Seoul fears a new wave of North Korean troops heading to Russia

Introduction: an alliance that keeps deepening

A warning signal from Seoul

South Korea's intelligence service is watching with growing alarm the possibility of another wave of North Korean soldiers being sent to Russia, as Pyongyang and Moscow keep deepening a military alliance that is redrawing the strategic balance of Northeast Asia. According to estimates from the National Intelligence Service (NIS), roughly 1,100 soldiers who returned home in December 2025 could be sent back to the front to take part in the war, according to the Kyiv Independent.

This scenario fits a trend already documented since October 2024, the date of the first massive deployment of North Korean troops onto Russian soil. Each successive wave has confirmed one thing: this alliance is not a one-off commitment — it is a long-term strategy embraced by both regimes.

The number that worries everyone

Roughly 11,000 North Korean soldiers were reportedly stationed in Russia's Kursk oblast at the start of 2026, including 10,000 combat troops and 1,000 engineers, according to NIS data cited by the Kyiv Independent. North Korean losses in that region alone are estimated at roughly 6,000 soldiers, killed or wounded, a staggering figure for an army that had not seen a foreign engagement of this scale since the Korean War.

A gradual escalation since 2024

Three waves of deployment

Ukrainian intelligence has identified three successive waves of North Korean deployment: a first contingent of 11,000 to 12,000soldiers in October 2024, including units from the 11th Corps, known as the Storm Corps, then a second wave of 1,000 to 3,000 men, and finally a third wave of roughly 6,000 military engineers, bringing the total to 17,000-20,000 personnel according to estimates cited by Korea JoongAng Daily.

That number, which seemed unimaginable just two years ago, shows how quickly Pyongyang turned a mutual defense agreement signed in June 2024 into a concrete, bloody military commitment on the European theater.

The summer 2025 precedent

As early as June 2025, the NIS had warned that Pyongyang could send more troops in July or August, following a visit to Pyongyang by senior Russian security official Sergei Shoigu, according to a Korea Herald report. That visit led to the announcement of a third wave of 6,000 engineers and military construction personnel headed to the Kursk region.

The pattern is repeating itself almost identically a year later: a high-level diplomatic visit, followed by an intelligence warning of a potential new deployment. This is no longer speculation — it is a documented, recurring pattern of behavior.

The human price paid by Pyongyang

Colossal losses, an indifferent regime

The price paid by North Korean troops is staggering. British intelligence estimates North Korean casualties from offensive operations on Russian soil at more than 6,000, a figure confirmed by several Western agencies and cited by the Kyiv Independent. Despite these losses, the NIS noted that the North Korean army had "acquired modern combat tactics" through this deadly experience.

That seemingly technical sentence hides a chilling reality: for Pyongyang, every soldier killed in combat in Ukraine represents a profitable investment in military experience, later transferred across the North Korean army through repatriated soldiers who become instructors.

Surviving soldiers, the new trainers

Roughly 3,000 North Korean soldiers who gained combat experience have returned home to be reassigned as instructors, helping to modernize North Korea's military doctrine, force structure, and weapons systems, according to analyses cited by Korea JoongAng Daily.

The explosive context of the Israel-Iran ceasefire

An interconnected authoritarian architecture

The summary provided by authorities points to a link between the fragility of the Israel-Iranian ceasefire and the risk of a fresh deployment of North Korean troops, a hypothesis that fits into a broader context in which Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea share cross-cutting military support networks, as documented in a JINSA analysis.

This authoritarian architecture does not operate in isolation. A resumption of hostilities in the Middle East could divert Western attention and give Pyongyang and Moscow an additional window to intensify their military cooperation away from the media spotlight.

An axis that feeds on itself

Russia, in exchange for North Korean support, is transferring sensitive military technology to Pyongyang, particularly in satellite launch and missile guidance, according to South Korean intelligence assessments cited by Reuters. This trade of cannon fodder for technology transfer is one of the most dangerous developments of the war in Ukraine for global security.

The international community's limited response

Condemnations, but few concrete sanctions

Despite multiple confirmations of North Korean troopdeployments in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, the international response remains largely rhetorical. NATO's Secretary General called this deployment a "significant escalation" and a "further violation" of UN resolutions as early as October 2024, according to remarks reported by NATO, without this translating into new binding measures.

This relative impunity feeds Pyongyang and Moscow's confidence in continuing their military cooperation, a vicious circle that Western verbal condemnations clearly are not enough to break.

Seoul recalibrates its posture

Facing this escalation, South Korea has begun easing its long-standing restrictions on transferring South Korean weapons to Ukraine through third-party channels, a strategic shift driven directly by the presence of North Korean troops on the front, according to analyses from ukraine-war-analytics. This is a strong signal: even the countries most cautious toward Moscow can no longer ignore the direct threat this alliance represents.

The persistent mystery around the numbers

Estimates that diverge depending on the source

One of the most frustrating aspects of this file remains the difficulty of getting definitive numbers. Estimates vary significantly depending on whether one relies on South Korean, Ukrainian, or Western intelligence services, ranging from 11,000 to more than 20,000 soldiers deployed in total since 2024 depending on the period considered and the methodology used by each agency.

This divergence is not surprising given the total opacity surrounding the North Korean regime. Pyongyang has, in fact, never officially told its own population the scale of its military commitment in Russia, a concealment that speaks volumes about the nature of the regime.

The silence imposed on families

Intelligence services have even detected signs that North Korea was isolating the families of soldiers selected for deployment, placing them in special facilities to prevent any leak of information to the general population, according to South Korean parliamentary briefings reported by the Associated Press.

This totalitarian handling of information illustrates, once again, the degree of control Kim Jong Un's regime exerts over its population, including over the families of those paying with their lives for the strategic alliance with Moscow.

What this means for regional security

A threat that extends beyond Ukraine

The modern combat experience gained by North Korean troops in Ukraine will not stay confined to the European theater. Once repatriated, these soldiers and their officers pass that know-how directly to the entire Korean People's Army, strengthening a force that directly threatens the security of South Korea and Japan.

Analysts in the region believe this rising capability could significantly change Pyongyang's strategic calculus in its relations with Seoul, particularly regarding its drone-warfare and precision-artillery doctrine, now tested under real conditions on Ukrainian soil.

The test that Taiwan represents

This dynamic is not lost on Beijing either, which is closely watching how the West responds to North Korea's direct military involvement in a major conflict, a precedent that could influence its own calculations regarding Taiwan in the years ahead.

China's murky role in this axis

Beijing, spectator or silent accomplice

China, while officially neutral in the Ukrainian conflict, continues to maintain close economic ties with Russia and North Korea, without ever explicitly condemning the deployment of North Korean troops in violation of UN sanctions. This complicit silence allows Pyongyang to continue its military commitment without fear of a rupture with its main regional economic backer.

Several Western analysts believe Beijing tolerates this alliance as long as it does not directly threaten its own strategic interests, a balancing act that could, however, become untenable if the conflict were to widen further.

A four-way axis that worries Washington

Western intelligence services are now watching this four-way configuration, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China in the background, as the main structural threat to the post-Cold-War international order, a view shared by several American defense think tanks.

This convergence of authoritarian interests, however fragile ideologically, produces concrete, measurable effects on the ground, from the Ukrainian front to tensions in the South China Sea.

Conclusion: an alliance thriving on Western silence

What Seoul truly fears

What South Korean intelligence truly fears is not simply another number of deployed soldiers, but confirmation that this military alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow is now structural, lasting, and designed to survive well beyond the war in Ukraine itself.

The urgency of a coordinated Western response

Facing an axis that now links Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, in the background, China, the West can no longer afford to treat each file separately. Every North Korean soldier sent to the Ukrainian front is also a signal sent to Taiwan, to the Korean peninsula, and to the entire rules-based international order that these regimes are systematically working to dismantle.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

This essay relies on South Korean, Ukrainian, and Western intelligence data reported by verified media outlets, as well as official NATO statements. No unverifiable information or personal testimony was used. Troop and casualty figures vary depending on the cited sources, a discrepancy explicitly flagged in the text, reflecting the inherent uncertainty of any military intelligence estimate on a country as closed as North Korea.

Sources

Primary sources

The Kyiv Independent — Nearly 11,000 North Korean troops stationed in Russia's Kursk Oblast at start of 2026, February 13, 2026

NATO — Doorstep statement by Secretary General Mark Rutte on DPRK's troop deployment to Russia, October 28, 2024

Secondary sources

Korea JoongAng Daily — Up to 8,000 North Korean troops remain in Russia's Kursk region, February 11, 2026

The Korea Herald — North Korea likely to send more troops to Russia in July, August: NIS, June 26, 2025

Reuters — North Korea may send more troops to Russia in July or August for Ukraine war, Seoul says, June 26, 2025

JINSA — The Axis Behind Iran: How China, Russia, and North Korea Sustain Tehran's Military Threat, March 25, 2026