PROFILE: The US-Iran MoU and regional security — what it really changes for Israel and the Gulf

A historic deal, unresolved questions

The memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between the United States and Iran in late spring 2026 represents one of the most significant diplomatic turning points in the Middle East in decades. It establishes a framework to end hostilities between Washington and Tehran, reopens the Strait of Hormuz to international trade, and opens the door to negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme, sanctions, and economic reconstruction. The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) expressed formal support — not out of enthusiasm, but out of relief at the halting of a conflict they never wanted.

But behind the surface consensus, deep concerns persist. How does this deal concretely affect Israel's security? What does it mean for the Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, which were not parties to the negotiations? These questions do not yet have definitive answers — but the signals sent by the first weeks of MoU implementation are already revealing.

The five clauses that structure the deal

According to analyses by the ISW (Institute for the Study of War), the MoU contains several structuring clauses. The most controversial is the fifth, which charges Iran with negotiating with Oman and other Gulf littoral states the future management of the Strait of Hormuz. This clause, apparently technical, is in reality politically explosive: it places Iran in the position of co-administrator of an international maritime waterway, which its Arab neighbours — and Israel — consider a dangerous concession to an expansionist power.

I must acknowledge a fundamental uncertainty: I do not have access to the full text of the MoU. What I am analysing draws on ISW reports, official public statements, and press analyses. It is possible that confidential clauses address some of the questions I raise here. I prefer to signal this limit rather than pretend to a certainty I do not have.

Iran's central condition: full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon

Iran's first red line in the negotiations directly concerns Israel. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran's chief negotiator, reiterated on June 24, 2026 that the full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon is a "central condition" for any final agreement. This position means Iran is using the Lebanon negotiations as a lever to impose a strategic retreat on Israel — a condition Israel can only accept if credible alternative security guarantees are in place.

Yet Israel is not a party to the US-Iran MoU. Its security is discussed, conditions are imposed on it as prerequisites, but its voice in the negotiations is indirect, filtered through Washington. This asymmetry is a source of deep frustration in Jerusalem. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio undertook a three-day tour of the Gulf to "reassure the GCC that the deal will not strengthen Tehran." But were similar messages delivered to Israel with the same clarity? The answer is not obvious.

The nuclear programme: an existential threat still present

The MoU opens negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme — but it does not dismantle it. For Israel, which regards a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, the distinction between "negotiating on the nuclear issue" and "limiting the nuclear programme" is fundamental. The 2015 negotiations (JCPOA) produced a deal that was abandoned by Trump in 2018 and whose terms Iran had in the meantime largely violated. The risk of history repeating itself is real.

Israel is in a diplomatically untenable position: excluded from negotiations about its own security, subjected to conditions set by its primary enemy, and dependent on an American ally whose foreign policy can shift entirely with one Truth Social post. If I were in the Israeli government, I would not be sleeping soundly.

Pragmatic support, not restored trust

The six GCC states officially backed the MoU, according to Al Jazeera (June 25, 2026). But this approval is "more driven by the collective desire to end hostilities than by restored trust in Iran," according to analyst al-Qawasmi of Qatar University. Gulf states have suffered from Iran-backed Houthis, from Iranian-led militias operating in Iraq, and from constant risks on the Strait of Hormuz. Their pragmatism is that of exposed states seeking peace, not naive states trusting Tehran.

Saudi Arabia is preparing a "reconciliation summit" between Iran and Arab Gulf states, separate from the US-Iran negotiations. This parallel format reveals that Riyadh is seeking to manage its relationship with Tehran directly, without being locked into a US-Iranian framework. This is an attempt to reclaim independent agency in a process where Gulf monarchies have been more objects than subjects.

The Strait of Hormuz: the real battle line

The Strait of Hormuz question is at the heart of Gulf concerns. Approximately 20% of global oil and a significant share of liquefied natural gas transit through this 33-kilometre-wide maritime bottleneck. If Iran secures a formal role in managing the Strait, it will hold a permanent strategic lever over Gulf monarchies' economies — whose revenues depend on the free movement of their energy exports.

I cannot understand how American negotiators could have agreed to let Iran participate in managing the Strait of Hormuz. It is like asking a burglar to watch the keys after the robbery. The only rational explanation is that Washington needed something else from Iran — perhaps on the nuclear question — and made this concession to get it. I don't know whether that is a good calculation.

Qatar's pivotal role

Qatar played a central mediating role in the US-Iran negotiations. Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani, Qatar's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, declared that his country was "open to discussion on Iran's plans to administer the Strait alongside Oman" — while refusing to allow the Persian Gulf to be "controlled" by a single state. This nuance is diplomatically important: Qatar validates the process without endorsing all its potential conclusions.

Oman, which shares land and maritime borders with Iran and has maintained diplomatic relations with Tehran even during periods of maximum tensions, is a key player in managing this transition. Iranian and Omani officials met in Muscat on June 23 — a rapid consultation that reveals how much is being decided right now in the corridors of Gulf diplomacy.

Bahrain and the Emirates: the most vulnerable

Bahrain, with a Shia majority population and home to the US Fifth Fleet, is in a position of particular vulnerability. If the US-Iran deal reduces the American military presence in the Gulf while leaving intact Iran's Shia influence network, Manama could find itself facing increased internal and external pressures. The United Arab Emirates, which normalised relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, are watching with particular concern any deal that could strengthen Iran while cooling US-Israeli relations.

Gulf states have made a complicated strategic bet in backing the MoU. They hope stability is better than war. That is a reasonable bet. But the history of the Middle East teaches that stabilities purchased through concessions to hegemonic actors are often temporary. I don't rule out that this bet is correct — I simply say its potential cost is underestimated.

Proxies, militias, and the regional security architecture

The MoU contains, according to available analyses, no binding clauses on the disarmament of Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. For Israel and Saudi Arabia, this is the fundamental gap. A nuclear deal that leaves intact Iran's regional military network does not resolve the security problem — it displaces it. Hezbollah's missiles remain pointed at Israel. Houthi drones continue to threaten the Arabian Peninsula. Iran-backed Iraqi militias maintain their armed presence.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi declared on June 26 that "good intentions are not enough without robust inspections." This formula applies equally to proxies: Tehran's declarations about its "willingness for regional cooperation" are only as good as what verification mechanisms can confirm.

The Trump unknown: the stability of the deal

The long-term reliability of any agreement involving the Trump administration is an open question. Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in 2018 — he could withdraw from this MoU if his priorities change, if midterm elections alter the composition of Congress, or if a morning Truth Social post triggers a new escalation. Israel and Gulf states are aware of this — and that is one of the reasons they are working to build alternative guarantees that do not depend entirely on American goodwill.

The real question this MoU raises is one of durability. An agreement based on threats from one side and pragmatic concessions from the other is fragile by nature. For it to hold, the parties must have a mutual interest in maintaining it — and I am not certain that interest is sufficiently asymmetric to guarantee long-term stability. But I acknowledge that without a deal, the situation may have been even worse.

Two states that keep channels open with everyone

Oman has been a discreet but essential intermediary in American-Iranian negotiations for decades. Its equidistant foreign policy allows it to maintain relations with Washington, Tehran, and Riyadh simultaneously — a unique position in the region. Crucial preliminary meetings between American and Iranian diplomats took place in Muscat before the 2015 JCPOA negotiations, and similar encounters facilitated the 2026 MoU. This discreet diplomatic infrastructure is of inestimable value in a region where official positions often make direct negotiations impossible.

Qatar plays a similar but more exposed role. The emirate has been the intermediary in negotiations between Hamas and Israel, between the Taliban and Washington, and now in Gulf-Iran discussions on the Hormuz Strait. Its international news network Al Jazeera also confers upon it an influence over the regional narrative that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have long resented. The 2017–2021 blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE had precisely this objective: to force Doha to abandon this diplomatic autonomy — without success.

I am fascinated by these small states that survive and thrive between conflicting giants by cultivating an irreplaceable diplomatic utility. Oman and Qatar have understood something essential: in a world where great powers cannot always speak directly to each other, the credible intermediary becomes indispensable. This is a form of discreet and effective power that great powers, too busy confronting each other, often overlook.

Saudi Arabia and the Emirates diversify their security guarantees

Faced with the uncertainty created by the US-Iran MoU, Gulf monarchies are not sitting still. Saudi Arabia is diversifying its security relations by engaging with China (defence cooperation agreement signed in 2023), strengthening its domestic defence capabilities through partnerships with European and American industrialists, and maintaining direct diplomatic channels with Tehran. This diversification strategy aims to avoid total dependence on a single security guarantor in a region undergoing profound reconfiguration.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which normalised relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, find themselves in a paradoxical situation: the US-Iran deal could cool American-Israeli relations, which would indirectly affect the strategic value of the Emirati normalisation with Tel Aviv. The UAE have nonetheless continued their military acquisitions — notably sophisticated armament programmes integrating American F-35-level systems — to maintain an independent deterrence capability against regional threats.

There is a pragmatic wisdom in the Gulf monarchies' strategy that Western diplomats should study: never depend on a single actor for your security, maintain relations with all actors including adversaries, and build your own defence capacity rather than outsourcing your security. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may have understood the multipolarity of today's world better than many Western capitals.

What Washington can and cannot promise

Secretary of State Marco Rubio's visit to the Gulf — three days in late June 2026 — had a clear objective: to reassure Gulf partners that the US-Iran MoU does not represent an abandonment of their interests. Rubio stressed the continuity of American security partnerships, the maintenance of the American military presence in the region, and the fact that the nuclear deal aimed to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon — not to give it a licence for unchecked regional behaviour.

But American guarantees have their limits in an unpredictable American domestic political context. The risk of a partial withdrawal of American troops from the Gulf, of a unilateral modification of the deal via a Truth Social post, or of a commercial policy change that affects relations with Arab partners — these risks are not theoretical, they have already materialised in different forms. That is why Israel and Gulf states are seeking to build their own capabilities and regional coalitions that do not depend entirely on the consistency of American policy.

I am not saying the United States is an unreliable ally — they remain the only power capable of guaranteeing balance in the region. But the Trump 2.0 era has clearly shown that American commitments can shift fast and unpredictably. Israel and Gulf monarchies are right to invest in their own resilience rather than relying entirely on Washington. This is a lesson Europe would do well to retain too.

Regional security remains a fragile construction

The US-Iran MoU halted a direct confrontation that threatened to plunge the entire region into a generalised conflict. That is a result not to be dismissed. But it does not answer the fundamental security questions for Israel (the Iranian nuclear programme, Hezbollah) nor for Gulf states (proxies, the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran's regional influence). These questions remain wholly open and will continue to shape the region's geopolitics.

What regional actors must do now

The rational response for Israel and Gulf states is threefold: strengthen their own defence capabilities and deterrence, maintain regional security coalitions that do not depend entirely on the United States, and engage actively in defining the terms of the negotiation process that will follow the MoU. Retreating into refusal or opposition will produce nothing — actively participating in defining the rules is the only way to influence outcomes.

I end this profile with a fragile hope: perhaps imperfect deals are better than no deals at all. Diplomacy is never clean — it is made of compromises, calculated ambiguities, and bets on good faith. If this framework succeeds in keeping Iran from the nuclear bomb and reducing regional tensions, it will be an imperfect but real success. I simply keep in mind that verification and vigilance must never stop.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

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