FACT-CHECK: The Supreme Court as the Last Bulwark Against Trump's Imperial Presidency

Introduction: When the Nine Justices Said No to a President Who Thought He Was All-Powerful

A historic showdown over tariffs

On February 20, 2026, the United States Supreme Court handed down one of the most consequential rulings of the Trump era: it struck down the entire global tariff regime known as the "reciprocal tariffs," imposed by the administration under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This sweeping judicial blow forced the White House to rethink its entire trade strategy from the ground up. The court concluded that the IEEPA did not authorize the president to unilaterally impose individualized tariffs on virtually every country in the world.

The ruling did not fall into a vacuum. Within hours, Donald Trump struck back, signing an executive order imposing a new global tariff of 10% under the authority of Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. But even this legal fallback was undermined: on May 7, 2026, the Court of International Trade (CIT) invalidated those tariffs by two votes to one, ruling that current economic conditions do not constitute the "large and serious balance-of-payments deficits" required by law. The judicial machinery resists. It brakes. It pushes back.

What the legal texts actually say

The fundamental fact-check here is this: the IEEPA, enacted in 1977, grants the president broad powers over economic transactions during a declared national emergency. But the courts have now ruled — and ruled clearly — that this does not include the right to create sweeping, permanent tariff regimes affecting nearly all of the United States' trading partners. This interpretation was not new: constitutional lawyers had advanced it as early as 2025, when Trump launched his famous "Liberation Day" tariffs in April of that year.

Section 122 offers an alternative, but a limited one: tariffs created under this authority cannot exceed 150 days. Any extension requires approval from Congress, where support is far from guaranteed. Without legislative action, these tariffs expire on July 24, 2026. The administration thus finds itself in an absurd position: it has an aggressive trade policy but a legal foundation that crumbles a little more each week.

TRUE or FALSE: A Six-Claim Audit of Trump's Tariff Record

TRUE: The Supreme Court genuinely struck down the IEEPA tariffs

Some pro-Trump commentators tried to downplay the significance of the February 20, 2026 ruling. They were wrong. The Supreme Court did indeed strike down the reciprocal tariffs grounded in the IEEPA — the very ones designed to impose individualized rates on almost every country on the globe. The so-called "fentanyl" tariffs applied to China, Mexico, and Canada were also nullified by that same ruling, according to the Atlantic Council's tracker. The invalidation is real, documented, and legally binding.

Trump's reaction was immediate and telling: within hours of the judicial defeat, he announced a global 10% tariff under Section 122. This pivot — happening so fast — suggests the administration had likely anticipated a court loss on the IEEPA and had a backup ready. The problem is that this alternative is now also under judicial scrutiny, with its legality being challenged in the courts.

FALSE: The tariffs on China disappeared with the ruling

A myth has been circulating that the Supreme Court ruling wiped the slate clean on tariffs against China. That is false. The Section 301 tariffs — the backbone of America's tariff apparatus against Beijing and a centerpiece of Trump's trade policy during his first term — were not touched by the IEEPA ruling. These 7.5% tariffs on a wide range of Chinese consumer goods, in place since 2019, remain fully in force.

Furthermore, on June 12, 2026, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) proposed tariffs of up to 12.5% on Chinese goods as part of a Section 301 investigation into forced labor. Public hearings are scheduled for July 7, 2026. Commercial pressure on Beijing continues — just through different legal channels than the IEEPA.

June 26, 2026: A New Front on Digital Taxes

Trump versus the major democracies on digital services

This Friday, June 26, 2026, while his IEEPA tariffs remain contested, Donald Trump opened a new front: he threatened to impose a 100% tariff on goods from any country that levies a Digital Services Tax (DST) on American companies. The message posted on Truth Social left no room for ambiguity: "This tariff will supersede trade deals made with the country, whether implemented, signed, or not." The countries most directly in the crosshairs are European nations, several of which are considering adopting such a tax in the coming weeks.

The irony: just days after signing a trade agreement with the European Union, Trump was brandishing the threat of total economic war against those very partners. This contradiction did not escape analysts at Bloomberg, who noted that the credibility of American trade deals is now fundamentally weakened. When the president declares that his tariffs can "supersede" signed agreements, who will want to sign with him?

The legal authority behind this new tariff: still unclear

The immediate question — one lawyers are already asking — is what legal basis exists for a 100% tariff imposed in retaliation for a foreign tax policy. It is not obvious that any currently enacted American law authorizes the president to take such a measure immediately and unilaterally. CNBC made this explicit on the very same day: "It is not clear what law would give Trump the authority to immediately impose massive tariffs on individual countries." The Supreme Court has already said no once. It may well say no a second time.

This tendency toward dramatic announcements without solid legal grounding has become a defining feature of the Trump presidency. He makes a declaration, markets react, partners sound the alarm, and the courts ultimately rule. This cycle played out with the IEEPA tariffs, with the Section 122 tariffs, and it risks repeating itself with digital taxes. The Supreme Court, within this pattern, is not an obstacle: it is the final arbiter of a constitutional system that functions as designed.

The Court of International Trade Strikes Back

A two-to-one ruling that rattled the White House

The May 7, 2026 ruling of the Court of International Trade (CIT) deserves careful reading. By two votes to one, the judges invalidated the 10% tariff grounded in Section 122, ruling that Trump had not demonstrated the existence of the balance-of-payments deficits required by law. The federal government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and may also request a stay of the ruling pending that appeal's outcome. The tariffs thus continue to be collected from non-plaintiffs — but the legal validity of the entire mechanism remains in question.

The plaintiffs in this case were the state of Washington, Burlap and Barrel Inc., and Basic Fun Inc. — a mismatched coalition illustrating the diversity of economic actors hurt by these tariffs. The ruling applies only to those plaintiffs, but it creates an explosive legal precedent. Other companies can invoke it to challenge tariffs collected on their own imports. The legal uncertainty is spreading like an oil slick across the American economy.

The July 24, 2026 deadline: a sword of Damocles

If the Section 122 tariffs are not extended by Congress before July 24, 2026, they expire automatically. That date is fast approaching, and nothing suggests Republicans in the Senate and House are aligned on renewing these measures. Trump's tariff policy now rests on weakened legal foundations, an imminent time limit, and a Congress divided on the matter. It is a politically unsolvable equation in the short term.

Faced with this potential void, the administration is exploring other avenues: Section 301 investigations into forced labor, new tariff threats over digital taxes, sector-specific tariffs on steel and aluminum. Each of these paths is legally distinct, and their combination creates an opaque tariff patchwork that American import businesses can barely navigate. According to Goldman Sachs, the Supreme Court ruling represented a net reduction of roughly 5% in average American tariff levels — a relief signal for the markets, but insufficient to dispel the broader uncertainty.

What This Sequence Tells Us About the State of American Democracy

A constitutional system that holds — despite everything

The sequence — IEEPA struck down by the Supreme Court, Section 122 invalidated by the CIT — is, in its own way, a reassuring illustration. The American presidency is powerful, but it is not all-powerful. The system of checks and balances that the Founding Fathers embedded in the Constitution continues to function. Judges — including those appointed by Republican presidents — apply the law as written, not as the executive branch wishes it were written. For those who worry about authoritarian drift in the United States, this judicial sequence is a breath of fresh air.

That said, naive optimism would be misplaced. Each judicial invalidation is met with a presidential counter-move — a new threat, a new tool, a new workaround. The pace of these cycles is accelerating, and it is legitimate to ask how long the institutions can keep up. But for now, they are holding. And that is what matters.

Washington's allies: between wariness and adaptation

For the United States' trading partners — the European Union, Japan, South Korea — this legal instability is a daily challenge. They cannot know whether commitments made by Washington will still be in force six months from now. The trade deal signed with the EU can be rendered moot by a court ruling or a post on Truth Social, as Trump just demonstrated by threatening to "supersede" any agreement with his DST tariffs. This unpredictability is itself an economic cost, impossible to quantify but very real for companies trading with the United States.

Paradoxically, this context reinforces the attractiveness of the Supreme Court as an institution. Foreign partners cannot rely on the president's announcements, but they can rely on the institutions. As long as American courts exercise their oversight role, a degree of predictability remains in the system — an institutional predictability, not a political one. It is thin. But it is real.

The Key Numbers of the Trade War: What Is Sourced, What Is Not

A documented tariff arithmetic

A few figures help frame the debate. The Supreme Court invalidated the IEEPA tariffs on February 20, 2026. Trump responded with a 10% tariff under Section 122, effective from February 24, 2026, for a maximum duration of 150 days — that is, until July 24, 2026. The Section 122 tariff was itself invalidated by the CIT on May 7, 2026. Meanwhile, Section 301 tariffs against China, at 7.5% on many products, remained in place. Tariffs proposed under the new Section 301 forced-labor investigation could reach 12.5% against China.

The new threat of June 26, 2026 targets digital taxes with a threatened rate of 100%. The net 5% reduction in average American tariff levels calculated by Goldman Sachs after the Supreme Court ruling has been partially offset by subsequent measures. This Goldman Sachs figure is an analyst estimate, not an official U.S. government number — I note it as such. The American economy has been living for more than a year under chronic tariff threat and a legal fog that is slowing investment decisions.

The Supreme Court ruling: a victory for whom?

Trump's opponents celebrated the February 20, 2026 ruling as a democratic victory. In one sense, they are right. But it would be naive to believe this ruling put an end to the administration's aggressive tariff policy. Within hours, Section 122 was activated. Trump showed he could pivot fast. The Supreme Court said no to a specific tool, not to the overall policy. American importers continue paying tariffs on various grounds. And trading partners continue to adapt to an unpredictable Washington.

The true victory perhaps belongs to the rule of law as a principle. The demonstration that the president of the United States can be called to order by the courts — not once, but twice, on two distinct legal instruments — is invaluable. It reminds Washington and the world that American democracy has antibodies. They are slow, costly, and imperfect. But they exist.

The Impact on Trade Allies: Europe, Japan, and the Rest of the World

The European Union in the crossfire of American tariffs

For the European Union, the American trade war represents a permanent external shock. The European Commission has responded to each wave of Trump tariffs by threatening countermeasures while pursuing the path of negotiation. The trade deal signed between Washington and Brussels in the spring of 2026 seemed to open a way out. But the threat of 100% tariffs on digital taxes, launched on June 26, 2026, calls into question the durability of any agreement with the Trump administration. European businesses are navigating blind, unable to plan stable supply chains over any twelve-month horizon.

The European response must go beyond reactive tactics. This is no longer a trade dispute — it is a matter of economic sovereignty. An Europe that depends on American court rulings to protect its exporters is a vulnerable Europe. Building a strategic trade autonomy — its own regulation of digital giants, targeted European public procurement, alternative bilateral agreements — is now a necessity, not an ideological preference.

Japan, South Korea, and Asia under pressure

Japan and South Korea, military allies of the United States, find themselves in an impossible position: they cannot openly confront Washington on trade without risking their security umbrella in a region where China, North Korea, and Russia are pressing on all sides. The IEEPA tariffs targeted allies as much as adversaries — and that is precisely what shocked Tokyo and Seoul. The judicial invalidation was therefore welcomed with relief in Tokyo, but without illusion about the durability of that reprieve.

Southeast Asia, for its part, sought to benefit from the realignment of supply chains away from China. Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand all attracted manufacturing investment fleeing China and its punitive tariffs. But the threat of extending 100% tariffs to digital services is a reminder that no one is safe from Trump's reversals. American trade policy has become a random variable in global econometric models. No one knows how to model it anymore.

What the Trump Era Teaches Us About the American Democracy of Tomorrow

The precedent for future presidencies

Beyond Trump, the 2026 sequence sets a precedent. Any future president who attempts to use the IEEPA to impose sweeping global commercial tariffs will face unfavorable case law. The Supreme Court ruling is not only a rebuke to Trump — it is a constitutional lock for decades to come. Future presidents will need congressional authorization for trade measures of such magnitude. This is a restoration of institutional balance.

One must still be honest: the IEEPA, Section 301, Section 201, sector-specific tariffs on steel and aluminum — the American commercial arsenal remains vast and largely intact. Trump lost two battles. He did not lose the trade war. And future presidents seeking to act aggressively on global trade will find other levers. The 2026 case law narrows the options; it does not eliminate them.

The silence of Republican lawmakers: the real scandal

What strikes me throughout this entire tariff saga is the silence of Republican legislators in Congress. They watch their president dismantle America's commercial predictability, and they say nothing. Senators from farm states — Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas — whose constituents suffer directly from Chinese counter-tariffs on soy and corn, remain mute. Out of calculation. Out of fear. Out of tribal loyalty. Their silence is a legislative abdication that gives Trump free rein to test the limits of the presidency.

The Supreme Court cannot compensate alone for the legislature's inaction. The separation of powers functions when all branches play their part. When Congress abdicates, the courts are left alone to hold the line. That is asking too much of them. And it is precisely why America's institutional balance remains fragile, even after the judicial victories of 2026.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court, the Imperfect Guardian of a Constitution Under Pressure

An unambiguous verdict on executive overreach

The 2026 sequence around Trump's tariffs sketches a clear constitutional lesson: the United States Supreme Court remains the last bulwark against executive overreach, even when that power is wielded with formidable energy and creativity. It did not prevent Trump from pursuing tariff policy — it invalidated two specific instruments while leaving others intact. This is not a total victory, but it is not a defeat either. It is democracy in action: laborious and effective at once.

The road ahead: between expiring tariffs and new threats

In the weeks to come, two deadlines structure the debate: the potential expiration of Section 122 tariffs on July 24, 2026, and the new threat of 100% tariffs on digital taxes. In both cases, the central legal question remains unanswered: what legal authority allows the president to act? The courts will respond, as they already have. And American democracy will continue its institutional arm-wrestling with a president who pushes, tests, and maneuvers. It is exhausting. It is vital. It is the Constitution in motion.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Who I am and where I stand

I am Maxime Marquette, columnist and analyst. I am not an American lawyer. My interpretation of the Supreme Court and Court of International Trade rulings draws on secondary sources — specialist journalists, think tanks, academic analyses — not on a direct reading of the judgments in American law. It is possible that certain legal nuances escape me. I say so clearly.

My acknowledged biases and what I do not know

I believe in liberal democracy and the separation of powers as a fundamental guarantee of freedom. I am skeptical of any excessive concentration of executive power, regardless of the president's political stripe. I do not know whether Congress will extend the Section 122 tariffs before July 24, 2026, nor whether the Court of Appeals will overturn the CIT ruling. The figure of a 5% reduction in average American tariffs attributed to Goldman Sachs is an analyst estimate, not a government figure — I note it as such. The legal uncertainty is real, and I make no claim to reduce it with predictions that nothing supports.

Sources

Primary sources

CNBC — Trump threatens 100% tariff on countries putting Digital Services Tax on American Companies — June 26, 2026

Atlantic Council — Trump Tariff Tracker — updated June 2026

ASIL — The U.S. Court of International Trade Invalidates Trump's 10% Global Tariff — May 2026

White House — Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes a Temporary Import Duty — February 20, 2026

Secondary sources

Bloomberg — Trump Vows 100% Tariff on Countries Over Digital Services Taxes — June 26, 2026

Council on Foreign Relations — The U.S.-China Trade Relationship — updated May 2026

Al Jazeera — Trump threatens tariffs for countries that levy digital tax on US firms — June 26, 2026