ANALYSIS: China encircles Taiwan from the east — the fait accompli strategy

Waters that no longer belong to anyone

Since June 1, 2026, the waters east of Taiwan — the Pacific Ocean, the island's "forgotten side" — are no longer what they were. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) has been patrolling them almost continuously, according to maritime tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence. These are not waters that have been disputed forever. This is a front that has just been opened. And its significance goes far beyond the maritime dispute used as the official pretext.

The official pretext: on May 28, 2026, Japan and the Philippines announced the opening of negotiations to delimit their overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in waters south and east of Taiwan. Beijing immediately responded that those waters are part of its own EEZ — derived from its sovereign claim over Taiwan. And to prove it, it sent the CCG to patrol waters it had never patrolled systematically before. What could have been a diplomatic protest became a progressive occupation.

What maritime tracking data shows

Data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence confirms that since June 1, 2026, CCG vessels have been patrolling waters east of Taiwan on a "near-continuous" basis. The ISW (Institute for the Study of War), in its June 26 report, documents this persistent presence and its gradual escalation. On June 6, China's Ministry of Transport launched a "special maritime traffic control operation" coordinating the CCG with the maritime administrations of Fujian and Guangdong, the East China Sea Navigation Support Center, and the East China Sea Rescue Bureau. An administrative armada dressed up as law enforcement.

The sea east of Taiwan. I had always imagined it as a natural buffer zone — the wide Pacific expanse protecting the island's eastern flank. That was an illusion. China has just shown it can reach there too. And it took six weeks to turn a Japanese-Philippine diplomatic announcement into a permanent maritime presence. That is the speed of the fait accompli strategy.

Details of the special operation

From June 6 to 10, 2026, China's Ministry of Transport conducted a "special maritime traffic control and hydrographic survey operation" east of Taiwan. The official Chinese figures: 1,030 nautical miles covered, 198 vessels inspected, 3 "non-compliant" vessels "rectified." Beijing presents this as routine maritime safety. Taiwan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany see things differently.

According to Taiwanese authorities and confirmed by British defense journal Defense News on June 24, 2026, the CCG did not inspect vessels — it harassed them. Foreign merchant ships transiting those waters received radio calls from the CCG asking for their ports of departure and destination — attempting to create the appearance that China exercises jurisdiction over these waters. That is appropriation through administrative formality. A right created by repetition.

Taiwan expels the vessels — but at what cost?

Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) sent its own vessels to "warn" Chinese ships. Taiwan's Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo called the Chinese patrols a "provocative act" and "cognitive warfare." He said: "They are trying to claim the eastern waters as their domain first — as if casting an enormous spider's web across the area." The CGA declared it had "expelled" vessels from restricted waters. But the CCG came back. It always comes back.

China builds its maritime rights the same way it builds artificial islands in the South China Sea: through accumulation. A hydrographic survey here. A vessel inspection there. A regular patrol over there. And one day the world looks up and realizes China is "administering" waters that, legally, do not belong to it. It is the strategy of the frog in slowly boiling water.

A hydrographic survey that precedes a blockade

From June 16 to 18, 2026, the research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 22, owned by the East China Sea Bureau of the Ministry of Natural Resources, conducted a "marine environmental survey" east of Taiwan. The ISW and Australia's Lowy Institute explained the strategic stakes of that operation: the data collected — shipping lanes, maritime trade flows, submarine cables, water depth, oceanographic conditions — has both civilian and military applications.

To prepare a blockade of Taiwan, you need that data. Where does commercial traffic flow? Which submarine cables connect the island to the world? What anchorages are available? What depths allow submarine operations? The Xiang Yang Hong 22 is not a warship — it flies the civilian flag of natural resources. But the information it collects will feed Chinese military planners. That is the role of the civilian vanguard in Chinese military strategy.

CCG–civilian vessel coordination: a troubling new development

The ISW also documented a first on June 5–6, 2026 at Pratas Island (Dongsha) — another territory controlled by Taiwan: for the first time, a CCG vessel and a Chinese civilian research vessel (Hai Si Lu 6) coordinated their operations in Pratas's restricted waters. The CCG patrolled while the civilian vessel traced the boundary of restricted waters. This type of coordination between the armed and civilian arms of Chinese maritime power is a qualitative leap. It means the operations are planned, coordinated, and deliberate — not opportunistic.

A research vessel and a coast guard vessel coordinating their movements in real time around Pratas — that is not coincidence. That is a sign that Beijing is testing operational procedures it will use at greater scale, in more important waters, at a time of its own choosing. The dress rehearsals for blockading Taiwan have begun. They just don't look like military exercises yet.

A joint statement from the US, UK, France, and Germany

On June 24, 2026, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany issued a rare joint statement expressing concern over Chinese activities east of Taiwan. A US State Department spokesperson stated: "China's actions are deeply destabilizing." The European quadrilateral statement described Chinese activities as "novel" and stressed that they "threaten regional stability and the freedom of navigation of international commerce."

Taiwan welcomed the statement. The day before, the Wall Street Journal had published a lengthy article on Chinese assertions of authority over merchant vessels, triggering Western media attention on these patrols. International diplomatic pressure was synchronized with media coverage — a coordinated effort to make visible what China would prefer to do quietly.

Beijing holds firm: "legitimate and necessary"

The Chinese response was immediate and unequivocal. Foreign Affairs spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that CCG patrols were "legitimate actions" to exercise jurisdiction over what he called the "EEZ and continental shelf of China in the waters east of China's Taiwan Island." Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhang Han added that the waters Japan and the Philippines sought to delimit "are part of China's EEZ." Beijing does not acknowledge having done anything out of the ordinary.

The US-UK-France-Germany joint statement is a signal. But I have learned to be wary of joint statements without concrete consequences. China has carefully studied Western reactions to its behavior in the South China Sea over the past ten years — and concluded that words cost nothing. What changes behavior is action. For now, the actions don't follow.

The claim of "nearby coastal waters"

The ISW report of June 26, 2026 provided the most precise analysis of the ongoing Chinese strategy. A CCTV state television-affiliated social media account, Yuyuan Tantian, had claimed on June 20 that China's survey and law enforcement activities east of Taiwan suggested Beijing now considers that zone to be Chinese "nearby coastal waters" — the term used for waters China effectively administers. Unidentified sources from that same account claimed these activities "would become regularized" to "protect" Chinese maritime territory.

The ISW interpreted this as a deliberate PRC attempt to erode Taiwanese sovereignty and establish itself as the sole "legitimate guardian" of China's maritime boundaries — including those around Taiwan. It is the same playbook used at the Kinmen islands, Matsu, Pratas. First irregular patrols. Then regular patrols. Then normalized. Then claimed as historical right.

The Kinmen model transposed east of Taiwan

The ISW identified what analysts call the "Kinmen model" — named for the Taiwanese islands close to the Fujian coast where the CCG began incursions into restricted waters in February 2024. Since then, those incursions have become nearly daily. The CCG presents them as normal maritime police patrols. The same sequence is now underway east of Taiwan — but in waters of immensely greater strategic importance, because they control maritime access to the Pacific from the Luzon Strait and the trade routes between Asia and the Americas.

The Kinmen model. I remember the first time I read that phrase. An isolated island, a few CCG incidents, some tension — and two years later it's normalized. Today Beijing is applying the same formula east of Taiwan, but at the scale of the Pacific Ocean. If no one stops it, in two years the waters east of Taiwan will be as contested as those of the South China Sea.

The simultaneous operations

From June 22 to 26, 2026, Taiwan conducted its own military exercise — counter-blockade maneuvers including tabletop simulations. During exactly that same period, the Chinese aircraft carrier Fujian — the most modern in China's navy — transited the Taiwan Strait. The simultaneity is not coincidence: it is a calculated show of force. While Taiwan rehearses countering a blockade, China sends its carrier as a message: we are here, we are watching, we can act.

Taiwan simulated the countermeasures for a Chinese maritime blockade during this exercise. The results — not published in detail — are worrying according to Taiwanese sources: simulations show that Taiwan must receive sufficient advance warning to move its strategic stockpiles of fuel, medicine, and food before a blockade begins. An island that depends on imports for 98% of its energy cannot afford improvisation.

Submarine cables: the absolute vulnerability

One of the lessons from the Chinese patrols documented by the ISW is the attention paid to submarine cables. The CCG explicitly patrolled in the zones where the submarine cables connecting Taiwan to the world are laid. Those cables carry 95% of global data — including Taiwanese communications with its allies. Cutting them means digitally isolating Taiwan before a single soldier lands. And China knows exactly where they are. It just mapped them.

Submarine cables haunt me in this story. They are fragile lines on the ocean floor connecting Taiwan to the world. If China cuts them — as it already did with cables near the Matsu islands in 2023 — the island is digitally isolated within hours. That is a surgical strike before the military strike. And the CCG just completed the exact inventory of their locations.

The architecture of grey-zone warfare

Australia's Lowy Institute published an illuminating analysis on June 18 on what Beijing is building east of Taiwan. It describes a "three-layer" strategy. The outer layer: the naval military, training for counter-intervention and area-denial operations to push back allied forces (American, Japanese) that might come to Taiwan's aid. The middle layer: the CCG, conducting "maritime police" missions to create de facto jurisdiction over the waters. The inner layer: maritime security, rescue, and hydrographic survey vessels, providing administrative cover and collecting data.

This three-layer architecture is designed to be difficult to counter. If Taiwan or its allies respond militarily to CCG vessels, they find themselves attacking police forces — not armed forces. If they do not respond, China normalizes its presence. The trap is elaborate, patient, and perfectly logical within China's doctrine of "contactless warfare."

The South China Sea precedents

The same strategy was applied in the South China Sea — with success. In 2012, China took control of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines after a standoff between the CCG and the Philippine navy. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines — but China ignored the ruling and kept control of the shoal. The lesson: international law cannot prevail over physical presence. Beijing learned that. It is now applying it east of Taiwan.

Scarborough. Second Thomas Shoal. The Paracels. The Spratlys. The list of waters China has progressively "absorbed" in the South China Sea has been growing for twenty years. Every time, the world watched, protested, then accepted the fait accompli. Every single time. The question is: will the world let the same thing happen east of Taiwan? Because the stakes there are not just one island — they are the entire freedom of navigation of the western Pacific.

The Tokyo and Manila decision

On May 28, 2026, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. announced that their countries would begin formal negotiations to delimit their overlapping EEZs in waters south and east of Taiwan. They specified that these bilateral discussions would not affect the rights of third parties. But China was furious: that delimitation would touch waters it considers its own — through its sovereign claim over Taiwan — and could potentially create new patrol routes and fishing zones for Tokyo and Manila.

China's reaction matched its fury. The Foreign Ministry called the negotiations "entirely illegal, null, and void." And the CCG immediately began its patrols. What was a diplomatic dispute became a maritime operation in 72 hours. That is the speed of reaction Beijing wants to demonstrate — to discourage other countries from making similar decisions in the future.

The Japan-Philippines-China triangle in the western Pacific

This dispute reveals a deeper geopolitical tension in the western Pacific. Japan and the Philippines — both US allies — are trying to manage their own maritime claims cooperatively. China interprets any regional cooperation that excludes it as an encirclement attempt. That is Beijing's strategic paranoia — real, documented, and self-fulfilling. By responding aggressively to a peaceful Japan-Philippines negotiation, China created precisely the regional alliance consolidation it feared.

There is something tragically predictable about China's reaction to the Japan-Philippines negotiation. Two democracies trying to peacefully resolve a maritime question under international law — and China responds by sending its fleet. This behavior does not reassure. It convinces China's neighbors that they need stronger military alliances. China is manufacturing the encirclement it complains about.

The American strategic analysis

On June 25, 2026, the Washington Times published an analysis of Chinese patrols east of Taiwan under the striking headline: "China patrols seen as rehearsals for Taiwan blockade." The article, filed from Seoul, cited Taiwanese officials and American military analysts who interpreted the CCG patrols not as a response to the Japan-Philippines dispute, but as a deliberate long-term plan to test and normalize a presence in Taiwan's most strategically vital waters — those through which it receives imports and reinforcements.

A Taiwanese blockade differs from a direct military invasion: it is a progressive stranglehold that cuts the island off from the world without triggering conventional warfare. It uses naval force, submarines, the CCG, and economic pressure to force capitulation without combat. China has observed that Western democracies are more likely to abandon support for a partner under prolonged blockade than to intervene militarily against an invasion. A blockade is therefore the optimal strategy — and the June patrols are its opening moves.

Taiwan's June 25 counter-blockade tabletop simulation

Taiwan responded to these pressures by holding a tabletop drill on June 25, 2026 to simulate countering a Chinese maritime blockade. Taiwan's presidency and the Ministries of Defense and Economy participated. The simulated scenarios covered fuel, food, and medicine stockpiles, alternative supply routes, and communications with allies under maritime isolation. The exercise was made public — a signal sent to Beijing that Taiwan is preparing and is not naive.

Taiwan holds counter-blockade exercises while the Fujian carrier passes through the strait. That image captures 2026 in this part of the world. A democracy preparing. An autocracy testing. And between them, a maritime space that shrinks a little more each week. If the West doesn't grasp now how fast the situation is deteriorating, it will be too late to understand when Beijing decides to act.

What the world would lose if Taiwan fell

Taiwan is not just a question of sovereignty or democratic rights — it is a question of control over western Pacific trade routes. More than 80% of global commerce passes through seas near Taiwan. The Bashi, Luzon, and Miyako straits — all pass in proximity to Taiwan. If China controls these waters, it controls global supply chains — and the TSMC semiconductors that power every phone, car, and military system on the planet.

TSMC — Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company — produces 90% of the world's most advanced chips. A Taiwan under Chinese control or subjected to a blockade is a Taiwan that stops producing those chips. That means a guaranteed global recession, a collapse of the global technology value chain, and a strategic advantage for China that would be industrially irreversible.

The allied response: insufficient but present

The United States maintains freedom-of-navigation patrols in international waters near Taiwan. Japan has reinforced its Self-Defense Forces in the Ryukyu Islands, close to Taiwan. The Philippines, under Marcos Jr., has reactivated its alliance with Washington after years of ambiguity under Duterte. Australia participates in regular regional naval exercises. But taken together, these responses remain below the level of the Chinese threat, which evolves every month.

TSMC. That name should be on the lips of every Western government talking about Taiwan. This is not just a noble democratic cause — it is the beating heart of the global technology economy. Losing Taiwan means handing China the keys to the semiconductor supply chain. It means the end of Western technological supremacy. And I have the feeling no one in Brussels has truly understood that yet.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the international legal framework governing EEZs, navigation rights, and hydrographic surveys. Under UNCLOS, the waters east of Taiwan are part of the Taiwanese, Japanese, and Philippine EEZs — not China's. China has no coastline facing those waters — unless one accepts its claim over Taiwan. Which international law does not.

But international law has no police force. The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in 2016 that Chinese claims in the South China Sea were illegal. China ignored that ruling. It will do the same if an international tribunal rules on the waters east of Taiwan. Law, without coercive enforcement, is a suggestion that revisionist powers can ignore with impunity.

The UN Security Council: paralyzed

China sits on the UN Security Council with veto power. Any resolution condemning its actions against Taiwan will be blocked. That is why the June 24 coalition — the US, UK, France, and Germany — chose a bilateral diplomatic statement rather than a UN resolution. But a statement without an enforcement mechanism is rhetoric. Beijing knows this. And it continues.

International law without enforcement is politeness in a world of brutes. Useful on good days. Useless on bad ones. And we are living through bad days. The solution is not to abandon international law — it is to give it teeth. Concrete naval presences. Joint exercises. Demonstrations of force that tell Beijing: we are here, we are serious, and we are going nowhere.

Tokyo between resolve and caution

Japan is on the front line of this crisis. The Ryukyu Islands, particularly Yonaguni — 110 km from the Taiwanese coast — would be at the center of any conflict. Tokyo has increased defense spending, adopted a preemptive strike capability, and reinforced its military presence in the southern islands. But Japan is also deeply dependent on its economic relationship with China — its top trading partner. This tension between security interests and economic interests complicates the Japanese response.

Takaichi's decision to open maritime delimitation negotiations with the Philippines was a courageous act that triggered China's reaction. But Tokyo also maintains open diplomatic channels with Beijing. That is the impossible balance for small and medium powers neighboring an aggressive superpower: you can neither fully oppose it nor trust it.

Manila and the dangerous triangle

The Philippines under Marcos Jr. clearly chose the Western camp after the Duterte years. American military bases are reactivated. Joint Balikatan exercises are multiplying. But the Philippines also received direct warnings from Beijing in June 2026 about their negotiations with Japan. Chinese CCG vessels inspected Philippine merchant ships in waters south of Taiwan. Manila is caught in a vice — exactly where China wants it.

The Philippines. I think of the Filipino fishermen at Second Thomas Shoal, harassed by the CCG for years, unable to approach their own territory without American naval protection. That is the reality of living next to an expanding empire. It is not abstract for them. It is their daily life. And it should be our daily concern too.

The 2027 or 2035 horizon: dates that keep coming up

American military analysts — notably within the Pentagon — believe China aims to have the military capability to invade Taiwan by 2027 (according to some), or by 2035 according to other planning timelines. These dates are not certainties — they reflect planning orientations, not irrevocable policy decisions. Xi Jinping has not necessarily decided to invade. But he is building the capability to do so — and the patrols east of Taiwan are part of that buildup.

What is happening in June 2026 is a preparation and testing phase. China is testing the reactions of Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, the United States, and Europe. It is testing alliance cohesion. It is testing its own logistical and operational capacity to sustain a presence in these waters. Each successful test — in the sense that it does not trigger a meaningful response — brings it closer to the ability to turn its maneuvers into action.

The window of opportunity: closing or opening?

There is debate among experts about the "window of opportunity" for Chinese action on Taiwan. Is it closing — because Taiwan is rearming, regional allies are strengthening, and the American military is consolidating its Pacific presence? Or is it opening — because the United States is distracted by Ukraine, the Middle East, and its own internal divisions? The June 2026 patrols fit squarely within this strategic uncertainty. China is not rushing — it is preparing.

I do not want to be alarmist. But I want to be honest. What I see in the June 2026 data is a China methodically advancing toward the ability to control the waters surrounding Taiwan — not just the strait to the west, but now the Pacific Ocean to the east. That is an encirclement. And encirclements, in military history, precede sieges. The West should take note before the next step arrives.

A threshold crossed irreversibly

The Chinese Coast Guard patrols east of Taiwan since June 2026 mark a threshold crossing. Not a war — nothing that dramatic. But something perhaps more dangerous over the long term: the progressive normalization of a presence in waters where China had no legal right to be. The Kinmen, Pratas, South China Sea precedents — all now applied to the Pacific Ocean itself. And once presence is normalized, there is no reversal in the history of Chinese maritime power.

What the West must decide now

The Western response to this situation cannot be limited to joint statements. It must include regular naval patrols east of Taiwan, combined exercises with Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines, increased support for Taiwanese counter-blockade capabilities, and a clear decision: the democracies of the western Pacific will not stand alone against Chinese pressure. That message can only be sent through action — ships, aircraft, contractual arms delivery commitments. Words are no longer enough. They were already insufficient in the South China Sea.

I close this analysis with a sense of obligation to sound the alarm. What is happening east of Taiwan in June 2026 is not yet a crisis — it is crisis preparation. And crises that we failed to see coming are always the most devastating. The West has the ability to see this one. The question is whether it has the political will to act before it is too late.

The island under total surveillance

In June 2026, Taiwan is surrounded. To the west, the Taiwan Strait that the Chinese navy crosses regularly. To the northeast, the Japanese Ryukyu Islands under growing pressure. To the southwest, the South China Sea under Chinese de facto domination. And now to the east, the Pacific Ocean over which China is beginning to claim jurisdiction. There is no longer a "hidden side" to the island. China has begun the complete encirclement — slowly, methodically, wearing the costume of maritime management and water policing.

The democracy of 23 million people facing it alone

Twenty-three million Taiwanese live this reality every day. They elect their leaders, run a sophisticated economy, produce the semiconductors the entire world depends on — and face one of the most powerful armies in human history that prepares daily to swallow them whole. They deserve better than a joint statement from four countries. They deserve alliances, equipment, training, and a credible guarantee that the West will be there if Beijing acts. We are not there yet. And that is a collective shame that history will hold against us.

Twenty-three million people. That is roughly the population of Taiwan. It is also roughly the population of Canada. I find it hard to imagine we would silently accept Canada being progressively encircled by a hostile power claiming its waters as its own. But for Taiwan, we display a patience I do not understand. That is not prudence — it is cowardice dressed up as diplomacy.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

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When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.