remain elite agreements without popular roots, vulnerable to future political turbulence.

The 2020 Abraham Accords were a genuine diplomatic innovation — bypassing the Palestinian veto on Arab-Israeli normalization by negotiating directly with pragmatic Arab states. The strategy had real logic. What the Trump administration had not anticipated was that normalization without a Palestinian solution would be as fragile as a house of cards the moment Gaza exploded again. October 7, 2023, revealed that fragility. It has not yet been repaired.

What would be needed to break the deadlock

An exit from the deadlock would require at minimum three elements: a credible international guarantee of Palestinian civilian security in exchange for Hamas's progressive disarmament, a governance mechanism that carries minimum legitimacy among the Gazan population — not only among Western chancelleries — and immediate reconstruction in clearly delimited zones to show Gazans that peace delivers something tangible.

These three elements exist in embryonic form in Trump's plan. What is missing is the political will of all parties to make the first concession. That political will is directly linked to each actor's short-term interest calculations — and at this hour, no actor finds conceding more advantageous than holding.

The price of stagnation for civilians

While diplomats struggle to find a way out of the impossible triangle, two million Gazan civilians live under Hamas in a zone where reconstruction has not begun, food supply remains precarious despite improvements in humanitarian aid, and the prospects of a normal life are abstract. These people — who voted for neither October 7 nor the Israeli strikes — deserve better than a procedural conflict between powers that treat them as adjustment variables in their geopolitical rivalry.

Gaza in June 2026 is the summary of everything the liberal world order has failed to accomplish: protecting civilians, resolving political conflicts through diplomacy, holding violent non-state actors accountable for their actions. I am not saying it was easy. I am saying that the price of this failure is paid every day by two million people who deserved better from a world that claims to defend human dignity.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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