INVESTIGATION: AUKUS Nuclear Submarines — the Truth Behind the June 2026 Drone Exercises

Introduction: The Tree That Hides the Underwater Forest

Spectacular Drones, a Faltering Nuclear Program

On June 22, 2026, Australia's Department of Defence proudly published the results of the Army Warfighting Experiment 2026: Australian, American, and British soldiers had tested autonomous drone swarms on the plains of Salisbury Plain, England, in conditions of "near-continuous rain" and "challenging woodland." Up to six drones at a time scanned terrain, identified targets, and transmitted data in near-real-time between AUKUS partners. A fine technological spectacle, generating guaranteed media coverage. But this so-called "Pillar II" strand of AUKUS — the one dealing with advanced conventional technologies — also serves as a convenient showcase, diverting attention from the true Gordian knot of the partnership: nuclear-powered submarines.

Colonel Jake Penley, director of Australia's robotic and autonomous systems coordination office, enthused that autonomous systems "are no longer experimental and are entering the core of how land forces operate." An encouraging result, without a doubt. But the generals in Washington, Canberra, and London know full well that infantry drones do not compensate for the absence of a strategic nuclear submarine capability. What truly counts in AUKUS — what the partnership was created for in September 2021 — is Pillar I: nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) for the Royal Australian Navy. And there, the reality is far less glorious.

The May 2026 Review: An Admission of Industrial Difficulties

On May 30, 2026, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles announced a significant revision of the acquisition plan. Australia will now receive three in-service Virginia-class Block IV submarines — instead of two Block IV and at least one newly built Block V or VII — with deliveries planned for 2032, 2035, and 2038. The first SSN-AUKUS (the new trilateral-build submarine) is not expected until the "early 2040s."

Marles presented this as a "rationalization" designed to simplify maintenance and training. Analysts immediately identified the underlying reality: the American submarine industrial base is in deep crisis. US shipyards are only producing 1.2 to 1.3 Virginia submarines per year, far short of the 2.33 boats annually that the US Navy considers necessary to satisfy both its own operational readiness needs AND its AUKUS commitments. The revision toward three in-service Block IVs — ships already built, some still in trials — is a pragmatic way of working around that industrial bottleneck without publicly admitting it.

Pillar I Under the Microscope: Timelines, Obstacles, and Blind Spots

The In-Service Block IVs: Ships With Reduced Operational Life

The three Block IVs designated for Australia come from the SSN-792 to SSN-800 group, commissioned between 2020 and 2028. Some are still under construction or in sea trials. Transferring in-service submarines to Australia entails a brutal accounting reality: these vessels will enter Australian service having already consumed a portion of their reactor life. A newly built SSN offers approximately 33 years of service. The transferred Block IVs will offer only about 23 years after integration into the Australian navy. The third vessel, delivered in 2038, will be operational until approximately 2061 — a full ten years less than a newly built ship would have provided.

This compression of the life cycle creates a structural challenge: if the SSN-AUKUS program experiences delays in the 2040s — which risk assessments consider plausible — Australia would find itself with a reduced nuclear submarine capability at precisely the moment the Chinese submarine threat is at its peak. China currently has 32 nuclear-powered submarines and launched 10 between 2021 and 2025, compared with only 7 for the United States over the same period. The production gap is widening in the wrong direction.

American and Australian Shipyards: An Impossible Equation?

The American submarine industrial base suffers from a chronic shortage of skilled labour, procurement delays for specialized materials, and maintenance capacity already saturated by the existing fleet's needs. The recent contract for a partnership with the HMAS Stirling shipyards in Western Australia — the future base for Australian SSNs — provides for massive infrastructure works to accommodate nuclear submarines. Those works are underway but whether they will be completed in time for 2032 remains an ambitious target.

Within Australia itself, training a generation of nuclear submariners takes time. Australian sailors are being trained in the United States and the United Kingdom — an integration program that works but cannot be accelerated at will. The initial rotation of American and British submarines based in Australia (already underway in Perth since 2023) serves as a pedagogical stepping stone, but it is not yet a sovereign Australian capability.

Pillar II as Narrative Compensation

The Salisbury Plain Drones: Real Progress, False Priority

The Army Warfighting Experiment 2026 genuinely produced interesting results. Soldiers expanded the complexity of autonomous operations from two to six drones, using swarming software to subdivide areas of interest, perform scans, and return imagery to handheld devices. An AI model was refined through repeated cycles of identification and confirmation. The near-real-time sharing of mission data between AUKUS partners represented a concrete advance in interoperability.

Australian engineer Hing-Wah Kwok from the DSTG (Defence Science and Technology Group) explained that the objective is for each partner to improve its systems internally, retrain models in the field, and share those models with allies to "build capabilities beyond what any single country could achieve alone." That is sound thinking. But one must acknowledge that infantry drones tested on Salisbury Plain do not replace the strategic deterrence embodied by a nuclear submarine patrolling the depths of the Western Pacific.

The True Strategic Value of AUKUS Pillar I

The deep purpose of AUKUS — the reason Paris erupted in September 2021 when Canberra cancelled its massive conventional submarine contract with France — is the strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific against China's rising naval power. China added approximately 79,000 tonnes of nuclear warships between 2021 and 2025, against 55,500 tonnes for the United States. At that pace, American submarine supremacy guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific will be contested by the 2030s.

Australian nuclear submarines operating in the region's waters would exponentially multiply Western surveillance and deterrence coverage. They would allow the US Navy to redistribute resources elsewhere. They would send a clear signal to Beijing about the resolve of Indo-Pacific allies. That is precisely why this program holds a strategic value that drone exercises cannot match — however technically impressive they may be. Lance Corporal Kai Smith, a drone operator with Australia's 1st Armoured Regiment, is the kind of human face the program needs — but not its strategic core.

Political and Diplomatic Obstacles

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Question

Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS raises complex non-proliferation questions. The vessels will be nuclear-propelled but will carry no nuclear weapons — a crucial distinction that several countries, including China and India, have publicly contested. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has validated a unique safeguards arrangement for Australia, but the modalities of oversight for enriched nuclear fuel supplied by the United States continue to be the subject of complex technical discussions with the UN agency.

China has systematically denounced AUKUS as a containment attempt and a violation of the spirit of non-proliferation. Beijing has raised the issue in multiple international forums. While these objections have not blocked the program, they create lasting diplomatic pressure on Canberra, which must constantly justify the partnership to its Southeast Asian neighbours — several of whom maintain significant economic ties with China and are reluctant to be drawn into a Sino-American confrontation.

Domestic Political Factors in Australia

Within Australia, AUKUS enjoys bipartisan support, but the program is not without controversy. Its total cost — estimated at several hundred billion Australian dollars over several decades — ties up resources that could otherwise go to other defence or social priorities. Some Australian defence experts continue to question the logic of resorting to in-service Block IVs with reduced reactor life, when cutting-edge conventional submarines could have been acquired more cheaply and quickly.

The decision by Richard Marles at Shangri-La represents a difficult political choice: it implicitly acknowledges that the original objective was too ambitious, while affirming that the program remains on track. The Australian government is navigating a delicate balance between transparency and maintaining confidence in a program that has become a central pillar of its foreign and defence policy. Critics in the Australian parliamentary opposition note that Block IVs approaching half their reactor life at the time of transfer represent a sub-optimal investment for Australian taxpayers.

The State of Shipyards and Industrial Partnerships

American Investments in Their Own Industrial Base

The United States has launched major investments to ramp up its submarine production rate. Partnerships with shipyards such as General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries have received additional funding. Australia itself contributed funds to the American submarine industrial base — approximately 3 billion Australian dollars — to accelerate production. But results take time to materialize: skilled workers capable of welding nuclear submarine hulls are trained over years, not months.

In the United Kingdom, the BAE Systems yards at Barrow-in-Furness — where British SSN-AUKUS vessels and a portion of Australian ships will be assembled — have also received investment. The schedule envisions delivery of the first Australian SSN-AUKUS in the "early 2040s." But that timetable is subject to the risk that American production problems persist AND that the SSN-AUKUS program, which uses an entirely new design, encounters its own development delays — a risk analysts consider significant.

The Initial Rotation and Submariner Training

The initial rotation of American and British submarines based in Australia — already underway in Perth since 2023 — serves as a pedagogical stepping stone for training a generation of Australian submariners operating nuclear-powered platforms. This program works but cannot be accelerated at will: nuclear reactor qualifications require years of rigorous training. Australian sailors are training in the United States and the United Kingdom under real submarine operating conditions. The HMAS Stirling infrastructure in Western Australia is undergoing massive works to accommodate nuclear submarines.

This training and infrastructure strand — less spectacular than contract announcements — may be the most critical for the program's long-term viability. A submarine without a qualified crew is merely a very expensive metal hull. Australia is investing heavily in this human capital — and that is an aspect worth acknowledging, even if government communications often favour order figures over photographs of instructors in reactor simulators. The challenge remains building this human pipeline at the pace demanded by China's military buildup.

Pillar II as Narrative Compensation

The Salisbury Plain Drones: Real Progress, False Priority

The Army Warfighting Experiment 2026 genuinely produced interesting results. Soldiers expanded the complexity of autonomous operations from two to six drones, using swarming software to subdivide areas of interest, perform scans, and return imagery to handheld devices. An AI model was refined through repeated cycles of identification and confirmation. The near-real-time sharing of mission data between AUKUS partners represented a concrete advance in interoperability.

Australian engineer Hing-Wah Kwok from the DSTG (Defence Science and Technology Group) explained that the objective is for each partner to improve its systems internally, retrain models in the field, and share those models between allies to "build capabilities beyond what any single country could achieve alone." That is sound thinking. But one must acknowledge that infantry drones tested at Salisbury Plain do not replace the strategic deterrence embodied by a nuclear submarine patrolling the depths of the Western Pacific.

The True Strategic Value of AUKUS Pillar I

The deep purpose of AUKUS — the reason Paris erupted in September 2021 when Canberra cancelled its mega-contract for conventional submarines with France — is the strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific against China's rising naval power. China added approximately 79,000 tonnes of nuclear warships between 2021 and 2025, against 55,500 tonnes for the United States. At that pace, American submarine supremacy will be contested by the 2030s.

Australian nuclear submarines operating in the region's waters would exponentially multiply Western surveillance and deterrence coverage. They would allow the US Navy to redistribute resources elsewhere. They would send a clear signal to Beijing about the resolve of Indo-Pacific allies. That is precisely why this program holds a strategic value that drone exercises cannot match — however technically impressive they may be. Lance Corporal Kai Smith, a drone operator with Australia's 1st Armoured Regiment, is the human face the program needs — but not its strategic heart.

Political and Diplomatic Obstacles

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Question

Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS raises complex non-proliferation questions. The vessels will be nuclear-propelled but will carry no nuclear weapons — a crucial distinction that several countries, including China and India, have publicly contested. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has validated a unique safeguards arrangement for Australia, but the modalities of oversight for enriched nuclear fuel supplied by the United States continue to be the subject of complex technical discussions.

China has systematically denounced AUKUS as a containment attempt and a violation of the spirit of non-proliferation. Beijing has raised the issue in multiple international forums. While these objections have not blocked the program, they create lasting diplomatic pressure on Canberra, which must constantly justify the partnership to its Southeast Asian neighbours — several of whom maintain significant economic ties with China and are reluctant to be drawn into a Sino-American confrontation.

Domestic Political Factors in Australia

In Australia, AUKUS enjoys bipartisan support, but the program is not without controversy. Its total cost — estimated at several hundred billion Australian dollars over several decades — ties up resources that could otherwise go to other defence or social priorities. Some Australian defence experts continue to question the logic of resorting to in-service Block IVs with reduced reactor life, when cutting-edge conventional submarines could have been acquired more cheaply.

The decision by Richard Marles at Shangri-La represents a difficult political choice: it implicitly acknowledges that the original objective was too ambitious, while affirming that the program remains on track. The Australian government is navigating a delicate balance between transparency and maintaining confidence in a program that has become a central pillar of its foreign and defence policy. Critics in the Australian parliamentary opposition note that Block IVs in service approaching half their reactor life at the time of transfer represent a sub-optimal investment for Australian taxpayers.

The State of Shipyards and Industrial Partnerships

American Investments in Their Own Industrial Base

The United States has launched major investments to ramp up its submarine production rate. Partnerships with shipyards such as General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries have received additional funding. Australia itself contributed funds to the American submarine industrial base — approximately 3 billion Australian dollars — to accelerate production. But results take time to materialize: skilled workers capable of welding nuclear submarine hulls are trained over years, not months.

In the United Kingdom, the BAE Systems yards at Barrow-in-Furness — where British SSN-AUKUS vessels and a portion of Australian ships will be assembled — have also received investment. The schedule envisions delivery of the first Australian SSN-AUKUS in the "early 2040s." But that timetable is subject to the risk that American production problems persist AND that the SSN-AUKUS program, which uses an entirely new design, encounters its own development delays — a risk analysts consider significant.

The Rotation and Submariner Training

The initial rotation of American and British submarines based in Australia — already underway in Perth since 2023 — serves as a pedagogical stepping stone for training a generation of Australian submariners on nuclear-powered platforms. This program works but cannot be accelerated at will: nuclear reactor qualifications require years of rigorous training. Australian sailors are training in the United States and the United Kingdom under real submarine operating conditions. The HMAS Stirling infrastructure in Western Australia is undergoing massive works to accommodate nuclear submarines.

This training and infrastructure strand, less spectacular than contract announcements, may be the most critical for the program's long-term viability. A submarine without a qualified crew is merely a very expensive metal hull. Australia is investing heavily in this human capital — and that is an aspect worth acknowledging, even if government communications often favour order figures over photographs of instructors in reactor simulators. The challenge remains building this human pipeline at the pace demanded by China's military buildup.

Conclusion: AUKUS Between Promises and Realities

What Has Been Accomplished

AUKUS is not a failure. In less than five years of existence, the partnership has generated real technological cooperation in drones, AI, and autonomous systems. It has accelerated the return of American and British nuclear-powered submarines to Australian waters. It has durably reconfigured the alliance landscape in the Indo-Pacific. The Salisbury Plain exercise is not a diversion — it is a genuine demonstration of deepened military cooperation between three Anglophone allies in the technologies of the future.

What Remains to Be Accomplished — and the Unanswered Questions

But the hard questions remain. Can the American submarine industrial base reach the pace of 2.33 boats per year needed to honor its AUKUS commitments without undermining its own fleet? Will Australian and British shipyards be able to assemble the SSN-AUKUS within the announced timelines for the 2040s? Will Australia have the qualified workforce needed to operate a complex mixed fleet in the 2030s? These questions deserve precise and public answers. So far, they have largely received general assurances and drone presentations.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My Position on AUKUS

I am supportive of the AUKUS principle — strengthening allied submarine capabilities in the Indo-Pacific in the face of China's military buildup strikes me as a strategic necessity that liberal democracies cannot afford to ignore. I am equally in favor of transparency about the real difficulties of such a costly and politically charged program. My pro-Western bias is acknowledged — I believe freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific is a common good worth the investment.

Uncertainties I Acknowledge

I do not have access to classified assessments of the true production rate at American shipyards or the precise funding details for Australian infrastructure works. Data on Chinese submarine production comes from open-source estimates that may diverge from operational realities. The technical and political complexity of the SSN-AUKUS program exceeds what open sources allow to be fully documented — I work with the best available information, knowing the reality is always more nuanced.

Sources

Primary sources

Australian Defence — AUKUS partners test drone swarming tactics — June 22, 2026

US Studies Centre (USSC) — By the numbers: AUKUS revised timeline comparison — June 10, 2026

ISW — China Taiwan Update, June 26, 2026 — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Sasakawa Peace Foundation — Why North Korea's Involvement in Russo-Ukrainian War Matters for Indo-Pacific — June 2026

CSIS — North Korea in 2026: Intentions, Realities, and Response — June 23, 2026

Asia Times — China tests Scarborough as Manila casts beyond US for help — June 26, 2026