COMMENTARY: The Trump-Iran Deal — A "Peace" Without Missiles or Militias That Looks Like Surrender

COMMENTARY: The Trump-Iran Deal — A "Peace" Without Missiles or Militias That Looks Like Surrender

Introduction: The memorandum that relieves without resolving

An agreement signed in the urgency of defeat

On June 17, 2026, the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) intended to end the war that Washington and Tel Aviv had just waged against Iranian nuclear installations. On paper, it is a diplomatic victory. In reality, it is a document that raises as many questions as it resolves. The agreement explicitly excludes Iranian ballistic missiles and Tehran's support for regional militias — Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias. Those are precisely the two files that make Iran dangerous to its neighbors and to the West. Excluding them means signing peace on the symbols while leaving the real threats intact.

I will attempt here to analyze this deal honestly — without excusing it in the name of short-term relief, and without rejecting it either in the name of an idealism that would ignore ground-level realities. Donald Trump did what he always does: he sought a fast agreement, presentable, sellable to his electorate. He obtained something. But that something, examined closely, looks less like an American triumph than like a pragmatic management of a situation that military strikes had created without truly resolving.

The immediate context: after the bombs, the negotiating table

To understand this MOU, we must recall the sequence of events. In 2025, the United States and Israel struck Iranian nuclear sites — Natanz, Fordo, Isfahan — in what was described as a preventive operation to set back Tehran's nuclear capability. Iran responded by closing the Strait of Hormuz, paralyzing part of global oil flows. Fighting broke out or resumed in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah. The region was on the brink of a general conflagration.

It is in this context — and not from a position of quiet American strength — that negotiations began. Mediated by Qatar and Pakistan, they produced a five-point memorandum in one week. Then, on June 22 in Lucerne, a second session established a 60-day roadmap toward a final agreement. That tight schedule says everything about the nature of this accord: it is a structured ceasefire, not a substantive treaty.

What the MOU contains — and what it does not contain

The five points of the agreement: a fragile architecture

The June 17 memorandum is structured around five main axes. First axis: immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. Second axis: reopening of the Strait of Hormuz for commercial vessels, without tolls, for at least 60 days. Third axis: suspension by the United States of sanctions on Iranian oil for the same duration — allowing Iran to resume its oil exports and release approximately 67 million barrels onto the market. Fourth axis: establishment of specialized working groups on nuclear questions, sanctions relief, reconstruction, and implementation of commitments. Fifth axis: creation of a deconfliction cell to manage the situation in Lebanon.

What is not in the agreement is equally revealing. No clause on Iranian ballistic missiles — missiles that can reach Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and according to some experts, targets in Southern Europe. No clause on Iranian support for militias — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, armed factions in Iraq and Syria. These two absences are not oversights. They are concessions that Iran refused to make and that Washington did not know how to — or chose not to — impose.

The frozen assets: who controls what?

One of the most disputed points of the agreement concerns frozen Iranian assets. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that some frozen assets had been released and that "Iran alone is entitled to decide how these resources are used." For his part, US Vice President JD Vance declared that if Iranian assets were unblocked, they would be used to purchase American agricultural products — corn, wheat, soybeans. Two diametrically opposed readings of the same jointly signed agreement. This type of contradiction in the interpretation of a co-signed text is the hallmark of a document drafted in haste, with intentional ambiguities to allow each side to sell its domestic narrative.

The US Congress, for its part, is "not happy" — according to analysts close to the negotiators. Republican and Democratic lawmakers who view Iran as an existential threat do not look kindly on an agreement that economically relieves Tehran without formal guarantees on its missile program or its regional proxies. The question of legislative ratification is unresolved. And in the American constitutional architecture, an international agreement that durably commits the United States must obtain Senate consent — or at least pass the test of political legitimacy.

The nuclear question: the essentials remain vague

Trump demands inspections. Iran agrees... on its own terms

On the nuclear issue — which is, after all, the original reason for the entire confrontation — the agreement is remarkably vague. Trump declared on social media that Iran had "consented to long-term nuclear inspections," adding that without this, "there would be no further negotiations." This is presented as a major victory. But what Iran says is substantially different: its nuclear spokesman, Baghaei, stated that cooperation would continue "within the framework of existing safeguard arrangements, in accordance with the decisions of Parliament and the Supreme National Security Council."

Translation: Iran agrees to allow IAEA inspectors back onto the bombed sites — which is not nothing — but refuses to commit on its enriched uranium stockpile, on the future level of enrichment, or on any formal limitation of its centrifuge capabilities. Vance clarified that negotiations aimed to "effectively make it impossible to restart the Iranian nuclear program" — but that formulation is political, not technical. It describes a goal whose modalities Iran has not accepted. It does not describe a concrete verification mechanism.

The unresolved questions on enriched uranium

The central questions of the nuclear file remain open. Will Iran be allowed to continue enriching uranium — even at civilian levels? What becomes of its current stockpile of uranium enriched to near-weapons-grade — the uranium that survived the strikes or was evacuated beforehand? How to reduce or downgrade this uranium — dilution on site, transfer to a third country, blending with civilian fuel? These three questions are the cornerstone of any serious nuclear agreement. They are not resolved. They are entrusted to technical working groups that have 60 days to find answers that diplomats have failed to formulate across multiple rounds of negotiations spanning years.

The comparison with the JCPOA of 2015 is unavoidable. The Vienna agreement, negotiated over two years with the help of China, Russia, the European Union, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, contained detailed verification mechanisms, precise limits on enrichment, and specific dismantlement timelines. Trump abandoned it in 2018, calling it the "worst deal in history." The agreement he presents today as a victory is — at this stage — far less precise than the one he rejected. That is a historical irony his supporters prefer to ignore.

Lebanon: the deconfliction cell that does not deconflict

A ceasefire that does not involve all parties

The MOU stipulates an "immediate and permanent cessation of military operations... including in Lebanon." That is written in the text. What the text does not say is how to enforce this ceasefire when neither the Israeli government nor Hezbollah are parties to the agreement. Iran agreed to try to halt Hezbollah's fire. The United States asked Israel to stop its strikes. But in the days following the signing of the MOU, Israeli bombardment of Lebanon continued. Netanyahu declared that Israel would maintain a security presence in southern Lebanon for as long as necessary.

The deconfliction cell created in Lucerne — involving the United States, Iran, and Lebanon, with Qatar and Pakistan as mediators — is a communication mechanism, not an enforcement mechanism. It can flag incidents. It can create direct lines between military commands. It cannot compel Israel to withdraw its troops from a security corridor of 602 km² in southern Lebanon — approximately 6% of Lebanese territory. And it cannot disarm Hezbollah, which continues to function as a state within the Lebanese state, armed, trained, and financed by Tehran despite all contrary declarations.

The Lebanese government: sovereign on paper, absent in practice

What is striking in the mechanics of this agreement is the place — or rather the absence — of the Lebanese government in the negotiations. It was the United States and Iran that decided Lebanon's fate. It was Qatar and Pakistan that mediated. The Beirut government was informed, brought in after the fact, but not truly consulted on substance. This is the continuation of a Lebanese tragedy that has lasted for decades: this small country of 5 million people perpetually serves as a battlefield for powers that never ask its opinion.

Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi said the deconfliction mechanism in Lebanon would be "the first test" of the overall agreement — because if the violence continues in the land of cedars, it could derail the broader diplomatic dynamic. That is accurate. But it is also a formulation that places Lebanon in the role of a thermometer indicator of the health of US-Iranian relations, rather than in the role of a sovereign subject whose fate deserves to be considered in its own right. Lebanon has suffered too long from being treated as a stake rather than as a country.

Trump and Netanyahu: the complicated alliance

Trump calls Netanyahu "crazy" — then "amazing"

One of the most revealing elements of the situation is the visible relationship between Trump and Netanyahu during the negotiations. Trump, according to sources close to his delegation, reportedly called the Israeli Prime Minister "crazy" — for his continued strikes on Lebanon despite the MOU. A few hours later, in a public statement, he described Netanyahu as a "very good man... an incredible partnership." This oscillation within hours between private insult and public praise says everything about the US-Israeli dynamic at this moment.

Israel did not co-sign the MOU. Israel is not bound by its ceasefire terms in the same way Iran is. Washington can ask. Israel can ignore. This asymmetry of obligation is at the heart of the agreement's structural weakness: it commits Iran to obligations whose reciprocity Washington cannot guarantee on the Israeli side. For Tehran, that is a convenient argument to invoke American bad faith as soon as something goes wrong — and Middle Eastern diplomacy operates largely on convenient pretexts.

The Gaza effect: the ticking bomb inside the deal

What the Trump-Iran agreement does not address directly, but which hovers over every line of its text, is the question of Gaza. The conflict in Gaza — ignited in October 2023 and still without a lasting resolution — is intrinsically linked to Iranian regional dynamics. Iran finances Hamas. Iran provided arms to Hamas. Iran used Gaza as an additional front in its war of influence against Israel and the United States. An agreement that settles the Iranian question without settling the Gaza question is an agreement that leaves a lit fuse in the powder.

Trump's logic is understandable: he wants to separate the files, advance on Iran, return to Gaza in a second phase. It is a sequential negotiation logic — one thing at a time. The problem is that in this region, nothing is truly sequential. Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the Strait of Hormuz are communicating vessels. Pressing on one moves the others. A fragmented peace that settles one front without addressing the others is a peace that selects its next site of explosion.

Iran: what Tehran obtained

An implicit recognition of the right to exist despite the nuclear program

If one takes stock of what Iran obtained in this deal, the list is substantial. Resumption of oil exports — the regime's primary source of revenue. Lifting of the maritime blockade — Strait of Hormuz reopened. Partial unfreezing of frozen assets. Reconstruction initiative financed in part by unlocked resources. Four working groups on sanctions, nuclear questions, reconstruction, and implementation — giving Tehran a seat at the table of negotiations on its own future without having conceded on the essentials of its positions.

And Iran conceded nothing on ballistic missiles. Nothing on Hezbollah. Nothing on the Houthis. Nothing on Iraqi militias. Nothing on the acceptable level of uranium enrichment. If you were an Iranian negotiator, you would return to Tehran with an excellent agreement. The mullahs' regime survived direct military strikes on its nuclear program — the scenario it had feared most for twenty years — and leaves with substantial economic relief, implicit diplomatic recognition, and its regional power tools intact.

Pezeshkian, the "moderate" — and the Revolutionary Guards who still decide

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, described as a moderate, was present in Pakistan during the negotiations. His profile is real — he holds less radical positions than his predecessors on certain domestic files. But in the Iranian power structure, the president does not decide alone. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards have the final word on strategic files — nuclear, missiles, regional militias. Pezeshkian can sign a memorandum. He cannot transform the regime's strategic doctrine without the agreement of the real centers of power.

That is why Baghaei's formulation — nuclear inspections "within the framework of existing arrangements, in accordance with the decisions of Parliament and the Supreme National Security Council" — is so significant. It reminds everyone who truly decides in Tehran. And those decision-makers have not said yes to real denuclearization. They said yes to an economic truce that gives them breathing room to restructure their defenses and their negotiations. It is a regime survival strategy, dressed up as dialogue.

What this deal says about American posture in 2026

Trump's America: the deal as product, not as strategy

To understand the Trump-Iran deal, one must understand Trump's philosophy on foreign policy. Trump does not think in terms of long-term geopolitical strategy. He thinks in terms of transactions: what do I get today, how do I sell it to my electorate, how does it position me for tomorrow. The deal with Iran ticks these boxes: it stops a costly war, reopens a global commercial artery, and can be presented as a diplomatic success where war had not produced a decisive victory.

What is missing from this approach is strategic coherence. Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff — the two principal negotiators on the American side — are businessmen accustomed to closing real estate transactions, not diplomats trained in the subtleties of the Iranian file. Their short-term results are real. Their understanding of medium-term dynamics is less certain. A 60-day truce negotiated by deal-makers is not a structuring peace treaty. And in 60 days, if the working groups have not produced the expected results, pressure will resume — with even less diplomatic room to maneuver.

What the deal says about America's regional allies

Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Arab Emirates — the three pillars of the American security architecture in the Middle East — were not enthusiastic about the announcement of this agreement. Riyadh fears that an economically reinvigorated Iran will restart its financing of regional proxies in Yemen and Iraq. Tel Aviv did not sign the agreement and continued its military operations. Abu Dhabi watches in silence, as always. None of these countries was fully consulted before the signing. That is another hallmark of Trump's diplomacy: the brutal bilateralism that short-circuits regional alliances patiently built over decades.

The risk is real: if Iran uses the economic respite of this agreement to rebuild its currency reserves, repurchase military equipment through intermediaries, and maintain its proxies in operational condition, America's regional allies will face an Iran that is economically stronger, with a new diplomatic shield, and still armed with the same missiles and the same networks. That is the scenario feared by Riyadh and Tel Aviv. And the MOU contains no clause that would prevent it.

The role of mediators: Qatar and Pakistan

Qatar: the hub of impossible diplomacy

Qatar has been playing the role of universal mediator for years — Israel-Hamas, US-Taliban, US-Iran. It is a small city-state that has turned its geographic vulnerability into a diplomatic asset. Doha has relations with everyone because it allows itself to hold positions that resemble no one else's. It hosts the American air base at Al-Udeid. It has historic ties with Hamas. It runs a television channel — Al Jazeera — that covers both camps. And it mediates agreements from which it hopes, rightly, to strengthen its influence and security.

In the context of the Trump-Iran deal, Qatar played an indispensable logistical and political facilitating role. Without Qatari channels, discussions would probably not have concluded as quickly — Iran does not speak directly to Washington, the United States does not trust the usual multilateral channels for sensitive matters. Doha filled that void. It is a real mediation power. But it is also a power whose own interests — commercial, energy-related, security-related — are never far from the table.

Pakistan: the surprise mediator

The involvement of Pakistan in this mediation is the genuine geopolitical surprise of the agreement. Islamabad is not a habitual player in Iranian diplomacy. But Pakistan holds several advantages in this context: it shares a long border with Iran, it maintains complex but open relations with Tehran, and it has a more distant relationship with Washington than Qatar — which gives it a different credibility in Iranian eyes. Pezeshkian's presence in Pakistan during the negotiations facilitated direct communications on the sidelines of the formal sessions.

But Pakistan is also a country in deep economic crisis, looking to reposition itself diplomatically to secure financial support. Playing a role in a major regional peace agreement is a strong signal to the IMF, to China, and to Gulf states: Islamabad is a serious actor, not merely a failing state asking for loans. That domestic political calculation does not invalidate Pakistan's mediation — but it illuminates it.

International reactions: calculated caution

The European Union: satisfied but vigilant

The European Union — which was not at the negotiating table, even though it was a co-signatory of the 2015 JCPOA — welcomed the deal with calculated caution. Costa and von der Leyen both acknowledged the agreement as an advance, but maintained their requirements: any deal with Iran must address ballistic missiles, support for regional proxies, and credible nuclear verification. These three requirements are not met by the current MOU. Europe said so politely, but clearly.

This European positioning is strategically wise. It allows the EU to avoid torpedoing a diplomatic dynamic that provides short-term relief to pressure on the Strait of Hormuz and European energy markets. But it maintains red lines that serve both as guardrails and as levers for future negotiations. Europe wants the deal to hold. It does not want it to hold at the cost of its own security.

China and Russia: satisfied spectators

Beijing and Moscow watch this agreement with undisguised satisfaction. For China, an economically reinvigorated and diplomatically rehabilitated Iran is a reinforced commercial and strategic partner — one that can continue to supply discounted oil and participate in the Eurasian axis dynamic that Beijing is trying to build. For Russia, a US-Iranian agreement that does not address regional proxies leaves Hezbollah and Iraqi militias in operational condition — useful as cards in future regional negotiations where Moscow wants to maintain influence.

Neither China nor Russia wanted to see a total war between the United States and Iran. Such a war would have disrupted their respective calculations, created uncontrollable instability, and risked triggering a reorganization of regional alliances unfavorable to their interests. This agreement — fragile, ambiguous, incomplete — suits them perfectly. It defuses the immediate without resolving the structural. And the structural — competition for influence in the Middle East — remains a terrain where China and Russia believe they have cards to play.

The 60 days: the real test begins now

Four working groups, an improbable timeline

The agreement's follow-up mechanism rests on four working groups: one on sanctions relief, one on nuclear questions, one on reconstruction, one on general implementation of commitments. These groups have 60 days to lay the foundations of a final agreement. That is an extremely tight deadline for files that have not been resolved in years of high-level negotiations. On the nuclear file alone — acceptable enrichment, stockpile, dismantlement timeline, verification — expert teams have worked for decades without reaching a definitive conclusion.

Analysts close to the negotiators already estimate that the technical phase could be far more complex than the political agreement and well exceed 60 days. That is likely. But the 60-day deadline creates a useful political pressure — it forces both sides to show results or publicly own the failure. In Trumpian logic, that is acceptable: if it works, it is a victory. If it fails, it is Iran's fault. The narrative remains manageable either way.

The Strait of Hormuz: the world's artery suspended on a precarious understanding

The Strait of Hormuz — 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest point — is the obligatory passage for approximately 20% of the world's oil. Its closure by Iran in 2025 had triggered a surge in oil prices and disrupted global supply chains. Its reopening within the MOU framework is therefore an immediate and real economic relief. But this reopening is conditional and temporary — it lasts 60 days, after which everything depends on the working groups' capacity to produce an agreement satisfactory to both parties.

The risk is concrete: if nuclear negotiations stall, if a military provocation in Lebanon reignites tensions, if the US Congress refuses to ratify the sanctions relief, Iran will once again have its hand on the Strait's switch. That structural vulnerability will not disappear with a memorandum signed in haste. It will only disappear with a complete, verified, multilateral agreement — the kind of agreement the JCPOA was trying to be, and that Trump tore up in 2018. History turns in circles.

What this deal says about Trumpian diplomacy in general

The return of brutal bilateralism

The Trump-Iran deal is an almost archetypal example of what I call "transactional diplomacy" — an approach that privileges fast agreement over institutional solidity, visible results over structural depth, bilateral relations over multilateral frameworks. Trump short-circuited Europe, sidelined Russia and China as potential co-signatories, ignored the IAEA as a central interlocutor, and produced a signed text in one week.

There is a raw efficiency in this method. And an equally raw fragility. Multilateral agreements are slow to build and resistant to undoing. Bilateral agreements are quick to sign and easy to break. The JCPOA took two years to negotiate. Trump abandoned it within weeks. The current MOU took one week to conclude. How long will it last if both parties interpret key terms differently — which they already do, on the frozen assets? The lifespan of an agreement is proportional to the depth of the compromises that produced it.

Europe: excluded from the table, but exposed to the consequences

What should outrage Brussels, Berlin, and Paris more is that Europe is bearing the consequences of an agreement in which it did not participate. European energy prices were affected by the closure of Hormuz. The security of Southern Europe is implicated by Iranian ballistic missiles. The stability of Lebanon — where EU member states have nationals — is at stake. And yet, Europe was not in Lucerne. It was not among the mediators. It was not consulted on the MOU's content before signing.

This is not merely a question of institutional self-esteem. It is a question of strategic coherence: if Europe wants to be an actor in its own security, it must insist on being at the table of negotiations that concern that security. It said so politely after the fact. It should have demanded it beforehand. A power that does not fight for a seat at the table always ends up on the menu.

The medium-term risks: three scenarios

Scenario 1: the agreement holds and deepens

In the optimistic scenario, the 60 days produce results. The nuclear working groups agree on a credible verification mechanism. Iran agrees to limit its enrichment in exchange for substantial sanctions relief. The Strait of Hormuz stays open. Lebanon finds precarious stability. And in 18 months, a formal agreement is signed — closer to the JCPOA in its architecture, but this time with a Trumpian stamp to make it sellable domestically.

This scenario is possible. It requires that both parties resist pressure from their internal hardliners — Revolutionary Guards in Iran, Republican hawks in the US Congress. It requires that Netanyahu does not blow up the process with a unilateral military action. And it requires that the international community — including Europe — maintains sufficient pressure to ensure commitments are respected. It is achievable. It is far from guaranteed.

Scenarios 2 and 3: the real risks

In scenario 2, negotiations stall on the nuclear issue. Iran uses the economic respite to rebuild its reserves and tactically delays technical discussions. After 60 days, the United States partially reimpose sanctions, Iran partially closes the Strait, and the situation returns to a gray zone of controlled tensions — worse than open war, worse than peace. In scenario 3 — the most dangerous — a major provocation in Lebanon or a revelation about hidden Iranian nuclear sites derails the agreement, Trump responds with additional military strikes, and the cycle of violence resumes, this time without the element of strategic surprise that had made the initial strikes effective. These two scenarios are not marginal. They are probable if the working groups fail.

What the Trump-Iran deal tells us, at bottom, is that diplomacy in a region this complex cannot be reduced to a transaction. It requires patience, institutions, alliances, and a nuanced understanding of the internal dynamics of each actor. These four elements are missing from the current approach. That does not mean the agreement will fail. It means its success will depend less on the quality of the signed text than on the political will of both camps in the months to come. And that will, no one can guarantee.

What the deal reveals about the nature of Iranian power

A regime that knows how to play on multiple registers

The Iran of 2026 is a regime that has learned to absorb blows and survive. Its nuclear sites have been bombed. Its currency is depreciated. Its population endures structural shortages. And yet it arrives at the negotiating table in a position to concede nothing on the essentials. This resilience is not accidental. It is the product of a long-term survival strategy that accepts short-term pain in exchange for preserving its strategic autonomy.

The Revolutionary Guards have an interest in this agreement for a direct economic reason: they control a significant share of Iranian oil exports. Their reopening means additional revenues for their own operations — which includes financing Hezbollah and other proxies. The US-Iran agreement, by releasing oil revenues, indirectly finances the very structures the agreement is supposed to contain. That is a paradox the negotiators knew perfectly well — and chose to accept for lack of a better option.

The question of internal legitimacy within the regime

The signing of this agreement also creates internal pressure in Iran. A faction of the regime — the hardliners of the Revolutionary Guards, the partisans of an absolute hard line — views any agreement with Washington as a betrayal of the founding principles of the Islamic Revolution. They tolerated the signing because the American-Israeli strikes temporarily weakened their position. But if Iranian concessions were to become real — on the nuclear issue, on proxies — the internal pressure on Pezeshkian and his team would become considerable. Iranian foreign policy is also domestic politics. And Iran's domestic situation, in 2026, remains volatile.

That does not mean we should conclude the agreement is doomed to fail. It means we must recognize that it is being negotiated within a context of Iranian political constraints that the text itself cannot resolve. Diplomacy does not operate in a vacuum — it operates within political systems, with internal actors who have their own agendas. Ignoring these dynamics when analyzing an agreement is analyzing a contract without looking at the signatories.

Verdict: a necessary, incomplete deal, dangerous to overvalue

What this agreement actually accomplishes

It would be unfair to deny what this deal achieves. It has stopped a military spiral that threatened to engulf the region. It has reopened the Strait of Hormuz. It has created a negotiating space where there was none. It has placed IAEA inspectors on the bombed sites — which at least allows a first assessment of the nuclear damage. These results are real and not negligible. In a region where the immediate alternative was escalation, an imperfect text is better than no text at all.

But the agreement does not denuclearize Iran. It does not dismantle its ballistic missiles. It does not cut its financing to regional proxies. It does not resolve the question of Gaza. It does not restore Lebanese sovereignty. It does not create a binding verification mechanism for future commitments. Those are the five things that make Iran dangerous — and not one of them is addressed in the five points of the memorandum. This is not a bad beginning. It is a beginning that must not be presented as an ending.

History will judge this deal on its next 60 days

In the history of US-Iranian negotiations, this June 17, 2026 memorandum will be judged not on what it says, but on what the working groups produce in the two months that follow. If the 60 days result in a formal, verifiable agreement that credibly addresses the nuclear issue, this deal will be seen as the starting point of a historic normalization. If they result in another cycle of endless renegotiations, tactical violations, and diplomatic rhetoric without substance, it will be seen as yet another capitulation dressed as victory — and Iran as an actor that has mastered the art of signing agreements without giving anything up.

For the West, and for Israel, and for all those who believe that nuclear non-proliferation is a foundational rule of the international order, the stakes of these 60 days are existential. A nuclearized or near-nuclearized Iran, with operational ballistic missiles and active regional proxies, is not only a threat to the Middle East. It is a threat to the very logic of non-proliferation — which, once broken, releases nuclear ambitions in dozens of other countries. That cascade risk is what this deal, if it fails, could trigger.

Conclusion: Between relief and lucidity — how to read this deal

Accepting the good without ignoring the missing

The right reading of the Trump-Iran deal is one that holds both truths simultaneously. First truth: this agreement is better than war. It stopped a cycle of violence that could have spread across the entire region. It gave breathing room to economies — Iranian, global — that were suffocating under the effect of the Hormuz closure. It opened a diplomatic window that, if used intelligently, could lead to something more solid. These facts deserve to be acknowledged.

Second truth: this agreement is incomplete on the questions that define Iran's dangerousness. Ballistic missiles, regional militias, verifiable denuclearization — these three absences are not technical details to be resolved later. They are the reasons why military strikes took place. Ignoring them in the peace agreement guarantees that the conditions for the next confrontation are already in place. An agreement that relieves without resolving is an agreement that postpones. And in Middle Eastern geopolitics, postponing often costs more than deciding.

What we must demand — and monitor

For those following this file with a sincere interest in regional peace, the message is simple: do not let the 60 days become a diplomatic routine without results. Demand that Western governments maintain pressure on the working groups. Demand that the IAEA publish its assessments of the bombed nuclear sites. Demand from Tehran clarity on its enriched uranium stockpile. Demand from Washington that it not present a truce as a treaty. And demand from Brussels that it reclaim its place in a file that directly concerns European security — ballistic missiles, Mediterranean stability, energy flows.

Peace in the Middle East is not a 60-day project. It is a generational project. This June 17, 2026 memorandum can be one of its first bricks — or yet another missed opportunity. The difference will play out in the weeks and months to come, in negotiating rooms that no cameras will film, between experts whose names will never appear in headlines. That is where peace is built or undone. And that is where we need to look.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and where I speak from

I am a Quebec-based columnist and analyst. I cover international affairs from an avowed pro-Western perspective — which means I believe that nuclear non-proliferation, state sovereignty, and respect for international law are non-negotiable values. This perspective influences my reading of the Trump-Iran deal: I am more severe about the agreement's shortcomings than some analysts who privilege the pragmatics of the immediate result. I own that.

This commentary is based on open sources — NPR, Al Jazeera, CNBC, Anadolu Agency. I have no contacts in the American or Iranian delegations. I do not have access to the full texts of the working groups. The information about the precise content of closed-door discussions is unknown to me. Where I express an opinion — and I express several in this text — I signal it explicitly.

Assumed biases and analytical limits

My main bias: I believe that Iran, as long as it is governed by its current power architecture — Supreme Leader, Revolutionary Guards — will remain a difficult actor to integrate into a stable regional order. This bias makes me probably more skeptical about the prospects of this agreement than some of my colleagues. I may be wrong. Diplomacy has sometimes surprised skeptics. But I prefer to err on the side of excess vigilance than excess optimism on a file where the stakes are this high. What I do not know: the informal compromises that enabled the signing, the precise content of the nuclear exchanges in Lucerne, and whether the Revolutionary Guards formally approved the MOU.

Sources

Primary sources

NPR / Associated Press — Iran's president heads to Pakistan as U.S.-Iran teams work on war-ending deal — June 23, 2026

Al Jazeera — What are the key outcomes of the Iran-US talks in Switzerland, what next? — June 22, 2026

CNBC — U.S., Iran agree roadmap for final deal, set up Lebanon deconfliction mechanism — June 22, 2026

Secondary sources

Al Jazeera — What the US and Iran agreed and disagreed on first day of talks — June 23-24, 2026

Anadolu Agency — Factbox: Key outcomes of Switzerland summit on Iran-US talks — June 22, 2026

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) — What they're saying about US-Iran talks — June 22-23, 2026