PROFILE: The US-Iran Deal That Left Israel Out in the Cold

Introduction: Jerusalem Watches Versailles Sign Without It

A memorandum signed in the shadow of an absent ally

On June 17, 2026, at Versailles, American president Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei put their signatures on a 14-point memorandum of understanding — a MoU that lays out a de-escalation framework between Washington and Tehran. What the day's photographs did not show was the conspicuous absence of a central actor in Middle Eastern geopolitics: Israel. Jerusalem was not at the table. Jerusalem was not consulted. And Jerusalem did not take long to make its alarm known over an agreement that reorganizes regional security without the state most directly threatened by Iran.

Follow-up negotiations began on June 22 in Geneva. For Tel Aviv, every day of those discussions is a source of growing anxiety. The deal covers, according to American briefings, the question of Iran's nuclear program, the gradual lifting of certain sanctions, and regional security. That last item sits at the core of Israeli fears: what exactly does "regional security" mean — and for whom?

The 14 points and the Israeli gap

The text of the MoU, as described at an American press conference — neither party having published the official document — contains one explosive clause: the "immediate and permanent cessation of military activities on all fronts, including Lebanon." The United States and Iran commit to protecting Lebanon's territorial integrity. What is striking at first glance is what the text does not mention: Israel, which maintains positions in southern Lebanon, is entirely absent from it. The agreement is exclusively bilateral — neither Hezbollah nor Israel is a party to it.

The question arising from this omission has no clear answer: how can a ceasefire in Lebanon be implemented if one of the belligerents — Israel — has signed nothing, and if the other — Hezbollah — is an entity the MoU does not formally recognize? Experts cited by Al Jazeera note that many questions remain unanswered, notably whether Iran is obligated to cut its financial support to Hezbollah. That is precisely where the crux of the problem lies for Jerusalem.

Profile of an Anxiety: The Fear of Iranian Legitimization

Iran normalized as a diplomatic interlocutor

What terrifies Jerusalem about the June 17 MoU is not so much its declaratory content as the process it sets in motion. A framework agreement between Washington and Tehran, even without immediate legal force, carries considerable political weight: it normalizes the Iranian interlocutor in the eyes of the international community. Once the United States treats the Khamenei regime as a diplomatic partner, sanctions become harder to maintain, and Israel's arguments in favor of preemptive action become harder to advance.

The president of the Iranian parliament and chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, reaffirmed on June 24, 2026 that a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was a central condition for any final agreement with the United States. This declaration places Israel in an uncomfortable position: it is simultaneously absent from the negotiation and identified as its primary obstacle. For Benjamin Netanyahu, this is an unacceptable situation — and he made that clear by stating the IDF would remain deployed in the security zone in Lebanon for as long as he remained prime minister.

The ISW analysis: Iran is using the MoU to buy time

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in their special report of June 24, 2026, advance a pointed thesis: the Iranian regime is using the discussions mandated by the MoU to delay any substantive negotiation on its nuclear program and on its efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. According to them, Tehran is very likely using these discussions to reach agreements with Gulf states that would allow it to maintain influence around the Strait. This is a reading radically different from the optimistic narrative promoted by Washington.

If the ISW is right, the MoU would be less a peace agreement than a diplomatic delaying instrument allowing Tehran to consolidate its regional positions while negotiators exchange formulas in Geneva palaces. This interpretation resonates with the history of Iranian nuclear negotiations over two decades: Tehran has always known how to transform the time of diplomacy into space for enrichment — in the literal sense as much as the figurative.

Security Guarantees for Israel: What the Agreement Does Not Say

The absence of binding commitments on the nuclear file

The MoU sets out a "framework for de-escalation" and "the launch of a round of negotiations" on the Iranian nuclear program and the gradual lifting of certain sanctions. But it contains no binding commitment on uranium enrichment thresholds, centrifuge capacities, or inspection protocols. Everything remains to be negotiated. And what Iran has sworn never to accept — the dismantling of its military nuclear capabilities — remains the sine qua non condition for Israel.

The European leaders of the E4 — Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom — welcomed the MoU favorably. But welcoming a framework is very different from endorsing it as a security guarantee. For Tel Aviv, this diplomatic complacency is a painful reminder of the 2015 JCPOA — which provided a veneer of legitimacy to a nuclear program that continued advancing below the surface.

Washington-Jerusalem-Beirut discussions

While diplomats debate in Geneva, the ground reality in Lebanon has grown considerably more complicated. Triangular discussions took place in Washington DC on June 23 and 24, 2026 among Israeli, Lebanese, and American officials on the question of the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon. Proposals are circulating for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to gradually replace the IDF in pilot zones. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that Washington would help strengthen the LAF's capacity to hold territory in southern Lebanon.

But Israel put its finger on a concrete problem: its soldiers had received no official update on the role of the deconfliction mechanism in Lebanon, according to an Israeli intelligence official cited by Haaretz on June 24. The IDF had also killed two Hezbollah fighters approaching its positions that same day, near Ali al-Taher. The reality of war continues, while diplomacy talks of peace.

Netanyahu's Position: Political Resistance and Diplomatic Isolation

A prime minister who refuses to be presented with a fait accompli

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu adopted a firm and public line: the IDF will remain in the security zone in Lebanon as long as he is in office. This declaration of June 24, 2026 is both a strategic position and a political message to his coalition partners. It means concretely that Israel has no intention of conditioning its military posture on agreements concluded without its participation. It is a de facto veto — not legal, but practical — against the implementation of the Lebanese dimension of the MoU.

Israel wants to complete a full assessment of Hezbollah's capabilities before authorizing any broader withdrawal. This condition is reasonable from an Israeli security standpoint, but it creates direct friction with Washington, which is pushing for rapid normalization to diplomatically validate the MoU. The first transfer of control at Dibbine, carried out on June 4, 2026, was limited and controlled. It is not the signal of an imminent general withdrawal.

Israel's relative isolation in the international community

The paradox of the situation is that the state most directly threatened by a nuclear Iran is also the one that is increasingly isolated in the international debate. Israeli strikes in Lebanon since early March have caused more than 3,000 deaths and displaced more than a million people, according to Al Jazeera. These figures feed an international narrative that casts Israel in the role of an obstacle to peace — even as it is Iran that finances the armed actors who triggered the spiral of violence.

This diplomatic dynamic is dangerous for Jerusalem. The more Iran succeeds in positioning itself as a partner for dialogue, the more Israel appears as the regional troublemaker. The June 17 MoU, by deliberately omitting Israel, reinforced this asymmetry. Washington chose to conclude a bilateral deal with Tehran without including Tel Aviv — a decision that, whatever its intent, sends a devastating signal to America's most loyal ally in the region.

The Strait of Hormuz and Iran's Ambitions in the Gulf

A strategic chokepoint that Iran wants to loosen

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical oil arteries in the world. Roughly 20% of global oil exports pass through it. Iran controls the northern shore of the strait and has the military capacity to disrupt its traffic in a crisis. The MoU addresses regional security in general terms, without clearly specifying constraints on Iranian military activities in the Gulf. For Gulf states — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait — that is a worrying gap.

According to the ISW, Iran is using the MoU discussions to try to reach agreements with Gulf states that would allow it to maintain influence around the Strait. Tehran is simultaneously playing on several levels: negotiating with Washington to lift sanctions, negotiating with the Gulf to secure its strategic positions, and maintaining a proxy presence in Lebanon through Hezbollah. This is a classic multiple-engagement strategy aimed at maximizing diplomatic gains while minimizing real concessions.

The verification gap: the MoU's Achilles' heel

The MoU does not specify verification mechanisms that would ensure Iran honors its commitments. Neither the modalities of nuclear inspection nor the conditions for monitoring support to Hezbollah are detailed in the 14 points as publicly described. Iranian authorities have not even validated the American interpretation of the text, as Al Jazeera noted on June 18. This interpretive asymmetry creates the conditions for a future dispute over what each party had actually agreed to.

This is precisely the scenario that most worries Jerusalem. A poorly defined agreement, whose parties hold divergent interpretations, is an agreement that will be violated — and whose violation will be denied. Iran has long experience with this kind of game. Israel bears the scars of it.

What This Reveals About American Diplomacy Under Trump

Washington between unpredictability and brutal pragmatism

Trump's decision to sign a deal with Iran without fully consulting Israel fits a coherent logic — even if it is disconcerting for traditional allies. Trump acts as a dealer, not as a guardian of alliances. He seeks a presentable agreement, a diplomatic win, a headline that proves he "gets deals done." The impact on regional allies is a secondary calculation. This approach is brutal, but it is not irrational from the standpoint of his own political interests.

But this logic carries a real strategic cost. Every time Washington deals with an adversary without informing its allies, it erodes the trust on which the Western alliance system rests. Israel is not the only one who has noticed: Gulf states, Jordan, European countries involved in Middle Eastern security are all watching this sequence with unease. Can Washington really be counted on when it can reverse course overnight?

Trump, Iran, and the logic of the bilateral deal

It is important to note that Trump is not ideologically anti-Israeli. His first-term record — recognizing Jerusalem as the capital, the Abraham Accords, withdrawal from the 2015 JCPOA — testifies to strong support for Israel. But his second term appears more pragmatic, more transactional. The June 17 MoU does not reflect an abandonment of Israel; it reflects the priority placed on landing a spectacular agreement with a historic adversary, at the risk of ruffling an ally. This is pure Trump: the act precedes the consultation.

The question is whether Israel can maintain its firm line without that leading to a deeper rupture with Washington. Netanyahu is playing an extremely risky game: standing up to Trump on the Lebanon withdrawal while preserving the alliance with the United States. It is a precarious balance, and Middle Eastern history offers no shortage of examples of leaders who miscalculated such a dependency.

What the Geneva Negotiations Will Decide

The Geneva framework: between hope and structural constraints

The follow-up negotiations on the MoU opened in Geneva on June 22, 2026 are unfolding in a structurally complex context. On one side, Washington and Tehran have an interest in moving the discussions forward — the United States to diplomatically validate the deal, Iran to obtain sanctions relief. On the other, the divergences over nuclear verification mechanisms and the status of Hezbollah are deep. The Robert Schuman Foundation summed up the situation aptly on June 22: "Everything will depend on the outcome of the negotiations."

That sober prognosis is perhaps the most honest that can be made. Geneva can produce a historic agreement or yet another diplomatic screen. Both scenarios are plausible. And neither can be predicted with certainty from outside those Geneva hotels where regional destinies are being decided.

Three scenarios for Israel

For Jerusalem, three scenarios are taking shape. First scenario: Geneva fails, the MoU collapses, and Israel recovers its room for maneuver. Second scenario: Geneva produces a nuclear agreement with robust verification mechanisms, and Israel must accept a de-escalation it did not choose but which objectively reduces the immediate threat. Third scenario — the most likely: Geneva produces a partial, ambiguous agreement that grants Iran increased legitimacy without genuinely neutralizing its military capabilities. It is this third scenario that Israel most dreads. And the one it is most actively preparing for.

The Gulf States and the Post-MoU Question

Saudi Arabia between caution and opportunism

The states of the Persian Gulf occupy a singular position in this diplomatic sequence. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have reason both to fear a strengthened Iran and to benefit from regional de-escalation. Since the Abraham Accords II brokered by Riyadh and Washington, Gulf geopolitics have reconfigured around an economic logic: Gulf states want to invest, attract capital, and turn the page on decades of sectarian tension. But they also know that an unconstrained Iran in its nuclear program is an existential threat to their own security.

The June 17 MoU puts them in a classic dilemma: applaud a de-escalation agreement publicly while quietly preparing for its consequences. The Robert Schuman Foundation noted that Gulf states are watching the Geneva negotiations with a mix of hope and wariness. Their security horizon, like Israel's, depends on the details of the verification mechanisms that will — or will not — emerge from the hushed rooms of international diplomacy.

Turkey, Jordan, and the secondary regional actors

Beyond the main players, regional powers such as Turkey and Jordan are observing the sequence with distinct interests. Ankara, which has for years pursued a policy of equidistance between Washington and Moscow, sees in the MoU a confirmation of its own intuition: great powers negotiate directly, and regional actors must either position themselves in the margins or find their own negotiating space. Jordan, for its part, is particularly concerned about the humanitarian impact of prolonged instability in Lebanon, whose refugee flows could redirect toward Amman in the event of an escalation.

This complex regional picture is a reminder that the Middle East is not binary. It is not simply Iran against Israel, or the United States against Russia. It is an ecosystem of cross-cutting interests, collective memories, and national calculations that make any broad agreement extremely difficult to sustain over time. The June 17 MoU deserves credit for existing. Its fault is pretending to simplify what nothing can simplify.

Conclusion: Jerusalem Will Wait — But Not Indefinitely

An American-Israeli alliance under structural tension

The June 17, 2026 US-Iran MoU has laid bare a structural tension in the American-Israeli alliance: Washington is willing to negotiate with Tehran on matters that directly touch on Israel's security, without necessarily obtaining Jerusalem's green light. This is not a rupture — the relationship between the two countries remains deeply rooted — but it is a clear signal that Trump, like his predecessors, can put his own diplomatic interests before those of his closest ally in the Middle East. Israel knows this. And Israel is acting accordingly, maintaining an independent military presence in Lebanon.

The outcome of the Geneva negotiations: uncertain but decisive

Everything will depend on the outcome of the negotiations — and that outcome remains unpredictable. What can be said with certainty is that the Middle East has entered a diplomatically intense phase, whose result will determine whether the June 17 MoU enters history as a breakthrough or as one more illusion. Jerusalem observes, holds to its red lines, and prepares its options. It is the only rational response to a situation in which others are deciding its future.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am Maxime Marquette, analyst and columnist. I believe that Israel's security is non-negotiable and that any Middle Eastern regional security architecture that ignores the Jewish state's legitimate interests is doomed to fail. I am skeptical of agreements that allow Iran to retain its influence while gaining economic concessions. These positions shape my reading of the facts, and the reader should take them into account.

What I do not know

I do not have access to the full text of the MoU. I am working from summaries and interpretations. I do not know exactly what the 14 points say in their official version, nor what precise concessions Iran accepted within the framework of the Geneva negotiations. The figure of 3,000 deaths in Lebanon is attributed to Al Jazeera — it is an estimate whose methodology has not been independently verified. The uncertainty is real, and my analysis bears its marks.

Sources

Primary sources

Robert Schuman Foundation — Europeans caught between trust and the need for protection — June 22, 2026

Al Jazeera — What the Trump-Iran agreement says about Lebanon, Hormuz and uranium — June 18, 2026

ISW — Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2026

Secondary sources

The Guardian — Middle East geopolitical context — June 24, 2026

Foreign Policy — US-Iran diplomatic analysis — June 2026

Kyiv Post — Regional security context — June 2026