INVESTIGATION: Scarborough Shoal — China's Gray Zone Strategy: Occupy, Retreat, Repeat

Introduction: One Atoll, One Platform, One Method

The discovery of late May 2026

In late May 2026, satellite images obtained by maritime surveillance group SeaLight through provider Satellogic revealed the presence of an unusual object at the southern entrance to the lagoon of Scarborough Shoal — known as Bajo de Masinloc to Filipinos and Huangyan Dao to the Chinese. The object, described as "small, reflective, clearly distinguishable on the reef flat," measured approximately 6 by 6 meters, according to the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea. It appeared to be equipped with a communications antenna and was reportedly carrying at least six people.

Philippine authorities identified it from the outset as a mobile floating platform deployed by China. Beijing, for its part, described the structure as a temporary scientific research installation for coral reef study, operated by the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. That divergence of interpretation is not trivial: it reproduces exactly the pattern of every previous Chinese incursion into disputed waters over the past two decades.

The structure of the cycle: appear, resist, disappear

What makes this episode emblematic is its cyclical structure. The platform appeared. The Philippines filed diplomatic protests. A formal diplomatic note was lodged. The international community expressed concern. And on June 17, 2026, the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea confirmed the withdrawal of the floating structure. The crisis appeared resolved. But within 24 hours of the withdrawal, a Chinese research vessel, the Tong Ji, was observed near the shoal. And data accumulated since October 2025 reveals that this episode is not an isolated incident — it is a systematic tactic.

Between October 2025 and June 2026, Philippine authorities documented the installation of eight buoys, antennas and structures at various locations around the shoal. A 352-meter floating barrier had been installed at the lagoon entrance in April 2026, blocking access for Filipino fishermen. The presence of Chinese coast guard vessels and maritime militia had doubled in the area. And in September 2025, China had unilaterally declared a "national nature reserve" covering approximately 3,500 hectares around the shoal — a legal gesture prefiguring broader territorial claims.

Scarborough Shoal: The Strategic Geography of a Flashpoint

A triangle of coral with colossal stakes

Scarborough Shoal is a triangular reef formation roughly twenty kilometers at its widest point, barely breaking the surface of the sea. Its inner lagoon reaches a maximum depth of around thirteen meters. Its economic value lies in the fishery resources it harbors and the potential mineral resources of the surrounding seabed. Its strategic value, however, is far out of proportion to its modest size.

Located approximately 200 kilometers from the coast of Luzon, the Philippines' main island, and more than 870 kilometers from the Chinese island of Hainan, the shoal sits squarely within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone as defined under international law. It controls access to vital maritime shipping lanes through which roughly a quarter of world trade transits. For the US Navy, for global commercial fleets, for the Philippine armed forces, its neutrality is a condition of regional stability.

2012: conquest without war

In 2012, China took effective control of Scarborough Shoal without firing a single shot. After a weeks-long maritime standoff with the Philippines, both countries had agreed to a mutual withdrawal. Only the Philippine forces withdrew. The Chinese coast guard stayed. It has stayed ever since, maintaining a permanent presence that restricts access by Filipino fishermen to their traditional fishing grounds.

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague issued a landmark ruling in the Philippines v. China case: China's claims over the shoal and over the South China Sea as a whole, based on the "nine-dash line," are illegal under international law. The tribunal also recognized the shoal as a traditional fishing zone for Filipino fishermen. China rejected that ruling as "null and void." And the shoal is still under Chinese control. The lesson Beijing drew: international legal rulings with no enforcement mechanism are worth only the paper on which they are written.

The Mechanics of the Gray Zone: Decoding the Chinese Method

The tools of gray zone strategy

China's gray zone strategy in the South China Sea rests on a carefully calibrated toolkit designed to stay below the threshold of armed conflict. The first tool: maritime militia vessels — civilian fishing boats armed and coordinated by the state, allowing a zone to be occupied without officially deploying military forces. The second tool: coast guard vessels — more official than the militia, but less provocative than the naval military. The third tool: scientific research — a convenient cover for deploying surveillance and survey equipment without triggering formal military alert.

The floating platform of May–June 2026 illustrates this third tool to perfection. By labeling it an oceanographic research installation, Beijing creates deliberate ambiguity. Philippine officers demanding answers cannot be one hundred percent certain it is not genuinely conducting research. Journalists must report both versions. Allied governments hesitate to react firmly in the face of organized uncertainty. And meanwhile, the platform collects data, records seabed topography, and assesses conditions for potential future construction.

The timeline reveals a pattern

The analysis by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) published on June 22, 2026 is particularly illuminating. It reconstructs the timeline: in April 2026, satellite images showing a 352-meter floating barrier at the lagoon entrance — confirmed by Philippine coast guard spokesperson Admiral Jay Tarriela. In May 2026, the appearance of the 6 by 6-meter platform with personnel on board. In June 2026, withdrawal under diplomatic pressure. Then — less than 24 hours after the withdrawal — the appearance of the research vessel Tong Ji, China's first "intelligent" ocean research vessel, belonging to Tongji University.

This pattern — installation, withdrawal, maintenance of an alternative presence — corresponds to what analysts call the "progressive consolidation" cycle. Each withdrawal is presented as a gesture of goodwill. But the presence never truly ceases. And with each cycle, the footprint is slightly deeper, the knowledge of the terrain slightly more complete, the claim slightly more grounded in facts on the ground.

The Naval Confrontation of June 20: An Escalation by Another Name

Four Chinese frigates against one Philippine vessel

On June 20, 2026 — the same day the joint military exercise Salaknib 2026 concluded, involving more than 7,000 military personnel from the Philippines, the United States, Japan, New Zealand and Australia — a rare confrontation took place 18 nautical miles south of Scarborough Shoal. Four warships of the People's Liberation Army Navy — including the Type 054A frigate named Tongliao — intercepted the Philippine frigate BRP Diego Silang during a patrol mission.

The standoff lasted eight hours, from 1:40 PM to 9:55 PM local time, according to the South China Morning Post. The two navies exchanged radio challenges, each ordering the other to leave the area immediately. At their closest point, two vessels passed within 90 meters of each other. Philippine Admiral Jay Tarriela called this the "closest dangerous maneuver in three years." The BRP Diego Silang launched its embarked AgustaWestland AW109 helicopter during the confrontation — a signal of resolve.

Contradictory messages

The Chinese navy accused the Philippine helicopter of violating the airspace of Huangyan Dao and described the BRP Diego Silang's presence as a "threat to national security." The Philippine navy rejected these accusations, invoking international law on navigation and collision prevention at sea. The spokesperson for the US Indo-Pacific Command, Commodore John Gay, posted on X that "the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty covers Scarborough Shoal" — a reminder to Beijing that any attack on Philippine forces would trigger an American response.

This episode is not a minor anecdote. It is a barometer of regional tension. The fact that four Chinese military frigates confronted a single Philippine vessel is a calculated show of force — the numerical disproportion is intentional, designed to intimidate. The fact that the BRP Diego Silang did not retreat and continued its mission is equally a signal: the Philippines, backed by Washington, will not yield to intimidation.

The Geopolitical Stakes: Why Scarborough Is a Keystone

If China militarized Scarborough

The CLAWS analyst frames the question bluntly: if China converted Scarborough Shoal into a military base as it did with Mischief Reef in the 1990s, the Philippines would effectively have "a Chinese fortress in their backyard." The implications would be considerable: permanent surveillance of Philippine naval and air movements, control of an essential commercial transit zone, strike range to Manila, continuous pressure on the Philippines to extract diplomatic concessions.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. told the Financial Times in May 2026 that his level of concern is "far higher than ever before." He said he had received intelligence on the structure and was "deeply concerned" by its implications. His statement to the Wall Street Journal captures the stakes: "If this is a precursor to a more permanent presence, or to other malicious activities, then it's worrying."

The Mischief Reef precedent

To understand why Manila and Washington are so alarmed, you have to go back to Mischief Reef. In 1994–1995, China began by installing structures described as shelters for fishermen. The Philippines protested. The international community expressed concern. And gradually, those shelters were transformed into a military base equipped with surface-to-air missiles and electronic warfare equipment. The parallel with Scarborough is obvious — and it is exactly what Philippine and American strategists fear.

By 2026, the Chinese navy had built complete bases with missiles, electronic warfare equipment and airstrips on several islands in the South China Sea — precisely the bases that Xi Jinping had promised Barack Obama in 2015 would never be built. That promise was broken. Philippine, Japanese, Vietnamese and American navigators know this trajectory by heart: from fishermen's shelter to military base, all it takes is time and patience.

The American Position: Declarations and Limits

The Mutual Defense Treaty guarantee

The US Indo-Pacific Command's declaration affirming that the Mutual Defense Treaty covers Scarborough Shoal is significant. It tells Beijing that any armed attack against Philippine forces or government vessels in the South China Sea could trigger an American military response. That is a clearly drawn red line. And the Salaknib 2026 exercises, involving thousands of American, Japanese, Australian and New Zealand troops, are the practical demonstration of that guarantee.

But the limits of American commitment are equally real. The United States is engaged on many fronts simultaneously: Ukraine, the Middle East, negotiations with Iran. Congress monitors military spending. And the nature of Chinese gray zone strategy is specifically designed to remain below the threshold that would trigger a direct military response. A 36-square-meter floating platform does not justify armed US intervention. That is precisely the sophistication of the Chinese calculation.

Joint exercises as a deterrence signal

In May 2026, the Philippines and the United States conducted their first joint patrol near Scarborough Shoal, according to Eurasia Review. That is a significant deterrence signal: the visibility of American presence alongside the Philippines is designed to discourage Beijing's most aggressive actions. The armed forces of the Philippines, the United States, Japan and Australia also conduct exercises like Balikatan and Salaknib that regularly grow in scale.

These exercises have a real deterrent effect. But they did not prevent China from installing its platform. They did not prevent the naval confrontation of June 20. They did not prevent the 352-meter floating barrier in April. What conventional deterrence cannot prevent is the gray zone strategy itself — because it deliberately stays below the threshold that would justify a military response.

The Philippines: Resistance, Diplomacy, and Persistent Vulnerability

Manila holds its line

The Philippines' response to the Chinese gray zone strategy is remarkable for its combination of firmness and caution. On the ground: regular patrols, systematic documentation of violations, joint exercises with allies. Diplomatically: filing formal protests at every incident, working the international press, maintaining the position that the shoal is "an integral part of Philippine territory." Legally: upholding the reference to the 2016 ruling as the foundation of Philippine rights in disputed waters.

General Romeo Brawner Jr., chief of the Philippine armed forces, confirmed the platform's presence with precise data and declared that "the protection of Philippine sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction remains a paramount consideration." That clear language, firmly grounded in international law, contrasts sharply with Beijing's ambiguous formulations and constitutes a genuine diplomatic asset.

Manila's structural vulnerabilities

But the Philippines also face their own vulnerabilities. Militarily: their navy and air force are structurally inferior to China's — four PLA frigates against one Philippine frigate is also the permanent reality of the balance of power. Economically: the Philippines have significant trade ties with China that create dependencies difficult to break. Politically: every Philippine government must navigate between the military alliance with Washington on one side and economic interests with Beijing on the other.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has so far maintained a difficult balance, remaining firm on territorial claims while avoiding a total diplomatic rupture with China. That balance is fragile. If the Chinese gray zone strategy intensifies, if an accidental confrontation goes wrong, if economic pressure mounts, Manila's room to maneuver will narrow.

After the Platform: The Permanence of the Threat

Withdrawal does not mean victory

The withdrawal of the platform on June 17, 2026 was welcomed as a diplomatic victory by Philippine authorities. It is true that it illustrates that diplomatic pressure can work — at least temporarily. But analysts remain cautious. CLAWS notes that "these repeated actions underscore that the recent floating platform incident is not an isolated event; it is a continuity of incremental Chinese actions" designed to test Philippine responses and progressively reshape the situation in the waters.

The immediate presence of the research vessel Tong Ji after the withdrawal illustrates that continuity. The two Chinese research vessels still observed in the area after the platform's removal confirm that surveillance never ceased. And AFP reported on June 26, 2026 that New Zealand expected a "persistent" Chinese military presence in the Pacific — an assessment suggesting that the underlying trend is far from reversing.

The 2027–2030 trajectory: where is this heading?

Strategic analysts identify three scenarios for Scarborough's future. First scenario: the status quo — China maintains its coast guard presence, conducts temporary installations that trigger protests and are withdrawn, without ever sparking an armed conflict. Second scenario: controlled escalation — China exploits a window of opportunity (a crisis elsewhere, diverted international attention) to install a more permanent structure, daring Manila and Washington to react. Third scenario: negotiated de-escalation — a zone management agreement, likely within broader bilateral negotiations.

Each scenario has its analytical proponents. What is certain is that the current cycle — installation, withdrawal, maintenance of presence — cannot continue indefinitely without altering the baseline facts. China is accumulating topographic and environmental knowledge. It is testing response thresholds. It is habituating all relevant actors to increasingly sophisticated intrusions. The ultimate goal remains a permanent presence under scientific or economic cover — convertible into a military installation when the moment comes.

The International Response: Inadequate to the Stakes

Words without binding mechanisms

The international community's response to China's gray zone strategy in the South China Sea suffers from the same structural problem as the response to other violations of international law: it is verbal, non-binding, and without practical consequences. G7 statements, NATO communiqués, European Parliament resolutions condemning Chinese actions are multiplying — without shifting Beijing's calculations by an iota.

In May 2026, the Philippine armed forces tracked 82 Chinese coast guard and naval vessels in the Philippine exclusive economic zone, including 39 around Scarborough Shoal alone, according to Newsweek. That figure illustrates the scale of the deployment. No international organization has any mechanism to compel China to withdraw those vessels. The 2016 arbitral ruling is still being ignored by Beijing without any effective legal consequence.

What the West should do differently

Maritime law analysts such as those at Eurasia Review recommend far more sustained Western support: more frequent and more visible freedom of navigation naval patrols, regular and public reaffirmation of the application of the Mutual Defense Treaty, assistance to strengthen the Philippines' maritime surveillance capabilities, and enhanced coordination among the partners of AUKUS, the Quad and NATO allies in the Indo-Pacific region.

But these recommendations run into political reality: European governments are primarily focused on continental security, on Ukraine, on their own economic challenges. The South China Sea is not yet perceived as a strategic emergency in Europe — even though freedom of navigation through those waters is vital for European exports to Asia. This strategic myopia directly serves Beijing's plans.

The Philippine Response: Diplomacy, Resistance, and Persistent Vulnerability

Manila between dialogue and firm declarations

Manila's response to the Chinese platform's presence at Scarborough illustrates the Philippines' uncomfortable position in this confrontation: too economically dependent on China to break off relations, yet too threatened in their sovereignty to accept faits accomplis without protest. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s government opted for a combination of official diplomatic protests and regular surveillance missions that document Chinese presence without provoking direct incidents.

The National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea played a central role in this strategy: publishing satellite images, organizing press conferences, and maintaining informational pressure on international opinion. This strategy of "radical transparency" — making every incident public with verifiable visual evidence — partially worked in media terms. It did not prevent China from installing its platform. But it kept the issue visible in Western capitals that might otherwise have ignored it.

The Philippine Navy facing an asymmetry of means

The fundamental vulnerability of the Philippines in this confrontation is the absolute disproportion in naval military capabilities. The Philippine navy has a handful of frigates and coastal patrol vessels, some of them reconditioned ships acquired from the United States. Facing the Chinese Coast Guard — which operates with multi-thousand-ton vessels in waters Beijing considers its own — the asymmetry is crushing. Documented incidents during resupply missions to Ayungin Shoal regularly show Philippine vessels blocked, harassed, or prevented from proceeding by much larger Chinese craft.

That is why the defense agreement with the United States — the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and the EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) accords — is central to Philippine strategy. Manila needs Washington to be sufficiently present and dissuasive for Beijing to calculate that the costs of an open occupation exceed the strategic benefits. But the precise definition of what triggers American obligations remains deliberately vague — an ambiguity that is comfortable for Washington but a source of uncertainty for Manila.

Washington and the Asia-Pacific: The Signals China Is Analyzing

American policy in the Southern Seas: between declarations and real commitment

American policy in the South China Sea under the Trump 2.0 administration is characterized by declaratory support for the Philippines and regular freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), but also by ambiguity about the level of direct military engagement in the event of a serious incident. Trump has personally expressed shifting views on the value of Asian alliances — privileging economic transactions over long-term security commitments.

This ambiguity is precisely what Beijing seeks to test with gray zone operations like the one at Scarborough. If Washington does not react decisively to a small unarmed platform installed on a contested atoll, Beijing can infer that a more permanent installation would also not trigger a disproportionate response. Every test not followed by significant consequences weakens the deterrence line. This is not a theoretical hypothesis — it is a dynamic observed in Chinese behavior in regional waters over the past decade.

The implications for Taiwan: the demonstration value of Scarborough

The Scarborough file is inseparable from the Taiwan question in American strategic calculations. What Washington demonstrates (or fails to demonstrate) in handling low-intensity Chinese provocations in the South China Sea sends a direct signal to Beijing about the credibility of its high-intensity commitments around Taiwan. A United States that acquiesces to the progressive occupation of Philippine atolls without a meaningful response is a United States whose resolve in a Taiwan scenario will appear more doubtful.

That is not a reality the American administration enjoys stating publicly. But it structures internal debates at the Pentagon and the National Security Council. The platform on Scarborough is not an isolated issue. It is a test of American strategic coherence across the Indo-Pacific — coherence that Taipei, Tokyo and Seoul are watching with at least as much attention as Manila.

International Maritime Law: Clear Norms, Absent Enforcement

The 2016 ruling: a verdict China refuses to apply

In 2016, the International Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague issued a clear ruling: China's territorial claims over almost the entire South China Sea — the "nine-dash line" — have no legal basis under the law of the sea. The ruling also concluded that Scarborough Shoal falls within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. China refused to recognize the ruling and continues to ignore it.

That refusal is not a procedural detail. It reveals a fundamental fault line in the architecture of international maritime law: enforcement mechanisms do not exist. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — which China has ratified — has no coercive mechanism to compel a state to comply with an arbitral ruling. Without an enforcement mechanism, an international legal ruling is merely a document expressing what the law should say, without the capacity to impose it.

What this precedent means for the international legal order

If China can ignore an international arbitral ruling on a maritime law question with impunity, other actors — state and non-state — will draw conclusions. The argument "China does it, why not us?" is not an abstract deduction. It is a pragmatic calculation made by governments facing binding international decisions they would prefer to ignore. The rules-based international order — which the West defends as the fundamental structure of peace — is upheld as much by example as by doctrine.

The Scarborough file is therefore also a test of the authority of international law itself. How will the international community respond to a permanent Security Council member that systematically ignores international judicial rulings on its territorial claims? The current answer is: with concerned statements and symbolic navigation patrols. That answer has its limits. It is not without consequences for the entire international legal architecture, far beyond the South China Sea.

The Economic Stakes: Fishing, Hydrocarbons, and Control of Shipping Lanes

A rich economic zone with multiple dimensions

Scarborough Shoal is not simply a question of symbolic sovereignty. The 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone surrounding it is one of the most productive fishing areas in the region. For tens of thousands of Filipino fishermen, access to these waters is a matter of daily survival. Since the Chinese Coast Guard began restricting access to traditional fishing grounds, these communities have seen their incomes fall and their options shrink.

Beyond fishing, the South China Sea is one of the world's most heavily trafficked shipping routes — approximately 3 to 5 trillion dollars in trade transits through this zone annually. Any increased control of these routes by a power seeking to regulate them creates freedom-of-navigation risks that countries whose maritime trade passes through these waters — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia — cannot afford to ignore.

Oil and gas resources: the real value of the zone

Beneath the South China Sea lie hydrocarbon reserves whose extent is estimated differently depending on the source. Chinese estimates are generally higher than those of independent geologists. But even conservative estimates suggest significant resources — enough for their access to be a factor in Beijing's long-term calculations about the strategic value of controlling these zones.

For the Philippines, the potential resources beneath their exclusive economic zone represent a long-term economic development option that China's progressive occupation of their maritime rights would make inaccessible. That is why Manila cannot simply "accept the reality" of Chinese presence, even if the military and economic pressure to do so is real. Sovereign rights over an exclusive economic zone are not just a matter of national pride. They are a matter of economic potential that belongs to future generations. The Philippines are defending their future, not their past.

Regional Allies: ASEAN, Australia, Japan — and Their Limits

ASEAN facing the dilemma of collective solidarity

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the regional organization most directly concerned by tensions in the South China Sea. But its decision-making architecture — based on consensus — makes it structurally incapable of adopting strong positions toward China, the leading trading partner of almost all its member states. ASEAN statements on the South China Sea are systematically diluted by member states most economically dependent on Beijing.

The Code of Conduct for the South China Sea — negotiated between ASEAN and China for more than a decade — has not been finalized, and the terms currently being negotiated fall well short of what the Philippines and Vietnam consider a minimum acceptable outcome. That is no surprise: China has negotiated with the objective of maximizing its operational flexibility while minimizing its legal constraints. ASEAN has negotiated with internal divisions that have weakened its position at every session.

Australia and Japan: the Indo-Pacific partners showing their face

In the absence of an effective collective ASEAN response, the Philippines are turning increasingly to bilateral and minilateral partnerships with like-minded countries. Australia has strengthened its joint exercises with the Philippines and publicly expressed solidarity on the Scarborough question. Japan has provided coast guard vessels under maritime capacity assistance programs. The Quad — comprising the United States, Australia, Japan and India — has declared itself in favor of a rules-based maritime order.

These partnerships are real. But they do not replace the core security guarantee that only the United States can provide. Australia will not deploy its navy against the Chinese Coast Guard at Scarborough. Japan has its own constitutional and regional security constraints. The Quad is a consultation platform, not a mutual defense alliance. Ultimately, the central question remains: how much is Washington willing to pay for credible deterrence in this particular strait?

Conclusion: Scarborough as a Mirror of the World Order

A microcosm of global tensions

Scarborough Shoal has become, in 2026, a microcosm of all the tensions that structure the world order. You can see in it the confrontation between international law and the law of the strongest. You can see the power strategy of an authoritarian state facing a smaller democracy backed by allies. You can see the limits of conventional deterrence against gray zone strategy. You can see the central question of our era: are the rules that govern relations between states real, or are they ornaments that powers respect when it suits them?

The answer the world gives at Scarborough will influence the answer to the next challenges of the same type — because other actors are watching. If the gray zone strategy succeeds in the South China Sea, it will be replicated elsewhere, by other actors, in other contexts. That is the demonstration effect of impunity: it teaches that the rules are negotiable for the powerful.

What the future demands

Resisting this logic requires consistency, patience and the will to match declarations with actions. The Philippines are showing it, at their level. The United States is showing it, partially. Europe is largely absent from the debate. And meanwhile, 200 kilometers from Manila, a triangular coral atoll continues to be the object of a standoff that will partly determine the security architecture of the 21st century.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My method and my limits

This investigation is grounded in publicly verifiable sources: Philippine coast guard reports, analyses from specialized organizations (CLAWS, Eurasia Review), journalistic coverage from recognized media (Washington Times, South China Morning Post, Manila Bulletin, Militarnyi). I do not have access to classified intelligence data on Beijing's actual intentions. Interpretations of Chinese strategic objectives are analyses based on documented facts and historical precedents — not certainties. The situation is evolving rapidly and some data may have changed since this article was written.

My stated biases

I consider international maritime law, including the 2016 arbitral ruling, to be the legitimate normative framework for disputes in the South China Sea. I am critical of gray zone strategy as a mechanism for circumventing that law. I recognize that China has legitimate security interests in its region — but not the right to impose its claims through force or coercion at the expense of the rights of other sovereign states.

Sources

Primary sources

Washington Times — Tensions rise at disputed South China Sea shoal — June 25, 2026

Militarnyi — China Uses Floating Platforms for Reconnaissance: One Spotted Near Scarborough Shoal — June 24, 2026

Manila Bulletin — AFP, US counterpart hold bilateral drills in West PH Sea amid Chinese activities in Scarborough — June 20, 2026

Vesper News — China and Philippines hold rare naval stand-off near disputed Scarborough Shoal — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

CLAWS — China's Floating Platform at Scarborough Shoal: A Pattern of Pressure — June 22, 2026

Eurasia Review — China's New Structure At Scarborough Reef Sparks Alarm — June 22, 2026

South China Morning Post — China and Philippines in a rare naval stand-off near disputed Scarborough Shoal — June 23, 2026

Géo.fr — An atoll claimed by China fuels political tensions — June 24, 2026