DECODING: Gaza phase 2 — demilitarization, reconstruction, governance: why everything stalls

Sharm El-Sheikh, October 2025: the fragile miracle

In October 2025, a ceasefire agreement was signed at Sharm El-Sheikh, following months of Egyptian, Qatari, Turkish, and American mediation. The first phase of that agreement — a halt to the fighting, a partial hostage exchange, the large-scale introduction of humanitarian aid — was implemented with difficulty but genuinely. It saved thousands of additional lives and offered the people of Gaza their first reprieve after more than a year of total war.

According to the WAFA agency, cited in available sources, Israel's war in Gaza had caused 72,971 deaths and 173,128 injuries by the time the agreement was signed. The real figure, accounting for those buried under rubble or in areas inaccessible to rescue teams, is likely far higher. It is against this backdrop of massive destruction that negotiators are now trying to build something durable. The task is titanic. The obstacles are structural.

Phase 2: the impossible agreement

The second phase of the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement is meant to address the hardest questions: the demilitarization of Gaza, the departure or surrender of Hamas, the return of still-held hostages, and the reconstruction and future governance of the territory. In June 2026, Cairo is hosting meetings between Palestinian factions and mediators from Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey in an attempt to break an impasse that looks increasingly structural and unsolvable.

According to Al Ahram on June 26, 2026, mediators are deploying "intensive efforts" to advance implementation of the agreement's provisions. The senior Hamas delegation, led by Khalil Al-Hayya, has been in Cairo since June 20. And according to Al Jazeera on June 23, it is "Clause 8" that is at the center of every blockage — the clause dealing with demilitarization, oversight of military installations in a post-conflict Gaza, and the assignment of security responsibilities to a unified Palestinian authority.

I'll be honest: I am deeply uncertain about what the future holds for Gaza. The obstacles to phase 2 are so numerous and so deep that I cannot see how a durable agreement is possible in the near term. That's not defeatism — it's a sober reading of what the sources reveal. Sometimes the first step toward solving a problem is admitting it is even harder than you thought.

What Clause 8 demands

Clause 8 of the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement is the Gordian knot of phase 2. It demands, according to Al Jazeera, the total demilitarization of Hamas — including the handover of tunnel maps and the surrender of personal weapons held by Gazans. Nickolay Mladenov, chief representative of the "Board of Peace" — the oversight body created by the Trump administration to supervise the agreement — insists that Gaza must be "cleared of all remaining weapons."

This demand is presented by Israel and by the Board of Peace as non-negotiable. Without demilitarization: no reconstruction. No international investment. No stable governance. The logic is understandable — no one wants to fund the rebuilding of infrastructure that Hamas could use to prepare future attacks.

Why Hamas will always refuse to disarm

Hamas's response to this demand is predictable and, from its own rational calculus, inevitable. Palestinian representatives in Cairo describe the demand for full disarmament as evidence that Mladenov is "a mere conduit for Israel's extreme conditions." For Hamas, disarming means signing its own political — and perhaps physical — death warrant. Weapons are the only card the movement still holds. Submitting to full disarmament would mean accepting governance by the Palestinian Authority or a foreign body, with no capacity for resistance.

There is a fundamental asymmetry of motivations here: Israel and its allies want the end of Hamas's military capability as a precondition for any normalization. Hamas regards its weapons as its only guarantee of survival. These two positions are not simply different — they are logically incompatible within the framework of any normal negotiation.

One can debate endlessly about the origins of the conflict and the legitimacy of each side's claims. On the question of Hamas disarmament in phase 2, I am clear-eyed: no armed movement voluntarily disarms unless it has guarantees for its political survival. If the international community wants Hamas to lay down its weapons, it must offer something in return. What? That is the question nobody wants to ask publicly.

The vast institutional void

Phase 2 raises a question that should have been resolved before negotiations even began: who governs Gaza after the conflict? The Palestinian Authority, based in the West Bank and led by Mahmoud Abbas, is formally recognized as the legitimate governing entity for Palestinians. But it has had no real presence in Gaza since 2007, when Hamas seized control of the territory by force. It is widely perceived by Gaza's population as corrupt, weak, and representative of an old guard disconnected from local realities.

Clause 8 calls for the establishment of a "unified Palestinian authority" responsible for security. In theory, this would mean a reconciliation between Fatah (which controls the Palestinian Authority) and Hamas — a coalition with the movement that the European Union, the United States, and Israel designate as a terrorist organization. In practice, no one has a clear answer to the question: what does legitimate governance in Gaza look like in 2026?

The Trump proposal and the Palestinian rejection

The Trump administration had floated the idea of "relocating" part of Gaza's population to Egypt or Jordan — a proposal rejected by both countries, by Palestinians, and by nearly the entire international community as being at best impractical, at worst constitutive of ethnic cleansing. Mladenov's "Board of Peace" proposes an international oversight model, but without any real enforcement power and without a clear political mechanism to replace Hamas in day-to-day governing functions.

While diplomats debate governance structures, 2.3 million Gazans need clean water, medical care, shelter, and food now — not five years from now when a political solution may or may not be reached. The humanitarian emergency cannot wait for the resolution of structural political questions. This gap between the timeline of negotiations and the timeline of human survival is one of the most profound cruelties of this conflict.

The question "who governs Gaza after Hamas" is the question everyone avoids because the honest answer is "nobody ready." The Palestinian Authority lacks the legitimacy, the capacity, or the security to move in tomorrow. An international force does not exist. And allowing Hamas to govern after defeating it militarily would be an anomaly without precedent. This institutional void may be the single greatest obstacle to phase 2.

The cost of reconstruction: astronomical figures

Estimates from the World Bank and the United Nations place the cost of rebuilding Gaza between $50 and $80 billion, depending on the scale of damage and the level of reconstruction targeted. This is an enormous sum for a territory of 365 square kilometers. International donors — Gulf states, the European Union, the United States — have expressed willingness to contribute, but all have attached conditions.

The central condition of Western donors mirrors Israel's: no reconstruction without Hamas disarmament and credible governance. Gulf states — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar — are prepared to invest massively, but under political conditions that vary from country to country and sometimes conflict with each other. Some want a role for the Palestinian Authority. Others are more accommodating toward Hamas. All want to avoid renewed instability that could threaten their own regimes.

Israel's position: conditional reconstruction

The Netanyahu government has maintained an uncompromising position: no international reconstruction as long as Hamas is not fully demilitarized and its leaders brought to justice. This position is consistent with stated war objectives since October 2023. It is also politically unachievable within the timeframe of phase 2 — because Hamas will not accept these conditions, and mediators cannot compel Hamas.

Israel also maintains its refusal to withdraw from certain strategic corridors within Gaza — including the Philadelphi Corridor and the Netzarim Corridor — on the grounds that these positions are essential to prevent Hamas from rearming. These refusals block the earliest phases of reconstruction, which require freedom of movement throughout the territory.

I understand Israel's security concerns. After October 7, 2023, no one can decently ask Israel to ignore the risks of Hamas rearming. But I also see that Netanyahu's conditions create a vicious cycle: no reconstruction without disarmament, no disarmament without political guarantees, no political guarantees without enough reconstruction to offer an alternative to Hamas. How do you break out of that circle? I don't have an easy answer.

Egypt: pragmatism and regional interests

Egypt is the historic mediator between Israel and the Palestinians. It shares a border with Gaza — the Rafah crossing — and has a direct stake in its neighbor's stability. Cairo maintains relationships with all parties: it is recognized by Israel, it has contacts with Hamas, and it is a partner of the United States. Its agenda: avoid an influx of Palestinian refugees onto its soil, preserve its own internal stability, and maintain its role as an indispensable regional mediator.

Egypt may be the most pragmatic mediator — but also the most politically exposed. If the mediation fails, pressure on the Gaza border will intensify. If it succeeds too visibly, questions will arise about its complicity with conditions imposed on Hamas. Cairo navigates between these hazards with all the caution of a state that knows its own internal fragility makes it vulnerable to regional shocks.

Qatar and Turkey: Hamas's relative allies

Qatar has hosted Hamas's political bureau in Doha for years — making it the most direct intermediary with the movement's political leadership. But this position exposes Doha to contradictory pressures: Israel and the United States demand that Qatar push Hamas toward compromise, while Hamas itself maintains demands that Qatar cannot entirely ignore without jeopardizing its privileged relationship with the organization.

Turkey under Erdogan also plays a mediating role, but with a more aggressive posture: Ankara has sharply condemned Israeli military operations in Gaza and maintains strongly pro-Palestinian rhetoric. This gives it credibility with Hamas but complicates its relationship with Israel and sometimes with the United States. The three main mediators — Egypt, Qatar, Turkey — have agendas that partially overlap but diverge on the critical points.

Three mediators, three different agendas. Egypt wants stability. Qatar wants to maintain its regional influence. Turkey wants to project its Islamist power. These three agendas can converge on some points but diverge on others. This is not a homogeneous mediation collective — it is a coalition of interests held together reluctantly. That makes it fragile. And it is on that fragility that the hope for an agreement rests.

The humanitarian abyss

While diplomats negotiate Clause 8 and post-Hamas governance, Gaza's population is surviving in conditions the UN describes as a "humanitarian catastrophe." Water and sanitation systems are 80% destroyed. Hospitals are operating at minimum capacity, often without electricity or medicine. Entire areas of the territory remain inaccessible to rescue teams. Displaced persons camps are overflowing. Child malnutrition has reached alarming levels according to international aid agencies active in the enclave.

This catastrophic humanitarian context creates additional pressure on negotiations. Every week of diplomatic deadlock is another week of suffering for millions of civilians. That urgency should force actors to accelerate. In practice, it sometimes creates tensions that complicate negotiations — Hamas can leverage humanitarian distress to extract concessions; Israel can use humanitarian access as a bargaining chip.

The international community facing its own contradictions

The international community faces a painful contradiction: it wants a durable political solution (phase 2 of the agreement), but Gaza's population needs immediate humanitarian aid that cannot wait for that solution. Fully decoupling the humanitarian emergency from political questions is impossible — humanitarian access is itself a political question. But making all aid contingent on political progress would be unconscionable.

The only honorable way out of this contradiction is to ensure unconditional and massive humanitarian aid while pursuing political negotiations on a separate track. This is easier to state than to implement — logistical access is controlled by actors with political interests. But it is the only approach that preserves both the dignity of victims and the credibility of the diplomatic process.

I refuse to treat Gaza solely as a geopolitical problem. Behind the negotiating tables and agreement clauses, there are real people — children, families, survivors — living in inhumane conditions for far too long. Political decoding is necessary. But it must not make us forget that the absolute priority is human life, not power balances.

Egypt: between mediation and national security

Egypt is an indispensable actor in any negotiation on Gaza — it shares a border with the enclave and controls the Rafah crossing, one of the few entry points for humanitarian aid. Cairo played a central role in mediating both phases 1 and 2 of the negotiations. But Egypt has its own interests that do not always align with those of the parties: it fears destabilization of the Sinai if the conflict spreads, it categorically refuses any forced mass displacement of Palestinians onto its territory, and it seeks to maintain its central mediating role to strengthen its regional influence.

President Al-Sissi is walking a tightrope: he must show enough effectiveness in mediation to maintain his role and the associated political benefits, while avoiding alienating Arab opinion by making too many concessions to Israel. This domestic political constraint limits his room to maneuver — he cannot always push as hard as necessary on the most difficult questions.

Qatar and Turkey: two Hamas allies with their own agendas

Qatar has hosted Hamas's political leadership in Doha for years — making it an indispensable intermediary for any communication with the organization. But this position exposes Doha to contradictory pressures: Israel and the United States demand that Qatar push Hamas toward compromise, while Hamas itself maintains positions that Qatar cannot entirely abandon without undermining its privileged relationship with the movement.

Turkey under Erdogan also plays a mediating role, but from a more aggressive stance: Ankara has harshly condemned Israeli military operations in Gaza and maintains strongly pro-Palestinian rhetoric. This gives it credibility with Hamas but complicates its relationship with Israel and sometimes with the United States. All three principal mediators — Egypt, Qatar, Turkey — have agendas that partially overlap but diverge on the critical points.

Mediating in intractable conflicts is one of the most exhausting and thankless diplomatic tasks in existence. You are asked to reconcile parties that do not want to be reconciled, on questions that touch their political and sometimes physical survival. I don't minimize the effort of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey — even when their motivations are not purely altruistic. If results come, they will be the product of those imperfect motivations.

The number that should change everything

While diplomats negotiate the clauses of phase 2, the humanitarian figures continue to mount. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons in Gaza are living in conditions that meet no minimum humanitarian standard. Medical infrastructure is partially or entirely destroyed in several districts. Access to safe drinking water remains insufficient. Child malnutrition has reached alarming levels according to humanitarian organizations active in the enclave. These figures are not abstractions — they are real children, real families.

Reconstruction is estimated at tens of billions of dollars by the United Nations. Even if a phase 2 agreement were signed tomorrow, reconstruction would take years — a decade by the most pessimistic estimates. This reality should force political actors to decouple immediate humanitarian aid from long-term political negotiations. Conditioning humanitarian aid on diplomatic progress means using civilian suffering as a bargaining tool. That is unacceptable.

The international community facing its contradictions

The international community faces a painful contradiction: it wants a durable political solution (phase 2 of the agreement), but Gaza's population needs immediate humanitarian aid that cannot wait for that solution. Fully decoupling the humanitarian emergency from political questions is impossible — humanitarian access is itself a political question. But making all aid entirely contingent on political progress would be unconscionable.

The only honorable exit from this contradiction is to ensure unconditional and massive humanitarian aid while pursuing political negotiations on a separate timeline. This is easier to state than to implement — logistical access is controlled by actors with political interests. But it is the only approach that preserves both the dignity of victims and the credibility of the diplomatic process.

I refuse to treat Gaza solely as a geopolitical problem. Behind the negotiating tables and agreement clauses, there are real people — children, families, survivors — living in inhumane conditions for far too long. Political decoding is necessary. But it must not make us forget that the absolute priority is human life, not power balances.

Why phase 2 is nearly unworkable in its current form

Phase 2 of the Gaza agreement as currently conceived runs into three structural obstacles that diplomacy alone cannot resolve. First obstacle: the fundamental incompatibility between Israel's demands for full disarmament and Hamas's survival rationality. Second obstacle: the absence of a credible Palestinian governing authority to take over. Third obstacle: the lack of a binding mechanism to compel the parties to honor their commitments.

These obstacles do not mean peace is impossible. They mean that current conditions do not yet permit the agreement Gaza needs. Solutions exist in theory — a robust international deployment, a supervised Palestinian reconciliation, an independent verification mechanism with real teeth — but they require an international political will that the key actors have not yet demonstrated at the level the circumstances demand.

What the West should do

The West — notably the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom — has a responsibility in resolving this crisis. That responsibility means being honest about the viability of the conditions currently being demanded, exercising real pressure on Israel to allow reconstruction without making it entirely conditional on prior disarmament, and investing massively in immediate humanitarian aid independent of political progress. Peace in Gaza will not be built through clauses on paper — it will be built through concrete actions that make peace preferable to war for all actors.

Gaza phase 2 is running into the same obstacles as every previous phase: parties whose core interests are incompatible, mediators with diverging agendas, and an international community that prefers declarations to concrete action. What I know is that the people of Gaza cannot wait for the resolution of these theoretical contradictions. The humanitarian emergency is not an option — it is an absolute moral obligation.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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