Baltic states top 5 to 7% of GDP on defense ahead of Ankara

Introduction: three small countries, one immense signal

Living on the bear's doorstep leaves no choice

Three days before the opening of the NATO summit in Ankara, the leaders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania met German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Berlin on July 3, 2026, to underline a simple reality: their defense budgets already exceed, or are about to exceed, the symbolic threshold of 5% of GDP, well above the Western average, according to information reported by Euronews.

This piece decodes what these numbers actually mean, where they come from, and why the Baltic states chose to act before the alliance as a whole even agreed on a common target.

What this decoding sets out to explain

Between the official figures cited by Baltic leaders and the comparative data published by the Anadolu agency, there are important nuances to clarify before drawing broad conclusions about the real state of these three countries' defense effort.

This decoding separates political announcements from verified data, and tracks the budgetary trajectory of each of the three Baltic states in the face of the Russian threat.

What Baltic leaders actually said in Berlin

Estonia, already past 5% on the core of its defense

Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal stated that "Estonia is already investing more than 5% of GDP in its core defense," a claim made during the Berlin meeting. That political statement must be distinguished from the more precise comparative data published elsewhere, which places Estonia's effort at a slightly different level depending on the calculation method used.

This nuance takes nothing away from the clearly upward trajectory of Estonia's defense effort, a country that shares a direct border of several hundred kilometers with Russia.

Latvia and Lithuania, same logic, same soaring numbers

Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs recalled the commitment made at the The Hague summit to reach 5% of GDP. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, for his part, announced that Lithuania was on track to devote "nearly 7% of its GDP to defense and security" this year, according to remarks reported by Euronews.

These three announcements, made on the same day in the same place, sketch a region that has clearly decided to stop waiting for NATO consensus before acting on its own timeline, dictated by its own perception of the danger.

What the Anadolu agency's comparative figures clarify

Slightly different percentages, an identical trend

A factbox published by the Anadolu agency ahead of the Ankara summit puts Estonia's defense effort at 3.38% of GDP, Latvia's at 3.73%, having already crossed the intermediate threshold of 3.5%, and Lithuania's at 4%, a budget that has quintupled since 2014. These figures, based on comparative data across allies, differ from the political announcements made in Berlin, which sometimes include broader security spending beyond the strict defense perimeter.

This methodological difference largely explains the gap between the figures cited by Baltic leaders and those published in international comparisons, without either being necessarily wrong.

Poland, the regional benchmark that outpaces everyone

The same factbox places Poland at the top of all NATO allies with 4.48% of GDP devoted to defense, a figure that exceeds even each of the three Baltic states taken individually under this calculation method. The entire region, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, thus stands out for a defense effort well above the Western average.

This regional contrast underscores how much geographic proximity to Russia remains the most decisive factor in each government's budgetary decision, far more than diplomatic pressure from Washington or Brussels.

The 5% target set at The Hague, a necessary reminder

A new threshold replacing the old 2% target

The The Hague summit set a new target for all NATO allies: reach 5% of GDP in defense and security spending by 2035, with an intermediate sub-target of 3.5% devoted strictly to "core defense." This new target replaces the old 2% threshold that had prevailed for years and that many allies were already struggling to reach.

By already comfortably clearing this new intermediate threshold, the Baltic states are positioning themselves at the front of this new budgetary race, well ahead of the deadline set collectively for the alliance as a whole.

Spain, the counter-example that highlights the Baltic contrast

At the opposite end of the spectrum, Spain secured a formal exemption from the 5% threshold, negotiating a cap set at 2.1% of GDP. This striking contrast between Madrid and the Baltic capitals illustrates just how radically the perceived Russian threat varies depending on each country's geographic distance from the Russian border.

This unevenness within the alliance itself raises a fundamental question about the real solidarity of NATO in the face of a threat that, by definition, does not affect all its members with the same immediate intensity.

Merz and Germany, a partner also raising its tone

"Baltic security is our security too"

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated during this meeting in Berlin that "the security of the Baltic states is also the security of Germany," adding that "the threat is not abstract, it is very real on NATO's eastern flank" and that "Moscow is testing how united and determined NATO truly is," according to quotes reported by Euronews.

These remarks mark a more assertive tone from German diplomacy, historically more cautious on questions of direct confrontation with Russia, notably because of its past energy dependence on Moscow.

Germany promises 3.5% by 2029, a slower timeline

Merz specified that Germany would reach the 3.5% of GDP mark "by 2029," a notably later timeline than what the Baltic states have already achieved. This difference in pace illustrates the persistent difficulty major Western economic powers face in accelerating their rearmament as quickly as countries directly exposed along the Russian border.

The contrast between Germany's promises for 2029 and the figures Lithuania has already reached in 2026 sums up, by itself, the gap in threat perception between the core and the eastern periphery of Europe.

What this money is actually funding on the ground

Drones, air defense and munitions as priorities

According to available information on regional budget priorities, the Baltic states are concentrating their investments on drones, air defense systems and munitions production, three areas identified as critical against Russian military capabilities stationed in the Kaliningrad enclave and on neighboring Belarusian territory.

This choice of priorities reflects lessons drawn directly from the war in Ukraine, where the availability of munitions and air defense capacity proved decisive for a country's survival against a prolonged Russian assault.

A local defense industry developing rapidly

Beyond direct equipment purchases, these sharply rising budgets are also enabling the development of a local defense industrial base in the three Baltic states, gradually reducing their dependence on foreign suppliers for certain basic equipment.

This industrial self-reliance, though partial, represents a long-term investment that goes beyond the immediate response to the current threat.

What this Baltic lead reveals about the rest of the West

A lesson in clarity for more distant allies

The comparison between the Baltic states and other NATO members further removed geographically from Russia raises an uncomfortable question: how many other allies are waiting for a direct, immediate threat before seriously adjusting their own defense budgets? The Balts did not have that luxury of time and had to act upfront, driven by their geography rather than by a general NATO consensus.

This difference in posture between frontline countries and more distant ones remains one of the most persistent structural tensions within the Atlantic alliance since the start of the Ukrainian conflict.

A precedent that could influence other European capitals

The Baltic example, widely publicized ahead of the Ankara summit, could serve as a political argument for European governments seeking to justify similar budget increases to their own publics, often reluctant to accept budgetary sacrifices deemed abstract.

It remains to be seen whether this example will be enough to convince countries thousands of kilometers from the Russian border, where the sense of urgency is necessarily less immediate than in Tallinn, Riga or Vilnius.

The Ankara summit as a credibility test for the entire alliance

The Balts arrive with proof, not just promises

Unlike several other delegations attending the Ankara summit, Baltic representatives can show up with figures already achieved rather than mere future commitments. This position strengthens their diplomatic credibility when they call on other allies to accelerate their own defense efforts against Russia.

This lead also gives them a particular legitimacy to demand stronger NATO support on their portion of the eastern flank, where the threat remains the most immediate and the most documented.

Moral pressure on the slower allies

By displaying such high figures even before the summit officially opens, the Baltic states are exerting a form of moral pressure on allies still far from the 5% target. This pressure, while not legally binding, weighs politically on the deliberations to come in Ankara.

It is a concrete example of how small countries can influence the debate within an alliance of thirty-two members, simply through the force of their budgetary example.

Conclusion: the social cost of this unprecedented budgetary effort

Painful trade-offs in national budgets

Devoting 5 to 7% of GDP to defense does not come without consequences for other national budget lines. Health, education, civilian infrastructure: these sectors often have to give up part of their resources in the face of the absolute priority given to defense in the three Baltic states. This budgetary sacrifice, rarely highlighted in official statements, nonetheless deserves recognition.

Baltic populations themselves appear to largely support these choices, aware that geographic proximity to Russia leaves their respective governments little other reasonable option.

Public support that is not guaranteed forever

This public support, however solid it may be today, is not guaranteed in the long run if economic pressure were to intensify without a visible improvement in the regional security situation. Baltic governments will have to keep justifying these sacrifices to their voters, year after year, without letup.

It is a delicate exercise in democratic balance that few other European countries have had to face with such sustained budgetary intensity.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I sign this decoding as an avowedly pro-Western, pro-NATO columnist, convinced that the Baltic states' defense effort is a rational and necessary response to the Russian threat documented since 2022. This conviction does not stop me from flagging the methodological nuances between the various figures cited.

What I don't know, and my method

I cannot guarantee perfect accuracy for every percentage cited, since calculation methods vary by source between strict defense spending and broader security spending. Every figure in this piece is attributed to its precise source, and, however, the gaps between sources have been flagged rather than hidden.

Sources

Primary sources

Ministry of Defense of Ukraine — official statements, accessed July 2026

NATO — official Alliance website, accessed July 2026

Euronews — Security of the Baltics is our security, Merz meets Baltic leaders, July 3, 2026

Secondary sources

Anadolu Agency — Factbox: NATO defense spending ahead of Ankara summit, July 2026

The New York Times — NATO defense spending, Trump, Rutte, July 7, 2026

Foreign Policy — geopolitical analysis, accessed July 2026