OPEN LETTER: Mr. Trump, the Panama Canal Is Not a Trophy

Introduction: A letter to a president obsessed with a canal

A remark that wasn't in the script

Mr. President, you said it yourself Wednesday, at the opening of the Theodore Roosevelt Presidential Library in Medora: that line about China and the Panama Canal "wasn't in the script." You added, almost laughing, that you didn't really have a script. But words, once spoken by an American president, stop being improvised: they become foreign policy.

"And now China is trying to take over the Panama Canal, and we're not going to let that happen, okay?" you declared. It's a simple sentence, almost banal in its phrasing, but heavy with consequences for a region that has already lived through, in barely eighteen months, one of the most intense geopolitical battles of the century over a single 51-mile waterway.

Why I'm writing to you, and why now

I am writing you this open letter because your words on Panama, Mr. President, come at a pivotal moment: after the judicial cancellation of the Chinese concessions, after the arrival of BlackRock and MSC, after months of diplomatic arm-wrestling between Washington, Beijing, and Panama City. You speak as though the battle were still to be won, when it has already, largely, turned in your favor.

I am also writing because I sincerely believe that vigilance toward Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere is justified. But I believe just as strongly that a strategic victory deserves to be told with precision, not with the theatrical exaggeration of a man who seems to rediscover, every week, a threat already largely neutralized.

What you said, word for word

The historical grievance over the 1999 handover

You were clear about your founding grievance: "The Panama Canal, so we gave it away. The first thing they did, you know what they did? They raised the prices for ships by four times, and they didn't lose a single ship. And then they raised it again twice more, and they didn't lose a single ship. All they did was make enormous amounts of money for years and years. How stupid that was," you said, in a mix of regret and retrospective anger.

This statement rests on a real historical fact: the Torrijos-Carter Treaties of 1977 set in motion the canal's gradual transfer, completed on December 31, 1999, under President Jimmy Carter. You have elsewhere recalled that the canal was, in your words, bought for "1 dollar" by one of your predecessors, a shocking formula that grossly oversimplifies a complex diplomatic negotiation.

The direct accusation against Beijing

Your accusation against China fits within a thesis you've defended since your inauguration: that of a Chinese "malign influence" establishing itself at both ends of the canal through a Hong Kong company. This thesis, unlike some of your other claims, was based on verifiable facts: for more than twenty years, a subsidiary of CK Hutchison did in fact operate the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, at both ends of the canal.

But here is what your Wednesday statement leaves out: this Chinese influence you describe in the present tense largely already belongs to the past. The legal and commercial battle that dismantled it played out over several months, with clearly identified actors, rulings handed down, and Western companies already installed at the helm.

A reminder of the facts: how Beijing lost the canal

An audit that started it all

Allow me, Mr. President, to reconstruct the exact timeline for your readers. Under pressure from your administration, the Panamanian government launched an audit of CK Hutchison's activities, revealing that the company had deprived Panama of considerable sums: roughly $300 million since its concession was renewed in 2021, and up to $1.2 billion over the entire original twenty-five-year agreement.

This audit fueled a legal action led by the Panamanian comptroller general, culminating on January 29, 2026, in a resounding decision by Panama's Supreme Court: the concessions granted to CK Hutchison's subsidiary were ruled unconstitutional, ending more than two decades of Chinese control over these strategic facilities.

BlackRock, MSC, and the Western takeover

As early as March 2025, under direct pressure from your administration, CK Hutchison had agreed to sell most of its global port portfolio, including the two Panamanian ports, to a consortium led by BlackRock, alongside Terminal Investment Limited, a subsidiary of the Swiss company MSC. The deal, valued at roughly $23 billion, covered 43 ports across 23 countries.

After the judicial cancellation of CK Hutchison's concessions, it was ultimately the Danish company Maersk, through its subsidiary APM Terminals, and Terminal Investment Limited that temporarily took over management of the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, completing the shift to Western control of these critical facilities.

The Chinese resistance that should not be underestimated

Beijing tried to block the sale

It would, however, be unfair, Mr. President, to claim that China simply gave up the fight. When CK Hutchison announced the sale of its non-Chinese ports to BlackRock, Beijing intervened directly, demanding that the transaction be submitted to China's merger review process and suggesting that the state-owned shipping conglomerate Cosco join the buying consortium as a "major strategic investor."

This maneuver was viewed by your administration as entirely unacceptable, causing a prolonged blockage of negotiations throughout the summer and fall. This Chinese resistance shows that Beijing considered, rightly from its own perspective, this port position to be a top-tier strategic asset, not a mere commercial asset to be given up without a fight.

Wang Yi's diplomacy

In March, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that Beijing was ready to strengthen practical cooperation with Panama, urging Panamanian authorities to "protect the rights of Chinese enterprises." He added that ties between Beijing and Panama City should "not be subject to interference from third parties," a barely veiled reference to the pressure exerted by Washington.

This Chinese diplomatic rhetoric, measured in appearance, concealed real frustration at the loss of a strategic foothold acquired over nearly three decades. Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino, for his part, has always denied any foreign interference, repeatedly stating that "every square meter of the Panama Canal" belongs exclusively to Panama.

The economic scale of what is at stake

A global chokepoint of maritime trade

Mr. President, you are right about one essential point: the economic stakes are colossal. The Panama Canal sees more than 13,000 ships pass through it every year, carrying roughly 5 to 6% of global trade. According to a Council on Foreign Relations report, this waterway facilitates hundreds of billions of dollars in annual trade and remains a central hub for American supply chains.

The United States remains, by far, the canal's largest user: roughly 40% of all American container traffic passes through it each year. Chile, China, Japan, and South Korea are among the other major users of this global trade artery, which explains why control over it generates such geopolitical interest.

What port control really means

Controlling the ports of Balboa and Cristobal does not mean controlling the canal itself, which remains administered by the Panama Canal Authority, a sovereign Panamanian institution. But it confers a considerable informational and logistical advantage: knowing ship movements, managing loading operations, and potentially influencing transit priorities in the event of major geopolitical tensions.

It is precisely this dimension of indirect influence, more than direct control, that explains why your administration deemed the Chinese presence via CK Hutchison unacceptable from a national security standpoint, even though the canal remained, in theory, under full Panamanian sovereignty.

The gray areas your speech doesn't address

CK Hutchison's uncertain fate

Mr. President, your Wednesday statement leaves out a crucial development: CK Hutchison has launched international arbitration against Panama, vigorously contesting the Panamanian Supreme Court's decision to cancel its concessions. This legal battle, which could drag on for several years, represents a financial and diplomatic risk your triumphant speech never mentions.

Moreover, negotiations between MSC, BlackRock, and CK Hutchison regarding the 41 other ports held by the Hong Kong conglomerate around the world remain, to this day, unfinalized, with China continuing to exert regulatory pressure on this broader transaction that goes well beyond the Panamanian case alone.

A victory that remains fragile

It would be unwise to present this affair as definitively closed. The Chinese government could seek other levers of influence in the region, whether through investment in other Panamanian infrastructure or through broader bilateral economic pressure on a country that remains, despite everything, economically tied to China for a significant share of its trade.

Your rhetoric of "we're not going to let that happen," spoken in the future tense, implicitly suggests, moreover, that you yourself perceive this victory as incomplete, or at least reversible should American vigilance ease in the months ahead.

The Panamanian reaction to your remarks

Mulino, guardian of a contested sovereignty

Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino has, repeatedly since December 2024, reaffirmed that the canal "is and will always remain Panamanian." This position, consistently repeated under successive pressure from your administration, illustrates a persistent diplomatic tension between the regional ally that Panama represents and the protective power the United States represents.

When you had previously raised the possibility of directly retaking the canal by force or economic pressure, Mulino responded firmly that Panamanian sovereignty "is not negotiable." This Panamanian firmness deserves recognition, Mr. President, even from a columnist who largely shares your strategic concerns about Beijing.

An ally who delivered the goods without being publicly summoned

What stands out in this affair is that Panama ultimately acted in line with American interests: the audit, the legal action, and the cancellation of the Chinese concessions all occurred through legitimate Panamanian institutional channels, without Washington having to resort to open threats of military or economic seizure of the canal.

This diplomatic success achieved through institutional means rather than direct coercion deserves, in my view, to be celebrated as a model of effective hemispheric cooperation, rather than reframed, as you did Wednesday, as a personal battle still to be fought against an adversary already largely weakened on this specific matter.

What this means for American doctrine in Latin America

The return of an assertive hemispheric posture

Your speech on Panama fits within a broader doctrine that some observers have nicknamed the "Donroe Doctrine," a nod to the historic Monroe Doctrine, reaffirming that the Western Hemisphere remains a priority sphere of influence for Washington, closed to Chinese, Russian, or Iranian strategic ambitions.

This doctrine has also shown up in your repeated statements about Greenland, where you have expressed a similar strategic interest, driven by comparable concerns about the influence of rival powers in territories considered strategically vital to American national security.

A strategic consistency that deserves recognition

Despite my reservations about the theatrical form of your announcements, Mr. President, I recognize a real strategic consistency in this approach: identifying Chinese footholds in the Western Hemisphere one after another, and mobilizing the diplomatic, judicial, and economic pressure needed to dismantle them before they become irreversible.

This approach, if applied consistently and without sliding into pure military coercion, could indeed slow the expansion of Chinese influence in a region that Beijing has patiently courted for more than two decades through massive infrastructure investment.

The lessons for other nations in the region

A precedent Beijing is watching closely

The outcome of the Panamanian affair sends a clear signal to other Latin American nations that maintain close economic ties with China: critical infrastructure, port-related or otherwise, can become targets of American diplomatic pressure if Washington deems it strategically threatening to its national security.

Countries like Peru, where China has invested massively in the port of Chancay, or Brazil, engaged in multiple infrastructure partnerships with Chinese companies, are probably watching closely how the Panamanian affair unfolded, trying to anticipate whether similar dynamics could someday apply to their own agreements with Beijing.

The risk of a regional resentment backlash

There is, however, a real risk that this American victory, if presented with the arrogance that characterized some of your past remarks on Panama, could feed latent resentment in a region already sensitive to accusations of North American imperialist interference, a heavy history stretching back more than a century of direct and indirect U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs.

A more measured American diplomacy, one that explicitly acknowledged Panamanian agency and sovereignty in this victory, would probably better serve Washington's long-term strategic interests than rhetoric that seems to minimize the role of Panamanian institutions in favor of a narrative centered exclusively on your own personal determination.

The underlying military dimension

A strategic canal for the U.S. Navy too

Beyond trade, the Panama Canal retains considerable military strategic value for the United States, allowing rapid transit of ships between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of operation without having to sail around the entire South American continent, a time saving that could prove decisive in a major conflict scenario involving China in the Pacific.

This military dimension partly explains why your administration has handled this matter with an urgency that has sometimes seemed disproportionate to observers focused solely on the commercial aspects of the port controversy.

Historical precedents of American intervention

The United States has, in the past, demonstrated its willingness to act militarily to protect its strategic interests in Panama, notably during the 1989 invasion that toppled General Manuel Noriega. This history weighs heavily on the Panamanian collective memory and explains the particular sensitivity of any American rhetoric evoking a possible retaking of the canal.

I do not believe, Mr. President, that you seriously contemplate military intervention in Panama over this port affair already largely resolved through institutional channels. But your words, spoken without nuance in such a historically charged context, risk being interpreted more menacingly than you may have actually intended.

What the West truly needs to watch now

Beyond Panama, a hemispheric Chinese strategy

The real issue, Mr. President, extends well beyond the Panamanian case alone: it concerns China's broader strategy of acquiring port, energy, and digital infrastructure across all of Latin America and the Caribbean, a patient strategy aimed at building, over several decades, a network of economic influence that is difficult to dismantle after the fact.

Focusing public attention exclusively on Panama, however symbolically important this canal may be, risks diverting attention from equally concerning matters, such as Chinese investment in the power grids of several Central American countries or 5G telecommunications infrastructure in certain South American nations.

Vigilance that must be systemic, not one-off

What the West needs, in my view, is not a series of spectacular announcements on isolated cases, but a coherent and systemic strategy for monitoring strategic Chinese investments across the entire Western Hemisphere, coordinated with European allies and multilateral financial institutions that share these security concerns.

Panama could serve as a model for this broader approach: precise identification of vulnerabilities, mobilization of sovereign local institutions, and quiet support rather than open coercion. It is this method, not campaign-rally rhetoric, that will durably protect Western interests in the region.

A message to European and Asian allies

Western solidarity in the face of Chinese expansion

This Panamanian affair should also speak to our European and Asian allies, who face similar dynamics of Chinese expansion in their own regional spheres of influence, whether in Africa, Southeast Asia, or the Balkans, where Beijing has likewise invested massively in strategic port and energy infrastructure.

The active participation of European companies like the Danish Maersk and the Swiss-Italian MSC in taking over the Panamanian ports shows that this fight against strategic Chinese influence is not an exclusively American battle, but a broader Western effort that would benefit from being more coordinated and publicly recognized as such.

Why this informal coalition must be strengthened

Rather than presenting this victory as a unilateral American accomplishment, Mr. President, publicly acknowledging the role played by these allied companies and governments would strengthen the credibility of a broader Western coalition, essential to effectively countering a China that closely coordinates its own strategic initiatives through its state and semi-state channels.

This Western coordination, if built over time, represents the only credible structural response to a Chinese strategy that, unlike yours, does not depend on election cycles and the shifting priorities of a single administration.

What Taiwan is watching in this affair

A precedent scrutinized in Taipei

Far from Panama, Taiwanese authorities are following with particular interest how Washington dismantled Chinese port influence in the Western Hemisphere, seeking to gauge American consistency on similar strategic matters directly involving Beijing and its broader regional ambitions.

For Taiwan, facing far more direct and existential Chinese pressure, the American demonstration in Panama is an encouraging signal: Washington is willing to mobilize significant diplomatic, judicial, and financial resources to counter Chinese strategic expansion, even on matters that don't necessarily make international headlines.

A consistency to maintain against Beijing everywhere in the world

But this consistency, Mr. President, must extend beyond the Western Hemisphere alone. If your administration applies rigorous vigilance in Panama while tolerating Chinese expansion elsewhere, in the Pacific or in Africa, the message sent to Beijing would lose considerable global deterrent force.

It is this global strategic consistency, more than one-off rhetoric on a single matter, that will determine whether China truly perceives the United States as an adversary resolved to contest its expansion, or merely as a power reacting case by case according to the electoral priorities of the moment.

What American public opinion actually retains

A priorities poll that doesn't put Panama first

It must be acknowledged, Mr. President: despite the real strategic importance of the Panamanian matter, American opinion polls regularly show that voters place inflation, immigration, and domestic security well ahead of hemispheric foreign policy issues as immediate governance priorities.

This electoral reality perhaps explains why your statements on Panama often take a condensed, dramatic form: they must capture the attention of a public that doesn't necessarily follow, day to day, the legal subtleties of international arbitration or the complex negotiations between CK Hutchison, BlackRock, and the Chinese government.

The risk of rhetorical fatigue

But this simplification carries a medium-term risk: by repeating dramatic claims about victories already largely secured, the American public could develop a form of generalized skepticism toward your foreign policy announcements, making it harder to mobilize public opinion during future crises that are truly urgent and unresolved.

It's a classic rhetorical trap: crying wolf over old victories eventually erodes the credibility needed to mobilize public attention the day a genuinely new and unresolved threat demands a swift, determined collective response.

Conclusion: A real victory, a rhetoric to adjust

What I take from your Wednesday remarks

Mr. President, your statement on the Panama Canal contains an important measure of strategic truth: vigilance toward Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere remains necessary, and the results achieved in Panama, through judicial and commercial means rather than military coercion, deserve to be recognized as a real diplomatic success of your administration.

But this victory, already largely secured since January, would have benefited from being presented with the factual precision it deserves, rather than with the theatrical exaggeration of a still-looming threat. The facts, Mr. President, are solid enough to do without rhetorical embellishment.

A call for precision, not for softened firmness

I am not asking you, Mr. President, to abandon your firmness toward Beijing: that firmness serves Western interests in a strategically vital region. I am simply asking you to tell this victory with the accuracy it deserves, acknowledging the role of sovereign Panamanian institutions, allied Western companies, and the judicial process that made this outcome possible.

Because a truth told with precision strengthens American credibility on the world stage, whereas an exaggerated victory, once revealed as such, risks weakening the trust your allies and adversaries place in your presidential word.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My acknowledged biases in this open letter

I am an openly pro-Western columnist, convinced that vigilance toward Chinese strategic expansion in the Western Hemisphere is justified and necessary. This bias favorably shapes my reading of the Trump administration's overall firmness on this matter, while allowing me to freely criticize the rhetorical form of its public statements.

I consider Donald Trump a necessary, if imperfect, actor in defending Western interests against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This conviction does not stop me from applying a critical eye to the factual precision and consistency of his public remarks, as I have done in this letter.

What I don't know and the limits of this analysis

I cannot predict the outcome of the international arbitration launched by CK Hutchison against Panama, nor the evolution of negotiations concerning the 41 other ports in the Hong Kong company's global portfolio. These matters remain in flux at the time of writing and could see significant developments in the months ahead.

I also do not have access to confidential diplomatic information about the real intentions of the Trump administration or the Chinese government beyond what has been publicly reported by the journalistic sources cited in this open letter.

Sources

Primary sources

Trump says the US will not let China take over Panama Canal — Reuters, July 1, 2026

'China trying to take over Panama Canal,' warns Trump — Livemint, July 2, 2026

Secondary sources

U.S.-China power struggle thrusts Panama Canal back into focus — CNBC, February 6, 2026

Chinese contract at Panama Canal canceled by court in win for Trump's "Donroe Doctrine" — Axios, January 29, 2026

Trump Administration Scores Major Victory as Panama Supreme Court Rules Against Chinese Shipping Firm — Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 2, 2026

Trump Warns that he will not Allow Foreign Influence Regarding his Favorite Canal in Panama — Newsroom Panama, March 7, 2026

The Panama Canal is a hinge point in Donald Trump's new order — The Economist, February 5, 2026