EDITORIAL: The EU Post-2028 Budget — Defense, Ukraine, Green, Migration: 27 Nations Tested

EDITORIAL: The EU Post-2028 Budget — Defense, Ukraine, Green, Migration: 27 Nations Tested

Introduction: The largest budgetary challenge in EU history

A framework agreed, a construction site just opening

On June 19, 2026, the 27 member states of the European Union approved the framework for the next seven-year EU budget covering the period 2028–2034. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented this as "an important step forward." In reality, approving the structural framework of a budget is like laying a building's foundations — the hardest work still lies ahead: filling in the numbers, arbitrating between competing priorities, and convincing 27 governments to contribute more to something whose benefits are not always immediately visible. The stated goal is to conclude negotiations by the end of 2026, allowing the adoption of legislative texts in 2027 and implementation from January 1, 2028.

This budget will be the first required to address simultaneously four contradictory priorities: funding for common European defense, long-term support for Ukraine through reconstruction and accession, the continuation of the green transition, and the management of migratory pressures. Four chapters, each of which would require a substantial additional budget on its own. The negotiations ahead will be epic.

What von der Leyen approved — and what remains to be decided

The General Affairs Council agreement of June 16, confirmed by the European Council on June 19, covers the structure of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028–2034 — meaning the broad outlines: how many headings, what types of spending qualify under each, what degree of flexibility is allowed between headings. This is not an agreement on amounts. The figures — total EU spending, allocations per policy area, what is funded through national contributions or own resources — remain entirely to be negotiated. That is where the most intense battles will begin.

The Commission still needs to present its formal proposal on amounts. Based on precedents and commitments already made, the total is expected to exceed €1 trillion over seven years — but pressure from the most demanding member states to reach €1.2 or €1.3 trillion is strong. And the "frugals" — Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Denmark — have already positioned themselves to resist any significant expansion of common spending.

Defense: the urgency that overrides every other priority

The precedent of the European Defense Facility

The European Council's decision at The Hague in June 2025 to set a target of 3.5% of GDP for defense spending by major NATO powers changed the EU's budgetary landscape. Under that commitment, confirmed in Berlin on June 24, 2026 by the leaders of the E5 (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Poland), member states must massively increase their national defense budgets — and the EU budget must accompany that effort with co-financing mechanisms for joint defense projects, military R&D investments, and shared industrial capacities.

The European Peace Facility (EPF) and existing instruments of military assistance to Ukraine demonstrated that the EU can mobilize off-budget funds — but these mechanisms have reached their legal and political limits. The MFF 2028–2034 must create a robust new legal framework that allows the EU to directly fund shared defense capabilities, a competence currently tightly constrained by existing treaties. Since treaty modification is politically impossible in the short term, EU lawyers will have to be creative in their interpretation.

The thorny question of own resources to fund defense

How can increased European defense spending be financed without imposing an excessive burden on national contributions? The answer many pro-European voices favor is the development of European own resources — taxes or levies whose proceeds feed directly into the EU budget, bypassing member states. The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), already in force, is one example. A tax on financial transactions or on digital giants could provide another.

But this prospect faces fierce resistance from several member states, notably the Netherlands and Sweden, which see own resources as a dangerous extension of Brussels's fiscal power. And without significant additional own resources, funding defense, Ukraine, the green transition, and migration simultaneously within a constrained budget will force politically explosive trade-offs between member states with diverging interests.

Ukraine: between immediate support and accession prospects

The Ukraine Fund facing an astronomical bill

The Ukraine Facility, created in 2024 with an envelope of €50 billion over four years, expires at the end of 2027. The next MFF must therefore incorporate a support mechanism for Ukraine covering the period 2028–2034, addressing both post-conflict reconstruction (estimated at several hundred billion euros) and the accession process — which, at the current pace, could bring Ukraine into the EU between 2028 and 2032.

Ukraine in the EU means the second-largest population in the Union, an enormous agricultural territory (which would capture a significant share of Common Agricultural Policy funds), and an economy that needs massive structural transfers to converge toward European standards. Some estimates suggest that Ukrainian accession would increase annual MFF spending by €20 to €35 billion. That is not trivial — it represents a structural transformation of the EU budget that will require, in return, a deep reform of the common agricultural policy and cohesion funds.

Military support that must continue even in peacetime

At the NATO Ankara summit (July 7–8, 2026), allies are expected to approve a €70 billion military aid package for Ukraine, of which €30 billion may flow through EU-guaranteed loans. This financial architecture — loans guaranteed by European taxpayers, repayable against frozen Russian assets or Ukraine's future revenues — represents a major legal and political innovation. It creates a contingent budgetary exposure for the EU that must be reflected in the MFF 2028–2034.

The lesson of the 2024–2027 Ukraine Facility is that financial support for Kyiv cannot be managed through ad hoc mechanisms outside the main budget. The MFF must incorporate a permanent Ukraine heading, sized to absorb both reconstruction needs and long-term military commitments. This is politically difficult to sell to the member states least engaged in supporting Ukraine — but economically and strategically indispensable.

The green transition: the poor relation of the next budget?

The Green Deal under pressure from defense spending

The European Green Deal, launched under the previous von der Leyen Commission, placed climate mainstreaming at the core of the MFF 2021–2027, with a target of 30% of total spending contributing to climate objectives. The question is whether that target can be maintained in the MFF 2028–2034, in a context where defense and Ukraine are absorbing a growing share of political attention and available resources.

Environmental organizations and several progressive member states (Germany, Netherlands, Denmark) insist that the green transition must not be sacrificed on the altar of defense. Their argument is economic as much as environmental: energy independence is a precondition of European security, and it runs through renewables, not fossil fuels. But in a zero-sum budget negotiation, every euro allocated to renewables is one not going to armaments. The tension is structural.

Cohesion funds and the East-West divide

Central and Eastern European countries — Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria — are the main beneficiaries of cohesion funds, designed to reduce development disparities between regions. These countries are also the least advanced in the green transition and most dependent on fossil fuels (coal in particular). Tying cohesion transfers more closely to climate targets would create an East-West fracture in budget negotiations, potentially as explosive as the rule-of-law debate.

The wiser approach would be for green cohesion funds to help Eastern European regions finance their energy transition, rather than penalizing them for a historical lag for which they are not entirely responsible. But translating that wisdom into legislative texts accepted by 27 member states with diverging interests is another matter entirely. This is precisely the kind of complex compromise that MFF 2028–2034 negotiations must produce.

Migration: the fourth priority that structurally divides

The Migration and Asylum Pact — an incomplete victory

The Migration and Asylum Pact, adopted in 2024, marked a significant advance toward common management of migration flows. But its funding remains insufficient and its mandatory solidarity mechanisms are contested by several member states, led by Hungary under Viktor Orbán. The MFF 2028–2034 must consolidate and adequately fund this framework, while accounting for migration pressures that will remain structurally significant.

Mediterranean member states (Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta) advocate massive funding for managing the EU's external borders and for development policies in countries of origin that address the root causes of migration. Northern member states advocate stricter controls and incentives for relocation. These positions are not incompatible — but arbitrating them within a single budgetary framework is an exercise that has derailed several previous reform attempts.

The temptation of retrenchment and its hidden costs

Under pressure from populist movements, several European governments are tempted to use the EU budget to fund border closure policies rather than integration policies. This choice carries a hidden cost: Europe is aging, its labor market needs skilled workers from all backgrounds, and its social protection systems depend on an influx of contributing workers. A migration policy that prioritizes exclusion over integration weakens the economic base that finances the European welfare state.

This economic reality is politically difficult to convey to voters who feel cultural and social tensions from insufficiently supported integrations. That is precisely why the integration and reception policy component must be substantially funded in the MFF — not out of idealism, but out of pragmatism. Poorly managed migration costs more in the long run than migration that is properly funded from the start.

Governance: the unanimity rule that blocks everything

The obstacle of "frugal" countries and the budgetary veto

Every MFF decision requires unanimity among all 27 member states in the Council — a threshold that gives every government, even the smallest, a de facto veto over the entire budget. This rule produced the endless July 2020 negotiating nights on the MFF 2021–2027 and the NextGenerationEU recovery plan. The unanimity rule on budgets is one of the main reasons European budgets remain structurally insufficient relative to the stated ambitions.

The Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark traditionally form the "frugals" bloc, committed to fiscal discipline and opposed to expanding common expenditures. In exchange for their agreement, they will obtain the rebates on their contributions that have characterized previous MFFs — a structural injustice that burdens the budget and creates permanent tensions. Reforming the rebate system is a prerequisite for a fair budget — and it is politically almost impossible to achieve.

The European Parliament: an actor of growing weight

The European Parliament co-decides the MFF — and demonstrated its leverage in 2020 by securing significant concessions from the Council's position. The Parliament will push for more own resources, greater spending flexibility, and stronger rule-of-law conditionality. These demands will carry even more weight given that European public opinion, increasingly aware of defense and sovereignty stakes, is more willing than before to support common investments.

The dynamic between the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament on MFF 2028–2034 will be one of the most demanding tests of European democracy. The outcome will depend largely on the ability of major member states — Germany, France, Italy, Poland — to build coalitions broad enough to overcome individual blockages. Von der Leyen, by saying she wants to conclude by end of 2026, sets herself an ambitious timeline. Probably too ambitious. But stating the ambition is itself a way of creating the necessary political pressure.

The Commission's role: budget guardian or hostage to member states?

The Commission's proposal: balancing the impossible

The European Commission, under the presidency of Ursula von der Leyen, is tasked with presenting the initial proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034. Its room for maneuver is structurally constrained: it must satisfy member states seeking more funding for their national priorities while maintaining fiscal discipline and the fiscal credibility of the Union. In the current context — increased defense spending, intensified support for Ukraine, costly green transition, growing migration pressure — this equation is mathematically unsolvable without painful trade-offs.

Net contributors to the EU budget — notably Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and the Nordic states — are under constant pressure to limit increases in their national contributions. Net beneficiaries — notably Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, and Mediterranean countries — want to maintain structural fund flows. This structural tension runs through every budget negotiation since cohesion funds were created. It will be even more acute for 2028–2034, because of the potential cost of Ukraine's and Moldova's accession.

Own resources: the unsolvable equation without new revenue

The Commission has long known that the long-term solution lies in new own resources for the EU — revenue that does not depend directly on national contributions. Several avenues have been explored: a financial transactions tax, a levy on carbon-intensive imports (carbon border adjustment mechanism), a share of European carbon market revenues, a digital companies tax. Each option faces political resistance in different member states.

Without new own resources, the 2028–2034 budget will be forced to choose: either increase national contributions — which net contributors refuse — or cut spending in certain areas — which beneficiaries refuse. This is not an abstract opposition. It is a concrete negotiation where each percentage point of GDP represents billions of euros and domestic political balances in every member state. The Commission must find a path that may not yet exist.

Accession candidates: burden or strategic investment?

Ukraine in the budget: a question of political survival

Ukraine's accession to the European Union — opened politically since the European Council decision of 2022 — would be the largest EU expansion since the 2004 enlargement. But Ukraine is a country of 44 million people with a significant agricultural economy and infrastructure considerably damaged by war. Integrating Ukraine into the structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under current terms would cost tens of billions of euros in additional spending per year — a burden that current member states overwhelmingly refuse to absorb without deep reform of those policies.

The reform of the CAP to accommodate Ukraine is particularly sensitive: Polish, French, and German farmers have already demonstrated their hostility to duty-free Ukrainian grain imports since 2022. Full Ukrainian integration into the CAP would create massive competitive pressure on existing European agricultural sectors. These resistances are not irrational — they reflect legitimate economic interests. But they illustrate the real political cost of enlargement, beyond the solidarity rhetoric.

The geostrategic value of enlargement

The counter-argument is equally powerful: failing to integrate Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova into the EU means leaving these countries in a geopolitical grey zone where Russia can continue to exert its influence. President Zelensky and Ukraine's leaders have clearly articulated their vision: EU membership is not merely an economic goal — it is a long-term security guarantee. A Ukraine inside the EU would be protected by European treaties, rule-of-law mechanisms, and the economic architecture that has made wars between members unthinkable since 1945.

This geostrategic value is difficult to quantify in budgetary terms. But it is real. An EU enlarged to include Ukraine is a Europe with greater strategic depth to the east, a strong signal to Moscow about the permanence of the West, and a reconstruction market of several hundred billion euros from which European companies would benefit. Enlargement is not only a cost — it is also an investment. The MFF 2028–2034 just needs to be designed to fund it.

Conclusion: The budget as a test of European solidarity

A moment of truth for the European project

The MFF 2028–2034 will be, in a sense, the most honest budget Europe has ever had to negotiate. Not because it will be more transparent than its predecessors — opaque compromises and delaying tactics will be part of the game as always. But because the stakes are so obvious, so immediate, and so existential that member states will not be able to fully pretend to ignore what they are really deciding: the security of Europe, the survival of a neighboring democracy, climate stability, and the social cohesion of an aging continent.

If the 27 reach an agreement before end of 2026 — or at the latest in the first half of 2027 — it will prove that the European Union can, when forced by circumstances, overcome its contradictions and short-sighted national calculations. If negotiations drag beyond 2027, threatening program continuity from January 1, 2028, it will demonstrate an inability to manage its own crises — a dangerous signal in a world where adversaries are waiting for Europe's divisions to exploit them.

What Europe has to lose — and to gain

Europe cannot afford a failed MFF. Not at this moment in its history, with a war at its eastern borders, an intensifying climate threat, and a geopolitical context dominated by powers that do not wish it well. An ambitious, coherent, and adequately funded budget is the condition for a sovereign Europe — not a political luxury, but a strategic necessity.

What Europe stands to gain from succeeding with this MFF is the capacity to shape the 21st century world: protecting its borders, supporting its allies, accelerating its energy transition, and maintaining its social cohesion. What it stands to lose by failing is the credibility of a political project that delivered 75 years of peace to the most war-prone continent in modern history. Rarely has a budget mattered so much.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial positioning and acknowledged biases

I am Maxime Marquette, a columnist-analyst who is in favor of a strong and ambitious European project. I believe that isolated member states cannot face the geopolitical, climate, and economic challenges of the 21st century alone, and that strong common institutions are a necessity, not an ideal. This positioning influences my budget analyses, and I fully own that.

I support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. I regard the energy transition as a strategic and economic urgency, not merely an environmental one. On migration, my positions are more nuanced — I acknowledge the legitimacy of security and cultural concerns while defending the fundamental rights of displaced persons. I try to be honest about these tensions rather than smoothing them over.

Methodological limits and uncertainties

The information available on MFF 2028–2034 as of June 27, 2026 is limited to the agreement on structure — the amounts remain to be proposed and negotiated. My projections on costs and trade-offs are based on historical precedents, official statements, and expert analyses, but remain speculative. I do not claim to predict the outcome of negotiations — I seek to map their tensions and stakes.

I did not have access to internal negotiating documents or anonymous sources within the European institutions. All my information comes from publicly verifiable sources, cited in the Sources section of this article.

Sources

Primary sources

EUNews — EU leaders agree on the structure of the next budget, von der Leyen: "an important step forward" — June 19, 2026

UK Government — E5 Leaders' Statement, June 24, 2026 — June 24, 2026

European Parliament Think Tank — Towards the 2026 NATO Ankara Summit — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

SimonGros.org — Europe's strategic turn: Ukraine, China, Russia and the new architecture of EU power — June 21, 2026

Euronews — Europe's five largest military powers meet ahead of key NATO summit with Ukraine in mind — June 24, 2026

Al Jazeera — Top European leaders vow strong support for Ukraine ahead of NATO summit — June 24, 2026

ECB — Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, June 2026 — June 11, 2026

Daily Sabah — European leaders converge in Berlin over Ukraine and NATO summit — June 22, 2026

Bloomberg — European leaders vow to take on NATO burden as Trump draws down — June 24, 2026