REPORT: The Prymary unit strikes Crimea — radar, locomotives, and fuel tankers reduced to ash

Introduction: Crimea as a firing range

A peninsula under systematic pressure

On June 30, 2026, Ukraine's special Prymary unit, attached to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (GUR), published a video documenting the destruction of several high-value targets in occupied Crimea. The toll: one Kasta-2E2 airspace surveillance radar, two freight locomotives, six fuel tankers, and three railway fuel cars. A methodical operation, filmed and claimed — because in the information war, demonstrating that you strike matters as much as the strike itself.

Crimea has long ceased to be a Russian sanctuary. Since the illegal occupation of 2014, the peninsula has served as a forward base for Russian military operations against Ukraine. Since 2022, Ukraine has been conducting a systematic campaign to degrade Russian military infrastructure in Crimea — a strategy of isolation and attrition that is bearing fruit, strike by strike, radar by radar.

The Prymary unit, specialist in deep-strike operations

The Prymary unit specializes in intelligence operations and precision strikes against high-value military targets in occupied territories. Its previous operations in Crimea had already targeted radar stations including the Podlyot, the Sopka-2, the P-18 Terek, and other Kasta-2E2 systems. The list grows regularly, populating war dispatches with Russian nomenclature that reads like a catalog of what Ukraine is capable of destroying.

What these operations reveal tactically is as important as what they destroy. By targeting radars first — surveillance and early-warning systems — before striking logistics, the Prymary unit applies a precise doctrine: degrade the enemy's situational awareness before hitting its supply lines. It is the same logic as a military orchestra playing its solos in the right order.

The Kasta-2E2 radar: a blinded eye over Crimea's skies

Functions and importance of the Kasta-2E2

The 39N6 Kasta-2E2 is a low-altitude airspace surveillance system designed to detect aircraft and drones flying close to the ground — precisely the profile of Ukrainian drones used for deep-strike operations. Its detection range extends to roughly 150 kilometers for high-altitude targets, and it is particularly effective against small, low-radar-signature platforms. In Crimea, the Kasta-2E2 formed an integral part of Russia's integrated air defense network.

Its destruction does not merely reduce local detection capacity: it creates a blind spot in Russian radar coverage, opening a gap that Ukrainian drones and missiles can exploit to reach targets even deeper inside the peninsula or beyond. Every destroyed radar expands Ukraine's operational space. This is not an abstract calculation — it is the lived reality of Prymary unit drone operators on every new mission.

A historical record of destruction in Crimea

The Prymary unit has previous form against Kasta-2E2 systems. Earlier documented operations had already destroyed at least three Kasta-2E2 units in Crimea, along with numerous other systems: Podlyot, Niobii-SV, Nebo-SV, Nebo-M, S-300VM systems, and Pantsir-S1 units. Russia's air defense network in Crimea has been systematically degraded over several months, to the point where its original effectiveness is now only a painful memory for Russian military planners.

This degradation campaign is part of the 40-day isolation strategy for the Crimean peninsula referenced by Ukrainian military sources: cut supply lines, destroy surveillance and defense systems, and render the Russian position in the peninsula increasingly untenable. The destruction of the Kasta-2E2 on June 30 is one step in this long-term strategy.

Railway logistics as a strategic target

Two locomotives and six tankers: a calculation of war

The destruction of two freight locomotives and six fuel tankers, along with three railway fuel cars, is far from incidental. Crimea is physically connected to mainland Russia by two primary axes: the Kerch Bridge — itself damaged by previous Ukrainian strikes — and the railway lines crossing Ukrainian territories occupied since 2022. These rail routes form the logistical backbone of the Russian military apparatus in Crimea.

Each destroyed locomotive reduces Russia's capacity to move fuel, ammunition, and equipment to and from the peninsula. Each burned tanker represents fuel that will not reach Russian motorized units. In a war of attrition, these numbers accumulate. Two locomotives today, three next week — the Crimean rail network is being slowly but surely bled dry.

The isolation strategy: starving the peninsula

Ukraine's strategy for isolating Crimea combines strikes on railway logistics infrastructure, fuel depots, Black Sea Fleet vessels, and air defense systems. Together they form a coherent whole: making the peninsula progressively harder to resupply, less and less defensible, and increasingly useless as a power projection base for the Russian military.

The operational consequences are being felt. Ukrainian military sources report growing Russian difficulties in maintaining adequate fuel and ammunition levels on the peninsula. The Kerch Bridge, partially out of service after multiple strikes, is no longer the massive communication route it was in 2022. Crimea is not yet isolated — but it is increasingly difficult to sustain.

The video as an information weapon

Filming the war to win the battle of opinion too

The Prymary unit published a video documenting these destructions — a systematic practice of Ukrainian forces since the start of the full-scale war. This operational communication strategy serves several functions: documenting results for military command, maintaining the morale of Ukrainian forces, and sending a clear message to the Russian population and international opinion about the effectiveness of Ukrainian resistance.

The video shows successive strikes on the Kasta-2E2 radar and railway targets. It does not glorify destruction for its own sake — it documents it as a fact of war. This distinction matters: Ukrainian communication generally avoids propagandistic excesses that would alienate Western audiences, instead sticking to verifiable, confirmable, filmed facts.

The drone war and operational transparency

The war in Ukraine is the first large-scale conflict in which drone operations are systematically filmed and published in near-real time. This operational transparency cuts both ways: it lets the world see Ukrainian effectiveness, but it also informs the adversary about capabilities and methods. Ukraine has clearly decided that the political and moral benefits of this transparency outweigh the tactical risks.

For Defence Express, which published and analyzed the June 30 video, each documented strike contributes to a war record that will be invaluable to future historians and defense analysts. These videos do not disappear: they build the memory of this war and bear witness, against Russian attempts at rewriting history, to what actually happened on the ground.

Context: the systematic degradation of Crimean defenses

An air defense network in tatters

Crimea was in 2022 one of the best-defended zones in Russian military space, with multiple S-400 batteries, Pantsir-S1 for close-in defense, and a radar network covering all altitudes. Today, this network is severely degraded. Ukrainian strikes have destroyed or damaged dozens of systems, forcing Russia to urgently redeploy air defense assets from other front sectors — exactly what Ukraine intended.

The destruction of the June 30 Kasta-2E2 adds to a long list. According to data compiled by Defence Express and other specialized sources, Ukraine destroyed a record number of Russian artillery and air defense systems in 2026 — a trend accelerating with improved Ukrainian drone capabilities and growing guided munitions production.

The Black Sea Fleet, another victim of the Crimean campaign

Ukraine's campaign against military infrastructure in Crimea extends beyond radars and trains. The Russian Black Sea Fleet was forced to abandon Sevastopol following repeated strikes from Ukrainian naval drones and missiles. Russian vessels now operate from ports in mainland Russia, far less well-positioned for power projection in the Black Sea. Crimea is therefore losing the foundational military value that motivated its annexation in 2014.

This strategic reality rests in part on the degradation campaign in which the Prymary unit is a key actor. Without radar coverage, without fuel, without railway logistics, without a naval fleet: the peninsula becomes a military burden rather than an asset. That is precisely the objective of Ukraine's isolation strategy.

The numbers of destruction: June 2026 as a record month

2,053 artillery systems destroyed in June

In June 2026, Ukrainian forces destroyed 2,053 Russian artillery systems — compared to 1,243 in June 2025, a rise of 65% in one year. These figures, compiled by sources including Defence Express and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, illustrate the intensification of the artillery war. Ukraine is striking Russian artillery more effectively, more rapidly, and in growing volumes — a trend directly linked to advances in Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike drone capabilities.

The ratio of artillery losses to combatant losses is shifting in Ukraine's favor. Destroying a Russian artillery system strips Russian forces of their primary tactical advantage: the massive firepower that leveled Ukrainian cities. Every destroyed howitzer, every neutralized Msta-S, every rocket launcher reduced to scrap represents a real reduction in Russian offensive capability.

The logic of attrition

The war in Ukraine is fundamentally a war of attrition — and in that logic, the numbers matter enormously. Russia holds a substantial stockpile of Soviet-era equipment, but that stockpile is being depleted. Russian factories produce, certainly, but not at the rate needed to offset losses. Iran and North Korea supply drones and ammunition — but those deliveries do not close the gap that keeps widening.

Ukraine's strategy of prioritizing artillery, radars, and logistics targets is designed precisely to accelerate this exhaustion. Destroying 2,053 artillery systems in June is not a matter of tactical luck: it is the application of a coherent doctrine, backed by quality intelligence, capable drone technology, and coordination across the different branches of the Ukrainian armed forces.

The June 30 operation in its immediate context

The timing of the strike

The operation of June 30, 2026 unfolds in a particular military context. At this point, the front line in Ukraine is broadly stabilized, but both sides are conducting continuous pressure operations. Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure in Crimea and rear areas follow a long-term degradation logic rather than seeking immediate territorial breakthroughs.

The simultaneous destruction of a radar and logistical targets illustrates the Prymary unit's two-step doctrine: first blind the adversary, then hit its supply lines. The Kasta-2E2 radar was likely covering the airspace around the railway targets — its neutralization reduces Russia's capacity to detect and intercept future drones sent against those same infrastructure assets.

The Russian military response

Russia is not passive in the face of these strikes. It has intensified its attempts to intercept Ukrainian drones, deployed additional electronic warfare systems, and raised its security protocols around critical installations in Crimea. These measures slow some Ukrainian operations but do not stop them. The Prymary unit continually adapts, testing new approach trajectories, new timetables, new methods of exploiting gaps in enemy radar coverage.

This permanent adaptation war, invisible to the general public but crucial to the conflict's outcome, plays out in Ukrainian operational planning centers. Every successful strike yields data on gaps in the Russian defensive apparatus. Every failure reveals new protective measures to work around. It is a war of ingenuity as much as a war of steel.

Implications for Ukraine's defense

Crimea as a doctrine testing ground

The Crimea campaign has become a laboratory of modern warfare: reconnaissance drones, strike drones, cruise missiles, combined special operations. The lessons drawn from these operations enrich Ukrainian military doctrine and are closely studied by NATO allies. The way Ukraine has degraded Crimean air defense is being analyzed in military academies across the West.

For Ukraine's long-term defense, the Crimean campaign demonstrates that a strategy of progressive degradation — combining strikes against multiple targets of varying strategic value — can be as effective as a massive ground offensive, without the catastrophic human losses that would entail. That is a fundamental military lesson, learned under the hardest possible conditions.

Western support as a force multiplier

The operations of the Prymary unit and Ukrainian forces in general would not have been possible without Western support. Intelligence provided by NATO allies, targeting technology integrated into certain weapons systems, training delivered to Ukrainian operators, and equipment supplied — drones, missiles, electronic warfare systems — form a support ecosystem without which the tactical victories documented in these videos would be inconceivable.

This operational partnership, often presented as "support" in Western diplomatic language, is in reality a deep and substantial military cooperation. NATO members are investing in Ukrainian victory — not only because they want Ukraine to win, but because they know what Russia would do next if it did win would be infinitely more costly for their own security.

The profile of the Prymary unit

A combined intelligence and strike unit

The Prymary unit is a special unit of the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate, specializing in surveillance, targeting, and precision strikes against military infrastructure in occupied territory. Its name, meaning "first" in Ukrainian, reflects its positioning as a lead unit in offensive intelligence operations.

Its operations in Crimea span several years and have contributed significantly to degrading Russian military potential on the peninsula. The regularity with which the unit publishes its operational videos reflects a deliberate communication policy: making Ukrainian successes visible, maintaining psychological pressure on the occupier, and reminding world opinion that Ukrainian resistance is active, effective, and determined.

The role of special operations in Ukraine's strategy

Special operations like those of the Prymary unit play a growing role in Ukraine's military strategy. They allow high-value targets to be reached in areas where regular forces cannot operate directly, with an exceptional cost-effectiveness ratio compared to conventional front operations. A small team, precision drones, rigorous planning: the result often surpasses what an entire company would achieve at the cost of heavy human losses.

This doctrinal evolution — toward more special operations, more drones, fewer frontal assaults — reflects both the demographic realities of Ukraine (a smaller population than Russia, unable to sustain massive losses indefinitely) and the technological advantages that Western support has made possible. It is a brilliant adaptation to the constraints imposed by the war.

The geopolitical stakes of the Crimean campaign

Crimea as symbol and reality

Crimea is both a concrete military objective and a first-order political symbol. Its illegal annexation by Russia in 2014 marked the beginning of the process that led to the full-scale invasion of 2022. Its eventual liberation — or even its sufficient military degradation to render it unusable — would constitute a major strategic reversal.

For Putin, Crimea is a rhetorical red line: he has repeatedly declared it "Russian forever." For Ukraine, it is a strategic priority and a legal obligation — its territorial integrity demands it. For the negotiators working toward a possible peace agreement, the question of Crimea remains one of the hardest obstacles to overcome. The Prymary unit's strikes speak this language: they maintain military pressure on the peninsula regardless of the state of diplomatic negotiations.

Negotiations and pressure on the ground

In late June 2026, complex diplomatic discussions continue between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. The question of the Anchorage spirit — Russian demands formulated at a US-Russia summit in Alaska — divides the parties. Russia wants Ukraine to withdraw from the Donbas; Ukraine categorically refuses. In this context, Ukrainian military operations, including in Crimea, also serve to maintain leverage in negotiations: you do not concede what you are capable of striking.

The logic is cold but real: the more Ukraine degrades Russia's military position in Crimea and on the front, the stronger its negotiating position. Diplomacy and war are not separate processes — they feed each other. The Prymary unit's videos are also, indirectly, negotiating arguments.

Ukraine beyond the strikes: reconstruction in parallel

Striking and building simultaneously

Ukraine strikes radars in Crimea and signs industrial agreements in Gdańsk. It fights and plans its reconstruction. It resists and negotiates its EU accession. This capacity to pursue military operations and the national reconstruction project simultaneously is one of the most remarkable features of Zelensky's Ukraine — and one of the things Moscow never anticipated.

The Prymary unit's strikes fit within this broader context. They are not disconnected from the Ukrainian national project: they are its military dimension. For Ukraine to survive and prosper, it must first repel the occupier. And to repel the occupier, it must strike its radars, burn its fuel, destroy its lines of communication. That is brutal, necessary, and entirely coherent.

Crimea tomorrow

No one can predict with certainty when or how the war will end, or what Crimea's final status will be. Negotiations are complex, positions are entrenched, and the violence continues. What is certain is that the peninsula is no longer the invulnerable base that Russia thought it held. It has become a zone of permanent combat, subject to growing military pressure, its strategic value eroding with every successful Ukrainian strike.

The operation of June 30, 2026 by the Prymary unit is one fragment of this reality. A radar destroyed, trains immobilized, fuel lost. In ten years, looking back, this may not be the strike anyone remembers. But it is one strike among thousands that, together, tipped the balance. And in this war, that is exactly what counts.

Conclusion: Crimea is being liberated through precision

The June 30 toll and what it announces

One Kasta-2E2 radar blinded, two locomotives stopped, six tankers burned, three railway cars destroyed. The toll from the Prymary unit's operation on June 30, 2026 is precise, documented, verified. It does not prejudge the final outcome of the war in Crimea — but it confirms that Ukraine continues to chip away at the Russian occupation of the peninsula, day by day, strike by strike, with a persistence that commands respect and an effectiveness that should alarm Moscow.

Crimea is not lost to Ukraine. It is being methodically besieged. And this methodical siege, invisible in its details but relentless in its logic, is one of the most compelling expressions of what Ukrainian resistance truly means: not merely surviving, but reclaiming. Not merely defending, but dismantling. Not merely holding on, but winning.

What these operations say about Ukraine

The Prymary unit, its drones, its operators, its planners — they embody something essential in the Ukrainian struggle. They are not movie heroes. They are professionals doing their job with cold precision, in service of a just cause. The liberation of Crimea will pass through thousands of operations like that of June 30, 2026. And if it comes one day, it will be thanks to those men and women who refused to let their country be occupied — and who proved, radar by radar, that occupation has a cost Russia cannot pay forever.

Conclusion: Every strike is a brick of freedom

The sum of courageous acts

The war in Ukraine will not be won in one grand gesture. It will be won through accumulation: every radar destroyed, every radar degraded, every radar blinded contributes to a broader picture in which Ukraine pushes back the occupation centimeter by centimeter, system by system. The operation of June 30, 2026 by the Prymary unit is one of those bricks. Small, precise, necessary.

History will remember the great battles and the great political decisions. It will probably forget the destroyed radars and the immobilized locomotives. That would be wrong. Because in the logic of the attrition war that Ukraine is waging against a larger invader, these precision acts count as much as the major offensives. They form the soil on which the final victory, if it comes, will be built. And every member of the Prymary unit who fixes their gaze through a drone camera on a Russian radar in Crimea is participating in that foundational work.

Conclusion: The Prymary operation and the memory of resistance

What the June 30 video leaves to posterity

The video published by the Prymary unit on June 30, 2026 will last only a few minutes. But it will be archived, analyzed, referenced in military reports, academic theses, and doctrine manuals. It will document that, in a brutal war of occupation, a Ukrainian special unit maintained pressure on the invader until the very last hour — and that this pressure never faltered, whatever the circumstances.

Ukrainian resistance is not an act of romantic heroism. It is work. It is planning. It is military engineering applied with remarkable professional rigor. The Prymary unit and its thousands of counterparts in the Ukrainian armed forces embody this truth: freedom is not earned by dying bravely — it is won by working intelligently. Every radar destroyed in Crimea is proof of that.

Conclusion: Crimea resounds under the strikes of freedom

The legacy of this campaign

In the years to come, when historians analyze how Ukraine resisted the most massive Russian invasion since the Second World War, the campaign to degrade Russian military infrastructure in Crimea will hold a particular place. It will demonstrate that freedom can be defended not only through great battles, but through the methodical, invisible, persistent work of units like Prymary.

One fewer Kasta-2E2 radar in Crimea. Two fewer locomotives on the Russian railway lines. Six fuel tankers that will not feed the occupier's tanks and trucks. That is little, in absolute terms. It is everything, in the logic of resistance. And this logic — methodical, patient, determined — is ultimately the only one that can prevail against the organized brutality of a regime that understands only force.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Acknowledged biases and editorial stance

I am Maxime Marquette, analyst and columnist. I am firmly pro-Ukraine in my coverage of this war. I consider the Russian occupation of Crimea illegal, Ukrainian resistance legitimate, and the Prymary unit's strikes against military targets to be lawful acts of war under international humanitarian law. I disclose these biases for transparency — not to retract them, but so that the reader can take them into account.

Method and limitations of this analysis

This analysis draws primarily on the Defence Express report of June 30, 2026, data compiled by Militarnyi and Euromaidan Press, and the context of the Crimean campaign documented over several months. I did not have access to classified details of the operation or direct testimony from members of the Prymary unit. Destruction figures come from official and specialized Ukrainian sources — I report them as such, noting they have not been independently confirmed by neutral observers.

Sources

Primary sources

Defence Express — Ukraine's Prymary unit destroys Kasta-2E2 radar, locomotives, and fuel tankers in Crimea — June 30, 2026

Militarnyi — Russian loss data and Ukrainian operations — June–July 2026

Kyiv Independent — War latest — July 2026

Secondary sources

Euromaidan Press — Context of the Crimean campaign — 2026

RBC Ukraine — Military operations in Crimea — 2026

Institute for the Study of War — Russian offensive campaign assessment — July 1, 2026