INVESTIGATION: China Can Strike Australia — And the Threat Is Growing, Lowy Reveals

A report that rattles Canberra

On June 15, 2026, the Lowy Institute — Australia's leading foreign policy think tank — published a report titled "Understanding the Chinese Military Threat to Australia." Its authors: Sam Roggeveen and David Vallance. Their central conclusion: China can already strike Australian territory with ballistic missiles, and this capability will grow "substantially" over the next decade. The report adds that the most immediate threat does not even require missiles to reach Australian soil — Beijing can already disrupt Australia's commercial shipping routes, sever the submarine cables on which Australia's communications depend, and conduct sophisticated cyber operations against its critical infrastructure.

This report is not the first to sound the alarm on China's military rise. But it is remarkable for several reasons. It focuses specifically on Australia — not on Taiwan, not on the generic Indo-Pacific. It is detailed and sourced. And it comes from an institute not given to dramatization. Australia, a continent-nation at the end of the world, has officially entered the range of Chinese military power.

Australia thought geography protected it

For decades, geography was Australia's first line of defense. Far from any hostile neighbor, surrounded by oceans, Australia could afford a modest defense posture. This geographical comfort is dissipating. The Lowy Institute estimates Chinese defense spending at approximately 977 billion U.S. dollars by 2035 — almost double the current level. With these resources, Beijing is developing long-range missiles, stealth bombers, and potential bases in Pacific islands that drastically shrink the geographical buffer Australia has long enjoyed. Geography remains an asset. It is no longer a shield.

There is something vertiginous about this Lowy report. It wasn't written to frighten. It was written by people who manifestly would rather not have written it but decided that silence was more dangerous than the warning. And when Sam Roggeveen says the threat is "real and growing," you hear someone who would have preferred to conclude otherwise. That kind of intellectual frankness is rare and precious.

Ballistic missiles and the range toward Australia

The Lowy Institute identifies in its June 15, 2026 report two direct strike vectors currently available to China against Australia. First, ballistic missiles launched from vessels or submarines. The PLA Navy deploys submarines with ballistic strike capability that can operate in waters close to Australia. Second, the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which can reach northern Australia from the artificial islands in the South China Sea. The DF-26 has an estimated range of between 3,000 and 5,500 kilometers.

These capabilities are not speculation. The Pentagon regularly cites the DF-26 in its annual reports on Chinese military power. The distance between the Spratly Islands and northwestern Australia is approximately 3,500 kilometers — within the DF-26's high range. This is not a theoretical threat. It is a ballistic and geographical reality measurable to the kilometer.

The DF-27 and what is coming

Even more concerning to the authors of the Lowy report, the DF-27 — an intermediate-range ballistic missile estimated capable of striking between 5,000 and 8,000 kilometers according to the Pentagon in its December 2025 statement — could reach central Australia from Chinese mainland territory. As the number of DF-27s in service increases, the range of the direct threat expands. And beyond the DF-27, the report mentions the possibility China could develop a conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missile — without nuclear warhead — capable of striking any point on the planet.

This final category is particularly concerning because it blurs the boundary between conventional strike and nuclear threat. If an intercontinental ballistic missile trajectory is detected heading toward Australia or its allies, early warning systems will not immediately be able to determine whether the payload is conventional or nuclear. That ambiguity risk is itself a destabilizing factor.

5,000 to 8,000 kilometers. That's the range of the DF-27. It's also the distance between Beijing and Sydney. The two figures coincide. That is what "the threat is growing" concretely means. This is not abstract geopolitics. It is ballistic physics with real geographical coordinates. And that reality deserves to be faced, without panic but without minimization.

Australia's commercial routes: vulnerable arteries

The Lowy report emphasizes that the most immediate and serious threat to Australia does not pass through missiles striking its territory. It passes through China's ability to disrupt Australia's commercial shipping routes at strategic choke points in the Indonesian archipelago. Australia is one of the world's most trade-dependent countries. Its exports of iron ore, coal, liquefied natural gas, and agricultural products transit through straits that could be influenced or blocked by the PLA Navy in a conflict.

The PLA Navy demonstrated in 2025 its ability to project force into Australian waters when a group of Chinese naval combat vessels completed a circumnavigation of Australia — the first of its kind. That operation was not hostile. But it was a message: we can be where you think you're alone. And an adversary that can freely navigate around a continent could one day choose to block its commercial traffic.

Submarine cables and cyberspace: Australia's digital arteries

Australia depends on submarine fiber optic cables for virtually all its international communications. These cables, transiting through the Indo-Pacific, are physically vulnerable to naval operations. In 2023, two cables linking Taiwan to the Matsu Islands were severed — an incident Taipei attributed to Chinese vessels, which Beijing denied. Australia is developing with Canada a partnership for an Arctic over-the-horizon radar, but its submarine cables remain a poorly protected vulnerability.

Chinese cyber operations against Australia are documented. In 2020, Australia suffered a wave of cyber attacks attributed to "a sophisticated state actor" — diplomatic language for China. These attacks targeted the government, political parties, hospitals, critical infrastructure operators, and academic organizations. Beijing's capacity to conduct destabilizing cyber operations against Australia is real and documented.

The cables. When I explain to people that their messages, their emails, their banking transactions pass underwater through cables that someone could cut, they look surprised. As if the internet were in the air. It isn't. It's in tubes under the ocean. And those tubes are there, vulnerable, and someone has mapped their position with military precision. That someone is not nobody.

Base agreements in Pacific island nations

The Lowy Institute identifies two developments that could "rapidly and dramatically" increase the threat of Chinese strikes on Australia. The first: China could establish a military base in a Pacific island state. The report notes that "China has actively sought basing arrangements in Pacific island nations since at least 2018." Such a base would place all of mainland Australia within range of PLA H-6 bombers and enable more frequent attacks.

Negotiations between China and the Solomon Islands for a security agreement in 2022 caused deep alarm in Australia and New Zealand. The agreement did not produce a military base, but it revealed that Beijing was actively probing opportunities. In 2024, a police agreement between China and Kiribati again raised concerns. Beijing's pressure on Pacific island states is continuous, patient, and well-funded.

The H-20 and long-range drones: capabilities under development

The second catastrophic scenario identified by Roggeveen and Vallance: China could bring a next-generation long-range stealth bomber into service. "China is known to be developing the stealth H-20," the authors write. "Evidence has also emerged of a stealth drone with the size and range needed to strike anywhere in Australia. It is not known if or when this aircraft will enter service." The report anticipates that photographic evidence of the H-20 could emerge in 2026.

A stealth bomber capable of reaching Australia from bases in mainland China or from advanced Pacific bases would represent a qualitative change in the threat. It could not be easily intercepted, unlike ballistic missiles whose trajectories are predictable. It could be used for precision conventional strikes without triggering nuclear alert mechanisms. It is a weapon designed for high-intensity conventional warfare between great powers.

The H-20. A code name. A silhouette in classified documents. Perhaps blurry satellite images of a hangar in Xian. And serious authors in Sydney writing they "expect it to be revealed soon." There is something unsettling about the phrase "it is not known if or when." Not because it's alarmist. But because it's honest. And honesty in this domain has a cost governments often prefer to avoid.

The 2025 Australian circumnavigation: a calculated signal

In 2025, a group of PLA Navy vessels completed a full circumnavigation of Australia. It is the first such documented operation. The Lowy Institute cited it in its report as an illustration of "the improvement of its capability to project its power beyond its borders." This operation was not hostile — it was legal under the law of the sea. But it was deliberately visible. The PLA Navy wanted Australia to see it.

This type of long-distance deployment is exactly what China is building its aircraft carrier program for. According to Pentagon estimates published in December 2025, China is planning the construction of six additional aircraft carriers in the next decade. With these capabilities, it will be able to maintain naval strike groups in Australian waters on a regular basis, permanently pressuring Canberra's strategic calculations.

The Royal Australian Navy facing this challenge

Australia's response runs largely through the AUKUS program, the tripartite security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States signed in 2021. This program provides for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, the first of which could enter service in the early 2030s. These submarines would represent a considerable force multiplier for Australia's maritime defense.

But AUKUS will not be operational tomorrow. In the meantime, Australia must work with its fleet of diesel-electric Collins-class submarines — reliable but with limited capabilities against a rapidly expanding PLA Navy. The Royal Australian Navy will benefit until then from the regular presence of American submarines based in Australia, something Canberra negotiated as a transitional measure. It is a partial solution to a non-partial threat.

AUKUS is a sound strategic decision. In 2021, it was presented as revolutionary. In 2026, it is still being implemented and the first submarines aren't expected for several years. In this in-between, Australia is more exposed than when AUKUS was signed, because China has continued to strengthen while Australia waited for its new submarines. That is the real temporal constraint the Lowy report helps measure.

Southeast Asian nations under pressure

The Lowy Institute underlines in its report that Southeast Asian nations "face growing pressure to align with Chinese interests even as they resist doing so publicly." This pressure is multifaceted: economic (dependence on Chinese investment and exports), military (growing Chinese naval presence), and informational (Chinese state media narrative dominant in several regional countries).

This dynamic is directly relevant for Australia, whose security depends on a stable and open Indo-Pacific. If Southeast Asian nations find themselves de facto under Beijing's dominant influence, Australia's commercial routes, regional alliances, and ability to project influence in the region will all be compromised. The threat to Australia is not only direct and military — it is also strategic and systemic.

Papua New Guinea and the Pacific: Australia's backyard under pressure

The island Pacific — which Australia and New Zealand traditionally consider their priority zone of influence — has for years been the theater of an influence competition between Canberra and Beijing. Chinese investments in infrastructure, fishing agreements, police training, and equipment donations create dependency ties with small island states. These ties are not necessarily military today. They create potential leverage for tomorrow.

Australia has responded with a reinforced Pacific initiative — the Pacific Step-up — which includes investments in submarine cables, digital connectivity assistance, and development programs. But Australia's Pacific budget remains limited against the financial resources Beijing can mobilize. This is an asymmetric competition Australia cannot win alone.

I recall a quote from an Australian analyst who said that Australia had long looked toward Europe as its cultural horizon and the United States as its security guarantor, without really looking at the Asia rising just above it. This Lowy report may be the end of that geographical and cultural luxury. Asia is there. It has missiles. And it is not waiting to be looked at before acting.

An Albanese government on a war footing

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's Australian government has been conducting a major review of its defense posture since 2022. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review concluded that Australia needed to shift from a "fortress Australia defense" force to one capable of long-range deterrence operations across the Indo-Pacific. This doctrinal change is profound and costly.

In budget terms, Australia committed to reaching 2% of GDP in defense spending — it was around 2% in 2024 according to NATO figures. Major acquisitions are underway: Tomahawk missiles, SM-6, air defense systems, long-range drones. And of course, AUKUS with its nuclear submarines. Australia in 2026 is an Australia rearming itself, conscious of its vulnerability.

The relationship with China: impossible but necessary balance

Despite the rearmament, Australia seeks to maintain a functional relationship with China. After years of trade tensions — Chinese sanctions on Australian barley, wine, and beef — the two countries have progressively normalized their trade since 2023. China remains Australia's top trading partner, with exchanges exceeding 200 billion dollars per year.

This economic dependence creates a permanent tension in Australian politics: how to acquire the military capabilities needed against China without triggering an economic break that would weaken the resources available for those same capabilities? There is no simple answer. Australia navigates this tension, seeking to maintain robust trade while building credible deterrence. It is a difficult equation, but the right one to pose.

Call her Mei. She is 34, works in aquaculture in northern Australia, looks out her window at the Pacific every morning. She didn't sign up to live on the potential frontline of a geopolitical conflict. But if Beijing's calculations ever change — if a Solomon Islands base materializes, if cables are cut, if a military warning escalates — it's her daily life that will be first upended. This Lowy report is for her. And for the tens of thousands of Mei's who live on this coast.

The Quad, Five Eyes, and AUKUS: pillars of Australia's response

Australia is a member of three complementary security architectures that define its response to the Chinese threat. The Quad (with the United States, Japan, and India) provides a platform for strategic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The Five Eyes (with the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand) guarantees the most complete and deep intelligence sharing available to any democracy. And AUKUS provides the critical submarine capabilities and a shared defense industrial base.

These architectures are complementary and coherent. They represent a serious response to a serious threat. But they have one limitation: they are only effective if their members honor their commitments with consistency. And in a world where the domestic politics of democracies fluctuate, that consistency is not guaranteed. That is why the Lowy report is also a form of pressure on allied governments: the threat is documented, the response must be too.

Australia's response to the Lowy report: urgency and sobriety

The official Australian reaction to the Lowy report of June 15, 2026 was measured. The government did not make grand alarmist statements. It took note. Officials confirmed that the report's conclusions aligned with Australian intelligence service assessments. This parallelism between academic analysis and government assessment is itself a signal: there is no gap between what researchers say and what governments know. The threat is real, documented, and shared.

Lead Lowy Institute expert Sam Roggeveen clarified to the ABC that while China's direct strike capability against Australia remains "limited," it is nonetheless "growing in a worrying manner." He added: "For a military force of China's magnitude, this capability remains relatively modest, as their focus has been more regional. But that focus is clearly shifting." This nuance matters. It avoids catastrophism. It does not deny reality.

The difference between an honest assessment and propaganda is precisely that: Roggeveen says the capability is limited but growing. He doesn't say China is going to attack Australia tomorrow morning. He says the trajectory is worrying and the time to act is now, not when the trajectory has become a certainty. This is exactly the type of rigorous analysis that democracies need to make sound strategic decisions.

The Chinese threat is not only about Taiwan

One of the most important contributions of the Lowy report of June 15, 2026 is demonstrating that the threat posed by China's military rise is not limited to Taiwan or the South China Sea. It extends, over time and space, to the most distant allied states — including Australia. This extension is directly linked to China's expanding long-range vector program.

The report also underlines that "China's military rise has already eroded U.S. military primacy in the Indo-Pacific, increased the threat to Taiwan, and created structural pressure on regional states to accommodate Beijing's preferences." These changes "affect Australian security independently of China's ability to strike Australian territory." The strategic environment has changed. And Australia must adapt to it.

The cost of inaction: higher than the cost of action

The report implicitly concludes that the cost of not responding to China's military rise is greater than the cost of responding. This logic applies not only to Australia but to all members of the Western alliance network in the Indo-Pacific. Current defense spending — significant but still below requirements — is less costly than the strategic concessions that would have to be made in a military environment dominated by Beijing.

This logic is not new. It is what guided Western defense policy during the Cold War. And it worked. Credible deterrence is the most economical long-term policy. The question is not whether we can afford to defend ourselves. It is whether we can afford not to. And the Lowy report, with its figures and projections, provides an unambiguous answer.

I think about the 977 billion dollars China will spend on defense by 2035 according to the Lowy report. That's almost double now. And against that, Australia is increasing its defense budget toward 2% of GDP. These two figures don't live in the same galaxy. What that means is that Australia, alone, cannot rebalance this equation. It needs its allies. And its allies need to understand that Canberra is no longer sheltered behind its ocean.

Chinese cyber operations against Australia: a heavy toll

The Lowy report is explicit on Chinese cyber operations: "China already has robust capabilities to disrupt Australian maritime trade via Indonesian archipelago choke points, to sever the submarine cables on which Australian communications and commerce depend, and to conduct sophisticated cyber operations against Australia's critical infrastructure." These three capabilities are operational now, not in ten years.

Australian cybersecurity agencies (ASD — Australian Signals Directorate) have documented cyber espionage and sabotage campaigns attributed to state actors linked to China. In 2020, the Australian government publicly acknowledged that "state-sponsored actors" were targeting Australian organizations across all sectors. This campaign is permanent, evolving, and difficult to counter completely in as open a digital environment as that of a liberal democracy.

Critical infrastructure resilience: a work in progress

Facing these threats, Australia has launched major programs to strengthen the cyber resilience of its critical infrastructure. The SOCI Act (Security of Critical Infrastructure Act), amended in 2021, imposes enhanced security obligations on critical infrastructure operators in 11 sectors, from electricity grids to maritime ports. Investments in submarine cable redundancy are planned.

But total resilience against an adversary of the PLA's capability is out of reach. Perfect cybersecurity does not exist. The realistic objective is to make cyber operations sufficiently costly and uncertain that Beijing only resorts to them in serious conflict — not for peacetime political pressure. Cyber deterrence rests on retaliation capability and resilience, not invulnerability.

Perfect cybersecurity is fiction. But I'm not talking about perfection. I'm talking about sufficiency — sufficiently difficult, sufficiently costly, sufficiently uncertain that the adversary chooses other options. And that sufficiency is built by seriously investing in detection, resilience, and response capability. Australia is moving in that direction. But the ground it must cover is vast and time is short.

The DF-26: first missile reaching Australian territory

The Lowy Institute's June 2026 report devotes particular attention to the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, nicknamed "Guam killer" in U.S. specialized press. Its operational range of 3,000 to 5,500 km allows it to reach not only the U.S. base at Guam but also the northern parts of Australia, including the bases at Darwin and Tindal, which host American force rotations. This missile can be fitted with either a conventional or nuclear warhead, creating additional strategic ambiguity for Australian defense planners: in a crisis, would a DF-26 strike on northern Australia be conventional or nuclear? This uncertainty is itself a form of deterrence.

The DF-27, a more recent intermediate-range ballistic missile first tested in 2023, complicates the picture further. Equipped with a maneuvering re-entry vehicle — making it harder to intercept — and with an estimated range of 5,000–8,000 km, it places all of Australian territory within its potential range. The Lowy report authors emphasized that HMAS Stirling naval base in Perth — future home of AUKUS submarines — and the major cities of Australia's eastern seaboard are now all within reach of Chinese precision missiles. This is not an abstract possibility. It is a reality of the PLA's military inventory in 2026.

Australia's missile defense capabilities: current state and gaps

Against these vectors, Australia's ballistic missile defense capabilities remain limited. The Australian Defence Force has short-to-medium range air defense and missile systems deployed on its Hobart-class frigates equipped with the Aegis system with SM-2 and SM-6 missiles. The future AUKUS submarines will bring deep-strike capability but not large-scale land or air-based ballistic missile defense. Australia depends largely on the American missile shield — particularly sensors and interceptors deployed in the region — for any defense against long-range ballistic missiles.

The Lowy report recommended accelerating Australian investments in ballistic defense, potentially including the acquisition of SM-3 or THAAD systems through American cooperation. It also insisted on the value of long-range offensive capabilities — under development through the AUKUS Pillar II program on advanced capabilities — as a complementary deterrence form. The best defense against missiles with 5,000 km range remains deterrence: making the cost of a first strike unacceptable for the aggressor.

The DF-26 can reach Darwin. That sentence should trigger debates in every defense school, every parliamentary committee, every Australian newsroom. It doesn't, enough. There is something deeply human in our inability to integrate abstract threats that haven't yet materialized. The Lowy report exists precisely to force that discomfort. Darwin is not Guam. But in Beijing's strategic calculus, the difference is smaller than one might think.

The H-20 program: characteristics and operational significance

One of the most significant analyses in the Lowy Institute's June 2026 report concerns the H-20 strategic bomber, China's first long-range stealth bomber, whose development is confirmed by Chinese authorities even though its in-service date remains uncertain. Its estimated characteristics — range of 8,000 to 10,000 km, payload capacity of 10 tonnes, B-2-style stealth design, compatibility with nuclear and conventional weapons — would make it the first Chinese strategic air platform capable of reaching Australia without refueling from Chinese mainland bases. The Lowy report emphasizes that the H-20's entry into service would mark a qualitative shift in the air threat China represents for Australia.

Currently, Chinese strategic airpower capable of reaching Australia relies on the H-6K and H-6N, jet bombers derived from the Soviet Tu-16 of the 1950s, modernized with long-range cruise missiles. These platforms, though upgraded, remain relatively vulnerable targets for modern air defense systems. The H-20, stealthy and longer-range, would change this equation. The Lowy report recommends that Australia start now planning its response to the H-20's entry into service — not when this bomber is operational, but before, so that countermeasures are in place at the right time.

The 2025 circumnavigation of Australia: demonstrating operational range

In 2025, PLA Navy vessels completed a full circumnavigation of Australian territory — a calculated demonstration of their ability to operate in all the oceans surrounding the Australian continent. The Lowy report analyzed this exercise as a demonstration of operational range: the Chinese Navy was signaling to Canberra that it can now operate in the Indian Ocean, the South Pacific, and Australian waters on a sustained basis, not merely in transit. This is not only a demonstration of naval power. It is a demonstration of logistical capability — the ability to sustain deployed forces far from their base for extended operations.

This demonstration directly fed Lowy report recommendations on Australian investments in submarine warfare, long-range maritime surveillance, and naval mines. The AUKUS submarines have value precisely in this context: they can operate discreetly in Australian approaches and exert counter-pressure on PLA naval forces at considerable distances. But their entry into service is not expected before the 2030s. Australia must manage a decade-long vulnerability window between the current threat and future AUKUS capabilities.

Chinese warships circled Australia. In 2025. Not in a Tom Clancy novel. In reality. I don't know if this news was covered widely enough in Australian media. I know it should have triggered a national debate, not just defense communiqués. Because if the PLA Navy can circumnavigate Australia in a demonstration, the following strategic question — the uncomfortable question — is: what does the same fleet look like on a combat mission?

AUKUS Pillar I: nuclear-powered submarines and their calendar

Announced in September 2021, the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States represents Australia's most significant defense agreement since the ANZUS Treaty. Its first pillar — equipping Australia with nuclear-powered submarines (but conventionally armed) — was detailed in a timeline in March 2023: American Virginia-class submarines rotational-stationed at HMAS Stirling in Perth from 2027, delivery of Virginia-class submarines to Australia from 2032, and the design and construction of a next-generation SSN-AUKUS submarine by 2040. The Lowy report praised this timeline as realistic while noting the risks of slippage.

Nuclear-powered submarines give Australia a radically different underwater endurance capability compared to current Collins-class diesel-electric submarines. They can operate for months without refueling, move at high speed, and reach operational zones in the South China Sea or off Taiwan's approaches from Australia in days rather than weeks. This capability changes Beijing's calculus: an AUKUS submarine fleet can threaten Chinese naval lines of communication well beyond Australia's immediate approaches.

AUKUS Pillar II: advanced non-nuclear capabilities

AUKUS's second pillar covers a broader spectrum of defense technology cooperation: artificial intelligence, autonomous undersea systems, electronic warfare, hypersonic missiles, cyber defense, and quantum technologies. This pillar receives less media coverage than the submarines but is potentially equally transformative. It creates a development and technology-sharing pipeline among the three countries that could considerably accelerate Australian defensive capabilities in domains where China is investing heavily. The Lowy report specifically cited hypersonic missiles developed under AUKUS cooperation as a capability that could offset Australian gaps in ballistic missile defense.

Beijing described AUKUS as a "Cold War mentality" and protested against nuclear technology transfer to Australia, even for conventional purposes. This reaction was predictable and largely cosmetic. China's operational response to AUKUS is visible in its military exercises, investments in anti-submarine missiles, and intelligence operations targeting Australian shipyards. The best proof that AUKUS disturbs Beijing is the intensity of its reaction. An initiative it judged inconsequential would not receive so much attention from the Chinese Communist Party.

AUKUS has a virtue its critics often forget: it forces Australia to choose. For years, Canberra tried to maintain deep commercial relations with Beijing while relying militarily on Washington. The coal, wine, and barley sanction crisis of 2020–2021 proved that double balance was unsustainable. AUKUS records a choice. It's uncomfortable. Choices always are. But countries that refuse to choose end up having their choice made for them.

Australia's dependence on China exports: a documented vulnerability

The Lowy Institute's June 2026 report did not limit its analysis to the direct military threat. It devoted a substantial section to the economic dimensions of the Australia-China relationship and their national security implications. The reality is documented and concerning: China absorbs approximately 30% of Australia's total exports, with extreme concentrations in certain sectors — iron ore (of which China is by far the top buyer), thermal coal, liquefied natural gas, and agricultural products. This dependence creates an economic vulnerability that Beijing demonstrated a willingness to exploit as a political lever during the diplomatic tensions of 2020–2021.

In parallel, Australia holds significant global reserves of critical minerals — lithium, cobalt, rare earths, nickel — essential for battery production, semiconductors, and modern weapons systems. This dual position creates a strategic tension: Australia wants its critical minerals to feed Western supply chains rather than the Chinese defense industry, but China controls a dominant share of global refining and processing capacity for these minerals. Owning the resources without controlling their processing remains a disguised dependence.

Australia's diversification strategy: reducing economic vulnerability

Since the 2020 Chinese sanctions, the Australian government has actively sought to diversify its trading partners and reduce its export dependence on China. Free trade agreements with India (2022), strengthened trade relations with Japan and South Korea, and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure initiative with Pacific countries constitute elements of this strategy. In parallel, Australia invested in developing national capacity to process critical minerals — to no longer export only raw materials but also processed components with higher added value.

The Lowy report emphasized that economic resilience is an indispensable component of national defense strategy. A country whose economy can be taken hostage by a potential adversary has reduced strategic options. Economic diversification is not just a trade policy — it is a defense policy. The Australia-India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement signed in 2022, participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework launched by the United States in 2022, and ongoing discussions on a trade agreement with the European Union all fit within this logic of vulnerability reduction. Every diversified trade partnership is a reduction of the coercive leverage Beijing can exert over Canberra.

Thirty percent of Australian exports to a single country. A country that, in 2020, imposed punitive tariffs on Australian coal, wine, and barley to punish Canberra for calling for an independent inquiry into COVID-19's origin. The lesson was costly. And it was learned. Australia in 2026 is not Australia in 2019 — it now knows what it means to be economically vulnerable to a partner willing to weaponize trade. That knowledge is painful. It is also irreplaceable.

The Lowy report as a turning point

The Roggeveen-Vallance report from the Lowy Institute of June 15, 2026 represents a turning point in Australia's national security debate. For the first time, a complete and sourced public assessment of the military threat China represents specifically for Australia is available to the general public, to decision-makers, and to allies. This report cannot be ignored. It cannot be refuted — the figures are verifiable, the trajectories are measurable, the arguments are built on accessible data.

This report is also a call to action. Not to panic. But to strategic lucidity and consistency of response. Australia is not without resources or allies. It is a member of AUKUS, the Quad, and Five Eyes. It has a developing defense industry, a rising budget, and a population that understands, according to polls, that the threat is real. What it needs is for these assets to be mobilized consistently and for its allies to honor their commitments with the same consistency.

What this means for all of us, here, now

The threat identified by the Lowy Institute is not an Australian threat alone. It is the regional manifestation of something global: Xi Jinping's authoritarian China challenging the liberal international order that democracies built since 1945. That order is not perfect. But it is preferable to what Beijing proposes as a replacement — an order where force supersedes law, where size determines rights, and where states unable to defend themselves alone are at the mercy of those that can.

Australia has just received a report telling it that this reality is arriving at its doorstep, in its own terms, with figures and projections. This is no longer an abstract geopolitical discussion. It is its strategic horizon. And the right response to this report is not fear. It is determination.

977 billion dollars of Chinese defense by 2035. Missiles that reach Sydney. Cables that can be cut. Bases sought in the Pacific. And on the other side: AUKUS, the Quad, Five Eyes, a robust Australian democracy and allies who, despite their internal divisions, remain fundamentally aligned on the same vision of a rules-governed world. I choose this side. Without hesitation. And I believe history will vindicate those who chose it early enough.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.