ESSAY: Gaza, the tunnels and Hamas disarmament — when peace demands the impossible

What envoy Mladenov put on the table

On June 17, 2026, envoy Nikolay Mladenov, appointed by the Trump administration to head the "Peace Council," submitted to Gaza a 15-point document of unprecedented ambition in the history of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. At the heart of its demands: the surrender of Gaza tunnel maps and the complete disarmament of Hamas, including personal weapons held by civilians.

This demand immediately polarized the negotiations in a way that reveals the depth of the chasm separating the two visions of peace in Gaza. For Israel and Washington, total disarmament is the non-negotiable condition of a durable peace. For Hamas and Palestinian factions, it is a disguised capitulation that would leave them without any defensive capacity against an infinitely superior military power.

The context of negotiations conducted beneath the rubble

It is impossible to understand these negotiations without grasping their human context. Since the formal ceasefire of October 2025, the Palestinian Ministry of Health has counted more than 1,000 Palestinians killed — which international observers attribute to multiple ceasefire violations, demining accidents, internal score-settling and local clashes.

These 1,000 deaths since a "formal" ceasefire illustrate how far diplomatic terminology and on-the-ground reality can diverge. Negotiating peace on the ruins of an already fractured ceasefire is an enterprise of extraordinary difficulty — and envoy Mladenov knows this perfectly well.

The demand to surrender tunnel maps and disarm down to civilians is either a demand for total capitulation, or the reflection of a profound misunderstanding of what "Gaza" means as a human reality. I would lean toward both simultaneously.

Why the tunnel maps are the key to everything

Gaza's tunnel network is far more than a military infrastructure: it is the nervous system of Hamas power. Built over decades, financed by hundreds of millions of dollars, Gaza's underground network constitutes at once military protection, a logistics network, and a symbol of resistance in Palestinian political culture. Surrendering the tunnel maps means handing over the blueprints of an armed organization's brain to its existential adversary.

From a strategic standpoint, this demand is rational: without knowledge of the tunnel network, any future Israeli military operation would be as hazardous as the preceding ones. From a Palestinian political standpoint, it is an unacceptable demand in the absence of viable security guarantees. Egypt, according to Ahram Online (June 25, 2026), is attempting to bridge this gap by proposing mediation mechanisms specific to this clause.

The memory of the tunnels in the culture of resistance

To understand why Hamas will likely refuse to surrender the tunnel maps without extraordinary guarantees, one must understand what these tunnels symbolically represent. They are the argument of physical resistance against Israeli air and technological superiority. They have enabled spectacular attacks and withstood massive strikes. For a population that perceives itself as besieged, surrendering this resistance capability is experienced as suicidal disarmament.

This is why Palestinian factions formed a unified position on clause 8 regarding heavy weapons on June 12, 2026. This rare unity — Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP rarely converge — signals that the disarmament question touches a fundamental nerve that transcends internal Palestinian political divisions.

Gaza's tunnels are both weapons and narratives. Asking Hamas to hand over tunnel maps without a credible security guarantee is like asking someone to hand their shield to the one who wants to strike them. The equation is unbalanced from the outset.

What the 15 points reveal about the Trump approach

The Mladenov agenda submitted on June 17, 2026 represents the operational translation of the Trump vision for Gaza: peace through total disarmament rather than political negotiation. This approach has an internal logic — one cannot build durable stability if one party retains significant military capability. But it presupposes a power asymmetry so extreme that Hamas perceives it as dissolution, not an agreement.

The 15 points, according to information from Al Jazeera (June 23, 2026), include demands on the surrender of tunnel maps, complete disarmament including civilian weapons, hostage release, reconstruction under international supervision, and a post-Hamas governance framework. Each of these points is individually defensible. Collectively, they form a demand for total surrender.

Hamas and the logic of the sequencing

Hamas has maintained a consistent position in these negotiations: complete phase 1 of the ceasefire before any discussion of subsequent phases. This insistence on sequencing is not a technical obstruction — it is a classic negotiating strategy. By refusing to discuss disarmament until phase 1 is fully respected, Hamas ensures it does not make concessions without prior verification of the other party's commitments.

Israel and Washington see this insistence as a delaying tactic. Hamas sees it as legitimate protection against unkept promises — and the history of Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements provides, unfortunately, many examples of unkept promises on both sides. This mutual distrust is the bitter legacy of three decades of broken peace processes.

Hamas says "finish phase 1 before talking about phase 2." That may be a tactic. But it is also a lesson from Oslo. Agreements signed too hastily left too many promises without follow-through. Distrust has historical reasons.

Cairo as a space for compromise

Egypt plays in the Gaza negotiations a role without equivalent: mediator between Hamas (which it considers a threat to its own stability due to its links with the Muslim Brotherhood) and Israel (its peace partner since Camp David). This uncomfortable position makes it a credible intermediary for both parties — precisely because it is the unconditional ally of neither.

According to Ahram Online (June 21, 2026), a Hamas delegation travelled to Cairo for a new round of discussions mediated by Egyptian intelligence — the Mukhabarat — which has experience translating incompatible positions into compromise texts. The Daily Sabah (June 26, 2026) indicates that Egypt is "pressing for the next stage" of the ceasefire plan, without revealing the parameters of the compromise it envisions.

The limits of Egypt's mandate

Egypt can facilitate, can propose formulations, can apply pressure on Hamas through its own channels. But it cannot substitute its will for that of the parties. If Hamas maintains its position on disarmament — a position unified since June 12 — and if the Mladenov agenda maintains this demand, Egypt finds itself mediating between two intransigences.

Egypt's room for manoeuvre is also constrained by its own national interests. Cairo does not want a destabilized Gaza that creates refugee flows into Sinai, does not want a Gaza under full Hamas control that would strengthen Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but does not want a Gaza reduced to total vassalage that would be perceived across the Arab world as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause.

Egypt navigates between too many contradictory interests to impose an agreement. It can serve as a decompression chamber. That is already useful. But we should not ask it to perform miracles that the great powers cannot achieve themselves.Egypt does what it can. But Cairo cannot resolve a deadlock that Washington, Tel Aviv and Hamas have built together over decades. Mediation has limits when the principals hold incompatible positions. Admitting this is necessary in order to move forward.

Disarming civilians: an unprecedented requirement

One of the most striking elements of Mladenov's 15 points is the demand to disarm personal weapons held by civilians. This demand goes beyond the military disarmament of Hamas: it targets a deeply rooted civilian arms culture in Gazan society, where weapon ownership for personal protection has been widespread for decades.

In a conflict zone like Gaza, where the rule of law has for years been replaced by various forms of armed authority, families and clans often possess weapons not out of political affiliation but for sheer survival. Demanding civilian disarmament in this context is equivalent to demanding a profound social and cultural transformation — not merely a military agreement. It is a legitimate long-term ambition, but unrealistic as a precondition for a ceasefire.

The reaction of Palestinian factions

The convergence of Palestinian factions on clause 8 regarding heavy weapons on June 12, 2026 signals that this issue triggered a rare unifying reflex. The British government (June 22, 2026), in its bulletin on the security situation in Gaza, notes the persistent tensions linked to these disarmament demands in its field assessments.

The unified Palestinian position is essentially this: disarmament can be discussed within the framework of a comprehensive political agreement that guarantees Palestinian security. Not before. Not as a precondition. This position has a logic that even Hamas's adversaries recognize privately. The problem is that Washington and Tel Aviv cannot sign an agreement that does not include disarmament guarantees — which creates a structural impasse.

Demanding the disarmament of Gazan civilians before the end of an active conflict is asking victims of a violent system to give up their only protection while hypothetically awaiting security guaranteed by the same actors who have previously failed them. I understand the Israeli security logic. But the humanitarian logic says something different.

Whoever controls reconstruction controls the future

Behind the military questions of disarmament and tunnels lies a fundamental political issue: who will rebuild Gaza and within what framework? The Mladenov agenda includes a vision of reconstruction under international supervision that de facto excludes Hamas from governing a rebuilt Gaza. This is the ultimate political objective of the Trump approach: a post-Hamas Gaza administered by international or Arab structures.

Hamas sees this proposal for what it is: its own disappearance as a political entity under the cover of humanitarian aid. Refusing to participate in a reconstruction agreement designed to eliminate it is not irrational intransigence — it is a perfectly rational organizational survival instinct. Peace Humanity (June 22, 2026) documents the 1,000 deaths since the formal ceasefire in a context where these post-agreement governance questions remain entirely open.

Humanitarian aid as a negotiating lever

Humanitarian aid to Gaza has become as much a diplomatic pressure instrument as a humanitarian necessity. Funds conditioned on negotiating progress, delayed convoys, humanitarian access used as bargaining chips — all of this creates a context in which civilian populations pay the price of political deadlocks between armed actors.

This instrumentalization of humanitarian aid has been denounced by international organizations for decades yet persists because it works as a short-term pressure lever. In the context of Gaza in June 2026, with more than 1,000 deaths since a formal ceasefire, this instrumentalization takes on a particularly grave dimension.

Using humanitarian aid as a bargaining chip in a political negotiation is a line I refuse to normalize regardless of which party crosses it. The children dying of hunger in Gaza are neither Hamas pawns nor Netanyahu pawns. They are children.

The scenarios of a partial agreement

Faced with the structural impasse that Mladenov's 15 points represent when confronted with the unified Palestinian position, analysts are considering several partial agreement scenarios. The most realistic would be an agreement on the release of remaining hostages and an extended truce, leaving the questions of disarmament, tunnels and governance to a subsequent process — without a fixed deadline.

This imperfect scenario would have the advantage of saving lives in the short term and maintaining diplomatic momentum. It would have the disadvantage of leaving fundamental questions unresolved, risking a resumption of conflict within 12 to 24 months. But in the political geography of Gaza in 2026, an imperfect agreement that holds may be worth more than a perfect agreement that will never be signed.

The role of the United States as credible guarantor

For any agreement to be viable, the United States must be willing to offer credible security guarantees to Palestinians — not only to Israel. Historically, Washington has provided robust guarantees to Israel and fragile assurances to Palestinian parties. Changing this balance is a sine qua non condition of any durable agreement.

The Trump administration, through its appointment of envoy Mladenov and its 15 points, shows a genuine intention to resolve this conflict. But intention is not enough: it requires a political will to sit down facing Hamas with real guarantees, not ultimatums. Egypt and Qatar can serve as relays for this type of indirect dialogue. But without substance, relays only transmit emptiness.

I do not know if an agreement is possible under these conditions. I know it is necessary. And I know that the 1,000 deaths since October 2025 are the most powerful argument for every actor to accept losing a little of their maximum position. Human life must weigh more than strategy.

Oslo and its ghosts in Cairo's corridors

Every negotiation on Gaza takes place in the shadow of Oslo. The Oslo Accords of 1993 generated immense hope — and produced decades of disillusionment. The memory of Oslo haunts Palestinian and Israeli negotiators alike, creating a visceral distrust of ambiguous formulas and non-binding guarantees. Every delegation arrives in Cairo carrying that historical weight on its shoulders.

Envoy Mladenov, with his 15 points, arrives with an approach fundamentally different from Oslo: where Oslo sought political compromise, Mladenov seeks technical resolution — tunnel maps, disarmament, governance mechanisms. This technocratic approach may overlook the fact that political conflicts are not resolved by technical solutions, however precise.

The invisible role of Palestinian civil society

In all these negotiations, one voice is systematically absent: that of Palestinian civil society. Ordinary Palestinians in Gaza — not Hamas leaders, not representatives of armed factions — live the consequences of every agreement or deadlock without ever having been directly consulted. The 1,000 deaths since the formal ceasefire of October 2025 are those ordinary Palestinians.

A durable peace in Gaza cannot be built solely through agreements between military and political elites. It must incorporate the aspirations of populations who want to live normally — send their children to school, work, build. This fundamental human dimension is systematically lost in the technical negotiations over tunnel maps and weapons stockpiles. That is a gap that Egypt and international mediators must address.

Ordinary Palestinians are neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority. They are people who wanted to live normally and who find themselves held hostage by negotiations over tunnel maps. This human reality must be at the centre, not the periphery, of any solution.

What this essay sought to demonstrate

Gaza is a Gordian knot of contemporary international politics. Mladenov's 15 points, the unified Palestinian position of June 12, the 1,000 deaths since the formal ceasefire, Egyptian mediation — all these elements converge on an uncomfortable truth: the conditions for a complete and durable agreement are not in place in June 2026.

But the absence of perfect conditions is not a reason to renounce an imperfect agreement. The history of international diplomacy is the history of imperfect agreements that nonetheless saved lives and opened windows. The question is not "is this agreement just?" but "is this agreement possible?" and "does it reduce human suffering in the short term?"

The moral imperative to persevere

The diplomacy on Gaza must persevere not because success is guaranteed but because the alternative — a return to total war — is morally unacceptable. The 1,000 deaths since a ceasefire that was not quite real are a warning. The coming months will determine whether these deaths served any purpose — whether international pressure can convert maximum positions into minimal compromises that preserve lives.

Complete Hamas disarmament may be the legitimate ultimate objective. But in an honest essay on Gaza's reality in 2026, one must recognize that this objective is unattainable as a precondition. Diplomatic wisdom consists of separating the final objective from the path leading to it — and accepting that this path is long, non-linear and strewn with partial agreements.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.