To the 144 Drones That Flew Over Our NATO Bases Unseen

Introduction: a letter to those who close their eyes to the sky

Dear Western defense officials, I have read your report

I am writing today to you, leaders of NATO, defense ministers and chiefs of staff, after reading the damning report published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies on July 2, 2026. This document, relayed by the New York Times, counts no fewer than 144 incidents of unidentified drones flying over sensitive infrastructure spread across twelve to thirteen countries of the Atlantic Alliance, between August 2024 and February 2026. You already know these numbers. I want to talk to you about what they actually mean.

Researcher Charlie Edwards, the study's lead author, does not mince words: "We consider this a coordinated strategy," he said, adding that this campaign "has operated with considerable impunity and represents a series of tactical successes for the Kremlin, while exposing a strategic gap in allied defense." Those words should haunt you as much as they haunt me.

Why I chose to write to you directly, without diplomatic detour

I could have written a cold, distant analysis of this report. I chose the open letter instead, because this subject demands a direct address to those responsible for protecting European skies. You are not solely responsible for this failure, of course. But you are the ones who must, starting now, turn this damning finding into concrete action.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had already sensed it back in October, after a spike in incursions: "We suspect that Russia is behind most of these drone flights." A year later, the IISS report confirms what many had already quietly feared.

What your silence allowed for eighteen months

Nuclear bases overflown like a routine exercise

Dear leaders, your report confirms that drones flew over RAF Lakenheath and RAF Fairford, two British bases used for the potential storage of American nuclear weapons. The submarine base at Île Longue, in France, home to the French nuclear deterrent force, was also overflown. In Belgium, Kleine-Brogel, and in the Netherlands, Volkel, two sites hosting American nuclear weapons under NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangement, were not spared either.

These are not amateurs piloting these machines. Analyst Ulrike Franke states it without equivocation: "It is illogical to assume these are amateur systems," and she adds a sentence that should echo through every European general staff: "A similar attack against NATO territory is entirely possible, and we are not prepared for it."

Germany, the quiet epicenter of a silent war

It is Germany that recorded the highest number of documented incidents, with 58 overflights, including six directly above the American base at Ramstein. That figure alone should be enough to justify a complete overhaul of German defensive posture against this type of hybridthreat.

Nearly half of these incidents targeted military bases, while 18 percent disrupted civilian airports, forcing temporary closures in Copenhagen, Oslo, Brussels, Munich, and Vilnius. The remainder, about 26 percent, targeted ports, power plants, and strategic industrial sites.

The shadow fleet, a weapon of war sailing beneath our radar

Civilian vessels turned into launch platforms

The report identifies specific ships belonging to the Russian shadow fleet, that network of aging tankers and cargo ships registered under flags of convenience that Moscow uses to dodge Western sanctions. The vessel Hav Dolphin is suspected of having served as a mobile launch platform for Orlan-10 type drones, capable of a range exceeding 480 kilometers. The tanker Seasons 1 is also cited in the investigation.

In December 2025, four large military drones flew over an Irish navy vessel, the LÉ William Butler Yeats, precisely during President Volodymyr Zelensky's visit to Dublin. A troubling coincidence, or a deliberate message from Moscow? I lean strongly toward the second option.

A French aircraft carrier targeted in the middle of the Baltic Sea

In February 2026, a French aircraft carrier sailing off the coast of Sweden was itself targeted by a drone, eventually neutralized. This incident shows just how far the threat has spread beyond the land territory of member states, now reaching the international waters used by Western naval forces.

This gradual escalation, from simple aerial observation to direct targeting of allied naval units, traces a troubling trajectory that the IISS report documents with a rigor that leaves little room for doubt.

The strategic failure no one wants to name

Not a single drone intercepted in eighteen months

Here is the number that should chill your blood, dear officials: out of 144 documented incidents, not one drone was intercepted or shot down by Western defenses. The IISS report calls this, without ambiguity, a "strategic failure of allied defenses." This is not criticism from the outside; it is a documented finding by researchers who methodically analyzed every incident.

This capability gap is no surprise to specialists in the field, but it becomes intolerable once exposed so clearly in broad daylight, in a report that will be read by allies, but also, let's be honest, by our adversaries.

The "drone wall" concept still stuck on paper

The European Union has been discussing a "drone wall" concept for months, meant to protect its eastern border against this kind of repeated incursion. Yet this initiative struggles to gain the political and financial momentum needed to become an operational reality. How many more incidents will it take before this project finally leaves Brussels meeting rooms?

I put the question to you directly, European leaders: what are you waiting for to turn this concept into an absolute budgetary priority, on par with weapons deliveries to Ukraine?

What the NATO summit in Ankara must change now

A golden opportunity for a collective response

The NATO summit in Ankara, bringing together Alliance leaders in the days following this report's publication, represents a golden opportunity to turn this awareness into concrete commitment. Western defense leaders must use this platform to announce massive investments in detecting and intercepting low-altitude drones.

According to the summit's preparatory analyses, defense spending among member countries keeps rising, an encouraging trend I welcome, but one that must now translate into concrete capabilities against this specific hybrid threat, rather than generic budget increases alone.

The role Washington must keep playing

I say this without excessive indulgence: on the strictly military front, the current American administration deserves credit for maintaining pressure on European allies to raise their contributions to collective defense. This stance, however contested it may be on other files, helps strengthen Western deterrence against Russia.

But this budgetary pressure will not be enough unless it comes paired with stronger technical coordination among allies to close precisely the gaps this IISS report has just exposed with surgical precision.

The psychological dimension of a war that dares not speak its name

Sowing doubt without triggering open war

What strikes me most in this report, dear leaders, is the very logic of this drone campaign. It is not about provoking a direct confrontation that would trigger Article 5 of NATO, but about maintaining a constant, diffuse pressure, nearly impossible to formally attribute, that erodes European populations' trust in their own security institutions.

This threshold strategy, carefully calibrated to stay below the level that would trigger an automatic collective response, illustrates the sophistication of Russian hybrid doctrine, refined after years of war in Ukraine.

The silent anxiety of overflown populations

Imagine, dear officials, what residents feel in towns where airports had to shut down abruptly because of an unidentified drone. This daily anxiety, rarely quantified in strategic reports, is nonetheless one of this campaign's primary goals: to psychologically wear down populations who are starting to doubt their governments' ability to protect them.

It is precisely this erosion of public trust that Russia seeks to provoke, far more than one-off material damage to any single isolated piece of infrastructure.

The Ukrainian precedent the West still refuses to see

A drone war already tested on the Ukrainian front

Russia has tested, refined, and perfected its drone tactics for more than four years on Ukrainian soil, before gradually exporting them to NATO territory. Kyiv endures daily waves of Shahed drones and other loitering munitions, a full-scale laboratory from which Moscow is clearly drawing operational lessons it now applies elsewhere in Europe.

Ignoring this direct link between the Ukrainian theater and the incursions observed on allied territory would be a major strategic analysis error, dear leaders, and I fear that is exactly the mistake some of you are still making today.

Supporting Ukraine is also protecting yourselves

Every air defense system supplied to Ukraine, every dollar invested in its detectioncapabilities, indirectly helps slow the refinement of Russian tactics that sooner or later get tested against Western targets. President Zelensky has repeated it for years: the defense of Ukraine is the first line of defense for all of Europe.

This IISS report should convince the last skeptics that this link is not a mere rhetorical formula, but a strategic reality documented by concrete incidents on the very soil of Alliance member states.

What I concretely expect from you, dear leaders

A unified chain of command against the drone threat

I ask you, dear NATOofficials, to create a unified command structure specifically dedicated to detecting and neutralizing unidentified drones over allied territory. The current fragmentation of responsibilities among member countries, each managing its own air defense under its own rules of engagement, is precisely the gap this report documents so well.

This coordination must not remain a pious wish voiced at summits, but must translate into regular joint exercises, real-time shared alert protocols, and budgets clearly earmarked for this specific threat rather than diluted into generic defense envelopes.

Public transparency about every confirmed incident

I also ask for greater transparency toward European populations. Too many incidents have been downplayed or kept quiet out of fear of appearing alarmist, when it is precisely this silence that now feeds public disbelief about the real scale of this Russian campaign.

An informed population is a population that more readily supports the necessary defenseinvestments. Excessive secrecy, on the other hand, benefits only those seeking to destabilize us in the shadows.

The wider threat China is watching closely

Beijing is learning from our gaps too

It would be naive to believe that only Russia is watching the Western reaction to this drone campaign. China, our main long-term strategic rival, is almost certainly studying how the Atlantic Alliance responds to this type of low-intensity hybrid threat, lessons it could one day apply in the Pacific or elsewhere.

A West unable to close its gaps against relatively rudimentary drones sends a dangerous signal of weakness to adversaries far more technologically advanced in this specific field.

Iran and North Korea, interested spectators

Iran, whose own dronecapabilities have heavily supplied the Russian arsenal used against Ukraine, and North Korea, which is developing its own military drone programs, are also watching closely how the West responds to this new form of warfare. Every gap documented in this report becomes, unfortunately, a free lesson handed to this entire authoritarian axis.

That is why I believe the response to this report must not be thought of solely in terms of Russia, but as a deterrence message aimed at every power that might be tempted to test our defenses the same way.

The lessons military history already teaches us

Strategic surprise is never inevitable

Western military history is full of examples where an emerging threat was first underestimated before forcing a swift and effective adaptation. The IISS report merely confirms a classic pattern: a new war technology, here cheap drones launched from civilian ships, outpaces defenses designed for more conventional threats.

But this initial underestimation must never become an excuse for prolonged inaction. Every additional month without a coordinated response turns a simple capability gap into a lasting strategic vulnerability.

Adapting faster than the adversary improves

The real question, dear leaders, is not whether the West can close this gap, but whether it can do so faster than Russia perfects its own tactics. This race against the clock, both technological and doctrinal, will largely determine the European strategic balance of the coming years.

I remain convinced that Western industrial and technological capabilities, properly mobilized, can quickly outpace the current tactics of the Russian shadow fleet, provided political will finally matches the scale of the challenge this report documents.

What European citizens have the right to demand

Security is not a budgetary luxury

Dear leaders, the citizens you represent have the fundamental right to demand that their taxes go toward closing precisely this kind of gap, documented in black and white by a research institute as respected as the IISS. Aerial security over allied territory is not one budgetary luxury among others; it is a basic condition of national sovereignty.

I refuse to accept the argument that these investments would be too costly, when the human and political cost of a successful attack on critical infrastructure would itself be incalculable and potentially irreversible.

A generation growing up under the drone threat

An entire generation of young Europeans is now growing up with the daily reality of airport closures caused by unidentified drones, a dangerous normalization that should never become acceptable in Western democracies supposedly built to offer their citizens security and stability.

This is the insidious normalization I refuse, and that I ask you, dear officials, to refuse as well, with the same firmness, in your upcoming budgetary and strategic decisions.

The role Western defense industries must play in this response

Accelerating the production of anti-drone systems

Western defense industry already has the technologies needed to detect and effectively neutralize this type of threat, whether laser systems, electronic jamming, or dedicated interceptors. The problem is less technological than political and budgetary, a finding that should actually make the solution considerably simpler.

European and American defense manufacturers must receive firm, massive orders for this type of equipment, rather than vague promises of future investment that never materialize with the urgency the situation clearly demands.

Stronger transatlantic cooperation, not fragmentation

I am arguing for stronger transatlantic cooperation between American and European defense industries on this specific drone file, rather than sterile commercial competition among allies who should, instead, join forces against a clearly identified common threat.

This industrialcooperation would also send a strong political signal to Moscow: that of a West responding collectively, not in scattered fashion, to a campaign deliberately designed to exploit our internal divisions.

What this report reveals about our collective relationship with risk

Eighteen months of incidents before public awareness

It took eighteen months of documented incidents, and the publication of a detailed report by an independent research institute, for this threat to finally get the public attention it deserved since the first confirmed overflight in August 2024. This delay, by itself, illustrates a structural problem in how we collectively assess emerging threats before they turn into open crises.

I ask the question directly: how many other hybridthreats are currently brewing, documented only in confidential reports the general public will only discover months, or even years, later?

Breaking with the culture of institutional denial

This culture of denial or minimization toward emerging threats must change, dear leaders. It protects no one; it only delays responses that become, over time, increasingly costly and increasingly urgent to implement in haste rather than through methodical preparation.

I sincerely hope this IISS report will mark a turning point in this institutional culture, rather than simply becoming one more document added to an already considerable pile of warnings largely ignored in the past.

What our Pacific allies are also watching closely

Japan, Australia, and South Korea drawing their own lessons

It would be a mistake to think this drone crisis stays confined to the European theater. Our Pacific allies, Japan, Australia, and South Korea, are watching with particular attention how NATO responds to this Russian campaign, since they themselves face similar tactics from China and North Korea in their own regional neighborhood.

A firm, coordinated Western response to Russian drones would send a reassuring signal to these Indo-Pacific partners, showing them that Western democracies know how to adapt collectively to sophisticated hybrid threats, rather than remaining paralyzed by their own internal divisions.

A deterrence that must now be thought of on a global scale

This global dimension of Western deterrence deserves to be fully integrated into the discussions at the Ankara summit. The defense of allied territory in Europe and strategic stability in the Pacific are today more interconnected than ever, a fact too many political officials unfortunately still treat as two entirely separate files.

I firmly believe NATO would benefit from strengthening its consultations with its Asian partners on this specific drone file, if only to pool lessons learned on both sides of the globe against adversary tactics that increasingly resemble one another.

Conclusion: a letter calling for action, not panic

What I truly expect from this open letter

Dear NATOleaders, this letter is not a call for widespread panic, nor a gratuitous accusation against your institutions. It is an urgent invitation to turn a damning report into a concrete, measurable, and above all rapid plan of action. The 144 incidents documented by the IISS are not fate; they are an alarm signal that we all have a duty to take seriously starting now.

The Ankara summit, the upcoming budget discussions, transatlantic industrialcooperation: all these levers already exist in your hands. At this stage, all that is missing is the political will to pull them with the urgency this file clearly demands.

One last thought for those already keeping watch

I close this letter thinking of all those, soldiers, analysts, technicians, already working, often in the shadows, to close these documented gaps. Your work deserves to be backed by political decisions that match the risks you identify every day on the ground, rather than by reports that pile up without concrete follow-through.

The West has always managed to adapt in the face of adversity, provided it clearly recognizes the nature of the challenge. This report gives us that clarity. It is now up to you to turn it into something concrete.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am a columnist, not a trained military expert, and I rely on the report published by the IISS as well as verified journalistic analyses for this open letter. I am pro-Ukraine, pro-NATO, and I believe the West must remain at the center of the international system against the threats posed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. This conviction clearly shapes my interpretation of the facts presented here.

What I don't know and my method

I cannot state with absolute certainty that every one of the 144 documented incidents stems directly from a coordinated Russian operation, even though the IISS report and several official statements point strongly in that direction. My method consists of citing the available figures and official statements, cross-checking multiple recognized journalistic sources, and explicitly flagging areas of uncertainty rather than claiming a precision that current data does not fully allow.

Sources

Primary sources

The New York Times — Russia waged 18-month drone campaign over Europe, IISS report, July 2, 2026

Forbes — What defense leaders will discuss at the 2026 NATO summit, July 1, 2026

The Guardian — Russia mounted drone surveillance of European nuclear sites over 18 months, July 2, 2026

Secondary sources

Newsmax — Russia drones Europe defense, July 2, 2026

Telex — EU Russia Ukraine war drone airspace violations defence, July 1, 2026

Wikipedia — 2026 Ankara NATO summit

The Aviationist — Europe drone incursions Russia shadow fleet, July 3, 2026