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REPORT: Five days of exercises: Taiwan trains for invasion

From June 22 to 26, 2026, Taiwan's armed forces conducted an exercise dubbed "Immediate Combat Readiness" — five days of intense training designed to simulate, as faithfully as possible, the transition from peacetime to wartime under duress. This was not an ordinary showcase exercise or a demonstration. It was something far more serious, far more urgent, and all the more signif

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Key takeaways
  1. From June 22 to 26, 2026, Taiwan's armed forces conducted an exercise dubbed "Immediate Combat Readiness" — five days of intense training designed to simulate, as faithfully as possible, the transition from peacetime to wartime under duress. This was not an ordinary showcase exercise or a demonstration. It was something far more serious, far more urgent, and all the more signif
  2. REPORT: Five days of exercises: Taiwan trains for invasion
  3. Introduction: the island learning to live on the edge of the abyss
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Facts, quotes, and cited links remain in the body. Interpretations are framed as analysis or opinion according to the format.

REPORT: Five days of exercises: Taiwan trains for invasion

Introduction: the island learning to live on the edge of the abyss

Five days to prepare for what should never happen

From June 22 to 26, 2026, Taiwan's armed forces conducted an exercise dubbed "Immediate Combat Readiness" — five days of intense training designed to simulate, as faithfully as possible, the transition from peacetime to wartime under duress. This was not an ordinary showcase exercise or a demonstration. It was something far more serious, far more urgent, and all the more significant in the context of the ongoing tensions with China.

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense described the exercises within a "real time, real troops, real equipment" framework — meaning actual deployments with operational hardware, orders issued in real time, and responses required within extremely compressed timeframes. The goal: to verify that every unit, every commander, every soldier can shift from standby to combat footing without the weeks of advance preparation that characterized older exercises.

A threat context that demands this format

This type of "surprise" exercise already existed in 2025, but took on a new dimension in 2026, in a context where the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had significantly intensified its military presence around the island. In May 2026 alone, the PLA conducted 4 "combat readiness" patrols and recorded 274 air sorties around Taiwan, with an ADIZ penetration rate of 79%. The frequency and intensity of these activities had rendered traditional training formats inadequate for the operational reality.

Defense Minister Wellington Koo stated it plainly before parliament on June 24: "This is about building the speed we assess as necessary to shift from peacetime to wartime footing." It is an admission of brutal lucidity — and admirable institutional modesty. Taiwan acknowledges it was not ready. And it is doing what it takes to become so.

The revolutionary exercise format: surprise as method

Gone: weeks of rehearsal

Traditionally, Taiwanese military exercises — notably the major annual Han Kuang drills — were prepared well in advance. Units had time to deploy their equipment, rehearse sequences, and memorize procedures. This format was useful for mass training but ill-suited to the current threat. The new approach imposes controlled improvisation: orders arrive with minimal notice, units must improvise their deployment in conditions close to those of a real crisis.

A rocket unit commander had illustrated this difference during earlier exercises: "Before, we would arrive at the firing position a week in advance to finalize launch preparations. This time, we arrived one day ahead." This compression of preparation time is a direct indicator of real operational capability against strategic surprise. In a single week's reduction, this symbolizes exactly the shortening of warning time that Minister Koo described.

Simulation of the worst case: the conversion of an exercise into an invasion

The exercises were explicitly designed to prepare Taiwanese forces for a particularly dreaded scenario: that China uses one of its regular military exercises as cover to launch a real invasion operation. In that case, the time between "normal Chinese exercise" and "start of the invasion" would be minimal — perhaps a few hours, perhaps less. Only forces capable of switching instantly to combat mode would have any chance of holding out through the critical opening hours.

On June 24, 2026, the third day of exercises, Taiwanese forces blocked the Tamsui River to simulate stopping the advance of an amphibious assault. This type of urban-riverine exercise is among the most complex — it involves real-time coordination between ground, naval, and coastal defense forces in a populated environment. The presence of 23 Chinese military aircraft detected between June 22 and 23, of which 20 crossed the median line of the strait, provided a realistic backdrop — perhaps a little too realistic.

The first rocket fire toward China: a powerful symbol

An unprecedented historical exercise

In early June 2026, during preparatory exercises leading up to the major drills, Taiwan had for the first time conducted rocket firings in the direction of mainland China — from a beach on the eastern side of the island, toward the Western Pacific, in the direction where Chinese forces are positioned. It was not a strike on Chinese territory, but a simulation exercise under realistic conditions. A powerful symbol: Taipei was demonstrating its capability and its will to resist.

This symbolic choice of direction — toward the Pacific rather than the strait — also underscores the Taiwanese awareness that the threat may not come solely from the strait. The Chinese patrols east of Taiwan at the start of the month had shown that the PLA can project significant force into those waters. Training is adapting to this reality.

The complete overhaul of defensive doctrine

The June 2026 exercises are part of a broader overhaul of Taiwanese military doctrine, initiated several years ago but accelerated under the pressure of a growing threat. Taiwan is gradually abandoning the model of large conventional battles in favor of an asymmetric defense: mobile forces, dispersed and hardened anti-ship and anti-aircraft weapons, decentralized command, enhanced civilian resilience. This transformation is directly inspired by the lessons of the war in Ukraine.

On June 1, 2026, the Taiwanese navy formally established a new Coastal Combat Command, consolidating surveillance capabilities, anti-ship missiles, and coastal drones under a single command structure. This reorganization aims to reduce decision times in the event of a sudden alert — precisely the problem that the June 22–26 exercises address.

The civilian dimension: building population resilience

Total defense as a strategic concept

Military exercises are only one dimension of a total defense approach that Taiwan is progressively developing. The concept of "total defense" — inspired by Nordic models, notably Finnish and Swedish — integrates civilian preparedness for resistance alongside professional armed forces. Civilian crisis preparedness exercises, strategic reserves of fuel and food, evacuation plans, and decentralized command structures are all part of this doctrine.

Taiwan's Vice Premier had warned Europe in June 2026: "If China attacks Taiwan or even imposes a blockade around Taiwan, consider how the world's interests will be damaged." This statement was aimed directly at European leaders who might be tempted to view this potential conflict as distant. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world's advanced electronic chips and 90% of the most advanced ones — its disruption would be a global economic shock.

Preparing reserve forces

One objective of the June 2026 exercises was to test the integration of reserve forces into the rapid response framework. Taiwan has a limited active army complemented by a large reserve corps. But mobilizing reservists takes time — precisely the time Taipei fears it may not have if China opts for a surprise scenario. The exercises therefore test the ability of commands to activate and integrate reservists quickly, in parallel with the action of active forces.

The major annual Han Kuang exercises will follow the immediate readiness exercises. But the difference between the two formats reflects an evolution in thinking: the Han Kuang are known in advance and prepared over a long lead time. The "immediate readiness" exercises that precede them are deliberately unpredictable. It is this unpredictability — inherent in any real war — that Taipei is now seeking to master.

The threat from the inside: what Taiwanese people think

Rising public support for defense

A public opinion survey conducted by National Chengchi University and published on June 16, 2026 found that Taiwanese people prioritize strengthening Taiwan's defensive capabilities and deepening cooperation with the United States over improving relations with mainland China. This result reflects a profound shift in Taiwanese public opinion — less and less inclined toward conciliation, increasingly aware of the real threat.

This shift accelerated after the major Chinese military maneuvers around Taiwan in 2022–2024, which made the military threat tangible to the ordinary population. Combat readiness exercises, once regarded as bureaucratic formalities by many Taiwanese, are now viewed with a mixture of seriousness and anxiety.

The resistance of opposition parties

The defense question is not without internal political fractures in Taiwan. Opposition parties have significantly delayed the vote on the 2026 general budget, with repercussions on defensive capabilities. According to the ISW, these delays could "detrimentally affect Taiwan's defense readiness." Defense budget cuts were threatened, including funds for critical systems such as Harpoon missiles.

This internal political tension illustrates the paradox faced by many democracies confronting existential threats: normal parliamentary debates can become strategic vulnerabilities in a deteriorating security context. Taipei must defend its existence while maintaining the functioning of a pluralist democracy — with all the contradictions that entails.

The Indo-Pacific gaze on these exercises

Allies watching closely

The Taiwanese combat readiness exercises were followed closely by regional allies — notably Japan, the United States, Australia, and the Philippines. The tripartite UK-France-Germany declaration of June 24 on Chinese actions east of Taiwan signals that interest in Taiwanese security is no longer limited to the Asia-Pacific zone. This change is significant but still insufficient to constitute a real deterrence coalition.

NATO's BALTOPS exercises in the Baltic, involving 20 ships and 6,000 personnel from 15 nations, were taking place simultaneously in Europe. The simultaneity of these exercises — in the Baltic facing the Russian threat, in the Taiwan Strait facing the Chinese threat — illustrates the reality of a world facing multiple and simultaneous threats. The West cannot afford to have only one front in its strategic thinking.

The US Indo-Pacific Command's warning

Admiral Paparo, commander of INDOPACOM, had warned mid-June 2026 before Congress that the danger of war with China was increasing and that American forces urgently needed new capabilities and armaments to prevent conflict. The PLA, according to his report, is engaged in a "historic expansion" of all its forces, training primarily for two missions: the annexation of Taiwan and the countering of U.S. and allied defensive capabilities.

This report, combined with the June 2026 Taiwanese exercises, paints a coherent and troubling picture: on one side, an island seriously preparing for a war it hopes to avoid; on the other, an adversary methodically equipping and training for an eventual confrontation. The question is not whether this confrontation will happen — it is doing everything to prevent it from happening.

Lessons from the exercises for the West: a transferable model?

NATO observes, but has not yet copied

Taiwan's exercises generated particular attention in Western capitals. NATO strategists, who are themselves thinking through surprise attack scenarios — notably against Russia on the eastern flank — see in them a model worth studying. The doctrine of surprise, compressed decision timeframes, integrated civilian resilience: all elements that several Alliance members are now seeking to adopt.

Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia have all intensified their own rapid mobilization exercises since 2022. But Taiwan's density — an island where every square kilometer is defensible and every citizen is potentially mobilizable — offers a specificity that larger territories cannot replicate identically. What can be transferred is the mindset: the conviction that defense begins before war is declared.

The strategic value of visibility: deterring by showing

These exercises are not purely military. They are also a political message. By making its drills visible — local and international journalists were present — Taiwan sends a clear signal to Beijing: we are ready, we are improving, invasion will not be easy. It is deterrence through demonstration, a strategy that small democracies surrounded by threatening powers have often employed.

Ukraine had done something similar before 2022, but with insufficient means and political resistance to public alarm. Taiwan has drawn that lesson. Today, it openly assumes its preparation, documents it, and broadcasts it. It is a strategic choice as much as a practical necessity: if the enemy knows you are ready, it recalculates the cost of attack.

Semiconductors at the heart of the global geopolitical stake

TSMC: the variable that changes the entire strategic calculus

You cannot talk about Taiwan without talking about TSMC. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces roughly 90% of the world's most advanced chips — the ones that power artificial intelligence, smartphones, military systems, and critical infrastructure across the West. The destruction or capture of these facilities would irreversibly alter the global technological balance.

This is precisely why Beijing cannot simply bomb Taiwan without partially destroying itself. But it is also why a blockade or gradual takeover represents a feared scenario: China would then obtain the ultimate technological leverage over its adversaries. These five days of exercises therefore carry an economic and technological dimension that is often underestimated in purely military analyses.

Western dependency: a vulnerability the West is slow to correct

The United States, Europe, and Japan have all launched programs to reshore semiconductor production. The American CHIPS Act, European investments in Germany and the Netherlands, TSMC's expansions in Arizona and Japan: all initiatives to reduce dependence. But these factories will not be fully operational for several more years.

In the meantime, if Taiwan falls, or if a blockade succeeds, the West would find itself in a position of historic technological weakness. Taipei's exercises therefore also serve as a reminder to Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo of what they stand to lose — and why words are no longer enough. Support for Taiwan is not just a question of democratic values. It is a question of industrial and technological survival.

Conclusion: five days that say a great deal about the years ahead

Exercises as a strategic mirror

These five days of immediate combat readiness exercises reveal both Taipei's lucidity and the scale of the challenge. Taiwan has none of the illusions of an island that believes itself invulnerable. It is adapting, transforming itself, and seeking to compensate through speed and flexibility for what it cannot match in mass. It is admirable — and it is necessary.

What the world must retain

Taiwan's security is not just Taiwan's concern. It is the concern of every democracy that depends on freedom of navigation in the Pacific, on Taiwanese semiconductors, and on an international order where force does not triumph over law. Five days of exercises showed that Taiwan takes this reality seriously. The question is whether the rest of the world is prepared to do the same.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Position and biases

I am clearly in favor of Taiwan's sovereignty and consider the island's military exercises to be a legitimate and necessary response to a real threat. This bias informs my analysis. I acknowledge that certain military statistics cited — particularly figures on the PLA — come from official Taiwanese and American sources, which have their own strategic biases.

Uncertainties in this article

I do not know with certainty to what extent these exercises genuinely improve Taiwan's operational readiness, nor whether the new defensive doctrines would be effective against a large-scale attack. I do not have access to internal performance assessments of the exercises. Data on PLA sorties comes from official Taiwanese statements.

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Cite this article

Maxime Marquette (2026). REPORT: Five days of exercises: Taiwan trains for invasion. MadMax. https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-cinq-jours-d-exercices-taiwan-s-entraine-a-l-invasion

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Maxime Marquette
Independent columnist

Maxime Marquette writes most of the analyses and columns published on MadMax — geopolitics, technology, and current events, no filler.

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This article was generated with AI assistance, under human supervision.

Reportage2645 words17 min read