OPINION: Zelensky absent from Gdańsk — the UPA, the heroes, and the Polish-Ukrainian wound

OPINION: Zelensky absent from Gdańsk — the UPA, the heroes, and the Polish-Ukrainian wound

Introduction: The empty chair that says too much

A notable absentee in the conference room

The Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026 in Gdańsk on June 25–26 was meant to be one of the high points of international support for Ukraine. Billions of euros disbursed, defense contracts signed, industrial partnerships sealed. And yet, one absence dominated the event: that of Volodymyr Zelensky, president of the country the conference was held to benefit.

Zelensky did not come to Gdańsk. He sent Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko in his place. And the reason for his absence — a diplomatic crisis with Poland, the host country of the conference — illustrates one of the most painful and complex tensions within the camp that claims to support Ukraine: the Polish-Ukrainian relationship, freighted with history and fractured by a name, that of the UPA.

The spark: a unit named after the "heroes of the UPA"

Zelensky named a Ukrainian special forces unit after the "Heroes of the UPA" — the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought for Ukrainian independence during and after World War II. For Ukrainians, the UPA is a symbol of national resistance. For Poles, it is associated with crimes against the Polish population in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–1944 — a bloody page of history that Warsaw has not forgotten and cannot, politically, ignore.

In response, Polish President Karol Nawrocki decided to strip Zelensky of the Order of the White Eagle, Poland's highest distinction. And he canceled his own participation in the Gdańsk conference. This double symbolic boycott — the Ukrainian president and the Polish president both absent from a conference meant to celebrate their solidarity — is a damaging image at the very moment Ukraine most needs the unity of its supporters.

The memory war — a toxic inheritance

Volhynia: an atrocity that never died

The events of Volhynia in 1943–1944 — qualified by the Polish Parliament as a crime of genocidal character in a 2023 resolution — remain one of the most open wounds in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship. Tens of thousands of Polish civilians were killed by UPA units in a context of intercommunal violence of exceptional brutality. This history is taboo, contested, instrumentalized on both sides — but it is real, and it weighs on every diplomatic interaction between Warsaw and Kyiv.

For Polish nationalists — including Nawrocki, elected on a nationalist right platform in 2025 — recognizing the UPA as "heroes" is politically unacceptable. It is a domestic red line that even a war context with Russia cannot erase. Zelensky's decision to name a unit in honor of the UPA struck this red line with a force that Ukrainian diplomacy had visibly not anticipated.

The reactions from both capitals

The reactions were revealing of the fault lines at play. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski — representing the more pro-European and pro-Ukrainian wing of the Polish coalition government — judged Nawrocki's decision to strip the decoration "inappropriate." He thus distanced the government from the president's position, illustrating the internal Polish tensions over managing the relationship with Ukraine.

On the Polish far right, Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS) seized the opportunity to demand the blocking of Ukraine's EU accession negotiations — a position that perfectly illustrates the toxicity of the political instrumentalization of this memorial crisis. Using the victims of Volhynia to block the accession of a country at war with Russia is a cynical political maneuver that deserves to be named clearly.

The impact on the coalition supporting Ukraine

A friction that weakens at the worst moment

The Polish-Ukrainian crisis comes at a particularly sensitive moment. Poland is one of the pillars of the policy of support for Ukraine within the EU and NATO — it dedicates more than 4% of its GDP to defense, participates in the E5 format, hosts thousands of Ukrainian refugees, and manages part of the weapons logistics flows into Ukraine. A deterioration of the bilateral relationship has direct implications for the coherence and effectiveness of this support.

Russia watches these tensions with satisfaction. Moscow has long sought to exploit the memorial and historical divisions among the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe — and particularly between Poland and Ukraine. This UPA crisis is precisely the kind of opportunity that Russian information services seek to amplify and deepen. Any friction between Warsaw and Kyiv is a gift to Moscow.

Poles take to the streets — a worrying signal

According to analyses published by Euromaidan Press, the memorial quarrel over the UPA has spilled into Polish streets, with demonstrations and intercommunal tensions between Poles and Ukrainian nationals residing in Poland — whose number is estimated at more than one million since 2022. These demonstrations are not representative of the majority of the Polish population, but they illustrate the destabilization potential that this crisis carries.

Poland has welcomed with remarkable generosity more than one million Ukrainian refugees since 2022. This hospitality, which had a real economic and social cost, was broadly supported by the Polish population. A deterioration of the bilateral relationship risks affecting this solidarity — to the detriment of Ukrainians who have made Poland their new home.

Memory as a weapon: the danger of history wars in wartime

Why memorial conflicts are particularly dangerous in 2026

In normal times — that is, in the absence of an ongoing existential war — memorial conflicts between neighboring nations can be managed with measured diplomatic patience: historians' commissions, joint declarations, and gradual reconciliation processes. In wartime, this temporal luxury does not exist. Every memorial crisis is immediately exploited by adversaries and domestic political rivals.

Russia has developed over decades an expertise in activating memorial conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. Its information services maintain networks that amplify nationalist rhetoric, feed historical grievances, and seek to widen divisions between allies. The UPA crisis is exactly the kind of subject these networks seek to exploit.

The shared responsibility to de-escalate

The responsibility for this crisis is not unilateral. Zelensky made a political choice that was predictably explosive in the bilateral context. But Nawrocki's reaction — stripping a decoration from a head of state at war with Russia, boycotting a reconstruction conference, letting Kaczyński talk about blocking accession negotiations — is disproportionate and counterproductive. Both parties have the responsibility to find a path to de-escalation.

The most positive signal came from Sikorski, who maintained a pro-Ukrainian position and judged Nawrocki's decision "inappropriate." This word, coming from a Polish foreign minister directed at a Polish president of the same period, illustrates internal Polish tensions — and hints at a possibility of crisis management if the right political will mobilizes.

Svyrydenko in Zelensky's place: a delegation that limits the damage

A competent Prime Minister in a difficult role

Yulia Svyrydenko, Prime Minister of Ukraine, led the Ukrainian delegation in Gdańsk in Zelensky's absence. She signed the agreements, participated in the discussions, and represented her country competently. Her presence avoided the worst scenario — a minimal Ukrainian delegation that would have signaled Ukrainian disengagement from the event.

But there is no point in being deluded: Zelensky's absence had a political significance that Svyrydenko's presence could not erase. The Gdańsk conference was precisely the type of event where the personal presence of a head of state — and one as symbolically powerful as Zelensky — would have had a considerable diplomatic and media impact. His absence left a void in the political narrative of the conference.

The Ukrainian paradox: absent from Gdańsk, yet ever-present on the information front

In his public communications around June 25–26, Zelensky maintained an intense media presence — announcing the SBU's 40-day campaign, confirming strikes on Russian refineries, commenting on the progress of military operations. Politically, his message was clear: war takes priority over conference diplomacy.

This is an understandable positioning — and one consistent with his image as a fully committed wartime leader. But it comes at a cost: it leaves some partners with the feeling that Ukraine expects their help without always prioritizing the bilateral relationships that make it possible. Diplomacy, even in wartime, cannot be entirely subordinated to military operations.

Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation: possible, necessary, urgent

The historical framework exists — it must be reactivated

The Polish-Ukrainian relationship has known moments of sincere reconciliation before this crisis. Joint declarations on Volhynia, shared memorial ceremonies, historians' commissions — real efforts have been made. They can be reactivated. But they require political will on both sides — and particularly from the leaders who have the power to de-escalate.

Poland and Ukraine are bound by common geography, common threats, a common future in the European Union, and potentially in NATO. These structural ties are stronger than memorial disputes. But they do not activate themselves — they require leaders who choose to value them rather than sacrifice them on the altar of short-term domestic political gains.

What Russia hopes for and what the West must avoid

The scenario the West fears — and Moscow hopes for — is a lasting deterioration of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship that would weaken Polish support for Ukraine, divide the Western coalition, and send Putin a signal of opportunity. This scenario is not inevitable. But it requires that the leaders concerned — Zelensky, Nawrocki, Tusk, Sikorski — demonstrate the same strategic lucidity they apply to the military war.

Managing alliance relationships is a skill as crucial as managing battles. The Gdańsk conference was a reminder that Ukraine and Poland need each other — and that this mutual dependency imposes responsibilities on both sides. The memorial wound is real. It must not become a diplomatic ulcer.

The substance of the dispute: historical memory and domestic politics

The UPA question and the memory of Volhynia

At the heart of the Polish-Ukrainian tension lies a historical wound that neither time nor war has healed: the Volhynia atrocities of 1943–1945, perpetrated by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) against Polish populations in western Ukraine. These events, which cost the lives of tens of thousands of Poles according to historians, remain a subject of extreme sensitivity in Poland. Warsaw has for years demanded full and complete acknowledgment of these acts by Ukraine — a demand that Kyiv has always treated with caution to avoid internal nationalist tensions.

This historical question has a direct contemporary political dimension: in Poland, newly elected President Karol Nawrocki used the UPA dispute as justification for hostile diplomatic gestures toward Ukraine, going as far as demanding that Ukraine's EU accession be blocked. Foreign Minister Sikorski described this position as inappropriate. But nationalist pressure in Poland on this subject is real, and any Ukrainian leader must navigate these political waters carefully.

Why the alliance remains indispensable despite the friction

Despite these tensions, the strategic Polish-Ukrainian relationship remains one of the most important on the continent. Poland is the main transit corridor for Western military aid to Ukraine. It hosts the largest number of Ukrainian refugees in Europe. It has delivered billions of euros in military equipment to Kyiv. Its political support in European institutions and at NATO is essential to maintaining pressure on Russia. Neither nation can afford a lasting deterioration of this relationship.

The way out runs through separating memorial policy from strategic cooperation. Warsaw can demand serious historical discussions without conditioning its military support for Ukraine on symbolic concessions. Kyiv can engage in these historical discussions without perceiving them as an attack on its national identity. This narrow path is tight but navigable. Both countries have traveled it before. They will need to find it again — because their common enemies have not changed.

Memorial politics as a tool of domestic politics in Poland

Nawrocki and the strategy of historical grievances

The use by newly elected Polish President Karol Nawrocki of the UPA and Volhynia question as a domestic political tool reflects a well-documented political dynamic: populist leaders find in historical grievances a way to activate their nationalist electoral base without having to propose concrete policies. Nawrocki pushed this play to the point of demanding that Ukraine's EU accession be blocked — a position that Foreign Minister Sikorski described as inappropriate. This division within the Polish conservative camp is revealing of internal tensions over Ukrainian policy.

Polish memorial politics is not solely political manipulation. The historical wounds of Volhynia are real and deep. Polish families whose ancestors were killed in 1943–1945 have the right to demand worthy recognition and commemoration. The problem arises when these legitimate claims are instrumentalized in an active war context to condition military support on symbolic concessions. It is this instrumentalizing drift that Ukraine's partners are watching with concern.

How to move beyond the dispute without erasing it

The lasting path runs through a bilateral Polish-Ukrainian historical commission, a body that can address these questions with the academic rigor and political sensitivity they deserve — separately from urgent military and diplomatic negotiations. This commission should have the mandate to work on documentation, commemoration, and recognition — without conditioning strategic cooperation on its results. This is a model that other pairs of nations have used successfully to manage their difficult historical legacies.

Ukraine and Poland both have an interest in a solid relationship that transcends domestic political crises in each country. Zelensky and the Tusk government share this long-term vision. The tensions around Gdańsk are real but surmountable. And history — if both countries make the right choices — will remember that they overcame their historical differences to build together a safer Europe. That is the stakes of this relationship. And it deserves not to be sacrificed to short-term political calculations.

Conclusion: Gdańsk despite everything — what was achieved beyond the absences

What was accomplished despite the crisis

Despite the two empty chairs — Zelensky's and Nawrocki's — the Gdańsk conference produced tangible results. €3.2 billion disbursed. €343 million in defense technology guarantees signed. €10 billion in total commitments announced. Industrial partnerships concluded. That is real, and it matters.

The conference did not fail. It was less symbolically powerful than it could have been. And this gap between what was possible and what was achieved — symbolically — is precisely the cost of the Polish-Ukrainian crisis. A real cost, but not irreparable. Not yet.

The columnist's note: do not let the past destroy the future

This opinion piece ends with an appeal. An appeal to Zelensky: find a de-escalation gesture that respects Polish sensitivity without sacrificing Ukrainian memory. An appeal to Nawrocki: your country has every interest in Ukraine's victory — do not sacrifice that interest for internal political gains. An appeal to both peoples: your relationship is too important, too structural, too tied to the common future of Central Europe, to be sacrificed on the altar of unresolved memorial quarrels.

Ukraine is fighting for its existence. Poland is supporting it with remarkable generosity. This solidarity is a precious asset. Take care of it.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Positioning and nuance

I am pro-Ukrainian, but I acknowledge that Zelensky made a diplomatic mistake in managing this episode. I am also sensitive to the Polish pain over Volhynia — a historical reality I do not deny. I take no position for or against either historical narrative on the UPA — that is the business of historians, not columnists.

Sources

This article draws on verified journalistic sources published between June 23 and 26, 2026. I have no diplomatic sources within the Polish or Ukrainian governments.

Sources

Primary sources

Euronews — No Zelenskyy in Gdansk: recovery forum tests Warsaw–Kyiv ties — 2026-06-25

Ukrainska Pravda — Polish foreign minister calls decision to strip Zelenskyy of honour 'inappropriate' — 2026-06-26

Secondary sources

Euromaidan Press — Poland and Ukraine's memory war has spilled into the streets. Its consequences might be disastrous — 2026-06-23

The Guardian — Volodymyr Zelenskyy to skip postwar conference amid tensions with Poland — 2026-06-23

Al Jazeera — Ukraine's recovery to be deliberated in Poland amid Kyiv-Warsaw spat — 2026-06-24

Euromaidan Press — Rebuilding Ukraine while it burns — what URC 2026 actually delivered — 2026-06-28