ANALYSIS: Trump-Xi Summit, a Facade of Stability — Taiwan, One Bargaining Chip Too Many

Introduction: Beijing, May 2026 — Xi’s Smile Hides a Concrete Red Line

A Historic Summit, a Deceptive Atmosphere

On May 14, 2026, Donald Trump landed in Beijing for the first state visit by an American president to China in nearly nine years. Welcomed with military honors at the Great Hall of the People, alongside a smiling and ceremonious Xi Jinping, the scene was perfect for the cameras. Two hours of formal discussions, a state banquet, an excursion to the Temple of Heaven: everything in the staging evoked a thaw. The two presidents agreed to aim for "constructive strategic stability" as the guiding framework for bilateral relations for the next three years and beyond, according to the Chinese state agency Xinhua.

But behind the friendly declarations, the divergences haven’t disappeared — they’ve simply been covered with a carefully polished diplomatic varnish. The most burning questions, Taiwan and Iran, were not resolved. They were adjourned with cautious words and calculated non-answers. This historic summit, at its core, produced more opera than substance.

Two Narratives of the Same Event

The divergence is glaring starting from the official communiqués. The American summary of the first day of discussions does not mention Taiwan — it highlights the common desire to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and potential Chinese purchases of American oil. The Chinese summary, however, places Taiwan at the heart of Xi’s message, who warned Trump that any "mishandling" of the Taiwanese issue could drag both countries toward a "collision, or even a conflict". Two accounts of the same meeting, two radically different priorities.

It is precisely this asymmetry of perception that makes the summit’s outcome so concerning for the West. Washington talks about soybeans, Boeing, and fentanyl. Beijing talks about Taiwan. And in this gap, there is a danger that commentators too enthusiastic about "restored stability" seem not to want to see.

Xi Jinping: Taiwan is the Absolute Test, and He Said So Bluntly

An Unusually Clear Warning

In the solemn setting of the Great Hall of the People, Xi Jinping spoke words of a firmness rare for a diplomatic setting. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he told Trump: "If the situation were mishandled, the two countries could collide, or even enter into conflict, which would put Sino-American relations in an extremely dangerous situation." This warning, unusual in its firmness within a solemn setting, contrasted with a meeting described by both sides as friendly and relaxed. Xi added that "Taiwanese independence and peace in the strait are as irreconcilable as fire and water."

For Beijing, the formula is clear: Taiwan is the variable that conditions everything else. "If the Taiwan issue is well managed, the bilateral relationship will remain generally stable; otherwise, the two countries will have frictions, or even confrontations," specified the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, echoing the tone of Xi’s remarks. This is the firmest position Xi has articulated to a sitting American president in years.

Trump "Listened to Him" — And That Is Precisely the Problem

Trump’s response to these warnings? Vague, cautious, deliberately ambiguous. Aboard Air Force One, returning to Washington, he told reporters: "On Taiwan, he is very firm. I haven't made any commitment one way or the other." He confirmed that he and Xi "talked a lot about Taiwan," and concluded with a phrase that sows doubt: "I think everything will be fine. He doesn't want a war." But to hear Xi, nod, and not reply firmly regarding American commitments to Taipei is already a signal.

Chinese diplomacy immediately captured this moment. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated after the summit that "the American side understands China's position, respects China's concerns and, like the international community, does not recognize or accept Taiwan's independence." Beijing presented Trump’s listening as an admission. A reading that Washington rushed to contest — but with very little conviction.

The $14 Billion Arms Package: Suspended, Transformed into a Bargaining Chip

A Package Approved by Congress, Frozen by the White House

In January 2026, the Trump administration had the U.S. Congress approve an arms package for Taiwan worth $14 billion, including PAC-3 Patriot interceptors, NASAMS air defense systems, anti-drone technologies, and advanced munitions. This package exceeded the previous record — itself set in December 2025, when Trump authorized a sale of $11 billion. But since January, the $14 billion package was sitting in the drawers of the State Department, frozen on instructions from the White House so as not to "complicate" the path to the Beijing summit.

Senators from both parties had sent, on May 11, 2026, an urgent letter asking Trump to formally notify Congress of the sale before his departure for Beijing. "We strongly encourage your administration to formally notify the $14 billion in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan," they wrote, recalling that the Taiwanese Parliament had voted for a special defense budget of $25 billion to finance these purchases. The call went unanswered.

Trump Explains: "A Very Good Negotiating Chip"

Back on Air Force One, Trump lifted the veil on his strategy. Asked by Fox News about the fate of the $14 billion package, he replied bluntly: "I’m putting it on hold, and it depends on China. It’s a very good negotiating chip for us, frankly. It’s a lot of weapons." He added: "I haven't given my approval yet. We'll see what happens. I might do it, I might not do it." And on the direct question of a decision: "I will make a determination" — a phrase that instantly became symbolic of all American ambiguity.

This declaration caused a silent earthquake in Taipei. Taiwan had spent immense political capital to get this defense budget passed against KMT opposition. Its President Lai Ching-te had aligned Taiwanese policy with Washington, invested hundreds of billions in the American tech industry. And now Trump was calling this defensive weaponry a "negotiating chip." The betrayal of the word was as strong as that of the act.

The Six Assurances Broken: A Rupture with Forty Years of Doctrine

A Founding Commitment Set Aside

Since the Reagan administration, the United States had committed — via the Six Assurances of 1982 — to never consult Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. This cardinal principle had been respected by every administration since Nixon, whether Republican or Democratic. It was one of the fundamental guarantees of American credibility in the Pacific. During this May 2026 summit, Trump broke this rule in a public and deliberate manner. Asked about this point, he told reporters: "What am I supposed to do? Say I can't discuss it because of a 1982 agreement? No, we talked about arms sales."

The Center for American Progress called this rupture "dangerous and fundamental," estimating that Trump not only froze a vital arms package but "demolished" the commitment to never negotiate Taiwan’s security with Beijing. The American position had always been anchored in three trilateral communiqués, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and the policies of all presidents since the normalization of relations with Beijing. All this architecture of forty years of strategic coherence is now cracked.

Secretary of State Rubio’s Semantic Contortions

Faced with the storm, Secretary of State Marco Rubio tried to contain the damage. After the first day of the summit, he told NBC News that Taiwan "did not figure significantly in today's discussions." But Trump, in the same time frame, told Fox News he had discussed arms sales "in great detail" with Xi. This contradiction between the two highest officials of American foreign policy sowed confusion in Taipei, Tokyo, and every allied capital in the Pacific.

Rubio then repeated, several times, that "U.S. policy on Taiwan is unchanged to this day." But when the American ambassador to China, David Perdue, had to clarify the next day by saying that "President Trump has been very clear: we are not changing U.S. policy on Taiwan," it was clear that something important had nonetheless shifted. You don't clarify what isn't blurry. The obsessive repetition of "nothing has changed" was already a tacit recognition that everything had shaken.

Taiwan, Laboratory of Western Credibility

The Island at the Heart of the First Island Chain

To understand why Taiwan cannot be a bargaining chip, one must look at a map. The island is positioned at the center of the first island chain of the Western Pacific, which blocks access for the People's Liberation Army Navy to the American territories of the second chain: Guam and the Northern Marianas. The globe's most important commercial arteries cross this zone. Taiwan is the fourth-largest trading partner of the United States and the source of the vast majority of advanced semiconductors needed for cutting-edge weapons systems and the artificial intelligence revolution.

Ceding Taiwan — or even sending the signal that its defense is negotiable — would not only be a geopolitical defeat for the United States. It would be the collapse of the entire deterrence structure in the Pacific. Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines: every ally in the region has its eyes fixed on what Washington says and does regarding Taiwan. If America can sell out the security of an island democracy of 23 million people for a trade deal with Beijing, what guarantee remains for the others?

Beijing’s Strategy of Structural Ambiguity

Xi Jinping did not ask Trump to formally abandon Taiwan. He is far too clever for that. He simply asked that arms sales be frozen, that phone calls with Lai Ching-te not take place, and that America publicly recognize that it "understands" the Chinese position. Each of these requests, taken in isolation, seems reasonable. Together, they constitute a strategy of progressive encirclement. The method consists of never crossing the red line all at once, but erasing it centimeter by centimeter until it no longer exists.

After the summit, sources cited by the South China Morning Post confirmed that Trump is not planning to call Lai Ching-te anytime soon, despite his statement on Air Force One where he had said he wanted to speak "to the person who runs Taiwan." Three sources specified that Washington believed a call with Lai could "derail the planned summit with Xi in September" in Washington. This is the calculation being made: Taiwanese democracy sacrificed on the altar of the Sino-American diplomatic calendar.

Iran: A Common File, but a Facade of Convergence

The Strait of Hormuz, a Point of Minimal Consensus

On Iran, the summit produced its only true point of convergence: the two presidents agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open. Practically closed since the outbreak of the conflict involving Iran — described by the International Energy Agency as "the worst energy crisis in history" — this strategic strait concentrates an essential share of the global oil trade. Xi Jinping, whose China is massively dependent on oil supplies from the region, showed an apparent interest in buying American oil to diversify his sources. Trump, for his part, claimed to have "Iran very well under control."

This convergence on Hormuz is real but minimal. It corresponds to the economic interest of both countries, not to a shared strategic vision. The Trump administration had been at war with Iran for two and a half months when the summit took place, and the two presidents agreed that "Iran should never acquire nuclear weapons." But beyond this formula, approaches diverge: Beijing has not condemned Iran, has not sanctioned the regime, and has carefully avoided taking a position on the conflict itself.

Iran as a Pretext to Freeze Arms to Taiwan

A revealing fact emerged after the summit: Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao told a U.S. Senate subcommittee that the United States was "pausing" the $14 billion package intended for Taiwan to "ensure we have enough ammunition for Operation Epic Fury" — the codename for the Iranian conflict. The argument: American stockpiles would be strained by the war. But Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth immediately denied this argument at the Shangri-La Dialogue, stating that he was "in no way coupling" the two issues. The $14 billion package, he specified, concerns future production, not current stocks.

Iran thus served as a convenient pretext, but the pretext was denied by the head of the Pentagon himself. What remains is the naked reality: the weapons are blocked because Trump has chosen to use them as diplomatic leverage with Xi. Not because of Iran. Not because of stockpiles. Because of a political calculation that places the relationship with Beijing above commitments to Taipei.

The "Constructive Strategic Stability" Doctrine: What Reality?

A Conceptual Framework Signed by Both Sides

The most concrete result of the summit is perhaps this formula: "Sino-American relationship of constructive strategic stability." Xi proposed this framework to guide bilateral relations over "the next three years and beyond." Trump subscribed to it. Two boards were created: a Trade Board to monitor tariff reductions, and an Investment Board to facilitate capital flows in non-sensitive sectors. Commercial commitments were announced: China would buy at least $17 billion in American agricultural products annually until 2028, reopen its market to American meat, resume poultry imports, and potentially sign an initial contract for 200 Boeing aircraft.

On paper, it is substantial. In practice, it is exactly what Beijing knows how to do: offer economic substance to gain strategic flexibility. Trade agreements serve to buy time, "normalize" the relationship, and create mutual dependence that makes political confrontations more costly. Xi entered the summit with the "three T's strategy" — trade, technology, Taiwan — and he came out with progress on all three, to varying degrees. Trump came out with contracts for soybeans and planes, and a Taiwan question hanging in the balance.

Mutual Vulnerability as Fragile Cement

Analysts like The Diplomat have identified the true basis of this "stability": mutual strategic vulnerability. Washington cannot easily replace Chinese rare earths; Beijing cannot easily replace Western chip-making equipment. Neither has yet achieved sufficient autonomy to absorb the full costs of an open break. This interdependence is real — and it is on this, and not on a shared vision of the world, that the fragile stability of the moment rests.

But this configuration will change. If China develops its own lithography machines or achieves autonomy in advanced design software, the Western lock on its chip ambitions disappears. If the United States and its allies develop their own sources of rare earths — in Canada, Australia, or via synthetic alternatives — Beijing's critical minerals weapon loses its edge. The "Beijing 2026 agreements" are not immune to rapid deterioration as soon as the conditions of this reciprocal vulnerability shift.

Taipei in the Storm: Lai Ching-te Facing American Uncertainty

A Loyal Ally, Treated as an Adjustment Variable

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te reacted with remarkable dignity. He expressed "great optimism" regarding the prospect of Trump approving the $14 billion in weapons, stating: "I believe that after a thorough review by the U.S. government, this can be approved." He recalled that Trump had authorized $18 billion in arms sales to Taiwan during his first term, and $11 billion in December 2025. Lai was choosing the facts that reassure — because he had no choice but to project confidence.

But beneath this projected confidence, the political reality in Taipei was that of an ally "twisting in the wind," to use the expression of the Center for American Progress. Taiwan had aligned its foreign policy with Washington, spent immense political capital to pass the defense budget against fierce KMT legislative opposition, and invested hundreds of billions in the American tech industry. In return, it received silence from Trump on the weapons, the absence of any phone call, and the characterization of its security as a "negotiating chip." This is not the policy of an ally. It is instrumentalization.

The Taiwanese Foreign Minister Reframes the Debate

Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, Lin Chia-lung, showed admirable diplomatic composure. Asked on June 17, 2026, by the Foreign Correspondents Club in Taipei, he indicated that "the pace of arms sales can be fast or slow, in a single package or several; it is a more technical issue. But the Trump-Xi summit did not lead the United States to stop or cancel arms sales to Taiwan." He pointed out that U.S. law — the Taiwan Relations Act — binds Trump’s hands, regardless of his rhetoric.

Taipei's resilience is real and deserves respect. But it must not mask the gravity of what happened. For Beijing does not look at American laws with the same respect as Taipei. Beijing looks at signals, gestures, silences. And the signals of May 2026 told it that pressure works. That American ambiguity, maintained in the right place at the right time, can produce dividends. That message, Xi received perfectly.

Deep Asymmetries Outlasting the Summit

Washington and Beijing are Not Playing the Same Game

The summit revealed a fundamental asymmetry in how the two powers approach the bilateral relationship. Washington, under Trump, arrived in Beijing with a list of economic demands — soybeans, beef, planes, market access — and with the hope of stabilizing the relationship enough to manage the Iranian crisis. Beijing arrived with a strategy spanning three decades: anchoring the United States in a relationship of progressive dependency, normalizing the dialogue on Taiwan, and obtaining symbolic concessions that strengthen its regional position.

The United States wants short-term deals. China is playing over decades. This temporal asymmetry is at the heart of all tensions. The Trade Board and the Investment Board created in Beijing are useful for managing the short term. But they are management mechanisms, not solutions. They do not address core issues: China’s abusive industrial practices, forced technology transfers, systematic overcapacity policy, investments in the military. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative continues its Section 301 investigations into Chinese practices. CFIUS maintains increased oversight on China-related investments. The technological competition did not take a break for the summit.

Technology and Minerals: The Real Battlefield

Under the veil of "stability," the technological war continues mercilessly. China seeks to replace Western lithography equipment to break its dependence on Taiwan-made semiconductors and ASML machines. The United States is tightening export restrictions on advanced technologies to China. The battle for rare earths and critical minerals — cobalt, lithium, rare earths for permanent magnets in electric motors and guided missiles — remains an open front where Beijing holds a structural advantage that Washington is striving to erode through investments in Canada, Australia, and elsewhere.

Economists at the Edelman Trust Institute noted that the relationship, even stabilized, remains defined by "persistent competition and managed uncertainty," not by real cooperation. The sectors of technology, AI, semiconductors, telecommunications, data, rare earths, and dual-use minerals remain "tightly framed by national security concerns." This is not a normalized relationship. It is a competition with guardrails — and guardrails that can fail.

The West’s Allies Watch, and Worry

Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra: Guarantee Anxiety

The signal sent by the Beijing summit was read far beyond Washington and Taipei. In Tokyo, where national security is directly linked to the stability of the Taiwan Strait, analysts scrutinized every word from Trump with barely masked anxiety. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asian delegations noted the absence of Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun — for the second consecutive year — as a signal from a Beijing that shuns multilateral security forums while negotiating bilaterally with Washington, bypassing allies.

In Seoul, discussions on North Korea — whose accelerating nuclear program is directly linked to Beijing’s silent support — were barely mentioned in the summit communiqués. The two presidents referred to the Korean Peninsula in a marginal passage. Kim Jong-un observed the summit’s results closely: if Trump is ready to treat Taiwanese security as a variable, he can do the same with guarantees to South Korea.

Europe: A Continent Too Busy to Look at the Indo-Pacific

Europe, for its part, was too absorbed in its own files to react with the vigor the situation deserved. European capitals issued formal statements of support for "stability" without measuring the implications of what Beijing had just obtained: an implicit recognition that Taiwan’s security was negotiable between great powers. Yet, a Taiwan absorbed by China would not only be a strategic catastrophe for Asia — it would be the end of the liberal order in the Pacific, with direct consequences for European trade routes and for the global security architecture that guarantees the stability of Europe itself.

The West must understand that the Taiwan issue is not an Asian matter. It is a Western matter in the deepest sense: it is the question of whether democracies can protect their own in the face of pressure from autocracies. Zelensky is resisting Moscow. Lai Ching-te is resisting Beijing. These two men hold front lines that protect the entire free world. Abandoning them, even by tactical calculation, is a choice to shrink.

The September Summit in Washington: The Next Test

Xi at the White House on September 24, 2026

The Beijing summit led to an invitation: Xi Jinping will visit the White House on September 24, 2026. It is a major diplomatic event, the first in years. And it creates immediate pressure on all pending files — in particular the $14 billion in weapons for Taiwan. Experts like Bonnie Glaser, director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, expect the arms sales to be announced "after" Xi’s visit. In other words: Taiwan will have to wait until the Washington summit has passed.

This is the trap into which the Trump administration is allowing itself to slide: every diplomatic event with Beijing becomes a reason to delay Taiwan’s security. First the Beijing summit. Then Xi’s visit to Washington. Then the midterm elections. Then something else. The list of reasons not to act grows infinitely, while the defense systems that Taipei awaits are still not delivered. And Beijing, in the meantime, continues its military maneuvers around the island.

The Critical Window for Taiwanese Security

Bipartisan U.S. senators estimated that the delay in arms deliveries had "tangible implications for Taiwan's security and its military readiness." The pending PAC-3 Patriot interceptors and NASAMS systems are not symbolic equipment: they are the heart of a credible air defense against a potential ballistic missile attack from the mainland. Delivery histories show that Taiwan has received weaponry with delays in the past, but the geopolitical context of 2026 is fundamentally different from previous years. China is holding its military exercises. It is testing its amphibious capabilities. It is developing its drones. Every month of delay is one more month where Taiwanese deterrence is weakened.

On May 8, 2026, the Taiwanese Parliament voted for a special defense budget of 780 billion Taiwan dollars, of which 480 billion is set aside specifically for the pending 14 billion sale. The budget is passed. The money is available. The only thing missing is Trump’s signature. A signature he is withholding as an instrument of pressure on Beijing, in defiance of U.S. law which requires him to provide Taiwan with the means for its defense.

The "Six Assurances" and the Taiwan Relations Act: Ramparts Still Standing

U.S. Law, a Shield Trump Cannot Ignore

The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act is a U.S. federal law, passed by Congress, that mandates the government to provide Taiwan with the defensive weapons necessary for its security. It is not a policy statement, nor an administrative memorandum. It is a legal obligation. Trump can delay notifications, can use ambiguous rhetoric, but he cannot formally cancel sales approved by Congress without a legislative act or a major constitutional clash. This legal lock is the main rampart still standing.

Members of Congress from both parties are also drafting bipartisan legislation to "strengthen the Six Assurances" and explicitly reaffirm the prohibition against negotiating Taiwan's security with Beijing. The fact that this legislation is deemed necessary in 2026 says a lot about the state of affairs. But its existence is also a positive signal: American democracy, despite its dysfunctions, has counter-powers. The question is whether these counter-powers will activate quickly enough.

American Institutional Resistance Facing Trump

It is striking to note that the firmest signals in favor of Taiwan did not come from the White House but from the Pentagon, Congress, and career diplomats. Pete Hegseth, by denying the argument of Iranian stockpiles, implicitly reaffirmed that the decision on weapons was not military but political. Senators like Andy Kim of New Jersey have written public letters and created media pressure. The American institutional bureaucracy is resisting, in its own way, Trump's steering toward Taiwan. It is a real counterweight, even if it is insufficient to reverse the dynamic in the short term.

The American administration has also maintained, at the level of official communications, a discourse of continuity: no policy change, commitment to Taiwan unchanged. This double level — official rhetoric of continuity, actual practice of ambiguity — is uncomfortable but not unprecedented in American diplomacy. The risk is that Beijing learns to read this dissonance as an invitation to push further.

The West Must Hold the Line: Why Firmness Pays

The Ukrainian Lesson, Applied to Taiwan

Recent history offers an instructive precedent. When the West hesitated to arm Ukraine in sufficient quantities before the Russian invasion of 2022, it encouraged Putin to take the step. When the West finally delivered heavy weapons, tanks, and long-range missiles, Ukraine held. Firmness works. Deterrence works. What doesn't work is the half-measure, the calculated ambiguity that invites testing the limits. The arms freeze for Taiwan sends Beijing the same signal that the hesitations of 2021 sent to Moscow: you can push, the Westerners will retreat.

Zelensky showed what it means to resist when the enemy is bigger and heavier. Lai Ching-te shows the same determination. These two men hold front lines that protect values — democracy, sovereignty, freedom — of which the West is supposed to be the guarantor. The West cannot afford to betray Taiwan in the name of a facade of stability with Beijing, in the same way it should not have betrayed Ukraine in the name of a facade of stability with Moscow.

Firmness is Not a Provocation — It is a Guarantee

A recurring argument from those who approve of Trump’s ambiguity policy is that firmness would provoke an escalation. The opposite is true. Firmness of commitments reduces the risk of war because it removes calculations of opportunity. Beijing will not attack Taiwan if the American response is certain and costly. What drives military adventurism is precisely uncertainty: the conviction that at the decisive moment, the ally will retreat. It is this conviction that Trump, with his "I will make a determination" and his "negotiating chip", is cultivating in the minds of Zhongnanhai.

The West as a whole — United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, Canada — must collectively and unambiguously reaffirm that Taiwan’s security is not negotiable. Not because war is desirable, but because clarity of commitment is the best guarantee that war will not happen. It is the paradox of deterrence: you show your strength so you don't have to use it. Beijing understands that language better than anyone.

Conclusion: Displayed Stability Must Not Become a Veiled Capitulation

A Summit that Stabilizes the Surface but Erodes the Foundations

The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing in May 2026 produced an atmosphere of detente, some useful trade agreements, and a conceptual framework of "constructive strategic stability." This is not nothing. Communication between the world's top two powers is better than open confrontation, and institutional mechanisms like the trade boards can help avoid accidental escalations. But the displayed stability hides deep, unresolved differences, of which the Taiwan issue is the most explosive. Xi Jinping got what he wanted in Beijing: symbolic concessions, American silence, and confirmation that pressure works.

The next step, the Washington summit in September, will be the true test of the Trump doctrine. If the $14 billion in arms for Taiwan is still pending at that date, if no Trump-Lai call has taken place, if the "Six Assurances" have remained a dead letter, then the Sino-American "stability" of 2026 will be a stability bought at the price of Taiwan’s security and the West’s credibility in the Pacific.

What the West Must Demand

The West — and primarily the United States — must hold four clear lines: approve the $14 billion package without delay of defensive weapons for Taiwan, formally reaffirm the Six Assurances through Congressional legislation, explicitly refuse to treat the security of allied democracies as a bargaining chip in negotiations with authoritarian states, and build an Indo-Pacific coalition solid enough that Beijing understands military adventurism would have an unacceptable cost. This is not idealism. It is strategy.

Taiwan is not just an island of 23 million people 180 kilometers from the Chinese mainland. It is an existential test for the liberal international order that the West has built since 1945. If authoritarian pressure is enough to erase commitments toward an allied democracy, then every democracy under pressure — from Ukraine to the Philippines, from Georgia to Moldova — will be justified in asking if its alliance with the West is still worth anything. The answer to this question must be yes, clearly, without hesitation, without delay.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

ABC News — Trump won't commit to arms sale to Taiwan after stark warning from Xi — May 15, 2026

South China Morning Post — No call with Taiwan, no new arms sales: how Trump is preparing to welcome Xi — June 19, 2026

South China Morning Post — Xi and Trump set sights on stability for China and the US — May 15, 2026

Secondary Sources

The Diplomat — The Trump-Xi Summit Produced Stability, But It Won't Last Forever — June 3, 2026

Center for American Progress — The Trump Administration's Taiwan Arms Freeze Is a Gift to Xi Jinping — June 3, 2026

Edelman — Xi–Trump Summit: Stabilization, Not Reset, as Both Sides Test Managed Competition — May 20, 2026

Axios — Trump waffles on Taiwan arms deal after Xi talks — May 15, 2026

South China Morning Post — How will Beijing judge Trump's take on Taiwan? — May 16, 2026