DECODING: The EU tightens screws with a 21st sanctions package against Moscow — but Brussels stumbles

DECODING: The EU tightens screws with a 21st sanctions package against Moscow — but Brussels stumbles

Introduction: The 21st turn of the screw that never finishes turning

A package announced, a package adopted, a package still on the table

On June 9, 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced with great fanfare the 21st European Union sanctions package against Russia. Nearly three weeks later, this complete package has still not been adopted. It is still under discussion among member states, stuck in Brussels corridors, while Moscow continues to export its oil, its weapons and its propaganda.

What was actually adopted on June 15, 2026 is a mini-package — a stripped-down version, limited to individual and entity designations subject to asset freezes. This is useful. It is even necessary. But faced with a war machine that has adapted to four years of economic pressure, sending a mini-package as a strategic response is like bringing a glass of water to an industrial fire.

The mechanics of sanctions under pressure

Since the large-scale invasion of February 24, 2022, the EU has imposed twenty successive sanctions packages against Russia. Each package was hailed as a turning point. The shadow fleet was targeted. Russian banks were hit. Technology exports were blocked. And yet the Kremlin continues to fund its war. The resilience of the Russian economy in the face of these waves of restrictions is a reality that Brussels still refuses to fully acknowledge.

The strategy of a "rolling deployment" package — announced by the Commission itself — is an implicit acknowledgment of this partial failure. Rather than waiting months for a symbolic mega-package, the idea is now to strike in a regular, targeted, incremental manner. This is more agile. But it must be accompanied by a real political backbone that several member states have not yet found.

The June 15 mini-package: what was really decided

Forty individuals, 47 entities, and a loophole for Yangjie

The mini-package adopted on June 15, 2026 adds 40 individuals and 47 entities to the list of persons subject to asset freezes. Among them: seven individuals and 21 entities linked to the Russian military-industrial complex, including one Belarusian and two Chinese nationals. Two individuals and 24 entities gravitate around the shadow fleet, including actors in Azerbaijan, Hong Kong, Libya, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

The package also designates ten individuals and one foundation linked to pro-Kremlin propaganda — Russian war correspondents, media directors, public personalities used as ideological transmission belts. And fifteen individuals involved in human rights violations related to the death of Alexei Navalny. Finally, six individuals are targeted for their role in Moscow-funded destabilization operations against Moldova.

The Yangjie derogation: when sanctions meet industrial reality

The most technical measure — but not the least important — concerns Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic Technology Co., Ltd, a Chinese chip trader supplying the Russian automotive and defense industries, designated in the 20th package in April 2026. The mini-package grants it a transition derogation: European companies may continue entering into transactions with Yangjie until December 31, 2026 to close previous contracts, and until March 16, 2027 for critical components.

This derogation is an admission of interdependence. The EU sanctions a Chinese company that feeds the Russian war machine — but acknowledges that its own industrialists need time to wean themselves off it. This is an acceptable transitional logic, provided it does not become a permanent escape hatch. The circumvention risk remains entirely intact as long as the supply chain does not structurally reconfigure itself.

The complete 21st package: what von der Leyen wants, what member states are slowing down

Energy, banks, cryptocurrencies: the most ambitious targets

The complete 21st package, presented by the Commission on June 9 but still under deliberation, is considerably more ambitious. On energy: 30 additional vessels added to the shadow fleet list, which now exceeds 600 sanctioned units. For the first time, LNG tankers would be subject to sales restrictions to Russia. The oil price cap adjustment mechanism would be frozen until January 2027, to prevent Moscow from benefiting from a price increase linked to tensions in the Strait of Hormuz.

On finances: 31 additional Russian banks under transaction bans. Twenty entities in third countries — banks, crypto platforms, oil traders — accused of circumvention. And above all: a potential total ban on crypto services from third countries, a first in the European sanctions arsenal. This is a strong signal that the EU is beginning to understand how Moscow uses digital assets to circumvent the Western financial system.

Trade, drones and fishing: the new frontiers of the sanctions regime

The commercial section of the 21st package targets metals and alloys used in aerospace and defense, technologies related to drones — ground equipment, jamming systems, launch ramps. New import bans covering approximately 60 million euros worth of goods target metals, minerals and automotive parts. And for the first time in the history of Russian sanctions: fishing. Substantial restrictions on certain fishery products, and a total ban on cod.

This last point deserves attention. Russia is one of the world's leading fish exporters. By hitting fishing, the EU is striking a revenue source that had until now been spared — perhaps out of concern about disrupting European food markets. This is a courageous decision. It signals that no sector should be shielded anymore if Moscow continues to fund the destruction of Ukraine.

The shadow fleet: 600 vessels, a global network, partial impunity

Moscow's maritime hydra

The Russian shadow fleet — those vessels without Western insurance, sailing under flags of convenience, transporting Russian oil at prices below the G7-set cap — has become one of the most eloquent symbols of the porousness of sanctions. Since 2022, the EU has designated more than 600 vessels. The 21st package would add 30 more, targeting not only tankers but also logistical support vessels — notably those that provide fuel supply.

This is not trivial. Until now, sanctions targeted the carriers themselves. Targeting support services means attacking the maintenance network that allows this fleet to function. The entities designated in the June 15 mini-package — based in Azerbaijan, Hong Kong, Libya, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates — perfectly illustrate the geography of this circumvention: a transnational network with no fixed center that reconfigures itself whenever pressure is applied.

Belarus as a back door

The 21st package also proposes to align the restrictions applicable to Belarus with those already weighing on Russia. This work had been overdue for years. Minsk has become a circumvention hub: sanctioned products enter Russia via Belarus, Belarusian entities serve as intermediaries for transactions that the EU directly bans with Moscow. Closing this gap is essential.

The reality is that as long as Belarus remains a gray zone in the sanctions regime, Russia will always have an emergency exit. Lukashenko is not an inconvenient ally of Putin: he is a functional component of the system. Aligning him with the same regime as Moscow is a correction that the EU should have made from the 15th package onward.

Internal resistance: Hungary, Malta, Greece and the logic of interests

Budapest, Valletta, Athens: three names, three logics

If the complete 21st package has been dragging since June 9, it is because it runs into the usual resistance within the EU Council. Hungary — not the pro-European faction of Péter Magyar but the Orbán structures still managing foreign relations — continues to dampen anything touching Russian energy. Malta and Greece, two major maritime nations, balk at measures targeting the shadow fleet and shipowners.

These reluctances are not purely ideological. They are structural. Greek shipowners manage a substantial portion of global maritime trade. Maltese-Libyan interests in the offshore oil sector create real conflicts of interest. This is not pure bad will: it is national politics dressed up as foreign policy. The EU cannot change this overnight. But it can build compensation and incentive mechanisms that make compliance more attractive than resistance.

The unanimity rule: Europe's Achilles heel

EU foreign and security policy requires unanimity in the Council. This is where the fundamental problem lies. A single member state can block, dilute or delay an entire package. This rule was designed to protect national sovereignty on existential decisions. It has become a structural veto tool that Moscow has learned to exploit through its allies and energy dependencies.

Chief diplomat Kaja Kallas declared that sanctions have cost Russia between 1,000 and 1,300 billion euros since 2022. That is an impressive figure. But it does not measure what faster, less negotiated unanimity could have produced. Every month of delay is one more month during which Moscow sells its oil, funds its missiles and bombs Ukrainian hospitals.

The extension of existing sanctions: twelve more months, until July 2027

A renewal adopted on June 25, 2026

While the complete 21st package is still being debated behind closed doors, the EU made a quieter but fundamental decision on June 25, 2026: the extension of all existing anti-Russian sanctions for an additional twelve months, until July 2027. This renewal was not guaranteed. It is now secured, and it sends a clear signal: whatever the internal political turbulence, the foundation of economic pressure remains intact.

This extension includes the sectoral economic measures adopted since 2014, dual-use technology restrictions, export bans to the energy and defense sectors, and individual sanctions against the Russian elite. This is the safety net on which the entire strategy rests. Without it, successive packages would be like additions piled on a collapsing foundation.

The June 19 summit: von der Leyen between ambition and caution

At the June 19, 2026 summit, von der Leyen insisted on the need to accelerate the adoption of the 21st package. She recalled that extending sanctions until 2027 was not a victory but a minimum obligation. The message was clear: Europe cannot afford to slow down now, when Ukraine is still holding, the front is stabilizing and Moscow is looking for cracks in the Western coalition.

This summit also reaffirmed the coherence of the link between economic sanctions and military support for Ukraine. One without the other is insufficient. Sanctions without weapons leave Ukraine holding on amid economic ruin. Weapons without sanctions allow Moscow to fund its war indefinitely. Both together create maximum pressure — the only kind that can, in time, lead to a just peace.

Kallas, the figures and the truth about the economic cost for Moscow

Between 1,000 and 1,300 billion euros in economic damage

Kaja Kallas, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, highlighted a figure intended to be reassuring: European sanctions would have cost Russia between 1,000 and 1,300 billion euros since their introduction in 2022. This figure aggregates export revenue losses, circumvention costs, ruble depreciation, logistics surcharges and capital flight.

This is a real figure. But it must be put in perspective. Russia has devoted approximately 600 billion dollars to its war effort since 2022. It continues to export oil — at a discount, certainly, but in sufficient volume to keep its public finances afloat. The Russian National Wealth Fund has been partially drawn down, but it is not exhausted. The economic damage is real but not paralyzing. And that is the problem.

Why Moscow is still holding

Russia holds economically for several reasons the EU cannot entirely control. China absorbs a growing fraction of Russian exports — oil, gas, metals, fertilizers. India buys Russian crude at discounted prices and refines it for resale on world markets. Turkey serves as a commercial and financial hub. These three countries represent millions of barrels and billions of euros in annual revenues for Moscow.

As long as the EU does not have an effective coercive mechanism against third-party states that circumvent its sanctions — and the 21st package is only timidly beginning to address this — pressure will remain partial. The tool exists in theory: anti-circumvention restrictions. But applying them to economies as large as China or India would amount to triggering trade wars that Europe is not ready to bear.

What the 21st package says about the EU's long-term strategy

The "rolling package" model: an agile response to a lasting war

The Commission's announcement of a "rolling deployment" sanctions regime — regular mini-packages in addition to complete packages — represents a major strategic evolution. Until now, sanctions packages took months to negotiate, allowing Moscow to anticipate and reposition itself. Faster, less predictable designations reduce this maneuvering room.

This is also a signal sent to international partners: the EU is not going to lift sanctions after a facade ceasefire. The sanctions architecture is built for the long term — until full restitution of Ukrainian territories, war reparations, and verifiable security guarantees. This is not just economic pressure; it is the outline of a post-conflict accountability policy.

The credibility challenge

Every half-adopted package, every granted derogation, every unpunished national veto erodes the credibility of the European sanctions policy. Moscow observes, calculates and communicates. The delays in adopting the 21st package — presented on June 9, still not adopted three weeks later — are immediately weaponized by Russian propaganda as proof of Western disunity.

The EU's challenge is therefore not only technical. It is narrative and political. Every package must be adopted quickly, communicated clearly, and followed by rigorous implementation monitoring. Yet enforcement capacity remains the weakest link in the system. Third-party countries continue to circumvent. European companies themselves find legal structures to maintain indirect commercial ties with Moscow. The Union needs a sanctions enforcement office with real transnational investigative powers.

Conclusion: Europe strikes — but must learn to strike faster and harder

Twenty-one packages, one logic, one urgency

The 21st sanctions package — in both its mini and complete versions — represents a real, serious, multilateral effort to suffocate Putin's war economy. The newly targeted sectors — fishing, crypto, LNG, drones — show that the EU is expanding its reach. The 600 vessels designated in the shadow fleet, the 31 new banks under restrictions, the extension of sanctions until July 2027: these are steps in the right direction.

But the history of these four years of sanctions is also the history of decisions that arrive too late, too diluted, too negotiated. The 21st package was ready on June 9. It was still not adopted at the end of June. Every additional day of negotiation is a day during which Russian oil flows, Russian missiles are funded and Ukrainians die. This is not a metaphor: it is a political equation that Europe must internalize as a moral as much as strategic urgency.

The true measure of success

The success of sanctions is not measured by the number of packages adopted. It is measured by the following question: can Moscow still fund this war at this pace in twelve, eighteen, twenty-four months? If the answer remains "yes", then sanctions are necessary but insufficient. Europe must go further — on the unanimity rule, on anti-circumvention mechanisms, on cooperation with G7 partners — or accept that the current strategy is a long-term bet in a war that, for its part, is being fought hour by hour on the Ukrainian front.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my biases

I am pro-Ukraine and believe that Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression is one of the most just causes of our era. I believe economic sanctions are an indispensable tool of pressure on Moscow, but I refuse to present them as a panacea when the facts indicate partial effectiveness. My analysis is documented by verifiable legal and media sources — not by uncorroborated government sources.

What I do not know

I do not know the precise details of the internal EU Council negotiations on the 21st package, nor the exact concessions demanded by each recalcitrant member state. The figures on the economic cost to Russia (1,000 to 1,300 billion euros) come from official statements by Kaja Kallas, not independently verified. The real impact of shadow fleet restrictions is difficult to measure precisely in real time — data on oil flows remain partial.

Sources

Primary sources

Mayer Brown — EU Adopts "Mini" Sanctions Package Against Russia (full details of June 15, 2026) — June 19, 2026

Baker McKenzie — EU Commission Announces 21st Sanctions Package (energy, banks, crypto, fishing) — June 12, 2026

International Bar Association — EU Increases Pressure on Russia with Latest Sanctions (anti-circumvention, first tool activated, Kyrgyzstan) — June 25, 2026

RBC Ukraine — EU Extends Anti-Russia Sanctions for Another Year (until July 2027) — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

gCaptain — EU Unveils 21st Russia Sanctions Package: Shadow Fleet, Banks, LNG Tankers — June 9, 2026

Euromaidan Press — EU's 21st Sanctions Package: Shadow Fleet, Banks, Stolen Ukrainian Grain (internal resistance) — May 11, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Mini-Package Adopted June 15 (designation details) — June 15, 2026