Manila bets it all against Beijing in the South China Sea

Introduction: a deadline closing in, and Beijing unafraid to cheat

A deadline set since 2023

The Philippines, holding the rotating ASEAN chairmanship in 2026, are staking everything on finalizing a code of conduct with China in the South China Sea before year's end. Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro repeated this in early June at an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington: the goal remains to finish the text before December 31, 2026, a deadline ASEAN foreign ministers set back in 2023, giving Beijing and its neighbors three years to wrap up negotiations that had already dragged on for more than two decades.

The problem is that China, in practice, keeps acting exactly as if no code were being negotiated at all, multiplying provocations in disputed waters while its diplomats talk politely at the negotiating table.

Timing that is anything but a coincidence

This late-2026 deadline lands precisely in the year the Philippines chair ASEAN, a fact Manila fully intends to exploit to maximize diplomatic pressure on Beijing. But the calendar also works against the Philippines: every month of delay gives China more time to entrench its physical positions on the ground, making any future diplomatic compromise increasingly theoretical against a reality already largely fixed by facts on the ground.

Scarborough Shoal, the symbol of permanent provocation

A floating platform removed under pressure

The saga of the floating platform installed by China inside Scarborough Shoal, also called Bajo de Masinloc by Filipinos, sums up on its own the climate of distrust hanging over these negotiations. Spotted in early June 2026, this semi-permanent structure immediately triggered a formal diplomatic protest from Manila, which reasserted that it holds "indivisible and incontestable" sovereignty over the area, in line with the 2016 arbitral ruling handed down in The Hague in the Philippines' favor.

According to reporting from Reuters confirmed on June 17, 2026, the structure was ultimately removed after several days of diplomatic pressure, a tactical win for Manila that nonetheless does nothing to fix the structural problem of China's repeated incursions into these disputed waters.

A cycle of provocations repeating for years

This is neither the first nor likely the last time such an incident occurs near Scarborough Shoal, a strategic area roughly 220 kilometers from the Philippine coast but entirely within its exclusive economic zone as recognized under international law. Every provocation follows the same script: China installs a structure or deploys its coast guard vessels, the Philippines officially protest, the international community watches, and the cycle starts again a few weeks later somewhere else in the region.

The specter of an Asian "Strait of Hormuz"

A comparison worrying regional strategists

Influential voices in the region, including Philippine ambassador Jose Manuel del Gallego Romualdez, have explicitly drawn a parallel between the energy crisis triggered by tensions around the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East and the similar risk an uncontrolled escalation in the South China Sea would pose. This waterway, carrying trillions of dollars in global trade every year, could become, in the event of open conflict, an economic chokepoint comparable to the Persian Gulf.

This comparison isn't just a rhetorical exercise: it's meant to convince Western partners, often fixated on the Middle East or Ukraine, that the Indo-Pacific deserves just as much sustained strategic attention before a similar crisis erupts in this region.

A lesson drawn from the recent Iran crisis

The energy crisis triggered by tensions around Iran in spring 2026 served as a wake-up call for Philippine and Asian strategists: if a similar blockage occurred in the South China Sea, the global economic consequences could be even more severe, given the volume of maritime traffic passing through this essential trade route between East Asia and the rest of the world.

ASEAN's role, caught between ambition and chronic paralysis

A regional organization caught between two fires

ASEAN finds itself in a delicate position: several of its members maintain close economic ties with Beijing, which complicates adopting a firm common stance against Chinese provocations in the South China Sea. This internal division largely explains why negotiations over the code of conduct, formally launched in 2017, have dragged on for nearly a decade without a concrete, binding result.

The Philippines, as this year's chair of the organization, are trying to use that position to speed up the process, but they run into the reluctance of some more cautious regional partners wary of Beijing, unwilling to upset their main trading partner.

A final text that could turn out to be an empty shell

Several regional analysts already warn that a deal rushed through solely to meet the symbolic end-of-2026 deadline risks producing a "framework" text stripped of real binding force, lacking geographic precision or any genuine military enforcement mechanism. A diplomatic win on paper, but an unchanged status quo in practice for Beijing.

Why the West must back Manila without hesitation

An ally defending international law against force

The Philippines are fighting, in this case, for a principle that extends far beyond their own maritime borders: respect for international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea against a power that prefers to impose its will through force and faits accomplis. This is exactly the kind of fight the West, already committed to supporting Ukraine against Russia, should recognize as structurally identical.

Letting China impose its will in the South China Sea without consequence would send a disastrous signal to other revisionist powers, including Russia and Iran, who are watching closely how firm, or how weak, Western democracies are when it comes to violations of international law.

Strategic consistency worth preserving

It would be inconsistent to vigorously denounce Russian violations of international law in Ukraine while turning a blind eye to similar methods used by Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. Western democracies must hold both cases to the same standard of principle, or risk seeing their credibility eroded by a selective application of international law depending on the economic interests at stake.

The 2016 arbitral ruling, still ignored

A legal victory never enforced

It's worth recalling that in 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines against China, rejecting Chinese historical claims over nearly the entire South China Sea embodied in the infamous nine-dash line. Ten years later, Beijing simply keeps ignoring this ruling, even refusing to acknowledge its legal legitimacy before the international community.

This persistent disregard for a binding international legal decision illustrates, better than any speech could, the nature of the challenge facing negotiators of the code of conduct: how do you build a trust-based agreement with a partner that has repeatedly shown contempt for existing international legal mechanisms?

A useful reminder for Western partners

This precedent should serve as a clear warning to anyone in Europe or North America tempted to believe a simple diplomatic text will be enough to change Beijing's behavior in the region. Without a robust verification mechanism and concrete consequences for violations, the future code of conduct risks suffering the same fate as the 2016 ruling: a victory on paper, ignored on the ground.

The growing militarization of disputed reefs

Artificial islands turned into military bases

Beyond the single case of Scarborough Shoal, China has systematically turned several disputed reefs and islets into military bases equipped with airstrips, radar, and anti-aircraft defense systems, a patient fait accompli strategy pursued for more than a decade despite repeated protests from its Asian neighbors and Western powers.

This gradual militarization fundamentally shifts the region's strategic balance, making every new round of negotiations over the code of conduct harder, since Beijing now negotiates from a position of near-established military strength on the ground, an advantage it did not have when talks began in 2017.

The Philippines strengthen their own alliances

Facing this reality, Manila has intensified its military cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia, ramping up joint naval exercises in the South China Sea to signal to Beijing that it does not stand alone against these repeated provocations. This strategy of multiple alliances is, for now, the best shield Manila has while awaiting the uncertain outcome of diplomatic negotiations.

What this crisis reveals about the global balance

A common front against revisionist powers

The situation in the South China Sea can no longer be analyzed in isolation from other flashpoints involving revisionist powers like Russia in Ukraine, Iran in the Middle East, or North Korea in the Pacific. These regimes share the same method: patiently test the limits of the Western response before pushing their territorial or strategic claims further.

Recognizing this convergence of methods between Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang should push Western democracies to coordinate their responses far more than they currently do, rather than treating each regional file in isolation, as too often happens in international diplomatic forums.

A test of Western strategic vigilance

This Philippine case, even though it may seem geographically far removed from European concerns centered on Ukraine, is a real test of the West's ability to maintain global rather than fragmented, region-by-region strategic vigilance. The outcome of this code-of-conduct negotiation will send a signal, positive or negative, to every power closely watching how firm democracies really are when it comes to violations of international law.

Conclusion: a deadline to watch closely through December

A test for ASEAN's and Manila's credibility

The completion, or failure, of this code of conduct before the end of 2026 will be a decisive test of ASEAN's credibility as an organization capable of standing up to Beijing, and of the Philippine chairmanship of this regional body. Secretary Lazaro herself summed up her position with telling caution: "I am optimistic, but also pragmatic," a phrase that betrays as much hope as lingering doubt about the real chances of landing a solid text.

Between the repeated provocations near Scarborough Shoal and the approaching diplomatic deadlines, the coming months will show whether the South China Sea follows a path of rules-based de-escalation, or slides further toward the dreaded "Asian Strait of Hormuz" scenario regional strategists now openly discuss.

What the West should take from this

For Western capitals, this file must remain a strategic priority, not a footnote behind Ukraine or the Middle East. Manila's determination to defend its maritime rights against a far larger power deserves clear, sustained diplomatic support from every partner committed to an international order based on rules rather than the law of the strongest.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

This editorial draws on public information reported by international news agencies and outlets specializing in Asia-Pacific affairs, cited as sources below. The quotes attributed to Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro come from her public statements as reported by the press. The comparative analysis with the Strait of Hormuz reflects the columnist's acknowledged editorial opinion, built from regional strategists' analyses cited as sources, and should not be read as a definitive prediction. No direct contact with Philippine or Chinese authorities is claimed in this piece.

Sources

Primary sources

South China Morning Post, South China Sea coverage — June 2026

Reuters, floating platform removed at Scarborough Shoal — June 17, 2026

Secondary sources

Reuters, Philippines' diplomatic action against Chinese structure — June 9, 2026

Philstar, Philippines targets end-2026 South China Sea code of conduct — June 10, 2026

The Straits Times, Hormuz crisis sharpens Philippine push — June 24, 2026

Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, Ambassador Romualdez's warning — April 19, 2026