ESSAY: AUKUS, drones, and the Indo-Pacific — the Western response to Xi Jinping's expansionism

The Army Warfighting Experiment 2026 — what happened on Salisbury Plain

On the plains of Salisbury, England, the summer of 2026 witnessed something that would have seemed like science fiction a decade ago: Australian, American, and British soldiers jointly operating autonomous drone swarms against simulated targets, with targeting coordination assisted by artificial intelligence. The Army Warfighting Experiment 2026, organized under the technological pillar of AUKUS (Pillar II), tested configurations of up to 6 simultaneous drones sharing targeting data in real time via a unified command hub.

This is not a technological gadget. It is the concrete translation of a military doctrine that recognizes future wars — and perhaps present ones, as in Ukraine — will be decided as much by the superiority of autonomous systems as by conventional firepower. AUKUS, the tripartite security agreement signed in September 2021 between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, is building that technological superiority — and it is directly aimed at China.

Bloomberg, Manila, and Ukrainian Magura drones in Chinese waters

The same weekend, a Bloomberg article dated June 24, 2026 revealed that the United States had tested Ukrainian Magura maritime drones in Philippine waters — a geographical environment directly relevant to a potential conflict with China in the South China Sea or around Taiwan. The Magura drones are the same surface drones that enabled Ukraine to carry out spectacular attacks against the Russian fleet in the Black Sea — sinking frigates, damaging port infrastructure. Their transfer to the Pacific signals that lessons from the war in Ukraine are being rapidly integrated into American military doctrine for an Indo-Pacific context.

These two events — the drone swarms at Salisbury and the Magura drones in the Philippines — are not separate. They form part of a coordinated Western response to China's military rise. This response is still incomplete, still underfunded relative to needs, and still subject to the domestic political uncertainties of each of the three AUKUS partners. But it exists, it is advancing, and it sends a signal to Beijing.

Watching Australian, British, and American soldiers test drone swarms in Wiltshire while transferring Ukrainian technologies to the Philippines — that is geopolitics in accelerated time. What is learned in Ukraine today will be deployed against China tomorrow. Xi Jinping is watching. It would be naive to think he is not drawing the same lessons.

The flagship projects of Pillar II in 2026

AUKUS is often presented in mainstream media through the lens of nuclear submarines (Pillar I) — the component that triggered the diplomatic crisis with France in 2021 when Australia canceled its French conventional submarine contract. But it is Pillar II — advanced technological cooperation — that is producing concrete results at the fastest pace.

The first Signature Project of Pillar II, announced in a joint UK government statement in June 2026, concerns sensors and weapons for autonomous underwater vehicles (UUVs). The United Kingdom has committed £201 million to this project, with a delivery scheduled for 2027. This system will allow the three partners to deploy armed UUVs capable of patrolling autonomously in contested areas — notably in the South China Sea — without exposing human crews to direct risk.

Drone swarms — doctrine and capability

The Salisbury Plain exercise validated several key technical capabilities. Drone swarms can operate with AI-assisted coordination that reduces cognitive load on human operators while maintaining human control over lethal decisions — an ethical and legal constraint that all three AUKUS partners firmly uphold. The drones can share targeting data in real time, adapt to target changes without individual manual intervention, and maintain swarm cohesion in the face of jamming attempts.

This capability is directly relevant to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. A Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan would have to cross a strait 180 kilometers wide — ideal terrain for deploying defensive maritime and aerial drone swarms. AUKUS doctrine is testing precisely the scenarios that could make such an assault prohibitively costly for the PLA Navy. This is not provocation — it is deterrence through demonstrated capability.

Drone swarms are the democratization of firepower. Six AI-coordinated drones cost a fraction of an F-35 fighter and can saturate the defenses of a warship. If the West masters this technology before China — and for now it holds an edge — that is a major strategic rebalancing in the Pacific.

Beijing invests massively in autonomous naval systems

China is not passive in the face of AUKUS drone development. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is investing massively — and at an accelerating pace since 2022 — in autonomous naval systems. Exercises in the East China Sea have demonstrated growing Chinese capabilities in naval drone swarms, autonomous underwater vehicles for surveillance and anti-submarine warfare, and suicide attack drones of the Shahed type adapted to a maritime environment.

China's defense budget exceeds $200 billion per year — growing at roughly 7% annually for more than a decade. A growing share of this investment is directed toward autonomous systems, electronic warfare technologies, and capabilities in the space and cyber domains. China aims to become the global leader in military AI by 2030 — an ambition it repeats in its official national strategy documents.

The Chinese navy — the world's largest in number of vessels

The PLA Navy is today the world's largest in number of vessels — surpassing the American navy with more than 350 combat ships. It has launched three aircraft carriers, including the Fujian — its first carrier with electromagnetic catapults — and is developing power projection capabilities that did not exist ten years ago. In the South China Sea, China has militarized artificial atolls, installing anti-ship missiles and air defense systems on reefs claimed by several neighboring countries.

This naval build-up is the direct context in which AUKUS exercises take place. Australia, with its 6,000 kilometers of coastline and vital dependence on maritime trade routes, is directly vulnerable to a China that controls Indo-Pacific maritime access. That is why Canberra has made AUKUS the centerpiece of its defense strategy — at the cost of the bilateral relationship with Paris, which remains strained.

The Chinese navy became the world's largest while the West was looking elsewhere. This reality is not a surprise — it was signaled in every defense white paper since 2010. But recognizing a problem and responding to it effectively are two very different things. AUKUS may be the structural response that was needed.

A budget of 12 to 15 billion for autonomous systems

Australia has announced an investment of 12 to 15 billion Australian dollars in autonomous systems by 2035-36. This amount covers aerial, naval, and underwater drones, counter-drone systems, and the digital infrastructure needed to coordinate these capabilities. It is the most ambitious defense investment in Australian history outside of major platform acquisitions such as the AUKUS submarines.

This investment forms part of a comprehensive revision of Australia's defense strategy published in 2023 — which concluded that Australia could no longer rely on an assumption of ten years of advance warning before any serious threat. The Taiwan crisis, tensions in the South China Sea, and China's military rise have compressed that window to a few years at best. The urgency of Australian rearmament reflects this new geopolitical reality.

Australia's geographical position — advantage and vulnerability

Australia's geographical position in the Indo-Pacific is both a strategic asset and a vulnerability. Asset: Australia is geographically distant from the primary tension zones (Taiwan, South China Sea), providing a secure rear base for American and British operations. The Pine Gap base (surveillance and intelligence), the naval facilities at HMAS Stirling (Perth), and the new air bases in the Northern Territory are major strategic assets.

Vulnerability: Australia depends heavily on maritime communication lines running through areas where China is seeking to extend its influence. A disruption to commercial routes through the Strait of Malacca or the South China Sea would have devastating economic consequences for an Australian economy deeply integrated into Asian trade. It is this dependence that makes freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific existentially important for Canberra.

Australia long wanted to be both China's economic partner and America's military ally. That dual posture has become untenable. Canberra has chosen — AUKUS is that decision. It is courageous, strategically rational, and economically costly in the short term. But it is the right choice.

What Ukraine learned to use in the Black Sea

The Magura V5 maritime drones developed and deployed by Ukraine in the Black Sea have revolutionized the doctrine of asymmetric naval warfare. With a unit cost estimated at around $250,000 — a fraction of the cost of a conventional anti-ship missile — they have sunk or damaged Russian vessels with a cumulative value of several billion dollars. The withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to Novorossiysk was directly caused by the threat these drones pose to naval bases.

Ukrainian innovation in this domain has been remarkable: Ukrainian engineers have developed increasingly sophisticated guidance systems, optimized explosive payloads, and autonomous navigation capabilities that allow the drones to operate even in the presence of Russian electronic jamming. It is a wartime accelerated technological development — precisely the kind of innovation that peacetime militaries struggle to generate.

The transposition to the Philippines — strategic significance

Testing the Magura drones in Philippine waters is no geographical accident. The South China Sea — where the Philippines claim maritime rights that China disputes — is precisely the kind of shallow, confined maritime space where autonomous maritime drones can have maximum impact. China deploys armed coast guard vessels, military ships, and a near-permanent presence around contested reefs and atolls.

Autonomous maritime drones capable of operating in that environment — surveilling, deterring, striking if necessary — would be a powerful leveling tool for ASEAN countries claiming rights in the South China Sea. The Philippines, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has moved significantly closer to the United States since 2022. Testing the Magura drones in its waters is a statement of intent: Washington will not let China control these sea lanes through intimidation.

Ukrainian drones in the South China Sea — the war in Ukraine is traveling. Lessons learned against the Russian navy are directly transferable against the Chinese navy. That is good news for the Philippines and other nations asserting their maritime rights. It is bad news for those who thought Xi Jinping could intimidate without consequences.

The submarine delivery schedule for Australia

Beyond drones, the central project of AUKUS remains the delivery of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) to Australia. The roadmap provides that Australia will host rotational American Virginia-class submarines at HMAS Stirling from 2027 onward, that it will purchase 3 to 5 Virginias before the end of the 2030s, and that it will then develop its own submarine class — the SSN-AUKUS — using British technology.

This schedule is ambitious and faces several challenges. American shipyards are already saturated with orders from the U.S. Navy and are struggling to deliver on time. The U.S. Congress has expressed reservations about the availability of Virginia submarines for Australia without compromising the American Navy. And the total program cost is astronomical — some estimates exceed 300 billion Australian dollars over 30 years, representing an unprecedented budgetary effort for Canberra.

The implications for deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

When operational, Australia's nuclear submarines will fundamentally alter the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific. An Australian SSN can operate from its base in Perth and reach the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea within days — quietly, without needing to pre-position forces in the region. This capacity for silent submarine power projection is precisely what China fears and what it has sought to contest diplomatically in international negotiations.

The reaction of China to the AUKUS announcement in 2021 — labeling it a threat to regional peace and a violation of the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — reveals the program's deterrence effectiveness. Beijing is not afraid of what AUKUS is today. It fears what AUKUS will be in fifteen years: a partnership with significant submarine capability able to defend Taiwan and contest Chinese naval supremacy in its own waters.

Australia's nuclear submarines are fifteen years away. That is a long time in political terms — and a short time in strategic terms. Xi Jinping is planning on a horizon of 2049 (centenary of the People's Republic). The West must think on the same timescale. AUKUS is its beginning.

Legitimate criticisms: cost, delays, and dependency

AUKUS is not without legitimate critics. The first concerns cost: could the hundreds of billions committed be better invested in shorter-term conventional defensive capabilities? The second concerns delays: if the Taiwan crisis erupts within the next ten years, AUKUS submarines will not yet be operational — leaving an uncovered window of vulnerability. The third concerns dependency: AUKUS ties Australia even more tightly to the United States and the United Kingdom, reducing its strategic autonomy in a region where it must maintain diplomatic relations with its Asian neighbors.

These criticisms are raised seriously by Australian defense analysts and by voices within the Australian Labor Party itself. They deserve to be taken seriously. The AUKUS commitment must be accompanied by complementary shorter-term investments — drones, anti-ship missiles, air defense — to bridge the vulnerability window while nuclear submarines are in development.

Unfounded criticisms: nuclear proliferation and instability

China and some neutral states have argued that AUKUS contributes to nuclear proliferation by providing Australia with nuclear-powered submarines. This argument is legally and technically unfounded: AUKUS submarines will be nuclear-powered but will not be armed with nuclear weapons. The distinction is fundamental under NPT law. The IAEA has validated the legality of the transfer under a specific safeguard mechanism. American and British conventional submarines deployed in the region do not trigger these criticisms — why should Australian submarines?

The Chinese critique is therefore primarily strategic, not legal. It seeks to delegitimize AUKUS in international opinion in order to reduce pressure on China's own naval build-up. It is an understandable diplomatic tactic — but not a serious argument that the West should allow to gain traction without clear, documented rebuttal.

Beijing criticizes AUKUS for nuclear proliferation while funding North Korea and its nuclear ballistic missiles. The hypocrisy is so blatant it would be laughable — if it were not so serious. Chinese criticism of AUKUS has no credible legal basis. That needs to be said clearly and without apology.

Toward an AUKUS+? Potential partners

AUKUS remains formally a tripartite partnership, but discussions are underway to extend certain technological cooperations — notably in Pillar II — to regional partners such as Japan, South Korea, and India. Japan has already been mentioned as a potential partner for specific drone and cyber capability projects. This extension, if it materializes, would considerably strengthen the geographical and technological reach of the partnership.

Japan is particularly well positioned to join certain aspects of Pillar II: its defense industry is technologically advanced, its companies are already involved in F-35 programs, and its evolving defense doctrine — toward a pre-emptive strike capability — aligns with AUKUS strategic needs. South Korea, with its growing defense industrial capabilities (Hyunmoo missiles, military drones), is another natural candidate.

India: Quad partner, not AUKUS member

India, a member of the Quad (strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, and Australia), maintains a position of strategic non-alignment that makes formal AUKUS membership unlikely in the near term. New Delhi buys Russian weapons, maintains commercial relations with China despite border tensions, and does not wish to be perceived as a vassal in a Western partnership. But India shares AUKUS concerns about China's naval rise in the Indian Ocean.

This informal cooperation between India and AUKUS partners — via the Quad, joint naval exercises, and intelligence sharing — may be more durable than formal membership that would trigger a diplomatic crisis with Moscow. Indo-Pacific geopolitics cannot be reduced to a simple anti-Chinese alliance — it is far more complex, and AUKUS must account for this to remain relevant in the long term.

The Indo-Pacific is too large and too complex for any single alliance to address all its challenges. AUKUS is one piece — essential — of a puzzle that also includes the Quad, American bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea, and India's independent diplomacy. All those pieces must be built in parallel.

A structural response to a structural threat

AUKUS is not a response to this week's or this month's Chinese provocations. It is a structural response to a structural threat — the rise of a revisionist power seeking to rewrite the rules of the international order in its region. This response takes time, costs money, and creates diplomatic tensions. But in ten or fifteen years, when SSN-AUKUS submarines patrol the Pacific and drone swarms can contest any amphibious assault attempt in the Taiwan Strait, the investment will have clearly been worth it.

The acceleration of Pillar II — with drone exercises at Salisbury, the UUV Signature Project, and Magura tests in the Philippines — shows that the partnership is not waiting for submarines to become operational. It is building capabilities across all domains simultaneously. That is the strength of an alliance founded on technological complementarity — Australia with its geographical access, the United Kingdom with its UUV expertise, the United States with its AI and guidance capabilities — rather than on the mere addition of defense budgets.

The message sent to Xi Jinping — and to all those watching

At its core, AUKUS sends a simple message to Xi Jinping: the West will not abandon the Indo-Pacific. It will not accept Chinese hegemony over the commercial routes that irrigate the global economy. It will not abandon Taiwan to its fate. And it is preparing, meticulously, the technological capabilities needed to make the cost of military aggression in the region prohibitively high. That message, repeated through exercises, £201 million contracts, drone swarms, and Magura drones transferred to the Philippines, is the best available form of deterrence.

Zelensky and Ukraine have shown that determined resistance against a militarily superior power is possible, costly for the aggressor, and a source of inspiration for all those resisting aggression. AUKUS is building, for the Indo-Pacific, the same architecture of anticipatory resistance. The West must hold both fronts simultaneously — supporting Ukraine today and building Pacific deterrence for tomorrow. It is difficult. It is necessary. And it is what the defense of a free world order requires.

I believe deeply in what AUKUS represents. This is not warmongering — it is the patient construction of credible deterrence against a power that plans across decades. The only answer to a Xi Jinping who thinks toward 2049 is a West that thinks toward 2040. AUKUS is that wager. And it is the right one.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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