Forty Billion for Drones, After Years of Silence

Introduction: a letter to those who took so long to react

A figure that arrives after the proof, not before

Dear NATO leaders gathered in Ankara, allow a columnist to write what many have been thinking quietly for months. You have just announced, through Secretary General Mark Rutte, a commitment of more than $40 billion over five years to build genuine anti-drone capabilities. That is a considerable figure, almost dizzying on paper. But it comes after, not before. After dozens of Russian drone incursions recorded over sensitive European bases, some housing American nuclear weapons, between August 2024 and February 2026.

This announcement was made Tuesday, at a defense industry forum held on the sidelines of the Ankara summit, at a time when drone threats have become, in Rutte's own words, "common on battlefields," with heavy losses reported in most of the world's active conflicts, according to information reported by the Jerusalem Post.

The price of waiting, measured in ignored incursions

This announcement, notably, cannot be read without weighing it against what an independent report revealed just days earlier. This letter, then, is not a letter of empty congratulations. It is a letter of cautious acknowledgment, paired with a demand for consistency.

Because forty billion dollars, however impressive, is worth only as much as the speed of its execution. NATO's recent history is littered with budget promises followed by industrial delays, endless negotiations over national shares, and deliveries that arrive years after the moment they would have saved lives.

What the IISS report reveals about your collective delay

One hundred forty days of documented vulnerability

A report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, published on July 2, 2026, documented that between August 2024 and February 2026, hundreds of drones maneuvered in the airspace of a dozen NATO member states as well as Ireland, according to data published by Stars and Stripes. These flights repeatedly forced the closure of major commercial air hubs and disrupted sensitive military activities.

The report does not mince words: these drones flew with "substantial impunity" across European airspace, representing both a series of "tactical successes for the Kremlin" and a "strategic failure of allied air defense." This isn't a pro-Western columnist saying so. It's an internationally recognized strategic research institute.

Volkel base, symbol of an admission nobody wanted to make

The most troubling case involves Volkel air base in the Netherlands, targeted by drones on at least three separate occasions in November and December 2025. This base is particularly sensitive: it hosts dual-capable aircraft tasked with delivering American B61-12 bombs under NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements. During one incident, as many as ten drones were spotted directly above the site. Security personnel opened fire from the ground, missed the aircraft, and no wreckage was ever recovered.

The report describes this as "a highly motivated and deliberate effort to surveil NATO's nuclear deterrence infrastructure." How can one read that sentence without feeling deep unease at the slowness of the Western response?

Ramstein and the ghost of the Russian fleet

A German base overflown from the sea

At Ramstein air base in Germany, drone flights were recorded between November 2024 and early 2025. According to IISS data, these aircraft were likely launched from vessels linked to Russia, operating as far as the North Sea or the Baltic Sea. The operation appeared designed to map allied vulnerabilities and probe gaps in military-civilian decision-making.

This use of Russia's "shadow fleet" — those clandestine vessels already known for evading oil sanctions — as drone-launch platforms illustrates a hybrid war that never speaks its name but strikes methodically.

The open refusal to shoot down everything systematically

Mark Rutte himself acknowledged that the alliance does not intend to shoot down every detected drone systematically, preferring a case-by-case approach. This caution has its own military logic — avoiding uncontrolled escalation — but it also carries a political cost: it projects the image of an alliance that tolerates intrusion rather than categorically refusing it.

In September, NATO fighter jets shot down a swarm of drones heading toward Poland, an episode marking the first time in the alliance's history that its aircraft opened fire on potential threats within allied airspace. That precedent exists. It proves that rapid action is possible once political will follows.

The countries stepping up, and those who must follow

A coalition of twelve, not thirty-two

The $40 billion initiative involves, according to statements made in Ankara, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey, according to the Jerusalem Post. Twelve countries, out of the alliance's thirty-two. That's a start, not unanimity.

Rutte summed up the philosophy of this expanded coalition in one simple line: "We can do more when we do it together. And we must do more." He added that NATO allies are joining new multinational acquisition coalitions, a mechanism meant to speed up deliveries by pooling orders rather than fragmenting them country by country.

What this letter asks of the other twenty

To those who have not yet joined this anti-drone coalition, this letter poses a simple question: how many more incursions must be documented before your name appears on the list? The threat does not stop at the borders of the twelve engaged countries. It looms, literally, over the entire continent.

Pooled procurement, if well executed, can cut costs and accelerate production rates. But it requires a level of political coordination that NATO has not always managed to demonstrate, as the IISS report rightly points out regarding the lack of unity and coherence in the European response to past incursions.

The industrial contracts behind the political promise

Saab and the $450 million GlobalEye gamble

In concrete terms, this announcement is already translating into contracts. Saab, the Swedish defense group, could begin delivering its GlobalEye surveillance aircraft as early as 2030 if NATO signs quickly, according to its chief executive Micael Johansson. The final price has not yet been set, but it is expected to range between $400 and $450 million per aircraft, according to remarks reported by the Jerusalem Post.

This delivery timeline, four years after the order, illustrates exactly the problem this letter wants to highlight: even when political will exists, the Western defense industry struggles to keep pace with the threat. Four years is exactly the time Russia has already had to refine its low-cost drone tactics.

Northrop Grumman and the vagueness that worries

European countries are also buying surveillance drones from the American firm Northrop Grumman, without the exact number of aircraft, the specific buyer countries, or the total contract value being specified at the announcement. This vagueness, on its own, deserves to be noted: an alliance that communicates in billions without detailing deliverables risks seeing its credibility erode if results are slow to materialize.

Transparency on timelines should be the logical next step of this announcement, otherwise the $40 billion will remain a communication figure rather than a verifiable commitment.

Ukraine, a de facto ally in this anti-drone race

Zelensky in Ankara to negotiate his own deals

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky used the same summit to announce that Ukraine planned to sign new drone agreements and other deals with its partners. Arriving in Ankara on Tuesday, he said he expected a "solid and productive" summit, and noted he would hold nearly twenty bilateral meetings with leaders, according to the Jerusalem Post.

Zelensky summed up his priority in a message posted on X: "We will continue working to strengthen Ukraine's air defense. New systems, missiles for them, and the question of production licenses — all of this is our priority." That sentence deserves careful reading: Ukraine is no longer asking merely for weapons, it is asking for the industrial capacity to produce them itself.

Ukrainian expertise, an asset underused by the West

No one knows drone warfare better than the Ukrainian military, which has faced daily swarms of Russian Shaheds for more than four years. Ignoring this expertise while building the new Western anti-drone architecture would be a major strategic mistake, almost an insult to the experience Ukrainian operators have accumulated on the ground.

This letter therefore calls for a far more systematic integration of Ukrainian lessons learned into future Western contracts, rather than a simple supplier-to-customer relationship.

The question of the American political calendar

Trump, a discreet but decisive presence

This budget announcement comes amid constant American pressure on European allies to raise their defense spending. The Ankara summit brings together 32 NATO leaders, along with outside guests, in a climate where Washington is closely watching how the financial burden is shared among allies.

Without this constant American pressure, one may reasonably wonder whether this $40 billion coalition would have come together this quickly. It's an uncomfortable but honest observation: Western deterrence owes part of its recent acceleration to an ally that regularly threatens to reduce its own commitment.

An equation where every dollar counts twice

For European countries, every dollar invested in anti-drone capability must now be justified both to their own public opinion and to an American partner demanding concrete proof of effort. This dual constraint complicates the swift execution the situation nonetheless requires.

This letter does not ask for the impossible. It simply asks that the word given in Ankara translate into weeks, not years.

What recent history teaches us about broken promises

The precedent of delayed Patriot deliveries

The recent history of the Ukrainian conflict is full of examples where Western arms promises took months, even years, to materialize on the ground. Patriot air-defense systems, for instance, were the subject of countless announcements before actual deliveries followed, often too late to prevent certain documented civilian losses.

This letter draws directly on that bitter experience to formulate a clear demand: that the $40 billion announced in Ankara not follow the same winding path between announcement and actual delivery.

Trust is measured in results, not press releases

A Western leader can announce any figure at a defense forum. What matters, in the end, is the number of radars actually installed, jamming systems actually operational, and civilian lives actually spared thanks to this new architecture. Everything else is summit rhetoric.

It is this demand for concrete results that this letter wants to carry, without excessive cynicism, but without naivety either.

The China-Iran-North Korea axis watches this Western gap

A lesson learned by the West's adversaries

It would be naive to believe only Russia is watching the slowness of the Western anti-drone response. China, Iran, and North Korea, all engaged in growing military and technological cooperation with Moscow, are also drawing lessons from this sequence. If low-cost drone incursions can operate with impunity over NATO nuclear bases for more than a year, why wouldn't other hostile actors attempt similar scenarios elsewhere in the world?

This global dimension of the threat alone justifies the scale of the investment announced in Ankara, but it also justifies the urgency of its rapid execution.

Deterrence rests as much on perception as on equipment

An alliance perceived as slow to react sends a signal of weakness that extends well beyond the European theater. That is precisely what this letter wants to prevent: forty billion dollars remaining a symbol of good intentions rather than proof of real capability against an increasingly coordinated hostile axis.

NATO's credibility rests as much on interception statistics as on the image it projects to its potential adversaries on other continents.

What this letter concretely asks of the Ankara signatories

A public timeline, not just a headline figure

This open letter makes a precise demand: that every signatory country of this anti-drone coalition publish a detailed acquisition timeline, with milestones verifiable by the public and by the independent press. Transparency is not a superfluous democratic luxury; it is a condition of strategic credibility itself.

Without this timeline, citizens of member countries will have no way to verify whether the promised $40 billion truly turns into operational defense or evaporates into endless industrial negotiations.

Formalized Ukrainian integration, not just symbolic gestures

This letter also demands that Ukrainian participation in future anti-drone contracts and exercises stop being a mere diplomatic gesture and become a structured technical collaboration, with real sharing of combat data accumulated since 2022.

The real wartime experience acquired by Ukraine is worth more than any Western simulation, however sophisticated.

The symbolic weight of the chosen venue for this announcement

Ankara, geographic crossroads of every tension

The choice of Ankara as the venue for this announcement is not incidental. Turkey occupies a unique geographic position, at the hinge between Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, and holds the second-largest army in NATO after that of the United States. Announcing a major anti-drone commitment from this crossroads sends a signal both to Moscow and to adjacent theaters where hostile drones could also pose a future threat.

This geographic choice also reinforces the growing industrial role Turkey wants to play within the alliance, given its own internationally recognized drone capabilities.

An alliance that must prove it learns from its mistakes

Ultimately, this $40 billion announcement will only matter if it marks a genuine break from the slowness documented in the IISS report. History will judge this coalition not by the figure announced in Ankara, but by the number of future incursions actually prevented.

That is the only criterion that truly matters to the populations living near these sensitive bases, whether in Germany, the Netherlands, or elsewhere on the continent.

The lessons Europe still refuses to fully learn

An architecture designed for yesterday, not today

The IISS report states it plainly: Europe's air-defense architecture was designed to detect and defeat conventional aerial threats, not repeated, low-cost, easily deniable incursions like those carried out by drones launched from civilian vessels. This structural mismatch largely explains why it took until 2026 to see a budgetary response of this scale.

Recognizing this mismatch is the necessary first step. Fixing it quickly will be the real test.

The political price of a still-too-slow response

Every additional month without a clear legal framework for neutralizing drones of uncertain origin over allied territory is a month of extended vulnerability. The report states it plainly: the path toward a credible European response first requires legal clarity the alliance has still not fully established.

This letter therefore calls, alongside the funding, for the swift adoption of harmonized rules of engagement among all alliance members.

What European citizens should demand of their governments

A say over the public money committed

Forty billion dollars is public money, drawn from the national budgets of twelveNATO member countries. Citizens of these countries have the right to know, line by line, how this sum will be split among radars, interceptors, jamming systems, and command centers. A democracy that funds its defense without clear public debate risks seeing that spending challenged at the first change of political majority.

This letter therefore calls on national parliaments to exercise real oversight of this commitment's execution, rather than simply rubber-stamping a figure announced abroad.

The education of the threat, a duty of governments

Too often, European populations discover the scale of a threat only after a shocking report like the IISS's is published. Governments should instead explain, in advance, why such investments are necessary, rather than letting the independent press reveal the scale of the problem after the fact.

This missing education partly explains why European public opinion remains divided over the scale of defense efforts needed against Russia.

The Baltic precedent, a lesson in foresight for all allies

Neighbors of Russia who didn't wait for forty billion

While the anti-drone coalition was being built at the NATO level, the Baltic states had already, on their own, taken the lead by raising their own defense budgets well beyond alliance standards. This national foresight, predating the collective Ankara announcement, shows what an acute awareness of the threat can produce when it doesn't wait for consensus among thirty-two countries to act.

This letter acknowledges this head start of countries located along Russia'sdirect borders, and invites geographically more distant allies to draw inspiration from it rather than waiting for the threat to approach their own borders before reacting.

A solidarity that must now be proven in fact

The forty-billion-dollar anti-drone coalition must not become a way for more distant allies to offload their responsibility onto frontline countries. Western solidarity is measured by the actual distribution of effort, not merely by a collective signature on a communiqué in Ankara.

This is a point this letter wishes to underline with the same firmness as the rest of its argument.

One last demand before closing

This letter sincerely hopes it will never have to be followed by a second version documenting the failure of this promise.

Conclusion: a letter still awaiting its answer

Forty billion, a promise under watch

This open letter ends as it began: with cautious acknowledgment. Forty billion dollars over five years is a significant commitment, announced by Mark Rutte before the defense industry gathered in Ankara. But that figure alone will not make up for the months of incursions documented by the IISS over bases like Ramstein and Volkel.

The real question is no longer whether NATO has understood the urgency. It clearly has, at least on paper. The question is whether that understanding will translate into action before the next incursion, or whether it will join the long list of announcements followed by too few concrete results.

What history will remember of this summit

History will remember either a decisive turning point in Western anti-drone defense, or one more figure in the long list of summit promises. This letter, addressed to those who decide, sincerely hopes for the first scenario, while preparing, from experience, to document the second if necessary.

Nuclear bases overflown with impunity for more than a year deserve better than a budget line item. They deserve protection that actually works, not merely a promise that sounds reassuring.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I sign this open letter as a columnist, not as a certified military expert. My bias is clear: I support Ukraine against Russian aggression, and I believe Western unity must remain an absolute priority against the hostile axis formed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. This conviction shapes my tone, but it never authorizes me to invent a fact or a quote.

What I don't know, and my method

I do not know whether the $40 billion announced in Ankara will actually be disbursed on the promised timeline, nor whether the Saab and Northrop Grumman contracts mentioned here will conclude on the terms described by their executives. Every figure cited in this text comes from an identified, dated source, and every uncertainty has been flagged as such rather than presented as an established fact.

Sources

Primary sources

Ukraine's Ministry of Defense — official statements, accessed July 2026

NATO — official Alliance website, accessed July 2026

The Jerusalem Post — NATO allies agree to invest over $40 billion in antidrone capabilities, July 7, 2026

Secondary sources

Reuters — NATO Ankara summit: who's going, what to expect, July 6, 2026

Anadolu Agency — infographic on NATO defense spending, July 2026

Stars and Stripes — Russian drones exposed weaknesses at bases housing US nukes, July 2, 2026