INVESTIGATION: Kim Jong-un wants to "dominate the world" — the North Korean nuclear race at its peak

Introduction: The plenum that revealed everything

The Political Bureau of June 20–22, 2026

From June 20 to 22, 2026, the plenary session of the Political Bureau of the Korean Workers' Party convened for what may prove to be one of the most consequential decisions in DPRK history since the proclamation of the nuclear state. Kim Jong-un there reaffirmed with particular solemnity the policy of "exponential" nuclear expansion — the word chosen by analysts at the Guardian to describe North Korea's trajectory. This reaffirmation, described as "solemn" in official records, signals that the DPRK is entering a new phase of acceleration in its nuclear programme.

Kim Jong-un was explicit about his objectives: nuclear expansion is the "most precise and unique method" for navigating an unstable world. This is not a restatement of existing policy — it is a doctrinal reorientation that positions nuclear weapons no longer as an instrument of defence but as an instrument of strategic domination. The phrase "dominate the world" reported by the Chosun (June 24, 2026) represents a significant rhetorical escalation.

Why this plenum, and why now?

The June 20–22, 2026 plenum did not take place in a vacuum. It came in the days following the first reports of USA-Iran talks at Burgenstock — and the conclusions Kim drew from them have been explicitly documented: Iran, which negotiated under pressure, is a counter-example. North Korea, with a more developed nuclear arsenal, is in a different position. This plenum institutionally formalizes an acceleration that was already under way but which gained urgency in the face of the Iranian precedent.

The formal character of this reaffirmation — a full Political Bureau plenary, the highest collective body of the party — indicates that Kim Jong-un is not acting impulsively. He is building institutional consensus around a policy that commits the entire state apparatus, the party, and the military to a common direction. This is a collective commitment, not a personal decree.

Concrete orders: warships and military-grade uranium

Arming warships with nuclear missiles

Among the concrete decisions to come out of the plenum, Kim Jong-un ordered the arming of warships with nuclear missiles. This order, combined with the launch of the destroyerChoe Hyon on June 23 and the announcement of a programme of ten ships over five years, confirms that naval nuclearization is not a vague future project — it is an immediate operational directive.

The order to nuclearize the navy represents a significant extension of North Korean deterrence doctrine. Until now, the DPRK relied primarily on land-based systems — intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, artillery — for its deterrence. Adding a nuclear naval component creates a strategic triad in formation — land-based, airborne (cruise missiles) and naval — that makes North Korean deterrence far more robust and resilient.

Increasing the stock of military-grade uranium

The second major operational directive from the plenum is the order to increase the stock of military-grade uranium. This order follows a militarily relentless logic: an "exponential" expansion in the number of nuclear warheads requires a corresponding expansion in fissile material stock. Military-grade enriched uranium (90%) is the critical resource that determines the pace of production of new nuclear weapons.

This order indirectly confirms estimates of the North Korean arsenal. Western intelligence agencies currently estimate that the DPRK possesses 40 to 60 operational nuclear warheads. If Kim needs to significantly increase his military uranium stock, it is because he is planning a significantly larger arsenal — perhaps in the range of 100 to 200 warheads over time. This projection has not been confirmed but is implicit in the directive.

The current arsenal: an assessment according to Western intelligence

40 to 60 operational nuclear warheads: what that means

The current estimate of 40 to 60 operational nuclear warheads for the DPRK, according to Western intelligence agencies cited in the editorial file, places North Korea in a significant category. For comparison: France maintains approximately 290 nuclear warheads, the United Kingdom approximately 225. The DPRK falls in the same range as estimated arsenals of Israel (not officially confirmed) and India (~160 warheads).

But the absolute size of the arsenal is not the only relevant factor: geographical distribution, reliability of delivery vectors, and the capacity to survive a first strike are equally important. On all three criteria, North Korea has made significant advances through its missiles on mobile land-based and rail launchers, its underground bunkers, and now its naval capabilities. An arsenal of 40 to 60 warheads distributed across these multiple platforms constitutes credible deterrence.

Mobile systems: rail, road, and underground

One of the most strategically significant innovations by the DPRK in recent years is the development of mobile launch systems on rail and road, complemented by an extensive network of underground bunkers. These systems make the DPRK resilient against pre-emptive strikes because they do not remain at known fixed positions.

A missile on a mobile road launcher can be moved day and night, making its location uncertain for reconnaissance satellites. A missile deep inside an underground tunnel is protected against all conventional munitions. These two characteristics combined mean that even a massive pre-emptive strike could not guarantee the destruction of the entire North Korean arsenal — and that a residual nuclear counterstrike is therefore probable. This is the definition of a credible second-strike deterrent.

The "exponential" expansion: the Guardian as source

What the Guardian documents about North Korea's trajectory

The Guardian (June 24, 2026) uses the word "exponential" to describe the trajectory of North Korea's nuclear expansion — a precise terminological choice that merits attention. In an armament context, "exponential" means growth that progressively accelerates: each new capability financed by the previous ones, each new vector adding to the credibility of the deterrence that justifies further investment.

The Guardian also notes that the DPRK possesses systems designed to "survive a first strike" — a qualification that defence experts consider the ultimate test of the credibility of a nuclear deterrent. A power that cannot survive a first strike can be neutralized by a sufficiently massive pre-emptive attack. A power that can survive — because its systems are dispersed, buried, and mobile — possesses an irreducible deterrent.

The capacity to "survive a first strike" as a strategic achievement

Achieving a first-strike survival capability is the holy grail of defensive nuclear doctrine. Major nuclear powers achieve this through their nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) which are virtually undetectable. The DPRK achieves it through a combination of dispersed land-based systems, rail-based systems, tunnels, and now nuclearized surface ships.

This reality means concretely that any military approach aimed at "disarming" North Korea by force is today of extremely questionable feasibility. Massive pre-emptive strikes would destroy certain North Korean nuclear assets — but not all. And an indeterminate number of surviving nuclear warheads ready to retaliate against millions of civilians in South Korea, Japan, and potentially the United States constitutes an unacceptable risk. The DPRK knows this. And it is precisely this reality that makes diplomacy the only viable path.

The Iranian lesson in Kim's strategy

Iran as the absolute counter-model

Any investigation into North Korea's nuclear expansion cannot sidestep the Iranian factor. Bloomberg (June 23, 2026) explicitly documents that Kim Jong-un cites Iran's fate — bombed, blockaded, and forced to negotiate — to justify the acceleration of his nuclear programme. Kim's lesson is simple: Iran did not have a sufficiently developed nuclear deterrent to be untouchable. North Korea will not repeat that mistake.

This instrumentalization of the Iranian precedent follows a tragically coherent logic. If the Burgenstock agreement was meant to demonstrate that diplomacy works and that nuclearization is unnecessary, the effect perceived in Pyongyang is precisely the reverse: Iran had to negotiate because it was not sufficiently nuclearized to deter Washington from acting militarily. The DPRK will be sufficiently nuclearized that Washington cannot afford to act.

Kim and the theory of the "most precise method"

The formulation chosen by Kim Jong-un — nuclear weapons as the "most precise and unique method" of survival — is a doctrinal statement of almost Cartesian clarity. He does not say "we need nuclear weapons to protect ourselves" — the classic defensive formulation. He says that nuclear weapons are the most precise method — compared to diplomacy, economics, and alliances — for guaranteeing the regime's survival.

This terminological precision reveals a strategic mind that has eliminated the alternatives: diplomacy has failed to produce security guarantees for the DPRK (the experiences of the 1990s and 2000s with the Agreed Framework and the six-party process); alliances are unreliable (China is a partner imposed by geography, not a security guarantor); the economy is structurally constrained by sanctions. Nuclear weapons remain — in Kim's logic — the only variable that makes the DPRK untouchable.

The 40–60 warheads: toward what final target?

Does North Korea want parity with mid-tier powers?

With an estimated 40 to 60 operational nuclear warheads and a directive to accelerate production, the analytical question is: what is the final target for the North Korean arsenal? Nuclear regimes generally have doctrines defining a target level sufficient for deterrence. The DPRK has never officially defined this level — but Kim's statements permit inferences.

If Kim is aiming for minimum deterrence — sufficient to survive a first strike and retaliate catastrophically — 40 to 60 warheads are already within that range. If Kim is aiming for regional parity with powers such as France or the United Kingdom (200–300 warheads), the directive to increase military uranium stocks suggests a far larger ambition. The rhetoric of "world domination" points toward an even broader goal — though its material realization is extremely difficult for an economy the size of North Korea's.

The growing submarine fleet as a nuclear vector

Beyond the land-based systems and the new destroyer, the DPRK's growing submarine fleet is documented as a component of the arsenal in the editorial file. North Korea maintains around sixty submarines of various sizes, some of which have been modified to launch ballistic missiles.

Submarine-launched ballistic missile platforms represent the most formidable naval nuclear component because they are virtually undetectable in operation. The DPRK has long worked to develop this capability, with mixed results to date due to technological limitations imposed by sanctions. But combined with the new destroyerChoe Hyon and the announced naval construction programme, North Korea's submarine fleet forms the naval component of an emerging strategic triad.

What this expansion demands of the international community

Has the "maximum pressure" policy failed?

Any investigation into North Korea's nuclear expansion inevitably raises an uncomfortable question: has the "maximum pressure" policy practiced alternately by American administrations for decades produced the intended results? If the objective was to halt or reverse the North Korean nuclear programme, the objective answer is no.

The harshest sanctions have slowed certain aspects of the programme but have not prevented the DPRK from progressing from a handful of primitive nuclear weapons in the early 2000s to 40 to 60 operational warheads with intercontinental missiles, tactical weapons, and now nuclear naval capabilities by 2026. This progression was achieved under the most economically unfavourable conditions. The analytical lesson is that sanctions alone cannot stop a nuclear programme that the regime has made an absolute survival priority.

Toward risk management rather than elimination?

In the face of this reality, a growing number of security experts are proposing a paradigm shift: rather than pursuing the impossible goal of total DPRK denuclearization, manage risks pragmatically — limit the size of the arsenal through arms control negotiations, reduce proliferation risks toward third-party actors, maintain communication channels to prevent accidental escalation.

The Straits Times (June 23, 2026) and the Washington Post (June 25, 2026) document Kim's statements on his nuclear ambitions in a context where this pragmatic approach is increasingly discussed in academic and diplomatic circles. The question is no longer "how do we disarm North Korea" — it is "how do we live with a nuclear North Korea in a way that reduces the risk of catastrophic conflict."

The impossible dialogue and its minimum conditions

What the DPRK might accept — and will never accept

This investigation, to be complete, must explore what the DPRK could theoretically accept within an arms control dialogue. Based on past commitments and the regime's logic, certain elements appear negotiable: a freeze on arsenal size at current levels, confidence-building measures on military exercises, and perhaps advance notification of long-range missile tests to prevent dangerous misunderstandings.

Certain elements, however, appear non-negotiable within the current political horizon of the DPRK: complete denuclearization as defined by Washington, the dismantling of existing nuclear facilities, and any agreement involving invasive verification of military sites. These limits reflect the Kim regime's deep conviction that nuclearization is the sine qua non of its survival — convictions that the supreme leader's public statements have elevated to the status of state dogma.

The minimum conditions for any resumption of dialogue

For dialogue to even be possible, several minimum conditions must be in place. On the American side: a willingness to engage without imposing prior denuclearization as a non-negotiable precondition, recognition of the DPRK as a state with which the United States can discuss matters without validating its political system. On the North Korean side: a commitment to a multilateral process that includes South Korea and Japan as directly concerned parties.

These minimum conditions are already substantial. They imply political concessions from both sides that have been refused on multiple occasions. But the alternative — a total absence of dialogue while the North Korean arsenal continues its "exponential" growth — produces an even less satisfactory outcome. The choice is not between a perfect solution and an imperfect one: it is between an imperfect solution and no solution at all in an increasingly dangerous world.

Conclusion: The investigation that cannot conclude

What the facts establish with certainty

This investigation establishes the following facts with documented certainty: the Political Bureau plenary of June 20–22, 2026 solemnly reaffirmed North Korea's nuclear expansion policy. Kim Jong-un ordered the arming of warships with nuclear missiles and the increase of military-grade uranium stocks. The current arsenal is estimated at 40 to 60 operational warheads with mobile, underground, and naval systems. The DPRK possesses first-strike survival capabilities. And Kim explicitly cites the Iranian precedent to justify the acceleration of his programme.

These facts combined trace an unambiguous trajectory: the DPRK is accelerating its nuclear programme in a deliberate, institutionalized, and militarily coherent manner. The declared objective of "dominating the world" is rhetoric — but the real objective, an absolutely credible nuclear deterrent that renders the DPRK militarily untouchable, is well on its way to being achieved.

The question this investigation cannot answer

What this investigation cannot answer: how will the West, South Korea, Japan, and China manage, in the years and decades ahead, the reality of a North Korea possessing 100, 200, or more nuclear warheads with diversified vectors and an active deterrence doctrine? There is no simple answer to this question. There are policies that are more or less risky, trade-offs that are more or less costly, diplomatic engagements that are more or less promising.

What this investigation can state: the time for inaction or the status quo is over. The "exponential" trajectory documented by the Guardian and institutionalized by the June 20–22, 2026 plenum demands a coherent and urgent strategic response from the international community. Any response will be imperfect. But the absence of a response will be catastrophic.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Investigation method and limitations

This investigation is based on the following documented sources: Guardian (June 24, 2026) for the term "exponential" and the first-strike survival capability; RBC-Ukraine (June 23, 2026) for the plenum and Kim's directives; Bloomberg (June 23, 2026) for the Iranian lesson; Straits Times (June 23, 2026) for the nuclear state policy; Chosun (June 24, 2026) for the world domination rhetoric; Washington Post (June 25, 2026) for weapons tests and offensive posture. All information on the North Korean arsenal comes from Western intelligence sources as reported through these media outlets — these are estimates, not certainties.

Data on the North Korean nuclear arsenal (40 to 60 warheads) are estimates from Western intelligence agencies, regularly revised and fundamentally uncertain. The DPRK does not publish official information on the size of its arsenal. This columnist cites these estimates as such — not as established facts.

Editorial position on North Korean policy

This columnist is fundamentally opposed to the North Korean regime and its nuclearization policy. But ethical opposition to a regime must not lead to underestimating its real capabilities or promoting policies that have failed. The analysis presented here is an attempt to assess the situation honestly as it is — not as one might wish it to be — because clarity about reality is the precondition for any effective policy.

The editorial passages in italics preceded by comments represent the personal opinions of the columnist and should be read as such by the reader.

Sources

Primary sources

Guardian — Exponential expansion of DPRK nuclear programme, surviving a first strike — June 24, 2026

RBC-Ukraine — Kim Jong-un pushes North Korea toward new nuclear level — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

Bloomberg — Kim wants more nuclear forces, the Iranian lesson — June 23, 2026

Straits Times — Kim: DPRK will exercise its position as a nuclear state — June 23, 2026

Chosun — Kim dominate the world, nuclear plenum — June 24, 2026

Washington Post — Kim weapons tests, offensive posture — June 25, 2026