REPORTAGE: Taiwan Forsaken — Trump Sacrifices a Democracy on the Altar of the Xi Summit

Introduction: The Island Washington No Longer Dares to Call

A Silence That Weighs Billions

On June 21, 2026, while democracies across the globe celebrate their solidarity in words, Taiwan watches Washington with growing anxiety. Donald Trump does not plan to call Lai Ching-te, the Taiwanese president. No phone conversation. No strong diplomatic signal. Two sources close to the matter confirm that no move has been made toward organizing such a meeting — and it depends entirely on the American president's willingness to take the initiative. In other words: nothing is planned, nothing is imminent, and the probability of such a call is estimated at less than 10%.

This silence is not trivial. It is the reflection of a calculated strategy: do nothing that could offend Beijing before Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington scheduled for September 2026. The American president invited his Chinese counterpart on September 24. Everything else — weapons, the call to Taipei, statements of support — is on the back burner. Taiwan has become a diplomatic adjustment variable.

The 2016 Scenario Still in Memory

The Trump administration remembers perfectly what happened in late 2016, when the president-elect picked up his phone to answer the congratulatory call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. It was the first direct contact of its kind since 1979. Beijing immediately issued an official protest, denouncing it as a "small trick" by Taipei. The lesson was learned — but in the wrong way.

Today, according to three sources close to the matter reported by the South China Morning Post, Washington believes a Trump-Lai call could derail the expected summit with Xi Jinping and annihilate the fragile détente achieved last May in Beijing. Bonnie Glaser, director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, is unambiguous: such a call "would probably torpedo" Xi's visit and "destroy the fragile stability reached in Beijing." Taiwanese democracy is paying the price for this caution.

The 14 Billion Package: Approved, but Frozen

A Congress That Votes, a White House That Blocks

In January 2026, the U.S. Congress gave the green light to an arms package worth $14 billion for Taiwan. This package includes advanced air defense systems: PAC-3 Patriot interceptors and NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems), as well as medium-range munitions and essential anti-drone assets. All of this represents what one U.S. official called "indispensable capabilities" to deter a Chinese military offensive.

But the Congressional vote is not enough. Under Foreign Military Sales rules, it is the American president who must formally notify Congress for the sale to become enforceable. Trump hasn't done it. He has let the file stagnate at the State Department for months. Just before his visit to Beijing in May 2026, the White House explicitly put this package on hold to "not provoke Xi," according to several sources cited by the New York Times. According to NPR, two arms packages totaling approximately $14 billion were delayed for fear of offending Beijing before the presidential trip.

Trump: "A Good Bargaining Chip"

Upon returning from Beijing, Trump dropped a phrase that shocked Taipei and Washington: asked about the 14 billion package, he stated during an interview on Fox News that he was "putting it on hold" because it is "a very good bargaining chip." The phrasing is telling. For Trump, arms sales to a besieged democracy are first and foremost a commercial lever in his dealings with Beijing — not a moral or strategic obligation toward a partner.

Since then, ambiguity has set in. Secretary of State Marco Rubio asserted before Congress in June that the package was not "officially on pause," but still under review. Trump, for his part, has said several times that he might or might not approve it. Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, counted four pending arms packages for Taiwan, two of which have been publicly reported. According to him, "all the president has to do is say 'go'," and the contracts follow.

The Beijing Visit in May: Xi Gets What He Wanted

Beijing Had Orchestrated Its Request Since the Beginning of the Year

According to an exclusive investigation by the South China Morning Post, Chinese officials began pressuring Washington to reduce the size of arms packages destined for Taiwan as early as the beginning of 2026 — well before Trump’s trip to Beijing was pushed back to May due to the war with Iran. Beijing wanted not only to slow the pace of approvals but also to stop the upward trend of record amounts approved under Trump. One official framed the Chinese ambition in these terms: Beijing was seeking to "arrest the trend line" on the record packages of the second Trump presidency.

Washington had nevertheless approved a first record package of $11.1 billion in December 2025, including HIMARS and self-propelled howitzers. This move provoked Beijing’s fury and targeted sanctions against American defense companies. Trump then seemed to want to hold the line. But the logic of the summit then took over: to prepare for a "historic" meeting with Xi, everything that could irritate Beijing had to be avoided — and Taiwan was at the top of the irritants list.

The Communiqué That Doesn't Mention Taiwan

At the end of the May 2026 summit in Beijing, the initial White House communiqué did not mention Taiwan. Secretary of State Rubio told NBC News that the subject "did not feature prominently" in the first day's discussions. The Chinese summary of the summit's conclusion highlighted the benefits of cooperation without mentioning Taiwan. As for Xi Jinping, he had opened the discussions by warning Trump of the risk of "conflicts" if Washington mismanaged the Taiwanese issue — and Trump had clearly signaled his desire to avoid any escalation.

The result is clear: Xi left without a formal concession from Trump on Taiwan, but having obtained the essentials — a freeze on arms sales and the absence of a Trump-Lai call. Le Monde correctly headlined: "Trump falls for China's bluff over arms sales to Taiwan." Because Beijing knew perfectly well that the United States is legally bound to arm Taiwan for its defense — Xi simply bet that Trump would treat this obligation as a card to be played.

The Strategic Error: Repeating Bush and Obama

A Well-Documented Precedent of Temporary Capitulation

What Trump is doing with Taiwan is not without precedent. George W. Bush had suspended arms sales to Taiwan in 2007 and 2008. Barack Obama did the same from 2011 to 2015. In both cases, according to Hammond-Chambers, these presidents repeated the "same error." They assumed that unilateral concessions on arms sales would change Beijing's calculations in other areas — trade, economic opportunities, Boeing aircraft sales, soybeans.

This bet has always proven false. Unilateral concessions have not modified China’s strategic behavior. They simply taught Beijing that it was enough to threaten diplomatically to obtain pauses in deliveries. Hammond-Chambers puts it clearly: Trump is making "a false assumption" in believing that arms sales are a lever that Beijing will use positively — while they are merely a pretext for bargaining that China has no reason to honor.

Even a "Few Months" Freeze Can Be Costly

Bonnie Glaser attempted to downplay the impact by observing that "a delay of a few months won't change much" given existing production delays in the American defense industry. But this logic is dangerous. It is not the timing of deliveries that is at issue — it is the political signal sent to Beijing, Taipei, and all of Washington’s Indo-Pacific partners. Every month of the freeze confirms that arms sales are a negotiable variable, not an inalienable commitment.

A diplomat cited by the South China Morning Post summarized the dynamic with chilling lucidity: Beijing has understood that the mere fact of waving the prospect of future engagement with Washington was enough to delay sales to Taiwan. It is a mechanism that Beijing has been perfecting for years, with increasing effectiveness — and Washington continues to fall into the trap.

The F-16s Ordered in 2019: Delivery Scheduled for Late 2027

A Seven-Year-Old Order, Still Not Honored

The history of delays in American arms deliveries to Taiwan is long, but the case of the F-16V Block 70 is emblematic. Taiwan ordered 66 aircraft in 2019, under the Foreign Military Sales program, with a budget of 247.2 billion Taiwanese dollars (about 8 billion USD). The initial delivery was planned for 2023-2024. It was first pushed back to late 2026. It is now expected for late 2027 at the earliest, according to data compiled by Taiwan News citing studies from George Mason University.

The reasons are manifold: production line relocations, supply chain disruptions, and competition with other American military priorities. Contractors are now working in two 20-hour shifts per day to speed up production, according to the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense. But the situation remains critical: none of the 66 aircraft have been delivered yet, and the first unit that left the production line in March 2026 has not been followed by others.

Glide-Bomb Missiles and Torpedoes Also Delayed

The F-16s are not the only system affected. AGM-154C guided glide missiles, intended for the F-16V Block 70 and valued at $4.42 billion, saw their delivery initially planned for 2024 pushed back to 2027-2028. The 24 Mark 48 heavyweight torpedoes and four training torpedoes have been pushed back to between 2026 and 2028. According to Rush Doshi, former deputy director for China-Taiwan affairs at the National Security Council, the delays on the F-16Vs now extend to 2027 or 2028.

Hammond-Chambers put things in perspective brutally regarding potential new orders: "We're talking about deliveries in the 2030s." These future buyers are therefore not affected by short-term production efforts. But Taiwan, which has been waiting since 2019, is. Taiwanese democracy finances its own defenses — it pays for them in full — and receives deliveries late while its designated protectors are distracted by their political calculations.

Lai Ching-te: "Great Confidence" in a Diplomatic Vacuum

The Taiwanese President Attempts to Preserve the Facade

On June 18, 2026, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te expressed "great confidence" in the prospect that Trump would approve the $14 billion in arms sales, attempting to soothe concerns sparked by statements in May where Trump treated American military support for Taiwan as a bargaining chip. According to the New York Times, Lai recalled that Trump had authorized $18 billion in arms sales during his first term, and that the $11 billion package approved in December 2025 demonstrated continued commitment.

Lai stated: "President Trump's arms sales have essentially met Taiwan's needs, and we remain optimistic about these upcoming sales." But this displayed confidence contrasts with reality. His Foreign Minister, Lin Chia-lung, called the arms sales delays a "technical problem" — a phrasing that seems to downplay what many in Taipei consider a major diplomatic setback. When a reporter from the Star asked Lin if a Trump-Lai call was planned, he replied that he couldn't speak for Trump, but that "Taiwan is ready for a call at any time."

Isolation Accelerating in the Face of Beijing

Lai is facing considerable pressure on all fronts. In May 2026, during an attempted official visit to Swaziland, three countries revoked overflight permissions for his plane less than 24 hours before his departure, under pressure from Beijing. The European Union denounced the weaponization of airspace as a political tool. Lai eventually spoke at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit in May, where he reaffirmed: "No attempt to isolate Taiwan will change our determination to participate in the international community."

On June 18, 2026, Lai convened a rare international press conference to denounce a campaign of "transnational repression" orchestrated by Beijing against Taiwan, including pressure on global media to ignore or reduce Taiwanese coverage. This public statement testifies to a reality that Taipei can no longer keep quiet: Taiwan's diplomatic space is shrinking, and Washington — supposed to be its shield — is stalling.

The May Détente: A Fragile Victory for Xi

A Summit Without a Joint Communiqué, but With Real Gains for Beijing

The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing in May 2026 was described by Trump as "historic" — but it produced neither a joint communiqué nor a concrete agreement. The "fantastic trade deals" touted by Trump were not detailed. What is proven, however, is what Beijing obtained behind the scenes: a freeze on arms sales to Taiwan, a total absence of a Trump-Lai call, and the confirmation that Washington is ready to treat Taiwan’s security as an adjustment variable.

Xi had opened the discussions by warning Trump of the risk of "conflicts" if Washington continued to arm Taiwan. Trump had responded by emphasizing his desire to avoid escalation. Rubio, in an interview with NBC on May 15, stated that American policy on Taiwan was "unchanged to date." But the post-summit reality contradicts this assertion: the freeze on the 14 billion, Trump’s statements on Taiwan as an "asset," and the absence of the Lai call tell a different story.

Beijing Learns to Play the Long Game

Beijing’s strategy is sophisticated and patient. According to an anonymous source cited by the SCMP, Beijing has learned that the mere fact of dangling the carrot of a future engagement with Washington was enough to delay arms sales to Taiwan. The prospect of the September 2026 summit in Washington is now playing the same role as the May summit in Beijing. As long as the horizon of a G2 — a term used by Trump himself during the G7 in France to describe the US-China relationship — remains open, Taiwan will remain on hold.

This logic has a real cost. Every month of delay in arms sales is a month during which the People's Liberation Army continues to modernize its amphibious capabilities, its ballistic missiles, and its invasion forces. The gap between Chinese military capabilities and Taiwanese defensive preparation is not filled with statements of principle — it is only filled with delivered NASAMS, operational PAC-3s, and F-16Vs in flight.

AmCham and the Trade Deal: Economic Diplomacy Instead of Security

A Trade Deal Masking Strategic Fragility

On June 16, 2026, the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan (AmCham Taiwan), celebrating its 75th anniversary, published its annual white paper. Its president, Carl Wegner, announced that a delegation was heading to Washington for "door-knock" meetings with U.S. officials, with a central message: Taiwan is the only one of the United States' top ten trading partners not to benefit from a double taxation agreement. This tax vacuum exposes Taiwanese companies investing in the U.S. to effective tax rates of up to 51%, compared to about 40% for their South Korean or Australian competitors.

The double taxation agreement has been blocked in the U.S. Senate for years. Wegner expressed cautious optimism, linked to the Accord on Reciprocal Trade (ART) signed earlier in 2026, which brought U.S. tariffs on Taiwanese exports down to 15% — aligned with those of Japan and South Korea. In exchange, Taiwan committed to direct investments of at least $250 billion in the United States. TSMC had already committed 100 billion in 2025.

Economic Cooperation Does Not Replace the Security Guarantee

The AmCham Taiwan white paper highlights that Taiwanese companies are among the world leaders in drone development and asymmetric warfare equipment, and that the opportunities for cooperation with U.S. partners in R&D and co-production are "enormous." But this industrial cooperation takes place against a backdrop of growing diplomatic vulnerability. The Taiwanese are contributing massively to American re-industrialization, investing hundreds of billions — and seeing their arms purchases frozen and their calls to the U.S. president postponed in return.

This is the structural contradiction of the Taipei-Washington relationship under Trump in 2026: maximal on the economic and technological level, minimal on the level of formal security. Taiwan gives. Taiwan invests. Taiwan waits. And meanwhile, Beijing continues to erode the island's diplomatic space, emboldened by the spectacle of a stalling Washington.

The HIMARS Facing West: Taiwanese Defense Regardless

A Historic Shot Toward the Taiwan Strait

On June 10, 2026, the Taiwanese military reached a symbolic and military milestone: for the first time, U.S.-supplied HIMARS launchers fired their rockets toward the China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait, from the island's west coast in Taichung. The live-fire exercise showcased a "shoot-and-scoot" strategy, aimed at illustrating the Taiwanese forces' ability to retreat quickly after firing to evade radar and retaliation.

These exercises, which also included 155 mm howitzers, simulated a response to a potential Chinese invasion. Battery commander Ko Ming-pin described a rapid mobilization of vehicles, which fired in less than three minutes, producing bright flashes — a demonstration of precision and agility. With an operational range of approximately 300 km, the HIMARS could theoretically hit coastal installations in China’s Fujian province, just across the strait. This signal was not ignored by Beijing.

Operational Pride in the Face of Diplomatic Abandonment

These exercises represent the only area where Taiwan can express itself with some strength. On the military level, the island trains, invests, integrates delivered systems — and lets it be known that it is ready to defend itself. Taiwan's representative to the United States, Alexander Yui, simply told CNN: "As an island, our firing options are limited to east or west, and they opted for west." A sober phrasing that says a lot about Taiwan’s geographic and strategic situation.

These HIMARS are precisely those whose delivery is proceeding on a more favorable schedule than other systems. The first delivery of 11 launchers took place in October 2025, ahead of the original 2027 schedule. The remaining 18 are expected by the end of 2026. It is one of the few pieces of good news in a picture overall marked by delays. But HIMARS are no substitute for F-16s, PAC-3 missiles, or NASAMS. They are one element of a global defense that remains incomplete.

The Mechanics of Beijing’s Diplomatic Blackmail

A Well-Oiled Agenda for Years

Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan has not changed in its broad outlines: it is about gradually isolating the island, reducing its access to defensive weapons, preventing any high-level contact between Taipei and Western capitals, and waiting for diplomatic fatigue to do the rest. What has changed is the effectiveness of this strategy — and Washington’s growing receptivity to these pressures.

The revocation of overflight permissions for Lai’s plane by three countries during his attempt to visit Swaziland, the continuous pressure on international media, the use of economic blackmail against American defense companies — all of this is part of an arsenal that Beijing deploys with remarkable consistency. And in the face of this arsenal, Washington responds with statements of principle on maintaining American policy toward Taiwan, while delaying deliveries and avoiding phone calls.

China Tests the Strength of the Alliance

Every move by Trump — every pause on arms sales, every missed call, every ambiguous statement on Taiwan’s independence — sends a signal to Beijing about the actual strength of the American commitment. And what Beijing observes is encouraging for its calculations: Washington can be maneuvered, commitments can be suspended, red lines are not red lines if pushed gently. Trump himself stated, according to the SCMP, that Taiwan should "cool it a little" — repeating word-for-word the narrative that Beijing has been disseminating for years.

This test of the alliance's strength has implications far beyond Taiwan. Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines are all watching what is happening. If Washington is willing to freeze arms sales to Taiwan to appease Beijing before a summit, what does that say about the reliability of American commitments to them? America’s deterrent credibility in the Indo-Pacific is being traded away, too, every time Trump sells out his commitments to Taipei.

The American Business Community on the Ground: Between Optimism and Lucidity

AmCham: 75 Years of Presence, a Resilient Confidence

**AmCham Taiwan** represents over 500 corporate members. On its 75th anniversary, it is publishing a white paper that testifies to a real and deep American economic commitment to Taiwan — a commitment that transcends political fluctuations. Carl Wegner described the trade relationship between Taipei and Washington as being "in much better shape than a year earlier," before the announcement of Trump's general tariffs in 2025. The Accord on Reciprocal Trade has effectively stabilized the economic relationship.

But Wegner also said something revealing about the blockage of the double taxation agreement: "We hear it's progressing — obviously, we've been hearing it's progressing for years." This sentence, delivered with bittersweet irony, sums up the Taipei-Washington relationship in 2026: a facade of optimism, real frustration, and a feeling that promises accumulate without ever materializing. Taiwan remains the only one of the United States' top ten trading partners without a double taxation agreement. After the ART, after 250 billion in promised investments, the question remains open.

Taiwanese Investment as an Economic Shield

The fact that Taiwanese companies are preparing to invest massively in the United States creates a form of economic shield: the more American financial interests are entangled with Taiwan, the harder it becomes for Washington to abandon it entirely. This is a deliberate strategy on the part of Taipei — strengthening economic interdependence to compensate for strategic vulnerability. TSMC in Phoenix, memory fabs, R&D centers — every investment is also an argument for Taiwan's defense.

But this strategy has its limits. It assumes that American decision-makers evaluate Taiwan's value not only in economic terms but also in terms of democratic values and regional security. However, under Trump, the criterion often seems to boil down to a single question: does it help me in my negotiations with Beijing? And when the answer is no, Taiwan waits.

International Law and the Taiwan Relations Act: The Flickering Safeguards

A U.S. Law That Imposes Itself Even on Trump

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 is the cornerstone of American policy toward Taiwan. It obliges the United States to provide Taiwan with weaponry of such nature and quantity as to enable it to defend itself. It also prohibits Washington from consulting Beijing on these arms sales — a provision Trump publicly violated by confirming he discussed the sales with Xi during the May summit. Trump himself acknowledged this contradiction but brushed aside the argument, saying: "What am I supposed to do — say I can't discuss it because of a 1982 agreement?"

In doing so, Trump treats the "Six Assurances" of 1982 — which explicitly state that Washington would not consult Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan — as relics of another era. Rubio, in his attempt to reassure Congress, said American policy on Taiwan was "unchanged." But how can it be unchanged when the president himself admits to having discussed arms sales with the leader of the country that is supposed to be ignored?

Bipartisan Senators Sound the Alarm

On May 8, 2026, before the Beijing summit, a bipartisan coalition of senators — including Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Thom Tillis (R-NC) — sent an urgent letter to Trump, urging him to formally notify the 14 billion package to Congress and clearly stating that "American support for Taiwan is not subject to negotiation." On May 13, the House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced the PORCUPINE Act (H.R.7146) unanimously (45-0), aimed at accelerating arms deliveries to Taiwan. These bipartisan signals show that the freeze imposed by Trump is far from consensus in Washington.

American democracy itself is resisting the drift. But as long as the president maintains control over the formal notification of sales, Congressional votes remain symbolic. The button is in Trump's hands — and so far, he hasn't pressed it. Taiwan, meanwhile, monitors Congressional votes, records Rubio’s statements, and waits for a signal from a man who seems more preoccupied with his next summit with Xi than with his country's legal obligations.

Toward September 2026: The Next Opportunity for Pressure on Taipei

The Washington Summit: A New Sword of Damocles

The mechanics repeat themselves. Before the Beijing summit in May, arms sales were frozen. Now, before the Washington summit in September, arms sales remain in limbo and the Trump-Lai call is ruled out. Bonnie Glaser predicts that the sales will be announced "some time after" Xi's visit — meaning after September 2026 at the earliest. This timeline provides Beijing with an additional window of several months during which no major reinforcement of Taiwan's defensive capabilities will be officially announced.

China has perfectly understood the dynamic. According to a diplomatic source cited by the SCMP, Taiwan will be a "key issue in high-level exchanges" between Beijing and Washington — which, in current diplomatic language, means Beijing will continue to use it as a bargaining chip. The cycle is set: summit in sight → freeze on sales → summit held → a few sales announced → new summit in sight → freeze restarted. Taiwan is caught in this cycle structurally.

The Darkest Scenario: When the Window Closes

Strategic analysts worry about a specific scenario: one where cumulative delays — in sales, deliveries, and the credibility of the American commitment — create a perceived window of opportunity for Beijing. If China believes the moment has never been more favorable to act — with a Washington in negotiation mode, delayed deliveries, and a diplomatically isolated Taiwan — the incentives for military action increase. This is precisely the deterrent reasoning that justified the vigor of support for Taiwan for decades.

The recent history of Ukraine offers a painful precedent. Unhonored promises, blurred commitment signals, ill-defined red lines — all elements that encouraged Putin to take the leap in 2022. Taiwan is not Ukraine, Beijing is not Moscow — but the dynamic of a great democracy leaving its partners in uncertainty over its commitments is dangerously familiar. And this time, the nuclear and economic stakes are even higher.

Conclusion: Democracy is Sold, but Not Delivered

A Mid-2026 Report That Should Worry Us

As of this June 22, 2026, the picture is clear. Trump will not call Lai — probability less than 10% according to experts, confirmed by the absence of any movement in that direction. The $14 billion package approved by Congress remains frozen since January, used as a bargaining chip with Beijing. The F-16Vs ordered in 2019 will not be delivered before late 2027 at best. The September summit with Xi is already conditioning American policy toward Taiwan — just as the May summit did. And meanwhile, Beijing is intensifying the island's diplomatic isolation with a consistent and patient strategy.

Taiwan faces this with a combination of admirable resilience and growing vulnerability. Its soldiers train with HIMARS. Its president speaks of "great confidence" while waiting for a call. Its business community invests 250 billion in the United States in the hope that money talks where democratic values have been silenced. It is a dignified survival strategy — but it is not the protection that a democracy of 23 million people deserves from the global democratic alliance.

What the West Risks Losing

Taiwanese democracy is not just a trading partner or a bargaining chip. It is living proof that a Chinese society can be free, pluralistic, and prosperous — and in that, it is an existential threat to the legitimacy of Xi Jinping’s regime at a much deeper level than any arms sale. That is why Beijing wants to crush, isolate, or absorb it. And that is why the West cannot afford to let it go — not just out of strategic interest, but out of loyalty to its own founding values.

If Washington allows Taiwan to be diplomatically isolated to preserve the détente with Beijing, it doesn't just lose a partner in semiconductors or an outpost in the first island chain. It loses the credibility of its promise: that democracies protect their own. And when that promise is emptied of its meaning, the world will be profoundly changed — and not in the way we want.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

The Star / South China Morning Post — No call with Taiwan, no new arms sales: how Trump is preparing to welcome Xi — June 21, 2026

Taipei Times — AmCham hopeful for progress on stalled double tax deal — June 16, 2026

The New York Times — Taiwan's President Says He Trusts Trump to Approve Arms Sales — June 18, 2026

Secondary Sources

South China Morning Post — The art of the deal: how Beijing pushed Trump to 'arrest' the trend on Taiwan arms sales — May 29, 2026

Le Monde — Trump falls for China's bluff over arms sales to Taiwan — May 18, 2026

Al Jazeera — US pausing $14bn arms sale to Taiwan due to Iran war, Navy chief says — May 22, 2026

CNN — Taiwan test-fires rockets in China's direction from US-supplied HIMARS — June 10, 2026

NPR — As Trump plans visit to China, arms package to Taiwan is delayed — March 4, 2026