NARRATIVE: 800 billion EUR and the ITAR-free obsession — Europe wants its army without Washington

Introduction: A rupture taking shape slowly but surely

The figure that says it all: 800 billion EUR

At the start of 2026, the European Union announced a defense rearmament plan of historic proportions: up to 800 billion EUR in defense investment over four years. This figure is not a conventional budget line — it is a mobilization target that combines national budgets, common European financing through instruments such as SAFE and the European Defence Fund, and guaranteed loan mechanisms. But its scale alone says something essential: Europe has decided to take charge of itself.

In parallel, European military planners are collectively targeting $900 billion mobilized under the EU Readiness 2030 objective. The convergence of these astronomical figures with a new obsession for ITAR-free — military equipment without components subject to American export restrictions — draws the portrait of a Europe seeking both to rearm and to free itself from a technological dependence that has constrained it for decades.

ITAR-free: when Europe refuses American oversight

The American ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) law controls the export of military and dual-use technologies. In concrete terms, if a European military system contains a component subject to ITAR — even a simple processor or navigation software — the United States has a say over its export or use by Europe. This is not a theory — it is a reality that has blocked European military cooperation in the past.

EU Insider of June 23, 2026 reports that the European Defence Fund 2026 has made ITAR-free an explicit financing criterion. This doctrinal shift is fundamental: Europe only funds with its common resources those equipment items whose full freedom of use it can guarantee. This is the budgetary translation of strategic autonomy into industrial and contractual language.

The ReArm Europe plan: ambition, reality, constraints

From announcement to execution

The ReArm Europe plan, announced at the start of 2026, mobilizes several distinct financial mechanisms. The SAFE instrument (Security and Defence Fund for Europe) offers preferential-rate loans to member nations for interoperable defense acquisitions — France signed the first loan of €15 billion on June 17, 2026. The €20 billion in budget flexibility granted to member nations allows them to increase defense spending without triggering EU excessive-deficit procedures. And the European Defence Fund co-finances joint defense R&D programs.

These mechanisms are complementary and address different needs: SAFE finances equipment purchases, budget flexibility enables increased national spending, and the EDF finances innovation. Together, they create an unprecedented European defense financing ecosystem in the history of European integration. Never before had Europe pooled its resources for defense to this degree.

The structural brake: industrial fragmentation

The greatest limitation of the ReArm Europe plan is not financing — the resources exist. It is the fragmentation of the European defense industry into a mosaic of national champions that jealously protect their domestic markets. Germany with Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei, France with Thales, MBDA, and Dassault, the UK with BAE Systems, Italy with Leonardo, Spain with Indra — each will want its own industrial players to be the priority beneficiaries of new orders.

This fragmentation creates costly duplications, prevents economies of scale, and produces incompatible equipment that limits interoperability. EU Perspectives of June 23, 2026 notes that Eurosatory 2026 in Paris highlighted this tension between Europe's collective ambition and national industrial protectionist reflexes. Resolving it will require painful political decisions that few governments are willing to assume publicly.

Military autonomy at €500 billion: the Sparta 2.0 analysis

Putting a price on independence

The Kiel Institute published an analysis known as Sparta 2.0 that attempts to calculate the cost of full European military autonomy — independent of the United States for the defense of the continent. Its conclusion: approximately €500 billion over ten years. This figure, cited in analyses by The Platinum Capital of June 21, 2026, helps calibrate the ambitions: €800 billion over four years would significantly exceed this threshold, but the €800 billion figure includes NATO financing, American purchases, and non-coordinated national spending.

The figure of €50 billion per year — identified by five German defense analysts in Defense News in May 2026 as the necessary sum — is more soberly realistic. Over ten years, €500 billion: less than Poland's annual GDP. A considerable but not unreachable sum for a European economy with an annual GDP of €17 trillion. Reallocating 3% of that GDP for ten years toward defense — mathematically possible. Politically difficult. But difficult is not impossible.

What Sparta 2.0 concretely implies

European military autonomy according to the Sparta 2.0 analysis does not mean dispensing with NATO or the United States. It means having the capacity to defend European territory without depending on an American decision for key systems: air defense, long-range precision strikes, satellite intelligence, submarine capabilities. These capabilities exist in Europe, but in fragmentary and insufficient form.

The trajectory traced by ReArm Europe + the E5 declaration + the SAFE fund is compatible with the Sparta 2.0 objective. But it requires a ten-year execution discipline that European democracies have not always demonstrated. Governments change, fiscal crises occur, electoral priorities evolve. The real question of European strategic autonomy is not "can we?" — it is "do we truly, durably, want to?"

The ITAR story: how an American law hinders Europe

Concrete cases of ITAR blockages

ITAR is not a theoretical abstraction — it has produced concrete blockages in European defense cooperation. European missiles could not be sold to certain allies without American authorization because they contained ITAR components. Franco-German cooperation programs were slowed by American authorization procedures on dual-use technologies. European drones had their export possibilities limited by the presence of an American chip in their navigation system.

These examples, documented by European industrialists and defense officers in specialist publications, illustrate the daily reality of technological dependence on Washington. EU Insider (June 23, 2026) emphasizes that the ITAR-free directive in the European Defence Fund is not aimed at breaking with the United States — it is aimed at giving Europe the freedom of action for its own defense capabilities without having to ask for authorization every single time.

ITAR dependence in the Trump context

The context of the Trump administration has singularly illuminated the necessity of European ITAR-free. When an American president makes the NATO relationship a conditionally negotiable object — "you spend enough or I reduce your protection" — the question inevitably arises: what happens if Washington uses ITAR as an additional pressure tool in those negotiations? This potential vulnerability, even as a hypothesis, is sufficiently concerning to justify a systematic effort to reduce ITAR dependence.

Trump is a necessary evil — his pressure produced the European rearmament that years of reasoned advocacy had failed to trigger. But democracies cannot build their security on the continuity of a particularly unpredictable administration. European ITAR-free is an insurance policy against American political uncertainty. It is a decision of long-term strategic wisdom.

Munitions and heavy systems: $31.7 billion in orders

1,400 self-propelled howitzers and 400 MLRS: the tally since 2022

European rearmament since 2022 is already considerable in terms of concrete orders. According to the data in the dossier, NATO nations have ordered 1,400 self-propelled howitzers across 14 countries and more than 400 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) across 11 countries, for a total amount of approximately $31.7 billion. These orders are not R&D or promises — they are signed contracts with defense manufacturers for systems in production.

These figures reflect the main lesson from Ukraine regarding heavy systems: long-range precision artillery is decisive in high-intensity warfare. Superiority in shells, range, and precision was one of the key factors in Ukrainian resistance. Europe, which had broadly disinvested in its artillery since the end of the Cold War, is now reconstituting this fundamental capability at a pace Cold War-era post-1991 budgets never would have allowed.

Delivery timelines: the industrial brake

The challenge is not the orders — it is the industrial production capacity. European munitions factories had been sized for peacetime order volumes. Shifting to wartime volumes requires investment in machinery, labor, and raw materials that industry has not all carried out simultaneously. Delivery delays of three to five years for certain heavy systems create a window of vulnerability between orders placed and effective receipt.

This is why the contracts signed in Ankara in July 2026 will have an impact on real NATO capabilities not in 2026 or 2027, but in 2029 or 2030. The production of heavy armaments does not respond to four-year electoral cycles — it responds to long industrial cycles. That reality imposes a political continuity across multiple terms that is precisely what democracies struggle to guarantee.

Carnegie Endowment: Europe needs a defense-tech strategy

The warning from strategic think tanks

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on June 23, 2026 an analysis titled "Europe needs a strategy for its turn to new defense technologies." This text, signed by recognized European security experts, identifies a fundamental gap: Europe is spending more, ordering more, but has not yet developed a coherent strategy for integrating disruptive technologies — military AI, autonomous drones, offensive cybersecurity, military space systems — into its collective defense architecture.

This gap is all the more concerning given that Europe's adversaries — China with Atlas, Russia with its improved Shahed drones — are developing these technologies in an integrated and doctrinal manner. Europe risks building a twentieth-century army with twenty-first-century budgets if it does not make the effort to define a coherent vision of the capabilities it wants to build and the doctrine it wants to apply.

The need for a "technological NATO"

Carnegie implicitly proposes creating a technological coordination mechanism within NATO — a "technological NATO" — that would do for disruptive defense technologies what classical NATO does for conventional military doctrines and standards. This would mean common standards for drone interfaces, data-exchange protocols between allied military AI systems, and a shared roadmap for cyber, space, and autonomous domains.

Such a mechanism would also have the advantage of reducing ITAR dependence risks by creating an intra-Western technological cooperation framework that favors exchanges among allies without routing them through unilateral American authorization systems. It is the institutional translation of the ITAR-free vision at the level of the transatlantic technological cooperation architecture.

The ECFR poll: Europeans ready to defend themselves

60% of Europeans in favor of more defense spending

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) published on June 19, 2026 a poll titled "Home alone: Europeans are ready to defend themselves." Its main finding is as surprising as it is welcome: a significant majority of Europeans — in most surveyed countries — is in favor of increasing defense spending and understands the necessity of collective rearmament in the face of the Russian threat.

This poll overturns a narrative that had long prevailed: the idea that European public opinion would be resistant to rearmament and military spending. In reality, years of war in Ukraine have profoundly transformed the European public's consciousness of the threat. When a real war, with real destruction and real victims, plays out a few hours' drive from European cities, geopolitical abstraction disappears.

Popular support as the foundation of durability

This popular support is fundamental to the durability of rearmament. Defense budgets decided by governments without popular mandate risk being reversed at every political change. Rearmament that rests on a shared civic conviction — on the understanding that security has a cost and that cost is worth paying — is far more solid than one imposed by American pressure or NATO summits.

The pedagogical work remains to be done in some countries — notably those that feel less directly threatened by Russia. But the ECFR poll provides solid grounds for asserting that European democracy can sustain a durable defense effort if political leaders do the necessary work of persuasion and transparency. That is encouraging.

Simon Gros and NATO 3.0: redefining the alliance

NATO 3.0: from containment to reinforced collective defense

Analyst Simon Gros published on June 21, 2026 a reflection on what he calls "NATO 3.0" — the third major transformation of the alliance since its founding. NATO 1.0 was the alliance of Soviet containment (1949–1991). NATO 2.0 was the alliance of post-Cold War management and expeditionary operations (the Balkans, Afghanistan). NATO 3.0, emerging since 2022, is the alliance of the return to territorial defense of member states in the face of a real Russian threat and systemic competition with China.

This paradigm shift demands a profound transformation of capabilities and postures. NATO 2.0 had optimized its forces for distant interventions — light expeditionary corps, special forces, precision aviation. NATO 3.0 must reconstitute heavy territorial defense capabilities — armor, artillery, multi-layered air defense — while maintaining expeditionary capabilities and developing the new cyber, space, and autonomous dimensions. It is a triple simultaneous effort that demands precisely the massive budgets under discussion.

Posture and forward deployment

NATO 3.0 also implies a transformation of the defensive posture. The forward deployment of NATO forces on the eastern flank — in Poland, the Baltic states, Romania — is already a reality since 2022. But NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) multinational battlegroups in these countries must scale up to become genuinely credible deterrent forces, not merely symbolic trip-wires.

Poland, which hosts the largest concentration of NATO forces on its territory, is at the center of this transformation. Its relationship with Germany — which is resuming its role as Central European logistical hub — and with the United States — which maintains a significant permanent presence — is the backbone of NATO 3.0 deterrence in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO's eastern flank is now the priority flank. And it will remain so as long as Putin's Russia exists.

The narrative from 2022 to 2031: nine years to rebuild

Rebuilding a sacrificed capability

The narrative of European rearmament is also the narrative of a capability sacrificed on the altar of the post-Cold War peace dividend. Between 1991 and 2022, European defense budgets were systematically reduced, munitions stockpiles were depleted, industrial capabilities were dismantled, and high-intensity warfare doctrines were abandoned in favor of light expeditionary ones. Thirty years of progressive disarmament cannot be reversed in three years.

The realistic timeline is 2031–2032 for capabilities reconstituted to a satisfactory level — provided budgets are maintained without wavering for nine years. That is a time horizon spanning multiple elections, multiple potential economic crises, and multiple changes of American administration. The durability of the effort, more than its initial level, will be the determining factor in its success.

Ukraine as guarantor of motivation

In this long-haul narrative, Ukraine plays the role of guarantor of motivation. As long as the war continues, the Russian threat remains concrete and visible to European publics. Every Russian missile on Kyiv, every Ukrainian drone video, every front-line report maintains the consciousness of the threat that drives governments to vote the necessary budgets.

A negotiated peace — even partial, even imperfect — could paradoxically weaken the political motivation to sustain the rearmament effort. This is one of the reasons why a peace that rewards Russian aggression by leaving Moscow with permanent territorial gains would be, in the long run, as dangerous for European security as a continuation of the conflict — it would remove the urgency that made the ReArm Europe plan possible. A just peace is not only a moral imperative — it is a strategic imperative for the durability of European rearmament.

Conclusion: The narrative of an awakening that is not yet an accomplishment

800 billion in ambition, 500 billion in necessity

The narrative of ReArm Europe and the ITAR-free obsession is the narrative of an awakening. Not an accomplishment. 800 billion EUR mobilized over four years — that is the ambition. 500 billion EUR over ten years — that is the necessity calculated by the Kiel Institute. Between the two lies a gap that depends entirely on the discipline, consistency, and political courage of European governments over a decade.

The foundations are in place: the ReArm Europe plan, the SAFE instrument, the EDF with its ITAR-free criterion, the E5 declaration, the popular support documented by the ECFR. The political will is real, even if it remains fragile in the face of budgetary constraints, political alternations, and the temptations of accommodation with Moscow.

The moment of decision: now or never

Europe does not have the luxury of time. The window of opportunity created by the clarity of the Russian threat, the popular support for rearmament, and the political convergence within the E5 is real but temporary. It can close if an economic recession pushes governments to trade off in defense's disfavor, if a political shift in a key country weakens the E5, or if an illusion of peace demobilizes public opinion.

The moment to build the European army without Washington — or more precisely, with Washington but without dependence on Washington — is now. The 800 billion must be deployed intelligently, with a coherent technological strategy (Carnegie), within consolidated industrial structures (Eurosatory 2026), according to doctrines adapted to real threats (JATEC), and within the renovated NATO alliance framework (NATO 3.0). That is the program for a decade. It begins with the decisions that will be taken in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Method and sources

This narrative draws on the dated sources from lot 8: EU Insider (June 23, 2026), EU Perspectives (June 23, 2026), The Platinum Capital (June 21, 2026), Simon Gros (June 21, 2026), ECFR (June 19, 2026), and Carnegie Endowment (June 23, 2026). The figures cited — €800 billion, $900 billion, €500 billion, €15 billion, $31.7 billion — come from these sources and from lot 8. No unsourced extrapolation.

The narrative is a deliberately narrative and engaged genre. This text defends a pro-European rearmament, pro-strategic autonomy, and pro-Ukraine position that the columnist fully assumes. Readers are invited to consult the primary sources for analytical analyses and detailed economic data.

Editorial positioning

Maxime Marquette believes in the necessity and possibility of a Europe that defends itself with greater autonomy. This belief is not a declaration of anti-Americanism — it is the conviction that strong allies are more valuable than dependent ones, and that the United States itself would benefit from a Europe more capable of bearing its own defense. ITAR-free is not against Washington. It is for an adult Europe.

The columnist acknowledges the limits of his analysis: the complexity of European financial mechanisms, the differences in position among the 27 member states, and national political uncertainties are factors that this compact format cannot treat exhaustively. Readers wishing to go deeper are directed to the specialized primary sources.

Sources

Primary sources

EU Insider — European defense ITAR-free: ReArm Europe, European Defence Fund — June 23, 2026

EU Perspectives — Paris Eurosatory 2026: the future of defense, can Europe keep pace? — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

The Platinum Capital — European strategic autonomy: the cost of independence — June 21, 2026

Simon Gros — NATO 3.0 and the rebalancing of transatlantic defense — June 21, 2026

ECFR — Home alone: Europeans are ready to defend themselves — June 19, 2026

Carnegie Endowment — Europe needs a strategy for its turn to new defense technologies — June 23, 2026