NARRATIVE: Putin Says No — Why the Kremlin Master Refuses to Limit His Long-Range Missiles

NARRATIVE: Putin Says No — Why the Kremlin Master Refuses to Limit His Long-Range Missiles

Introduction: A refusal that says everything

Zelensky's letter and Putin's calculated silence

In early June 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky did something unusual in the vocabulary of contemporary warfare: he wrote an open letter to his enemy. To Vladimir Putin. Publicly. Readable by the entire world. The proposal was simple in its phrasing and provocative in its implication: mutually limit long-range strikes against civilian and energy infrastructure. Stop bombarding each other's cities with missiles. A partial de-escalation agreement that would not mean peace, but could mean darker winters for fewer millions of civilians on both sides.

Putin said no. His public response at the end of June 2026 reveals a logic worth understanding — not to justify it, but to calibrate the Western and Ukrainian response correctly. His official justification was that Ukraine had made the proposal because Russian "deep counter-strikes into Ukrainian territory are far more powerful." In other words: I refuse because I'm in a position of strength, and limiting my strikes would mean surrendering that advantage. That is the raw logic of brute force applied to diplomacy, stripped of any diplomatic veneer.

What this refusal reveals about Putin's strategy

Putin's refusal to limit long-range strikes is no surprise to anyone who has tracked Russian logic since 2022. His strategy has always rested on an asymmetry of destruction: striking Ukraine harder than it can strike back, destroying the infrastructure that sustains the Ukrainian civilian population, and hoping that pressure will eventually break the will to resist. That strategy has not worked as planned — Ukraine holds, Ukrainian drones now reach Yaroslavl — but Putin has no alternative plan. He only has escalation.

Analyst Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund provided Al Jazeera a pertinent reading of Putin's refusal: the Russian president preserves his advantage in long-range strikes precisely because it is one of the few domains where Russia maintains military superiority over Ukraine. Relinquishing that advantage through negotiation would, in his logic, amount to partial capitulation — something he cannot afford politically, either domestically or for his international credibility.

The history of long-range strikes — from 2022 onward

How the missile war escalated

The long-range missile war between Russia and Ukraine has followed a trajectory of progressive escalation since the start of the full-scale invasion. In the early months, Russian strikes primarily targeted military and command infrastructure. From autumn 2022 onward, Russian strategy evolved toward the systematic targeting of energy infrastructure — attempting to plunge Ukraine into cold and darkness to break civilian morale. Dozens of massive strikes hit power plants, transformers, and high-voltage lines.

Ukraine responded by developing its own long-range strike capabilities, initially limited to Russian border regions, then progressively extended deeper into Russian territory as domestically built drones extended their range. Military installations in Belgorod, then refineries in Krasnodar and all the way to Yaroslavl, 250 km from Moscow. This progressive extension of Ukrainian reach is precisely what motivated Zelensky's proposal — aware that if Ukraine can reach deep into Russia, a mutual limitation agreement becomes in both parties' interest.

The 2022 Istanbul talks — the ghost precedent

To understand the context in which Putin's refusal sits, one must revisit the Istanbul talks of March–April 2022. At that point, less than two months after the invasion began, Ukrainian and Russian negotiators were close enough to an agreement that draft texts were produced. That hypothetical agreement involved Ukrainian neutrality — no NATO membership — in exchange for Russian withdrawal from territories occupied since 2022.

Those talks failed. The reasons remain debated — some attribute a role to British intervention (and then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson in particular) in Ukraine's decision to walk away from negotiations. Others point to the discovery of the Bucha atrocities as the real factor. This precedent shows that serious negotiations have existed — and that they can exist again. But it also shows that their failure had lasting consequences for Kyiv's level of trust in any agreement with Moscow.

The Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska — what didn't happen

A summit without agreement on long-range strikes

The meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Alaska, in the months preceding June 2026, was anticipated as a potential diplomatic breakthrough. It was not. The most contentious issues — including mutual limits on long-range strikes — produced no agreement. The two presidents exchanged positions, confirmed disagreements, and projected an image of dialogue to their respective domestic audiences — but the concrete outcome is zero.

The silence about the summit's details is itself revealing. In negotiations that succeed, spokespersons rush to detail the agreements reached. In those that fail, communiqués speak of "constructive discussions" and "positive atmosphere" without ever naming a specific agreement. The Alaska Trump-Putin meeting belongs to the second category — meaning Putin conceded nothing that Trump could announce.

Trump as mediator — his limits and his value

Donald Trump entered his second presidency in 2025 with a conviction: he could end the war in Ukraine quickly, thanks to his personal relationship with Putin and his transactional approach to diplomacy. That conviction collided with the reality of a Putin who does not negotiate on questions he considers existential — and the territorial integrity of Russian acquisitions since 2014 falls in that category.

Trump has value as an interlocutor with Moscow — he may be the only Western leader Putin respects enough to speak frankly to. But that value is limited if the parties' fundamental positions are incompatible. Putin wants a neutralized Ukraine and guarantees on occupied territories. Zelensky and the Ukrainian population want a sovereign Ukraine with security guarantees and restitution of territories. These positions do not meet in the middle — they are structurally incompatible.

American envoys in Moscow — Witkoff, Kushner, and the Trump calculation

Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner headed to Moscow

At the end of June 2026, available information indicated that Trump's envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, were expected in Moscow for discussions whose precise objectives were not made public. These two figures — Witkoff as special envoy for the Middle East and Russia, Kushner as an informal adviser with his own channels in Russia and the Gulf states — represent Trump's approach to parallel diplomacy: informal channels, discreet discussions, interlocutors who are not career diplomats.

This approach has advantages — it allows frank conversations without immediate institutional commitment — and major drawbacks. Non-professional diplomats can be outmaneuvered by sophisticated interlocutors like Russian negotiators. Informal agreements struck in back-channels may not hold once confronted with the institutional reality of the governments involved. And discussions without Kyiv at the table — or even informed in real time — are a legitimate source of distrust for Ukraine and its European allies.

The risk of a deal behind Ukraine's back

The primary concern of European allies and Kyiv about direct American diplomatic channels with Moscow is this: that Washington and Moscow conclude an arrangement serving both superpowers' interests at Ukraine's expense. Insufficient security guarantees, a ceasefire line that freezes Russian conquests, a timeline for American troop withdrawal from Europe — these scenarios are nightmares for NATO allies who have invested politically and financially in supporting Ukraine.

Putin, in his statements at the end of June 2026, said he was looking forward to the resumption of American diplomatic efforts. That is a signal he sees in the Trump administration a potentially more accommodating partner than European governments — and that he is counting on direct American-Russian discussions to obtain more than a format involving Ukraine and Europe would give him. That strategy is transparent. The West must see it for what it is and ensure that Kyiv remains at the center of any negotiation that concerns it.

Why long-range missiles matter — Russia's strategic advantage

Russia's superiority in long-range strikes

Despite its economic and logistical problems, Russia maintains significant superiority in long-range strike capabilities over Ukraine. Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, difficult to intercept even for Patriot systems. Long-range cruise missiles Kh-101 capable of striking the entirety of Ukrainian territory. Precision Iskander ballistic missiles. And increasingly, ballistic missiles supplied or inspired by North Korea, increasing the diversity and volume of possible strikes.

This superiority in long-range strikes is one of the few domains where Russia can still inflict strategic damage on Ukraine that Ukraine cannot entirely counter. Ukrainian air defense systems intercept a growing proportion of strikes — between 60 and 80% depending on the wave, according to ISW and other observers' analyses. But the 20 to 40% that get through are enough to inflict considerable damage when strikes target specific infrastructure.

North Korean missiles in Russia's arsenal

The integration of North Korean missiles into Russia's arsenal is a factor that has changed the calculus in the long-range strikes war. North Korea has supplied Russia with short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that allow it to increase the total volume of strikes without drawing as heavily on Russian precision stocks. These North Korean missiles are less accurate than Russian systems, but precision is not always the objective — saturating Ukrainian air defenses with enough volume that some get through is.

Russia's use of North Korean missiles violates UN Security Council resolutions — ones Russia itself voted for in more predictable times. The fact that Moscow violates its own UN commitments with total nonchalance illustrates how much the international institutional framework is under pressure in this conflict. Each violation without consequence invites future violations — a precedent whose implications extend far beyond the Ukrainian theater.

Ukraine as precedent — the limits of long-range strikes as deterrence

Why classical deterrence failed

The war in Ukraine raises a fundamental question for Western security doctrine: why did deterrence fail? NATO is one of the most powerful military alliances in history. Russia knew the risk of a robust Western response. Putin chose to invade anyway. That decision suggests either a miscalculation of consequences, or a deliberate calculation that consequences would be manageable — a wager that Western disunity and reluctance to engage in a direct conflict would allow Russia to prevail before the international response organized itself.

That wager proved partially right — the Western response was slow, hesitant, incremental. But it also proved partially wrong — Ukraine held, the coalition organized, and sanctions began to bite. The mixed track record of deterrence in this conflict should prompt the West to revisit its doctrines: deterrence through post-aggression economic punishment is less effective than deterrence through pre-aggression military denial. In other words: it is better to make the invasion impossible than to punish after it has occurred.

Lessons for European security architecture

Putin's refusal to limit long-range strikes also teaches a lesson for post-war European security architecture. Any peace or ceasefire agreement that does not include credible mechanisms for limiting and verifying Russian long-range weapons would leave Ukraine — and Europe — in permanent vulnerability. Russian long-range strike capability would remain intact, with the demonstrated willingness to use it. An agreement without verifiable disarmament is not a security agreement — it is a pause before the next strike.

Europe should draw from this lesson an accelerated urgency to develop its own air defense capabilities and conventional deterrence. The European Sky Shield Initiative, to which most NATO members have adhered, is a step in the right direction. But its deployment timelines and final capabilities remain insufficient in the face of the documented threat — an insufficiency that must be corrected with urgency inversely proportional to complacency.

Putin's psychology — understanding to resist better

The calculation of a man who has bet everything

To understand why Putin refuses to limit his long-range missiles, one must understand his personal and political situation. He launched a war he presented as a special military operation lasting a few weeks. Four years later, he is bogged down in a conflict that has cost tens of thousands of Russian soldiers, hundreds of billions of dollars, and his country's international isolation. In that context, conceding anything — even a technical limitation on strikes — is perceived as unbearable loss of face.

Putin's psychology is that of a man who cannot afford to lose — not from strategic conviction, but from political survival necessity. A Putin who abandons positions undermines his domestic credibility. His loyalists, his security men, the nationalists he has fed for years — all judge his "strength" by his refusal to yield. Any visible compromise is interpreted as weakness. This dynamic is a trap Putin cannot exit without risking his position.

The calculation of Russian elites — can anyone change the game?

Whether Russian elites could theoretically end the war by replacing Putin is one of the most important — and most speculative — questions in contemporary geopolitics. Contradictory signals exist: on one side, oligarchs fleeing the country with their assets; on the other, generals and security men whose careers are tied to the war's continuation. Prigozhin's abortive mutiny in June 2023 showed both that armed dissent exists within the system and that it can be rapidly crushed.

What serious analysts note is that the conditions for regime change in Russia are rarely predictable. Russian history teaches that power transitions in the Kremlin are often a surprise to those who anticipated them — and a surprise when no one was expecting them. The West should neither plan for imminent regime change nor exclude that possibility from its planning scenarios. Real preparation means having plans for all scenarios — including a post-Putin Russia with which rebuilding a European security framework would be possible.

Ukraine after the refusal — what strategy?

Keep striking — drones as the answer

Ukraine's response to Putin's refusal to limit long-range strikes is clearly articulated in the actions that followed: continue, and even intensify, deep Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory. The refineries of Slaviansk and Yaroslavl, the Kerch depots, military installations in border oblasts — Ukraine has transformed Putin's refusal into additional justification for its own offensive operations.

That response is strategically coherent. If Putin refuses to limit his strikes because his advantage in that domain is too precious, then the logical Ukrainian response is to reduce that advantage — either by developing additional air defense capabilities or by raising the cost of Russian strikes by attacking missile production facilities and depots. That is the logic of economic and military attrition warfare — not the war of great maneuvers, but the war of long exhaustion.

The demand for additional air defense systems

Putin's refusal also reinforces the Ukrainian argument for receiving more air defense systems from its allies. If Russian long-range strikes cannot be limited by negotiation, they must be contained by physical defense. Additional Patriot systems, NASAMS batteries, Italian-French SAMP/T systems — each additional system raises the interception rate and reduces the percentage of strikes that reach their targets.

Ukraine's demand for air defense systems is the most urgent and most consistent since the war began. It runs up against an industrial reality: Western production of air defense systems and interceptors is insufficient to cover both the national stocks of NATO member countries and Ukrainian needs. That industrial insufficiency is the real underlying problem — and it requires investments in production capacity that Western governments were slow to launch and are only now beginning to yield results.

The Ukrainian population — winters of strikes and a resilience that doesn't break

Four winters of strikes on energy infrastructure

Four consecutive winters of massive strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure — and the Ukrainian population still holds. That fact is remarkable enough to be difficult to express in the sober terms of a news piece. Millions of people who have lived through winters without reliable electricity, without heating in their apartments, with air raid sirens interrupting sleep and work. Children doing homework by candlelight. Hospitals running on generators. Bakeries calculating how to finish their batches before the power cuts out.

Ukrainian resilience before these conditions is not resignation — it is conviction. Polls concur: a majority of Ukrainians refuse to cede territories for peace, accept the war continuing if necessary, and maintain their trust in President Zelensky despite the hardships. That conviction has a source: Ukrainians know why they are suffering — because Putin decided to make them suffer — and that knowledge transforms suffering into resistance rather than surrender.

What Putin's refusal says to Ukrainians

Putin's refusal to limit long-range strikes says something precise to Ukrainians: he does not want an acceptable peace. He wants your capitulation. That reading is widely shared by the Ukrainian population and its leaders — which is why negotiations that don't include solid security guarantees are seen as traps, not crisis exits. If Putin were prepared for a just peace, he would not have refused Zelensky's proposal on long-range strikes — which was precisely the kind of confidence-building measure that paves the way for major negotiations.

This context explains why polls show 70% of Ukrainians are skeptical that current talks will lead to a durable peace. Their skepticism is not obstruction — it is lucidity. They have watched Putin violate the Minsk agreements, violate the security assurances given by the Budapest Memorandum, violate international humanitarian law in their cities. They do not trust him. And they have every rational reason in the world not to.

The allies' position — between support and pressure to negotiate

The tension within the alliance over the "right moment" for negotiations

Behind the façade of unity in the coalition supporting Ukraine, a real tension plays out about the timing and conditions of negotiations. Countries like Hungary, Slovakia, and to some extent Italy push for rapid negotiations even at the cost of Ukrainian territorial concessions. Countries like the United Kingdom, the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland maintain that any peace must be a just peace — with Russian withdrawal or at minimum a freeze of current front lines with solid security guarantees.

This internal coalition tension should not be underestimated. Putin monitors and actively cultivates it — calculated openness signals toward certain European interlocutors favorable to negotiation, leaks about Russian "proposals" designed to split the coalition, offers of preferential energy prices to countries that adopt a more accommodating position. This information and economic influence war is as important to Moscow as the military war.

What allies must say to Putin — and to Ukraine

The message Western allies must send to Putin is one of consistency: the conditions for a peace acceptable to Ukraine and its allies will not change under pressure. That message must be backed by actions — maintaining and increasing military support, strengthening economic sanctions, refusing Washington-Moscow bilateral agreements that exclude Kyiv. And the message to Ukraine must be one of guarantee: your allies will not abandon you, your interests will be at the center of any negotiation, the security guarantees you receive after the war will be substantial and verifiable.

Both messages must be consistent over time — not declarations of "unwavering" support followed by pressure for concessions in back-channels. Allies' credibility toward Ukraine is a strategic resource that, once compromised, is extremely difficult to reconstitute. And Putin calculates precisely the gaps in that credibility to exploit their effects.

The scenario of a long war — what it costs and why it matters

The costs of a war that keeps going

If negotiations fail — if Putin's refusal to limit long-range strikes is a sign of willingness to continue the war at high intensity — then the prospect of a war lasting years more must be planned for honestly. The costs of that continuation are immense: human, economic, and political. Tens of thousands more deaths. Hundreds of billions more in infrastructure destruction. A Europe whose internal challenges — energy transition, demographic aging, technological competitiveness — are put on hold by the need to finance a war indefinitely.

These costs must be weighed honestly. They do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that peace at any price is preferable — as we have seen, a bad peace can cost far more in the long run. But they must be weighed to calibrate war objectives realistically. Honest planning acknowledges the costs of continuation as much as the costs of a premature peace.

The conditions for a durable peace — what must be guaranteed

A durable peace with Russia — if it ever becomes possible — will require elements that Putin's refusal to limit long-range strikes makes even more obvious. Verification mechanisms on Russian long-range weapons, to ensure no reconstitution occurs under a ceasefire. Concrete security guarantees for Ukraine — preferably NATO membership, failing that bilateral commitments with credible response capabilities. Reparations for reconstruction. And a justice process for war crimes committed.

These conditions are ambitious. They may be unattainable in the short term. But establishing them clearly as non-negotiable conditions of the Western position is important — not to impose them immediately, but to define the framework within which any serious negotiation must be situated. Putin's refusal to limit his long-range missiles is not a signal that the war will stop soon. It is a signal that it continues on his terms. And those terms must change — through pressure, through exhaustion, and ultimately through the defeat of the logic that imposes them.

Russia's doctrine of striking civilians — a crime that continues

The deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure

Putin's refusal to limit long-range strikes fits within a broader doctrine of deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Hospitals, schools, markets, residential buildings — Russian strikes make no distinction between military and civilian targets, and the regularity with which manifestly identified civilian buildings are hit suggests deliberate intent rather than systemic accident. This doctrine is documented by human rights monitoring organizations, by the United Nations, and by Western governments that have condemned these strikes.

The International Criminal Court has opened investigations. International prosecutors are accumulating evidence. Arrest warrants have been issued — including one against Putin himself. These processes matter for establishing historical accountability and for future deterrence. But they do not protect Ukrainian civilians today. Today's protection comes from air defense systems that intercept missiles — and there are never enough of them.

What international law can and cannot do

International humanitarian law is a valuable moral and legal framework — and largely powerless in the face of a state that deliberately decides to violate it without fearing a direct military response. Russia violates the Geneva Conventions by striking hospitals. It violates the laws of war by targeting civilian markets. It violates UN Security Council resolutions by using North Korean missiles. And it continues — because the consequences of these violations are insufficient to change its behavior.

This observation is not an argument for abandoning international law — it is an argument for strengthening it through accountability mechanisms that have practical effects. Additional economic sanctions directly tied to violations of IHL. Mechanisms to seize Russian assets to fund reparations. Exclusions from international forums. And, where appropriate, supplying Ukraine with the weapons needed to defend itself against a military doctrine that deliberately violates the law protecting civilians.

What long-range missiles mean for Europe's future

The proliferation of long-range missiles and the challenge for European security

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that long-range missiles are a warfare and intimidation tool that medium-sized actors can use for disproportionate strategic effects. That demonstration has not been lost on other regional actors watching the conflict closely. Post-war European security architecture will have to integrate the reality of a world where long-range missiles are more accessible, more precise, and harder to counter than they were during the Cold War.

Europe needs a robust missile defense layer credible against not only Russian arsenals but potential threats from the proliferation of similar technologies to other actors. The European Sky Shield Initiative is a step in the right direction, but it is underfunded and its deployment timelines are too long given the speed at which the threat landscape is evolving.

NATO's response — reinforce, not reassure

NATO's response to Putin's refusal to limit long-range strikes must be to concretely strengthen collective defense capabilities — not to publish communiqués that reassure domestic audiences without changing military capabilities. Increased investment in collective air defense. Pre-positioning of interception systems in the most exposed NATO member states. Interoperability exercises preparing for massive strike scenarios. And doctrinal clarity on the Alliance's response thresholds to missile strikes reaching NATO members.

This doctrinal clarity is precisely what Putin seeks to probe with his strikes — how far can he go before NATO deterrence triggers? The safest answer, for NATO members and Ukraine alike, is to make that line as visible and credible as possible. Ambiguity about NATO's thresholds is an invitation to test them.

What history will say about this moment

A refusal that defines an era

Decades from now, when historians analyze the Russia-Ukraine war and the decisions that shaped its outcome, Putin's June 2026 refusal to limit long-range strikes will be cited as one of the defining moments. Not because it is an exceptional military decision, but because it reveals with total clarity the nature of the Russian regime and its objectives in this conflict. This is not a regime seeking security. It is a regime seeking domination. And domination is not negotiated — it is defeated.

This defining moment must be used — politically, diplomatically, and militarily — to consolidate the cohesion of the coalition supporting Ukraine around a clear conclusion. Putin does not want peace. He wants victory. And the only answer to that ambition is to make victory impossible — through Ukrainian military resistance, through the growing economic pressure documented by the Kiel Institute, and through sustained Western support until Moscow's calculations change.

Zelensky — a leader facing the impossible

Volodymyr Zelensky proposed peace. He was refused. He documented that refusal publicly. He has continued to lead his country under strikes, to negotiate international support, to maintain his population's morale, to manage tensions with allies over the pace and conditions of arms deliveries. All of this simultaneously, in a war of unknown duration and no guaranteed outcome. Whatever judgment one makes of certain strategic decisions, his performance as a wartime leader exceeds what anyone would have predicted of the actor and comedian he was a decade ago.

History will judge Zelensky on results. For now, what can be stated with certainty is that he held when almost everyone predicted he would flee, that he unified when almost everyone predicted Ukraine would fracture, and that he proposed de-escalation when Putin rejected it — illuminating, once again, who is responsible for this war and who is paying for its continuation.

Conclusion: No to peace — and now what?

After the refusal — hold the course

Putin's refusal to limit his long-range missiles is not an ending — it is a clarification. It confirms what serious analysts have long known: Russia in its current configuration is not ready for an acceptable peace. It is seeking capitulation. That is not the same thing. And confusing the two — by pressuring Ukraine toward a peace that would resemble capitulation — would be a historic error whose cost would be paid in years, not months.

The response to this refusal is to hold the course: continued and amplified military support, maximum economic pressure documented by the Kiel Institute, coalition cohesion despite internal pressures, and support for Ukraine's deep-strike doctrine that raises the cost of the war for Moscow. This course is not romantic. It is not without cost. But it is the only course leading to a peace that Ukraine and Europe can live with.

Ukraine deserves a peace it earned — not an imposed capitulation

Ukraine has the right to a peace it earned — not a peace imposed upon it for the convenience of others. That right is not a moral abstraction. It is the foundation of the credibility of the entire international order built on respect for states' sovereignty. If Ukraine is forced into a bad peace, the precedent created will be that wars of aggression pay. And that precedent will cost the West, in the long run, infinitely more than everything it has invested in supporting Ukraine.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and limitations

This narrative draws primarily on Al Jazeera's report of June 29, 2026: "Russia-Ukraine war: Why has Putin rejected limits on long-range strikes?", the analyses of analyst Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund, and the documented public statements of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky on the question of long-range strikes. Analyses of Putin's psychology, the dynamics of Russian elites, and diplomatic scenarios are editorial interpretations based on open sources.

I do not have access to details of private diplomatic discussions between Washington and Moscow. Information on Witkoff and Kushner's presence in Moscow comes from publicly available reports at the end of June 2026, but their precise content is unconfirmed. Projections on future negotiations and peace conditions are speculative analyses based on documented positions of the parties.

Declared biases

I consider Ukrainian resistance legitimate and Putin's refusal to de-escalate as revealing an absence of willingness toward an acceptable peace. I am critical of diplomatic initiatives that exclude Ukraine from discussions that directly concern it. I believe that solid security guarantees are a non-negotiable condition of any durable peace agreement. These are editorial judgments distinct from the facts I cite.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — Why Putin rejected limits on long-range strikes — June 29, 2026

Kyiv Post — Zelensky's open letter to Putin on long-range strike limitations — June 2026

Kyiv Independent — Latest front and diplomacy news — June 29, 2026

Secondary sources

German Marshall Fund — Ian Lesser analysis on long-range strikes — June 2026

Foreign Policy — Putin rejects Zelensky's long-range strike proposal — June 2026

ISW — Analysis of Ukraine's deep-strike campaign — June 2026

Euromaidan Press — Putin rejects Zelensky's long-range strike proposal — June 2026