COMMENTARY: Trump, Russian Oil, and the Silent Betrayal of Ukraine

Introduction: Are Trump’s Words Still Worth Anything?

The Scene in Évian-les-Bains and What It Truly Reveals

On June 16, 2026, on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, France, U.S. President Donald Trump uttered the words that every supporter of Ukraine had been waiting months to hear. Asked about the possibility of reinstating sanctions on Russian oil—suspended since March 2026 under the pretext of stabilizing energy markets disrupted by the war in Iran—Trump replied with his characteristic casual confidence: "Soon we'll be able to do that because the oil is now flowing." These words, broadcast live on LiveNOW from FOX on June 20, 2026, and picked up by every major global news agency, were welcomed as an encouraging signal by Ukraine's allies.

But behind this promise, a reality asserts itself with a brutality that the polished diplomacy of the G7 cannot mask. These words—"soon" and "in a position"—are not commitments. They are exit ramps, carefully phrased to avoid promising anything concrete. And this is not the first time Donald Trump has toyed with the expectations of his allies on the issue of Russian oil. The chronicle of these delays—three successive extensions of sanction licenses since March 2026, each accompanied by assurances that never materialized—is a masterclass in the gap between the words and the deeds of a president whose strategic inconsistency has cost Ukraine dearly.

What Allies Hear When Trump Speaks

The European leaders present in Évian have learned, over the months, to decode Trump’s language. A public statement from him does not constitute a firm political commitment—it is a trend signal, an opening, a window of possibility. French President Emmanuel Macron chose to see in these words an "unprecedented convergence" within the G7 regarding support for Ukraine. But two European diplomats told Reuters that Trump had been noncommittal behind the scenes about the imposition of new, concrete American sanctions. This is the chasm that separates summit rhetoric from political reality.

This gap is not trivial. Every time Trump delivers a strong speech on sanctions and the actions fail to follow, the credibility of the entire Western policy of pressure on Moscow erodes a little more. Vladimir Putin reads these signals with meticulous attention. And if the recent history of oil waivers has taught him anything, it is that American determination has a price—and that price can be negotiated.

The Chronology of Waivers: Three Times the Same Mistake

March 2026: The First License for Impunity

It all began in March 2026, at the moment when the war in Iran caused an unprecedented spike in global oil prices. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced a 30-day emergency general license allowing countries to purchase Russian oil already in transit across the oceans. The argument put forward: a "narrowly targeted and short-term" measure that "will not provide a significant financial benefit to the Russian government". Senators Jeanne Shaheen, Elizabeth Warren, and Chuck Schumer immediately denounced the move in a stinging statement provided to the Kyiv Independent: according to them, this waiver could net the Kremlin up to $150 million per day in additional funding for its war machine.

The Kremlin's reaction was swift. Putin’s economic representative, Kirill Dmitriev, stated that the decision demonstrated "the essential role of Russia in the stability of the global energy market" and that further concessions were "inevitable". When the enemy thanks you for a decision, you might want to ask yourself if you made the right one. In fact, six out of seven G7 partners expressed their disagreement with this waiver—only the United States chose this path, under pressure from the markets, but above all from a White House that failed to resist.

The Perverse Logic of Temporary Relief

The initial waiver in March 2026 was based on a simple economic hypothesis: by allowing Russian oil already at sea to be sold, an artificial shortage is avoided while the Iranian crisis rages. The problem is that this hypothesis was never validated by the facts. As Senators Shaheen and Warren demonstrated in their June 17, 2026, statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prices at the pump for Americans continued to rise throughout the duration of the waivers, without consumers actually benefiting. Only Putin collected the dividends.

The tool chosen by Trump did not fulfill its stated function. The CREA estimated that Russia had approximately 50 million barrels of oil at sea at the time of the first waiver, representing considerable potential revenue. This revenue—the result of a unilateral American decision made against the advice of six G7 partners—directly fueled Moscow’s military budget during the most intense months of the bombardment of Ukraine.

The Escalation of Extensions: April, May, June

Bessent Promises, Treasury Extends: The Cycle of Broken Words

The scenario repeated itself with a mechanical regularity that borders on institutional farce. In early April 2026, Secretary Bessent publicly stated that the U.S. government would not extend the waiver on Russian oil already at sea. Two days later, the Treasury published a new license valid until May 16, 2026. On April 25, 2026, Bessent again claimed there would be no further extension. On May 18, 2026, a third license was issued, valid until June 17, 2026. According to the Kyiv Independent, this is the second time the Trump administration renewed the mechanism after publicly stating it would not do so.

This sequence is not insignificant. It reveals a troubling behavioral pattern: Trump and his team say one thing, do the opposite, and do it all over again. Congress is not notified as required by the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Senators Shaheen and Warren explicitly denounced this practice in their June 17, 2026, statement as a deliberate attempt to avoid Congressional votes of disapproval and to escape any accountability for the aid granted to Putin.

The Paradox of Credibility: When Contradictory Signals Feed Moscow

Each cycle of promise-extension sent a clear message to Moscow: American sanctions on Russian oil are not permanent—they are negotiable, conditional, and liable to be eased under the guise of economic circumstances. For a regime like Putin’s, which plans for the long term, this is strategic information of inestimable value. It allows him not to fundamentally change his behavior, as he anticipates that the pressure will sooner or later be released.

Secretary Bessent himself had stated before Congress that the sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil from October 2025 were so significant that they alone compensated for the entire previous period of inaction. Then, a few weeks later, he presented the March 2026 waivers as a "narrow" measure that did not affect those same sanctions. Except that, in practice, easing the conditions for selling Russian oil—even partially—mechanically reduces the impact of existing sanctions. This is elementary logic that the U.S. Treasury preferred to ignore.

What $150 Million a Day Can Buy for Putin

The Macabre Calculus No One Wants to Face

The figures put forward by the Democratic senators are not rhetorical exaggerations. The Kyiv Independent, in its analysis published on March 17, 2026, precisely documented what an additional $150 million per day allows Moscow to finance. The conclusion is chilling. This sum corresponds daily to approximately 3,000 to 7,500 Shahed drones—the equivalent of an entire month of Russian drone attacks against Ukraine. It also allows for the financing of between 62 and 75 Kh-101 cruise missiles, enough for three to five massive aerial attacks. Or even the recruitment of an additional 4,400 to 5,500 new Russian soldiers.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had warned: the Kremlin would spend this extra revenue on weapons, particularly the drones used for mass attacks against Ukrainian cities. During the three months that the successive waivers lasted—March, April, May, until June 17, 2026—Ukrainians endured intense bombardment of their energy infrastructure, their power grids, and their hospitals. The correlation is damning, even if it does not constitute direct proof of causality.

Drones, Missiles, Soldiers: The Accounting of War

The Kyiv Independent pushed the analysis even further: $150 million per day would finance approximately 214,000 to 500,000 FPV drones—those small, remote-controlled devices that cause havoc on the front lines. Russia was already launching more than 6,000 drones per month before the waivers. The production and deployment capacity for these weapons is directly linked to Moscow’s oil revenues. Every barrel sold under a waiver is an additional link in the chain that leads from Siberian oil wells to Ukrainian battlefields.

One must also consider the recruitment bonuses for Russian soldiers, which according to Ukrainian military intelligence, reach up to $30,000 depending on the region. With $150 million, Russia can recruit between 4,400 and 5,500 additional soldiers for every day of the waiver—enough to compensate for a large portion of its estimated daily losses of about 1,000 soldiers killed or wounded. The mechanics are clear, cold, and absolutely unbearable to contemplate when you know that this income was authorized by an American decision.

Shaheen and Warren: The Conscience of the Senate Facing the Silence of the White House

An Indictment Framed in Diplomatic Terms

The statement released on June 17, 2026, by Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Ranking Member of the Senate Banking Committee, is an indictment of surgical precision. "If the Administration renews this license now, it will be the clearest sign yet that President Trump does not believe his own deal will hold or that he simply will refuse to confront Putin, even after more than four years of conflict and countless innocent lives lost," they wrote. And: "Every additional dollar the Kremlin earns from this license helps Putin fund his illegal war."

These words were spoken on June 17, 2026, the very day that license 134C expired—and the day after Trump’s statement in Évian. Shaheen and Warren knew Trump’s speeches. They did not trust him. And they were right not to trust him—one only needs to look at the chronicle of the three previous extensions. The press release on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee website constitutes a historical record: formal proof that American elected officials documented Trump’s inconsistency on the issue of Russian oil in real-time.

Systematic Parliamentary Oversight Since July 2025

This is not the first time Shaheen and Warren have sounded the alarm on Trump’s drift concerning Russian sanctions. In July 2025, they announced a formal investigation into the five-month pause that the Trump administration had then imposed on all regular sanction designations against the Russian war machine. In May 2025, they had led a group of Democratic senators in a letter to National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, outlining a precise eight-point action plan to increase economic pressure on Moscow. In June 2026, during a heated parliamentary hearing, Shaheen reminded Rubio that the waivers granted to Russian oil allowed Russia to earn $4 billion per month.

This consistency is remarkable. While Trump zigzagged between promises and extensions, Shaheen maintained a documented, coherent, and factual pressure. She represents the best of what American democracy can do: a parliamentary opposition that relies on facts, that is not seduced by superficial declarations, and that maintains the institutional memory of betrayed commitments. In a political system where memory is often short, this is a service of the utmost importance.

The Évian G7: A Facade of Convergence

When the International Community Settles for Words

French President Emmanuel Macron claimed that the Évian G7 summit had produced "unprecedented convergence" among leaders, including Trump, on maintaining support for Ukraine. According to Reuters, Zelensky stated at the conclusion of the summit that G7 leaders agreed that Russia was "not winning" the war, and that they had discussed additional sanctions targeting Russian oil exports, the banking sector, and military production. The final G7 declaration promised to "strengthen sanctions, including in the oil and gas sectors." The atmosphere seemed positive.

Except that two European diplomats told Reuters that Trump had been noncommittal regarding the imposition of new U.S. sanctions on Russia—exactly what his European allies were calling for. The European Union was already considering a new package of sanctions on Russian oil and the banking sector. The United Kingdom had announced new measures against the shadow fleet. Canada had imposed new restrictions targeting 162 individuals, entities, and vessels. And the United States? They had simply let a waiver expire—without initiating any major new sanctions of their own.

The G7 as a Theater of Variable-Geometry Solidarity

The Évian G7 communiqué on sanctions is written with enough vagueness to avoid committing anyone to specific actions within a defined timeframe. According to S&P Global Energy, G7 countries remained divided on key measures such as lowering the price cap on Russian oil—only the United States still maintained the original $60 per barrel cap established in 2022, while the UK, Canada, and Japan had reduced it to less than $50. The European Union proposed a total embargo on maritime services for Russian oil, a measure that would supersede the cap—but without American agreement, its effectiveness would be limited.

The G7 fracture over Russian oil sanctions is not new, but it has widened under Trump. In 2022 and 2023, coordination between allies was exemplary. In 2026, each G7 member moves at its own pace, with its own priorities. This fragmentation is a strategic victory for Moscow, which has always bet on Western division as a lever of resistance. And Trump, through his inconsistency, has largely contributed to this breakdown of allied solidarity.

The Shadow Fleet: The Blind Spot of American Policy

Hundreds of Tankers Evading Sanctions

At the heart of the Russian oil sanctions problem is a mechanism that the Trump administration has systematically outsourced to its allies: the shadow fleet. This collection of dilapidated tankers, often re-registered in third countries, allows Moscow to bypass Western restrictions on its hydrocarbon exports. The United Kingdom, during the Évian G7, announced a new package of sanctions specifically targeting these vessels, including those carrying liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia's Arctic LNG 2 project, which was already sanctioned. The British measure also targets the financial networks used by Moscow to circumvent existing restrictions.

For their part, Senator Shaheen and her bipartisan colleagues had co-introduced the SHADOW Fleets Act in September 2025, a piece of legislation aimed at massively expanding U.S. sanction authorities to target these vessels. The bill sought to sanction any vessel engaging in a ship-to-ship cargo transfer with a sanctioned shadow tanker, to target Russian Arctic LNG projects, and to impose strict liability on countries purchasing illicit oil. It was blocked, delayed, and weakened—notably under pressure from the White House, which demanded waivers allowing Trump to choose whom to sanction.

Why the Shadow Fleet is the Cornerstone of the Putin System

Without the shadow fleet, Russian oil sanctions would be far more effective. It is precisely because these ships allow for large-scale circumvention of restrictions that Moscow can continue exporting its hydrocarbons despite the sanctions regime. In January 2025, under the Biden administration, the U.S. Treasury had sanctioned 183 vessels as part of a massive crackdown on this fleet—including several that were also carrying sanctioned Iranian oil. This coordinated action with the UK represented one of the most serious offensives against the Russian evasion infrastructure.

Under Trump, this dynamic slowed down. The administration preferred sporadic and theatrical sanctions—such as those on Rosneft and Lukoil—while allowing the operational circumvention network to flourish. Targeting oil companies without simultaneously targeting their export vectors is like convicting a drug kingpin while leaving his distribution network intact. The symbolic effect is real. The economic effect, however, remains partial.

The Rosneft-Lukoil Precedent: When Trump Knows How to Strike Hard

October 2025: Proof That Trump Can Act When He Decides To

It would be intellectually dishonest to pretend that Trump has never acted decisively on Russian oil sanctions. In October 2025, after canceling a trilateral summit in Budapest with Putin and Zelensky, Trump ordered the Treasury Department to sanction Russia’s two largest oil companies: Rosneft and Lukoil. Secretary Bessent stated: "Given Putin’s refusal to end this senseless war, Treasury is sanctioning the two largest Russian oil companies that fund the Kremlin’s war machine." The effects were immediate: Chinese state oil giants—PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC, and Zhenhua Oil—suspended their short-term purchases, according to sources cited by Reuters.

An analysis published on re-russia.net estimated that these sanctions threatened more than 2 million barrels per day of Russian oil exports, or about 30% of the total. Revenue losses for Russia could reach 15% to 25% of total hydrocarbon exports in 2026. Brent crude prices rebounded by 5.4% upon the announcement. These data confirm one essential thing: when Trump truly wants to sanction Russian oil, he has the means, and the effects are measurable. This makes the three months of waivers granted to Putin in 2026 all the more inexplicable—and inexcusable.

The Contradiction at the Heart of Trump’s Policy

Here is the unresolved tension at the center of Trump’s policy on Russian oil: he sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil with one hand in October 2025, then granted massive waivers on Russian oil with the other in March 2026. He signed the designation of these companies under Executive Order 14024, freezing all their U.S. assets and prohibiting any U.S. entity from doing business with them. Then he allowed their foreign customers to buy their oil without secondary sanctions for three months.

It is a schizophrenic posture that dilutes the actual impact of the sanctions. When you sanction a company but temporarily authorize the purchase of its product, you create legal and commercial ambiguity that benefits opportunistic buyers—notably China and India—and weakens the deterrent effect of your own decisions. Scott Bessent himself had attempted to explain this apparent coherence before Congress, using arguments that Senators Shaheen and Warren dismantled point-by-point in their successive public interventions.

The Hormuz Rhetoric: The Perfect Alibi

When Geography Serves to Justify Inaction

The official argument from the Trump administration to justify the three successive waivers on Russian oil was simple: the war in Iran had disrupted global markets, the Strait of Hormuz was partially blocked, and temporarily authorizing the sale of Russian oil already at sea helped avoid a global energy crisis. On the surface, the argument is technically defensible. Except that, as Senators Shaheen and Warren pointed out on June 17: "This effort clearly failed, as Americans have endured significantly higher prices at the pump and in grocery stores since the conflict began."

In other words, the waiver did not fulfill its stated goal of stabilizing American consumer prices. It only benefited Russia. This is a brutal realization that calls into question the administration's entire line of reasoning: if the tool doesn't work for its stated goals but exclusively benefits the adversary you claim to be pressuring, what is its real purpose? The most charitable answer is analytical incompetence. The least charitable is that Trump simply chose to protect the Russian beneficiaries of the sanctions at the expense of his own voters and Ukraine.

The End of the War in Iran as a Turning Point

The agreement between Washington and Tehran to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz represents, according to Trump himself, the primary justification for the possible return of sanctions on Russian oil. "We took sanctions off because obviously we're not looking to impede the oil. We are in a position to do that soon," he declared in Évian on June 16. This logic is consistent in itself—if the Hormuz crisis justified easing sanctions, the reopening of the strait should logically justify their reinstatement. But it also reveals that sanctions on Russian oil were never, for Trump, a matter of moral principle or solidarity with Ukraine—they are a conditional lever, adjustable based on oil prices.

According to The Moscow Times, the price of the benchmark Russian Urals oil had fallen back below $65 per barrel by the time license 134C expired on June 17, after peaking at approximately $120 at the height of the war in Iran. The drop in oil prices mechanically gives Washington more room to reinstate sanctions without triggering an immediate spike at the pump. But on June 17, Trump was still "monitoring the price drop"—a classic conditionality that leaves the door open for a fourth waiver if prices rebound.

Zelensky’s Position and the Battlefield Reality

Ukraine: Resistance as a Condition for Negotiation

Volodymyr Zelensky was present at the Évian G7 at the invitation of France. According to Reuters, he stated at the conclusion of the discussions that G7 leaders agreed that Russia was "not winning" the war. American Ambassador Bill Taylor, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, interviewed on LiveNOW from FOX, confirmed that the Ukrainians had regained the initiative on the ground: they are killing more Russian soldiers than Russia can recruit, they are reclaiming more territory than they are yielding, and they are striking deeper into Russia than the Russians are striking into Ukraine. The analysis is clear: Ukraine is in a position of relative strength, but this position depends on the financial and military resources the West consents to maintain.

It is precisely for this reason that Trump’s oil waivers are so dangerous. Every additional dollar granted to Putin prolongs the war. And every prolongation of the war increases the human, economic, and political cost for Ukraine, for Europe, and ultimately for the United States itself. Zelensky is not asking for charity. He is asking for the tools that exist to be used with consistency. The G7 promised to "strengthen sanctions." Ukraine is waiting to see the deeds match the words.

The War in the Air: Ukrainians and Russians Strike Their Strategic Targets

According to LiveNOW from FOX, the Ukrainians have intensified their strikes on Russian oil infrastructure—refineries, depots, export ports—precisely because these facilities are the backbone of the Russian war effort's financing. In parallel, the Russians have continued to target the Ukrainian electric system, gas networks, and water and heat infrastructure. This dual movement—attacking the enemy's funding sources while defending one's own vital infrastructure—illustrates the economic-military logic that has underpinned this conflict since 2022.

The Patriot missiles, which had been diverted to the defense of Iran during the Mediterranean conflict, could now return to Ukraine if the ceasefire with Iran holds—according to Bill Taylor. This would represent a significant reinforcement of Ukrainian defensive capabilities against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles. The G7 promised to "strengthen Ukraine's air defenses." If the Patriots return and if oil sanctions effectively resume, the combination of these two measures could change the military equation on the ground.

Trump’s Strategic Inconsistency: A Systemic Danger to the West

When Unpredictability Becomes a Geopolitical Risk

The history of Russian oil sanctions under Trump illustrates a broader structural problem: Trump’s inconsistency as a mode of governance. He sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025—then granted massive waivers in 2026. He declared "soon" in Évian on June 16—then was "noncommittal" on concrete measures behind the scenes. He supported Lindsey Graham’s bipartisan Russian sanctions bill in January 2026—then asked the Senate to delay it in June 2026 and to insert presidential exception clauses. This behavioral pattern is not just frustrating for allies. It is actively exploited by Moscow.

Since 2022, Russia has developed a sophisticated circumvention infrastructure—shadow fleet, alternative payment networks, intermediary buyers—precisely because it understood that Western sanctions would be applied inconsistently. Every period of relief—like that from March to June 2026—gives it time to reorganize, consolidate its financing circuits, and test the limits of Western determination. In this sense, Trump’s inconsistency does not just harm Ukraine. It harms the very effectiveness of the sanctions regime the West has spent years building.

Allies Attempting to Offset American Unpredictability

Faced with American zigzags, European G7 partners have tried to maintain pressure on Moscow through their own means. The United Kingdom has strengthened its sanctions on the shadow fleet and aligned with the European Union to target refiners processing Russian oil abroad. The EU has proposed a total embargo on maritime services for Russian oil—a measure that would theoretically render the shadow fleet useless by targeting all actors in the logistical chain. Canada imposed restrictions in 2026 on more than 3,400 individuals and entities and more than 600 vessels linked to Russia.

But these unilateral or Euro-coordinated measures cannot replace the firepower of the United States in the sanctions regime. Without Washington, secondary sanctions do not have the same deterrent reach—large Chinese and Indian companies calculate their risk exposure based on exposure to U.S. markets, not European ones. The fragmentation of the Western front is, therefore, ultimately a strategic victory for Putin—and a direct consequence of Trump’s unpredictability.

China and India: The Great Silent Beneficiaries

Beijing and New Delhi Profit from Every Easing of Sanctions

The policy of easing American sanctions on Russian oil has a beneficiary that official communiqués rarely mention: China. Under the pressure of secondary sanctions imposed in October 2025, major Chinese state oil companies had suspended their purchases from Rosneft and Lukoil. But during the 2026 waiver period, they were able to resume their purchases of Russian oil—helping to keep the Kremlin’s oil revenues at high levels. India has played an analogous role: as the primary beneficiary of general licenses allowing for the purchase of Russian oil at a discount, it imported massive volumes during the three months of waivers.

This dynamic raises a fundamental political question that the Trump administration never truly wanted to face: how can one simultaneously impose punitive tariffs on China and India for their purchases of Russian oil, while granting them exemption licenses that allow those very same purchases? The answer is that you can’t—and that is precisely why Trump’s sanctions policy on Russian oil lacked internal consistency. By combining tariff pressure with targeted relief, Washington ultimately offered Beijing and New Delhi the best of both worlds: the rhetoric of firmness without the actual consequences.

China: The West’s Primary Enemy, the Russian War’s Primary Financier

Beyond Russia, China is the most structural geopolitical threat to the Western world order. By continuing to buy Russian oil on a massive scale—even while temporarily reducing its purchases from Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025—Beijing provides Putin with the economic lifeline without which his regime could not indefinitely finance such a costly war. According to Reuters, reports suggested that Indian refiners were significantly reducing their Russian oil imports after the October 2025 sanctions. China has officially expressed its opposition to U.S. sanctions. This opposition is not a diplomatic posture—it is a strategic choice.

However, every waiver granted by Trump on Russian oil directly benefits Chinese and Indian buyers, who can maintain their supply flows without risking secondary sanctions for the duration of the license. It is an unsolicited gift to Beijing—an actor that Trump himself presents as the primary adversary of the United States. The contradiction is striking: China is declared the greatest threat, record tariffs are imposed on it, and then it is offered windows for Russian oil supplies at a discount without sanctions.

The June 17 Expiration: A Real End or a New Illusion?

License 134C Expires—But Without a Guarantee of Returning to Sanctions

On June 17, 2026, general license 134C—the third waiver on Russian oil granted by the Trump administration—expired without renewal. This is the first time since March 2026 that Washington has allowed sanctions to take full effect without an extension. The decision is accompanied by Trump’s strong signal in Évian on June 16: "Soon we'll be able to do that... We're in a position to do that soon." Markets interpreted these words as a return to sanctions. The price of the benchmark Russian Urals oil, which had peaked at approximately $120 per barrel at the height of the war in Iran, has dropped back below $65 per barrel according to The Moscow Times.

But caution is warranted. The Trump administration has, on two occasions, let a waiver expire—only to renew it a few days later. The Straits Times noted that on June 17, the U.S. Treasury simply had not published a new extension, without Trump or his officials explicitly confirming the return of sanctions. Trump himself, asked on June 17 during the G7, had stated: "We are looking at that. We're seeing how far the price of oil comes down, it's really tumbling." This is not the posture of a leader determined to impose costly sanctions—it is that of a man monitoring the markets before deciding.

The Test of the Fourth Extension That Should Not Happen

The real question is not whether license 134C expired on June 17—it did. The real question is: will there be a license 134D? A new pretext, a new "exceptional circumstance"—a rebound in oil prices, instability in another producing country, pressure from purchasing allies—could theoretically justify a fourth waiver. The history of the first three licenses shows that the pattern is well established: expiration, a promise not to renew, then renewal under a new pretext.

If Trump wants to be taken seriously on Ukraine, he must resist this temptation. Senators Shaheen and Warren had warned: "We hope President Trump understands what is obvious: Ukraine is winning. And if President Trump is interested in a peace deal, he should increase the pressure on Putin to accept a just and lasting peace, not grant him further sanctions relief." These words, spoken on the very day the license expired, constitute the best summary of what Ukraine and its allies now expect from Washington.

Conclusion: Trump, Oil, and the Price of Inconsistency

What Ukraine Takes Away from Six Months of False Starts

The sequence from March to June 2026 regarding American oil sanctions against Russia offers a political lesson of striking clarity. Trump has the tools to pressure Putin economically. He used them effectively in October 2025 against Rosneft and Lukoil. He then sabotaged them for three months under the pretext of stabilizing energy markets that his own decisions had helped destabilize. He now announces their return—by saying "soon", by conditioning his decision on oil prices, by leaving every exit door open. This is not strategy. This is improvisation.

During those three months, Ukraine suffered large-scale attacks. During those three months, Russia collected additional oil revenues that should have been blocked. During those three months, Senators Shaheen and Warren publicly documented the betrayal—not out of partisan ideology, but out of an attachment to facts and the principled commitments the United States has made to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion of 2022. Inconsistency has a cost. That cost was paid in Ukrainian lives.

Words Must Become Deeds—And Fast

If Donald Trump wants to be taken seriously on Ukraine—if the words spoken at Évian on June 16, 2026 are to have any meaning—he must reinstate full and waiver-free sanctions on Russian oil, target the shadow fleet with the same energy deployed for the sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025, and stop sabotaging bipartisan Congressional bills by demanding presidential exception clauses. He must ensure that his G7 allies believe his commitments—and that Putin, above all, understands that the sanctions regime is permanent and non-negotiable.

Ukraine cannot afford a fourth delay. Neither can the free world. Zelensky continues to lead his country under fire with a consistency that commands respect. The American senators continue to document the failings with exemplary rigor. European allies continue to push forward their own measures of pressure on Moscow. Only one thing is missing: for Trump to decide, once and for all, that actions speak louder than words. And that "soon" means now.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

LiveNOW from FOX — Trump signals swift return of sanctions on Russian oil, G7 Summit Évian — June 20, 2026

U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee — Shaheen and Warren urge Trump to finally end Russian oil relief (General License 134C) — June 17, 2026

Kyiv Independent — What Russian oil sanctions relief means for Putin’s war machine — March 17, 2026

Secondary Sources

Kyiv Independent — US renews Russian oil waiver again despite Secretary Bessent’s promises — May 18, 2026

The Moscow Times — US Russian oil waiver expires for the third time — June 17, 2026

Newsmax — Trump signals return of Russian oil sanctions — June 16, 2026

U.S. Senate — Shaheen, Warren, Coons announce investigation into Trump administration’s five-month pause on sanctions against Russia’s war machine — July 3, 2025

Fox News — After waffling between Russia and Ukraine, Trump slaps Kremlin with oil sanctions — October 22, 2025