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The ColumnOp-Ed· No. 529

OPEN LETTER: Mr. Trump, the Strait of Hormuz Is Not a Bargaining Chip

On June 17, 2026, the United States and Iran electronically signed a memorandum of understanding — designated by the acronym MOU —

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Key takeaways
  1. On June 17, 2026, the United States and Iran electronically signed a memorandum of understanding — designated by the acronym MOU —
  2. Introduction: A Historic Agreement on Fragile Foundations
  3. June 17, 2026: A Memorandum That Changes Everything
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Facts, quotes, and cited links remain in the body. Interpretations are framed as analysis or opinion according to the format.

Introduction: A Historic Agreement on Fragile Foundations

June 17, 2026: A Memorandum That Changes Everything

On June 17, 2026, the United States and Iran electronically signed a memorandum of understanding — designated by the acronym MOU — providing for the immediate and permanent cessation of all military operations on all fronts. It is a historic decision, born in the gilded corridors of the Palace of Versailles during a Trump-Macron meeting that surprised nearly every Western chancellery. An agreement concluded in haste, under pressure from markets, diplomacy, and an American electoral calendar that waits for no one.

In return, Iran agreed to immediately reopen the Strait of Hormuz, that vital maritime artery conditioning approximately 20% of global oil supplies. The United States, for their part, lifted the naval blockade and granted a 60-day waiver on Iranian oil exports. Sixty days to settle everything: the nuclear file, the sanctions, the frozen assets, and the reconstruction of a country in ruins. Sixty days for one of the most complex dossiers in contemporary global diplomacy.

A Letter That Must Be Written, a Voice That Resists

I am writing you this open letter, Mr. Trump, not out of any taste for controversy, but because what you have just done deserves a frank response. You presented this MOU as a personal triumph, further proof of your unique talent for "the art of the deal." Perhaps. But this deal is not a hotel. This deal involves a regime that, barely three days after signing it, had already threatened to close the very strait it had just opened.

I am neither a diplomat nor an accredited expert in Middle Eastern chancelleries. I am a columnist who reads texts, listens to experts, and refuses to be dazzled by diplomatic fireworks. And what I see in this MOU is as many promises as troubling grey areas. The question is not whether this agreement is good or bad in absolute terms — it is whether its foundations can hold.

The MOU: What the Text Actually Says

A 14-Point Framework Agreement of Ambitious Scope

The memorandum of understanding is a framework agreement structured around 14 points that defines the terms of a de-escalation between Washington and Tehran. At the core of the arrangement: the immediate and permanent cessation of all military hostilities on all fronts — which explicitly includes Lebanon, the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. The United States commits to lifting the naval blockade and granting a temporary 60-day waiver on Iranian oil exports. In exchange, Iran opens the strait, suspends its proxies' activities, and agrees to negotiate within a tight timeframe.

The agreement also provides that the United States will terminate all types of sanctions against Iran as part of a final settlement including a complete nuclear agreement. There is also mention of Iranian reconstruction aid of more than 300 billion dollars under the terms being discussed. This figure is colossal. It exceeds modern Marshall Plans, it surpasses the political attention span of an American administration that shifts priorities week to week. And it assumes Iran will honor its commitments.

The Clauses That Raise Serious Questions

One of the most sensitive points of the MOU concerns the release of Iran's frozen assets and the withdrawal of UN Security Council resolutions — two non-negotiable Iranian demands. These conditions imply a radical transformation of the international legal framework that has governed Iran for decades. Withdrawing UN resolutions is not done by a simple American decree; it requires a Security Council vote, where China and Russia play a decisive role.

There is also the question of the 60-day deadline — the mid-August 2026 target for concluding a full final agreement on Iran's nuclear program. This timeline is worthy of a diplomatic science-fiction novel. The 2015 agreement — the JCPOA — required years of multilateral negotiations involving six major powers. Claiming to resolve in two months what the world has failed to finalize in twenty years is either genius or recklessness. I cautiously opt for the second hypothesis.

The Strait of Hormuz: Anatomy of a Vital Artery

A Maritime Corridor Worth Billions

The Strait of Hormuz measures barely 33 kilometers at its narrowest point. Yet this passage between Iran and the Sultanate of Oman is one of the most closely monitored chokepoints on the planet. According to data from Holland & Knight Law, it carries approximately 20% of global oil supplies — making it an unparalleled geopolitical power multiplier for whoever controls it. Closing the strait, even temporarily, sends oil prices into orbit and paralyzes entire economies.

For Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is far more than a commercial route: it is an economic deterrence weapon. The Islamic Republic has used it repeatedly as a negotiating lever, regularly threatening to close it whenever international pressure became too intense. And this time again, barely three days after signing the MOU, Iran declared the strait closed in retaliation for Israeli strikes in Lebanon. Proof that the weapon remains operational, and that signing a framework agreement does not disarm the reflexes of a militarized theocracy.

The Reopening: A Real but Conditional Victory

The reopening of the strait following the signing of the MOU is undeniably good news for global markets, energy consumers, and U.S. regional allies. The tankers that had been waiting outside the strait were able to resume their routes. Maritime insurance premiums — which had exploded during the period of tension — began to ease. The global economy took a deep breath.

But this reopening is conditional. It depends on the MOU holding, on Tehran's good faith, on the absence of new Israeli escalations, and on American diplomats' ability to sustain the pace of an unrealistic calendar. The Strait of Hormuz is not a faucet one opens and closes at will. It is a thermometer measuring the geopolitical stability of the Middle East — and in June 2026, that thermometer still reads alarmingly high temperatures.

The Versailles Meeting: Decoding a Surprising Diplomatic Setting

Why Versailles, Why Macron

The choice of the Palace of Versailles as the venue for the Trump-Macron meeting is not incidental. France has maintained for decades a tradition of mediation with IranTehran has often used Paris as a discreet intermediary. By bringing Macron into the equation, Trump secured European diplomatic cover that he would have lacked had he acted unilaterally. It is shrewd. It is pragmatic Trump, using Western diplomatic architecture when it suits him, and bypassing it when it does not.

For Macron, this agreement is an opportunity to reposition France as an indispensable mediating power at a moment when Europe is seeking weight in a world dominated by the Washington-Beijing duel. France is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it has considerable economic interests in the Middle East, and it has been trying for years to demonstrate that Europe can be a leading actor in resolving regional crises. Versailles as backdrop is also carefully calculated staging.

What the Agreement Says About the Trump-Macron Relationship

The relationship between Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron has gone through turbulent phases since 2017. Yet in June 2026, the two men appear to have found pragmatic common ground. Trump needs the multilateral legitimacy Macron can offer him; Macron needs American influence to carry weight in major negotiations. It is a partnership of circumstance — fragile but functional.

This Versailles partnership also reveals something deeper: even a Trump who spent years vilifying multilateral institutions sometimes needs the European flag to dress up his diplomatic gambles. It is an implicit acknowledgment that a united West remains more credible than America alone — even if that unity is sometimes cobbled together after the fact, in the corridors of a royal palace.

The Nuclear Program: The Elephant in the Room

A Program That Remains Intact Despite Everything

Let us be clear, Mr. Trump: Iran's nuclear program has not disappeared with the signing of the MOU. Iran retains its centrifuges, its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and its capacity to cross the military nuclear threshold within a timeframe experts estimate at weeks or months. The MOU is a maritime and military de-escalation agreement — not a nuclear disarmament agreement. It opens a negotiating window; it does not resolve the underlying problem.

As of June 21, 2026, according to analyses published by sources close to NPR and AP, no agreement on the nuclear file had been reached. Iran maintains its enrichment as a maximum lever in the forthcoming negotiation. This is classic diplomacy: keep your most precious card in hand until the final round. And in this game, Tehran clearly has more patience than Washington.

Sixty Days for the Impossible

The mid-August 2026 deadline for concluding a comprehensive nuclear agreement is an extraordinarily risky diplomatic gamble. A nuclear agreement with Iran entails IAEA verification mechanisms, multilateral negotiations with permanent members of the Security Council, resolution of disputes over frozen assets, and a profound transformation of the international sanctions regime. All of this in 60 days.

If this agreement fails by mid-August, the MOU itself risks collapsing. Iran could then resume its enrichment activities at full speed, close the Strait of Hormuz again, and mobilize its regional proxies. The return to square one would not merely be diplomatic — it would be military. And in that scenario, the United States would find itself in a weakened position, having granted oil waivers and lifted a naval blockade without obtaining lasting nuclear concessions in return.

The 300 Billion USD Reconstruction Package: Reality or Mirage

A Staggering Figure That Deserves Scrutiny

According to terms discussed and reported by 19FortyFive, a complete final agreement with Iran could include reconstruction aid of more than 300 billion dollars. If confirmed, this figure would represent one of the largest reconstruction programs ever envisioned for a country emerging from a state of belligerence. By way of comparison, the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after World War II amounted to approximately 13 billion dollars at the time — roughly 150 billion in today's value.

The question is not merely whether these 300 billion are realistic from an American budgetary standpoint — it is who would truly benefit. Reconstruction aid to an Iran under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would not be aid to the Iranian people. It would be funding for the regime. Distribution channels, oversight mechanisms, spending transparency: these are the questions no one is yet asking publicly but which will be decisive if negotiations progress.

Regional Allies Watch with Growing Unease

Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and all the Gulf monarchies are watching these negotiations with mounting unease. For them, a diplomatically rehabilitated Iran with access to global markets and a potential reconstruction plan worth 300 billion dollars is an Iran with far greater resources to fund its proxies — Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias, and others. The economic rehabilitation of Iran without the disarmament of its proxies is a dangerous equation for regional stability.

Israel in particular did not sign the MOU. Tel Aviv has its own strategic calculations, its own red lines, and a capacity for unilateral action that Washington cannot always predict or control. The Israeli strikes in Lebanon that led Iran to declare the Strait of Hormuz closed on June 20 are the living proof: an Israeli bombing run can trigger an Iranian reaction that jeopardizes the entire architecture of Washington's diplomacy.

Trump as "Necessary Evil": What This Agreement Reveals About American Doctrine

Trumpian Pragmatism and Its Limits

I have written it elsewhere and I affirm it again here: Donald Trump is a necessary evil for the West. Not because his methods are always sound, but because in a world where Putin, Xi Jinping, and Iranian leaders play constant intimidation games, sometimes only an actor capable of breaking the rules can bring an opposing party back to the table. The MOU of June 17 may be the most striking demonstration of this.

No previous American president had managed to get Iran to sign a general ceasefire agreement in so little time. Obama had taken years to obtain the 2015 JCPOA, which was then torn up by Trump himself in 2018. Biden had tried to revive it without success. And here is Trump, through weeks of maximum military pressure, obtaining a framework agreement that includes the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. The method is brutal. The result is real.

But the "Necessary Evil" Has Its Own Dangerous Logics

The problem with the Trump doctrine is that it maximizes short-term gains at the expense of long-term institutional solidity. The MOU is a bilateral agreement negotiated without the full participation of European allies, without thorough consultation with Israel, without a robust international verification mechanism. It is unilateral deal-making dressed up in multilateral diplomacy thanks to Macron's cosmetic participation at Versailles.

If this agreement holds, Trump will have succeeded where all his predecessors failed. If it collapses within 60 days — which remains a very serious possibility — the United States will have granted massive concessions (blockade lifted, oil waivers, diplomatic credibility invested) without obtaining lasting nuclear concessions in return. And Iran will move on strengthened, having obtained a precious economic respite without having surrendered its primary negotiating asset.

The Impact on Ukraine and Global Foreign Policy

Kyiv Watches Tehran with Justified Anxiety

This Iran-USA MOU is not without consequences for Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky knows it better than anyone: every dollar of American political and military attention devoted to the Middle East is a dollar potentially subtracted from support for Kyiv. And Iran, let us recall, is one of the main suppliers of Shahed drones to the Russian army — those same drones that have terrorized Ukrainian cities for two years. A rehabilitated, economically reinvigorated Iran — could it continue selling weapons to Putin while signing a peace agreement with Washington?

The honest answer is: perhaps. The MOU provides for the cessation of direct Iranian hostilities, but does not explicitly mention arms deliveries to Russia. Iran could theoretically maintain its arms contracts with Moscow while respecting the letter of the MOU. This is a deliberate grey area that will need to be addressed in forthcoming negotiations — or it will remain a permanent source of tension between Washington and Kyiv.

The Signal Sent to Moscow and Beijing

Moscow and Beijing are watching this agreement with a mixture of calculated satisfaction and uneasy vigilance. Satisfaction because American attention is divided, because Washington's diplomatic resources are being called upon across multiple fronts simultaneously. Vigilance because if the Iran deal succeeds, it establishes a precedent: even the most intransigent regimes can extract massive concessions in exchange for partial and temporary de-escalation.

For Vladimir Putin, the message is twofold. On one side, he sees an Iran that obtains sanctions relief and 300 billion dollars in reconstruction in exchange for signing a memorandum — and that can call the whole thing into question the very next day by closing a maritime strait. On the other, he sees an America that remains the dominant power, capable of forcing de-escalation where it chooses. This double signal sustains Russian strategic ambivalence toward Washington.

Gulf Allies: Between Relief and Distrust

Saudi Arabia and the UAE: Partners in Wait-and-See Mode

The Gulf monarchies welcomed the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the cessation of hostilities with cautious relief. For Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose economies depend massively on oil transit through Hormuz, every day of tension in the strait represents billions of additional dollars of risk on their hydrocarbon exports. De-escalation is therefore objectively good for their finances in the short term.

But their distrust of Iran is structural, historical, and almost visceral. A rehabilitated Iran in the international system, with access to global markets and potentially endowed with 300 billion dollars in reconstruction aid, is a considerably more powerful Iran in the regional competition for influence. The Sunni Gulf monarchies have no reason to celebrate in the long run an Iran that recovers its strength without having abandoned its expansionist Shia ideology.

Israel: The Uncontrollable Independent Variable

Israel represents the primary external risk factor for the MOU's survival. Tel Aviv is not bound by this agreement, did not participate in its negotiation, and maintains its own security doctrines that Washington cannot always predict or control. The Israeli strikes in Lebanon that led Iran to declare the Strait of Hormuz closed on June 20 are the most recent demonstration: an Israeli bombing run can trigger an Iranian reaction that jeopardizes the entire diplomatic architecture Washington has built.

For the MOU to hold, it would therefore be necessary in some sense to coordinate Israeli security policy with the imperatives of the American-Iranian agreement. This is a diplomatically complex task of the highest order, not made easier by current tensions between Washington and Tel Aviv over the management of the crisis in Gaza and Lebanon. The Trump administration will have to choose: unconditionally support Israel, or preserve the MOU with Iran. These two objectives are increasingly difficult to pursue simultaneously.

The 60-Day Oil Waiver: An Economic Time Bomb

What the Temporary Lifting of Oil Sanctions Means

The 60-day waiver on Iranian oil exports is one of the most immediately quantifiable concessions in the MOU. It allows Iran to sell its oil on international markets without fear of American sanctions during this transitional period. It is a strong signal sent to markets: Iranian oil, which until now circulated largely through clandestine channels and a shadow fleet circumventing sanctions, can now flow more freely toward its traditional buyers.

For global oil markets, the effect is twofold. On one side, additional supply exerts downward pressure on prices — good news for Western consumers and energy-importing economies. On the other, this pressure on oil prices mechanically weakens the revenues of Russia, whose budget depends massively on hydrocarbons. This is why Trump was able to declare at the G7 that the United States would be able to "increase the pressure on Russia because the oil is flowing now" — an economic formulation of remarkable clarity.

After 60 Days: Three Scenarios

When the 60-day waiver expires, three scenarios are possible. First scenario: a comprehensive nuclear agreement is concluded, sanctions are permanently lifted, Iran fully integrates global markets. Second scenario: negotiations continue beyond the 60 days within a new interim agreement extending the status quo. Third scenario: negotiations fail, the MOU collapses, and the United States must decide between reimposing all sanctions or accepting an uncomfortable hybrid situation.

Each of these scenarios has profound implications for global oil markets, for U.S. regional allies, for Ukraine, and for American diplomatic credibility. The Trump administration has bet on a tight calendar, hoping that accumulated economic and diplomatic pressure would force a quick agreement. It is an audacious gamble — but audacious gambles in Middle Eastern diplomacy have a long and painful history of failure.

What This Agreement Reveals About Iran Today

A Weakened but Still Calculating Regime

The Iran of June 2026 is not the Iran of ten years ago. The Ayatollahs' regime has suffered heavy losses: Israeli strike campaigns have degraded its air defenses, its economy is bled dry, its population increasingly hostile, and its regional proxies — Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias — have paid a heavy military price. It is in this context of strategic vulnerability that Tehran agreed to sign the MOU of June 17.

But a weakened regime is not a rational one in the Western sense of the term. Iranian leaders have their own survival logics, their own calculations of internal legitimacy, their own ideological constraints. Accepting an agreement with the United States requires selling it domestically to a base that has been fed for 45 years on the rhetoric of the Great Satan. That is not trivial. And it explains why, even after signing the MOU, Iran immediately demonstrated — by declaring the strait closed on June 20 — that it had renounced none of its pressure tools.

The Revolutionary Guards: The Real Variable

The great unknown in this entire equation is the position of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This paramilitary force controls a major share of the Iranian economy, the nuclear program, and the networks of regional proxies. Any agreement that does not obtain the tacit approval of the IRGC is an agreement that can be scuttled from within. American diplomats know this. But negotiating directly with the IRGC — an organization designated as a terrorist organization by Washington — is an even more delicate exercise than negotiating with the official Iranian government.

There is in this MOU a fundamental ambiguity: who speaks for Iran? The Pezeshkian government, which negotiated the agreement and appears to genuinely want de-escalation? Or the IRGC, which has its own interests and has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to torpedo governmental diplomatic initiatives? This unanswered question may be the greatest structural risk hanging over the MOU's survival.

Russia and Iran After the MOU: An Alliance Showing Cracks?

Moscow Faces the Rehabilitation of Tehran

One of the least-discussed effects of the USA-Iran MOU is its impact on the Russian-Iranian relationship. Russia and Iran have developed since 2022 a close military cooperation, with massive deliveries of Iranian drones to the Russian army and military technology transfers in exchange. This alliance of convenience has been invaluable to Moscow in its war against Ukraine.

But a rehabilitated Iran, seeking reintegration into global markets and the unfreezing of its assets, has every incentive to gradually distance itself from Russia. Continuing to supply drones to Putin while negotiating a nuclear agreement with the United States would be a diplomatic contradiction that Washington could not ignore. Iran therefore potentially finds itself in the delicate position of having to choose between its ties to Moscow and its aspirations to international rehabilitation.

Russian Oil Under Additional Pressure

According to the analysis published by The National on June 19, 2026, the return of Iranian oil to global markets exerts additional downward pressure on prices that directly weakens Russia's oil revenues. In a context where the Bank of Russia has cut its key rate to 14.25% in an attempt to stimulate a struggling economy, every drop in oil prices represents an additional budgetary shock for Moscow.

For Trump, this is the key argument justifying the concessions granted to Tehran: by bringing Iranian oil back to market, one reduces Russian oil revenues, weakens Putin's economy, and creates additional economic pressure on the Kremlin. It is a strategic calculation with real logic — even if its concrete effects will take months to fully materialize on the Kremlin's balance sheets.

The Credibility of the West at Stake

European Allies: Between Surface Support and Real Concern

NATO's European allies have welcomed the MOU with cautious enthusiasm. On one side, Middle Eastern de-escalation reduces the risks of a regional conflict that would have immediate repercussions on European energy supplies and on the Old Continent's financial markets. On the other, the Trump method — bilateral, rapid, minimally consultative — creates a dangerous precedent for how the United States manages major international crises.

The primary risk to Western credibility is that of the double standard. The West imposed massive sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, affirming that those sanctions would not be lifted until a full withdrawal of Russian troops and a restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty. If the West accepts lifting all Iranian sanctions in exchange for an as-yet-unverified nuclear promise, it sends a devastating signal to Moscow: sanctions are negotiable, red lines have back doors, and perseverance is ultimately rewarded.

What Zelensky Thinks of It

Volodymyr Zelensky has not publicly commented on the USA-Iran MOU with the words that would probably correspond to what he truly thinks. As a diplomat hardened by three years of total war, he knows that openly criticizing an American diplomatic initiative would not serve Ukrainian interests. But the non-verbal signals are eloquent: a Ukraine that sees the United States granting massive economic concessions to one of Russia's primary military backers can only wonder about Washington's hierarchy of priorities.

Western solidarity with Ukraine remains the moral pillar of the response to the challenge posed by Putin. Any action that could weaken that solidarity — even indirectly, even with valid strategic justifications — deserves to be publicly questioned. That is the role of a columnist. It is not an accusation leveled at Trump or at Macron. It is a demand for consistency toward a Western foreign policy that claims to be founded on principles.

Iranian Civil Society in the Shadow of the Agreement

A Population Between Economic Hope and Distrust

Behind the official communiqués and diplomatic maneuvering, ordinary Iranians are waiting to see whether this agreement will change their daily lives. For years, American sanctions have ravaged purchasing power, fueled inflation, and isolated Iran from the international financial system. The agreement of June 17, 2026 represents an economic promise for them — but also a source of deep uncertainty. The 60-day oil waiver is insufficient to reverse years of contraction.

Independent Iranian economists point out that the oil waiver cannot, by itself, reverse years of economic contraction. It takes months, if not years, for the easing of sanctions to translate into concrete jobs, accessible medicines, and repaired infrastructure. The Iranian people have learned not to celebrate too quickly. The memory of 2015 — the nuclear deal of the Obama era, celebrated in the streets of Tehran, then torn up three years later by Trump himself — still haunts people's minds.

The Revolutionary Guards' Grip on Society

Alongside the diplomacy, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards maintain their hold on civil society. Any expression of popular enthusiasm for a deal with America is closely monitored. The regime needs the population to remain in a state of controlled distrust — too much popular enthusiasm would weaken the Iranian negotiating position by showing that Tehran needs this agreement more than Washington believes.

This tension between a population that yearns for normalization and a security apparatus that distrusts it constitutes one of the most important fault lines of the post-MOU period. If the agreement holds, ordinary Iranians will want tangible results. If those results are slow to come, popular disappointment could paradoxically weaken the moderates and strengthen the hardest factions — a scenario that Washington must absolutely anticipate.

Conclusion: An Agreement to Watch Like a Pot About to Boil Over

The Stakes in the Next 60 Days

Mr. Trump, your agreement with Iran may be the diplomatic coup of the year. It may also prove to be the disillusionment of autumn 2026. The difference between the two will depend on three factors: the ability of American negotiators to obtain verifiable Iranian nuclear guarantees within the 60-day timeframe, Washington's ability to keep Israel in a sufficiently restrained posture to prevent the agreement from derailing, and the willingness of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to allow their government to honor its commitments.

These three factors are beyond Washington's direct control. That is why I watch this agreement with the attention one gives to a pot on the stove: one moment of inattention, and everything boils over. The West cannot afford a failure of this diplomatic process. Global markets, regional security, and the credibility of the American word depend directly on it.

What I Expect of You, Mr. Trump

I ask you, Mr. Trump, not to treat this agreement as a definitive victory on your diplomatic record. Wait out the 60 days. Wait for the IAEA inspections. Wait for Iran to actually dismantle its enrichment capabilities before ordering the fireworks. The history of agreements with Iran is a history of unfulfilled promises, missed deadlines, and dashed hopes. Perhaps you are the one who will change that history. But caution is warranted as long as the result has not been proven by facts.

What you began at Versailles deserves to be completed with rigor, transparency, and consultation with your allies. The West is stronger when it speaks with one voice. And that voice must include not only Washington and Paris, but also Berlin, London, Jerusalem, and — never forget — Kyiv. Because peace in the Middle East is worth nothing if it is built upon the abandonment of Ukrainian democracy to Putin's brutality.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial Positioning

This open letter expresses the personal viewpoint of Maxime Marquette, an independent columnist-analyst, and does not reflect any institutional position. The author has no ties to governments, oil lobbies, pro-Iranian or pro-American pressure groups, and received no compensation related to the subject addressed in this article.

Limits of the Analysis

This column is written from open-source material available as of June 25, 2026. The full text of the MOU has not been made public in its entirety; some details of the agreement remain officially unconfirmed. The author acknowledges this limitation and invites readers to consult the primary sources cited to deepen their understanding of the agreement's precise terms.

Independence and Method

Maxime Marquette commits to never inventing quotes, testimonies, or figures. Every fact advanced in this article is corroborated by at least one verifiable source. The columnist freely acknowledges that he does not have all the elements of a rapidly evolving diplomatic situation, and that his analyses may be contradicted by future developments.

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Cite this article

Maxime Marquette (2026). OPEN LETTER: Mr. Trump, the Strait of Hormuz Is Not a Bargaining Chip. MadMax. https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-monsieur-trump-le-detroit-d-ormuz-n-est-pas-une-monnaie-d-echange

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Maxime Marquette
Independent columnist

Maxime Marquette writes most of the analyses and columns published on MadMax — geopolitics, technology, and current events, no filler.

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Op-Ed4999 words31 min read