EDITORIAL: Seven Belgian F-16s for Ukraine — the turning point in air superiority

Introduction: when Belgium changes the equation in the sky

The June 2026 confirmation and what it means

In June 2026, Belgium officially confirmed the delivery of 7 F-16s to Ukraine this year — 3 operational and 4 designated for spare parts. This declaration by Minister Theo Francken, published on YouTube on June 23 and reported by ISW in its June 22 assessment, is not spectacular in numerical terms: 7 additional fighters in a conflict that engages thousands of aircraft on both sides. But it is symbolically and operationally significant in ways that numbers alone do not capture.

What matters here is the cumulative effect. Belgium delivers 7 F-16s, Norway has already delivered 6 operational ones. Other countries — the Netherlands, Denmark — have announced further deliveries. Together, according to Francken's own statements, the Western F-16s now form a genuine "real fleet" of military aircraft for Kyiv. This "real fleet" changes the Ukrainian air equation, not all at once but progressively, through accumulation — exactly like the Ukrainian attrition strategy on the ground.

The context of a long-awaited delivery

The delivery of the first F-16s to Ukraine was announced in 2023, expected in 2024, and finally materialized in a significant way in 2025–2026. This delay was due to several factors: training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 system (incomparably more complex than the Soviet Su-27s they operated), establishing maintenance and logistical support infrastructure, and internal political discussions within donor countries on the terms and conditions of the transfer. These delays were rightly criticized by those who argued that every month lost meant lives lost. But the deliveries are now taking place, and their effects on the battlefield are being assessed.

Ukraine received these aircraft in a difficult air context. Russia maintains numerical superiority in aircraft and intensively exploits its ballistic missile and long-range drone capabilities. The F-16s do not eliminate this numerical superiority — they improve it qualitatively, bringing specific capabilities that Soviet Ukrainian aircraft do not possess, particularly in the areas of cruise missile interception and long-range precision strikes.

What the F-16 brings that the Su-27 lacks

The technological difference between two generations

Comparing an American F-16 Fighting Falcon with a Soviet Su-27 Flanker is comparing two philosophies of aeronautical construction separated by a generation of technological development. The Su-27 is a powerful, robust, and maneuverable aircraft — designed in the 1970s to be the best fighter in the Soviet world. The F-16, whose airframe was also designed in the 1970s but whose avionics have been continuously updated, carries electronic systems, radars, and weapons navigation systems that belong to the 21st century.

In concrete terms, the F-16 Block 20/30 delivered to Ukraine integrates active electronically scanned array radars capable of simultaneously managing multiple aerial threats, sophisticated onboard electronic warfare systems, and compatibility with an extended range of precision-guided munitions — including AIM-120 AMRAAM active radar-guided missiles capable of engaging targets at tens of kilometers without maintaining course. These capabilities transform the F-16 into a force multiplier for an air force underequipped in air defense systems.

The proven capability against cruise missiles and drones

Belgium explicitly stated that the F-16s delivered to Ukraine had proven their effectiveness against cruise missiles and drones. This statement is not a sales pitch: it is real-world feedback from Ukrainian pilots who have used these aircraft since their delivery. Intercepting a Kh-101 cruise missile or a Shahed drone requires a combination of early detection, precise radar guidance, and capable interception missiles. The F-16 with its AN/APG-68 radar and AMRAAM missiles provides exactly that combination.

Every Russian cruise missile intercepted by a Ukrainian F-16 is one more power plant that will not be destroyed, one more residential building that will not collapse, more civilians who will not die. The equation is simple but its human significance is immense. The ability of F-16s to defend Ukrainian airspace against standoff attacks cannot be measured in number of aircraft: it is measured in Ukrainian lives preserved.

Norway and building a coherent Western fleet

Six Norwegian F-16s already operational

Norway preceded Belgium in delivering F-16s to Ukraine, with 6 operational aircraft already transferred at the time of the June 2026 statements. These six Norwegian fighters, combined with the seven Belgian ones announced (three immediately operational), are beginning to form the "real fleet" mentioned by Francken. Add the aircraft announced by the Netherlands and Denmark, and Ukraine is heading toward an F-16 fleet that could number several dozen aircraft in operational configuration.

This is not comparable to the fleet of several hundred aircraft that Russia can deploy. But in an air war based on precision rather than mass, the qualitative difference between an F-16 Block 20 and a decade-old Russian Su-30 can compensate for part of the numerical inferiority. Norway drew the lessons from its own progressive withdrawal from the F-16 in favor of the F-35 and ensured that its former fighters would be used by an ally in urgent need rather than being stored or scrapped.

Equipment standardization: an operational advantage

One of the often underestimated advantages of building an F-16 fleet from multiple countries is the growing standardization of equipment, maintenance procedures, and spare parts. When Belgium and Norway deliver the same type of aircraft, Ukrainian technicians trained on one can work on the other. Replacement parts are interchangeable. Maintenance procedures are identical. This standardization reduces logistical complexity, which was one of the major challenges of the Ukrainian air force with its heterogeneous fleet of aging Soviet aircraft.

In the long run, if deliveries continue and accelerate, the Ukrainian air force could progressively migrate toward a fleet entirely based on NATO-compatible aircraft. This transition, beyond its immediate operational value, prepares Ukraine's future integration into the Alliance — whose formal membership is still under discussion but whose military cooperation is already an advanced reality.

Ukrainian Su-27s and JDAM bombs: an asymmetric innovation

Adapting Soviet aircraft to Western munitions

In parallel with F-16 deliveries, the Ukrainian air force continues to adapt its existing Su-27s to fire GBU-62J JDAM-guided bombs — an achievement reported by ISW in its June 24, 2026 assessment. This adaptation, technically complex since it requires integrating Western guidance interfaces into Soviet cockpits, perfectly illustrates the pragmatic and inventive approach of the Ukrainian air force: use everything available, even if it requires sophisticated engineering workarounds.

JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) kits are GPS guidance systems that transform unguided bombs into precision munitions capable of striking with accuracy within a few meters. Mounted on 500, 1,000, or 2,000-pound bombs, they allow a Ukrainian Su-27 to precisely strike hardened targets — bunkers, ammunition depots, command nodes — from high altitudes, out of range of many Russian short-range air defense systems.

The addition of capabilities: F-16 + Su-27 JDAM + drones

The combination of F-16s for interception and air superiority, Su-27s armed with JDAMs for precision strikes, and long-range drones of the Fire Point type for strategic strikes constitutes an increasingly sophisticated aerial architecture for Ukraine. Each component plays a distinct role: F-16s clear the sky of Russian aerial threats, Su-27s strike priority ground targets, and long-range drones attack Russian rear areas without exposing pilots to the risk of aerial combat.

This layered architecture is the equal of those of the conventional air forces of NATO countries, even if its means remain quantitatively inferior. It reveals a capacity for planning and weapons systems integration that has considerably evolved since the first weeks of the war, when the Ukrainian air force was operating largely ad hoc with its outdated Soviet aircraft. Ukraine has learned to fight in the air the way it learned to fight on the ground: with intelligence.

The final Belgian decision: NATO first, Ukraine second

The Atlantic Alliance constraints on transfers

Belgian Minister Francken was explicit on one important condition: the final decision on additional Belgian F-16 transfers depends on Belgium's NATO requirements. This clarification reveals the real tension experienced by NATO countries committing to equipment transfers to Ukraine: every aircraft sent to Kyiv is an aircraft no longer defending Belgian skies, no longer participating in Alliance exercises, and that cannot be recalled if Belgium's own security situation deteriorates.

This tension is not trivial. NATO has minimum capability requirements for each of its members, and these requirements exist for real collective security reasons. An eastern flank of the Alliance weakened by massive equipment transfers to Ukraine creates its own risks. Belgium, by conditioning further transfers on NATO needs, is playing the role of a responsible ally seeking to balance its two commitments: toward Ukraine and toward the Atlantic Alliance.

The transition to the F-35 and its implications for Ukraine

Belgium, like Norway, is in the process of replacing its F-16s with fifth-generation F-35 Lightning IIs. This transition is progressively freeing up F-16s that, while superseded by Belgian and Norwegian standards, are extremely valuable aircraft for Ukraine. This is an example of virtuous strategic recycling: NATO countries modernize their fleets, and their old fighters find an essential second life in the defense of a country fighting for the security of all of Europe.

This F-35 transition dynamic concerns several NATO countries that still operate F-16s and that could free up additional aircraft for Ukraine in the coming years. The Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Poland — several countries have F-16 fleets that will progressively be replaced. If the logic of the Belgian and Norwegian transfers becomes generalized, Ukraine could receive dozens of additional aircraft in the coming years, progressively building an air force truly competitive against Russia.

The impact of F-16s on Ukrainian defensive capabilities

Integrated air defense with Western systems

Ukrainian F-16s do not function in isolation: they integrate into an air defense architecture that includes surface-to-air systems provided by allies — American Patriot, NASAMS, Franco-Italian SAMP/T, modernized HAWK. This integration creates a multi-layer defense network capable of simultaneously handling ballistic threats at high altitude (Patriot), cruise missiles at medium altitude (NASAMS, SAMP/T), and low-altitude drones (F-16, HAWK, short-range systems). The depth of this network is its primary strength.

The complementarity between F-16s and these surface-to-air systems is fundamental. F-16s can be vectored toward threat zones that surface-to-air systems have detected but whose missiles cannot effectively reach. They can also protect surface-to-air batteries against Russian anti-radiation strikes — specialized missiles designed to track radar emissions and destroy air defense systems. By hovering this threat over Russian anti-radiation missile operators, F-16s make the task of suppressing Ukrainian air defense considerably more complex for Moscow.

What local air superiority changes tactically

Even if Ukraine is not in a position to contest Russian air superiority across the entire front, F-16s allow it to establish temporary local air superiority in strategic sectors. This local superiority, maintained for the duration of an offensive operation or a defensive evacuation, fundamentally changes engagement conditions. Ukrainian troops covered by an F-16 overhead do not fear Russian Ka-52 assault helicopters. Logistical convoys covered by fighters do not suffer direct air strikes. This local air protection has enormous operational value that aerial combat statistics do not capture directly.

It also has psychological value. Knowing that a Ukrainian F-16 can appear to defend a position boosts the morale of ground units. And knowing that Russian pilots now risk engagement by Ukrainian F-16s armed with AMRAAM missiles changes their willingness to penetrate Ukrainian airspace for bombing missions. The mere presence of Ukrainian F-16s changes Russian tactical calculations, even without direct engagement.

The policy editorial: the West must accelerate

Slow deliveries as a strategic problem

This editorial must be direct on one point: the slowness of military equipment deliveries to Ukraine is a strategic problem of the first magnitude. Discussions on F-16s began in 2022. The first significant deliveries took place in 2025. Three years of delay in providing an ally — for that is what Ukraine effectively is — with equipment that already existed in allied arsenals. This delay has a cost in human lives that will never be precisely calculated but is real.

The justifications for these delays are multiple and partially valid: pilot training, infrastructure preparation, geopolitical considerations about escalation, NATO's own needs. But examining them one by one, one is forced to acknowledge that firmer political will from 2022 onward could have considerably accelerated the timeline. Ukrainian pilots learned to fly the F-16 in months rather than years. Infrastructure was prepared. Training took place. The feared escalation did not materialize. In hindsight, the delays reflect political reluctance more than technical impossibility.

What this editorial recommends for the future

For the future, this editorial recommends several principles of action for the community of Ukraine's allies. First, accelerate transfers of remaining F-16s from countries transitioning to the F-35, without waiting for new aircraft deliveries to be complete before releasing the old ones. Second, seriously consider delivering fourth-generation F-16s with more modern avionics — the Block 50/52 that some allies still operate — to reinforce Ukrainian deep strike capabilities. Third, establish a formal coordination mechanism for aeronautical transfers, similar to the Ramstein Group for ground systems, to avoid duplication and optimize complementarities.

These recommendations are not utopian. They are grounded in what the international coalition for Ukrainian aid has already accomplished — and what it could accomplish more quickly if the political will were equal to the stakes. The seven Belgian F-16s and the six Norwegian ones are a beginning. They must not remain a ceiling.

The impact on Ukrainian pilots: a professional transformation

Moving from the Su-27 to the F-16: a paradigm shift

For Ukrainian pilots trained on the F-16, the transition from Soviet aircraft represents much more than a platform change. It is a shift in aerial combat philosophy. Soviet combat aircraft were designed for formation-based use, with rigid procedures and predominantly manual flying. The F-16, with its sophisticated onboard computer, intuitive human-machine interface, and long-range guided weapons, rests on a combat doctrine centered on the pilot as the final decision-maker within a very fast information loop.

This transition is not straightforward for pilots who learned to fly according to a different doctrine. The accelerated training programs that several NATO countries offered to Ukrainian pilots had to balance rigor with speed. The results appear positive: Ukrainian F-16s are operational and their pilots have demonstrated their combat effectiveness, notably in the interception missions documented by Belgium. But continuing training remains a key challenge: maintaining competent F-16 pilots in a context of inevitable attrition requires a permanent training pipeline.

Continuing education: a strategic investment

Beyond initial training, the ongoing and advanced training of Ukrainian F-16 pilots and technicians is a long-term strategic investment. It is not only about training pilots for the current war: it is about building aeronautical expertise that will endure after the war and allow Ukraine to maintain a credible air force in the decades ahead. Countries like Romania, Poland, and the Netherlands have offered training capabilities that constitute a valuable infrastructure for this program.

F-16 flight simulators deployed outside Ukrainian territory allow intensive training without risk of losing precious equipment. Combined with supervised training flights in protected airspace, they create a training system that can be adapted to evolving needs. This is a model that should be reinforced and formalized within the framework of bilateral commitments by allied countries with Ukraine.

The political dimension in Belgium and allied capitals

The difficult consensus in Belgium on deliveries

Belgium's decision to deliver 7 F-16s to Ukraine was not without internal debate. Belgium, a founding NATO member and host of its Brussels headquarters, is also a country where the pacifist tradition and cautious public opinion on military commitments create permanent tension with the demands of allied solidarity. Minister Francken, who championed this decision politically, had to navigate between advocates of stronger support for Ukraine and those who feared escalation or were sensitive to arguments about Belgium's own defense needs.

This Belgian debate is representative of what is happening in most allied capitals: permanent tension between awareness that Ukraine is fighting for values Europe shares, and resistance from part of public opinion to engaging further in a distant conflict. Managing this tension is the most delicate political task that allied governments face on the Ukrainian question. Belgium's decision to deliver the 7 F-16s, in this context, is an act of political courage as much as a strategic decision.

European leadership on the question of deliveries

Belgium joins a group of European countries — the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Poland, the Baltic states — that have demonstrated remarkable consistency and firmness in their military support for Ukraine. This group is defining a new standard of European leadership on defense matters, a standard that contrasts with the hesitations of some larger member states. On F-16s, it is medium-sized economies that have led the way — not NATO's large military powers.

This "small countries" leadership on the Ukrainian question is one of the most interesting political dynamics of this conflict. It reveals that geographic proximity to Russia — and therefore a visceral awareness of the threat it represents — is a better predictor of the firmness of support than the country's economic or military size. The Baltic states, Poland, the Scandinavian countries, and now Belgium and the Netherlands understand what a revanchist and aggressive Russia means. This understanding guides their decisions.

The F-16s and NATO accession negotiations

Interoperability as a precondition for accession

Building a Ukrainian F-16 fleet fits into a broader perspective than the current conflict alone: that of Ukraine's future integration into NATO. One of the Alliance's accession criteria is interoperability of equipment and procedures with the forces of existing members. A country whose air force uses F-16s — the same aircraft as Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Greece — is de facto interoperable with a large part of the Alliance, without the costs and delays of a complete equipment transition upon accession.

By delivering F-16s to Ukraine, allied countries are therefore not only reinforcing its current war capabilities: they are investing in the conditions of its future NATO accession. This delivery fits within a logic of progressive integration that advances practically and technically even if the formal political accession process is suspended during the war. When the war ends and accession negotiations resume in full force, Ukraine will already have an army partially integrated to Alliance standards.

Russia facing an increasingly NATO-compatible Ukraine

The supreme irony of Russia's policy of aggression against Ukraine is that it has produced precisely what Moscow claimed to want to prevent: a Ukraine increasingly integrated into NATO, equipped with Western equipment, trained according to Western doctrines, and whose population is more resolutely pro-European and pro-Atlantic than it has ever been in modern history. Every F-16 delivered, every Patriot installed, every pilot trained in a NATO country is a direct and lasting response to Russia's 2022 aggression.

Russia wanted to push NATO away from its borders. It transformed Ukraine — a country that in 2021 still had segments of the population ambivalent about Atlantic integration — into a country unanimously aspiring to that integration and increasingly compatible with it militarily. Putin created the very problem he sought to solve. And the seven Belgian F-16s are one of the many visible proofs of this historic strategic failure.

Critical assessment of effects at the front

What F-16s cannot do

A responsible editorial must also mention what F-16s cannot accomplish. They cannot alone reconquer occupied territories. They cannot compensate for deficits in artillery and infantry on the ground front. They do not change the numerical balance between Russian and Ukrainian air forces — Russia retains considerable quantitative superiority. And they are vulnerable to advanced Russian air defense systems — S-400, S-300, Pantsir — which remain serious threats to Ukrainian pilots.

These limits are real and must be acknowledged to avoid an inflation of expectations that, left unsatisfied, would produce counterproductive political disillusionment. F-16s are a valuable tool among many in the Ukrainian arsenal. They are not a panacea. Their true impact will be measured over time — in the capacity to maintain a coherent air defense over the long term, in the progressive improvement of interception results, and in the psychological deterrence they exert on Russian pilots and planners.

The real numbers and the expected effects

With 3 additional operational Belgian F-16s alongside the 6 Norwegian ones already in service, and accounting for Dutch and Danish aircraft, one arrives at a fleet that could count between 30 and 50 operational aircraft by the end of 2026 if announced deliveries materialize. This figure remains modest against the Russian air force, but it is sufficient to create a significant local deterrent effect, to improve air defense coverage of major Ukrainian cities, and to enable more effective ground support missions in offensive sectors.

The most concrete expected effects in the coming months include: an improvement in cruise missile and Shahed drone interception rates in zones covered by F-16s; an increase in precision strike capabilities through air-to-ground missions using JDAMs and HARM anti-radiation missiles; and a reduction in losses among older Ukrainian Su-27/MiG-29 aircraft on missions where F-16s can take over. These effects will not be spectacular in themselves, but their cumulative weight will progressively shift the aerial balance.

Air power within the framework of the overall strategy

The three pillars of Ukrainian strategy in 2026

The delivery of Belgian F-16s fits within what I call the three pillars of Ukrainian strategy in 2026. The first pillar is active defense: hold the ground front, attrit Russian forces, regain ground progressively. The second is deep strike: disrupt Russian logistics, economic infrastructure, and command at great distances via long-range drones and missiles. The third is progressive dominance of contested spaces: air, sea, electronic — reducing the zones in which Russia operates freely.

F-16s contribute primarily to the first and third pillars. For active defense, they reinforce aerial cover of ground units and reduce the effectiveness of Russian air attacks. For dominance of contested spaces, they contribute to building an extended air denial zone that forces Russian aircraft to operate with more caution and from less effective altitudes. The synergy between these three pillars is the key to Ukrainian strategy, and F-16s are an important link in it.

What air superiority would achieve if attained

The ultimate goal of the build-up of F-16s and other Ukrainian aerial capabilities is not to equal the Russian air force in numbers — it is to achieve local and temporary air superiority sufficient to support significant ground offensive operations. The history of modern wars shows that air power is the decisive multiplier of ground operations: the 1991 Iraqi campaign, the Balkans operations, and more recently campaigns against Daesh all demonstrated that ground troops operating under benign air cover can accomplish in weeks what would take months without that cover.

If Ukraine can establish this local air cover in key sectors of the front, the announced and prepared counter-offensives could unfold under significantly more favorable conditions than they have until now. The seven Belgian F-16s are not the key to Ukrainian victory. But they are part of it. And that is why their delivery deserves this editorial.

Integrating the F-16 into the Ukrainian air defense doctrine

An essential piece in the puzzle of aerial sovereignty

The integration of F-16s into Ukrainian air defense goes beyond the simple question of the number of aircraft available. These versatile fighters bring Ukraine a rapid reaction capability against cruise missiles and Shahed drones that did not exist with Soviet aircraft. Their AN/APG-66 radar and modern electronic countermeasures suite make them significantly more effective than Ukrainian MiG-29s and Su-27s in detecting and intercepting low-altitude targets. Every F-16 added to the fleet is an additional threat that Russian pilots and operators must factor into their mission calculations.

The demonstrated capability of Ukrainian Su-27s equipped with GBU-62J JDAM to precisely strike ground targets opens an even more interesting perspective: F-16s equipped with precision-guided munitions could transform the situation along the lines of contact, providing Ukrainian infantry with close air support of unprecedented precision. This air-ground synergy is one of the most sought-after capabilities by the Ukrainian military since the conflict began.

The challenges of training and maintenance under wartime conditions

Training Ukrainian pilots on F-16s in wartime presents considerable logistical and operational challenges. The conversion time for a pilot accustomed to Soviet aircraft to an advanced fourth-generation Western aircraft is generally estimated at several months of intensive training. In the context of an ongoing war, this training takes place partly abroad — in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark — and partly on Ukrainian territory, with all the risks that entails.

The maintenance of these aircraft represents an even more complex challenge. F-16s require a sophisticated technical support infrastructure — spare parts, specialized tooling, personnel trained to NATO standards — that does not yet exist in Ukraine at the level required. This is precisely why Belgian Minister Francken confirmed the dispatch of 3 operational aircraft and 4 for parts: the aircraft cannibalized for parts allow operational aircraft to remain in service in a context where the standard supply chain is disrupted by the war.

The political and diplomatic dimension of the F-16 transfer

The signal sent to Moscow by European capitals

The confirmation of the Belgian F-16 transfer in June 2026, combined with the six Norwegian F-16s already delivered, sends a strong political signal to Moscow: Western allies have no intention of capping their military support for Ukraine, and the red lines brandished by the Kremlin no longer produce the paralyzing effect they had at the start of the conflict. Every delivery of sophisticated Western armament is a demonstration that Europe has drawn lessons from its initial hesitations and is determined to see its commitment to Ukraine through to the end.

This political evolution is significant: it reflects a growing consensus among European governments that Russia's defeat in Ukraine is a necessary condition for the continent's collective security. The hesitations that characterized the first years of the conflict — fear of escalation, hope for a negotiated de-escalation, reluctance to deliver offensive weapons systems — have progressively given way to a full-commitment doctrine of which F-16s are the most visible expression.

Industrial stakes and the revival of European defense

The transfer of F-16s to Ukraine fits within a broader context of European defense re-industrialization. The conflicts in Ukraine have clearly demonstrated that European military equipment stocks were largely insufficient to sustain a prolonged attrition conflict. European governments launched emergency armament acquisition programs, increased their defense budgets, and sought to rebuild industrial capabilities that had been reduced after the end of the Cold War.

In this context, transferring F-16s to Ukraine fulfills a dual function: it directly reinforces Ukrainian capabilities while freeing up acquisition slots for new aircraft in the donor countries' air forces. Belgium, for example, is in the process of transitioning to the F-35 to replace its aging F-16s. By ceding some of these aircraft to Ukraine, it accelerates its own modernization while contributing to the collective defense effort — a win-win calculation that other European countries are beginning to replicate.

Editorial conclusion: accelerate, coordinate, commit

This editorial's position is clear

This editorial takes a clear stand: the 7 Belgian F-16s and the 6 Norwegian F-16s are a valuable and welcome contribution to Ukraine's defense. They represent a concrete political and military commitment that this editorial salutes without reservation. And it explicitly calls for an acceleration and broadening of that commitment: more aircraft, faster, with fewer restrictive conditions on their use, to allow Ukraine to truly build the aerial fleet it needs to defend its territory and contribute to Europe's collective security.

The war in Ukraine is not only a war for Ukrainians. It is a war for European values, for the principle of territorial integrity, for the right of peoples to choose their destiny. Every F-16 delivered to Kyiv is a concrete affirmation of these values by the countries that share them. Seven aircraft is insufficient. It is nonetheless a signal. And signals matter.

The editorial that will remain a waiting

In six months, in a year, I would like to return to this question and note that Ukraine's F-16 fleet numbers 60, 70, 80 operational aircraft. That the pilots are trained, maintenance assured, and cruise missile interception missions multiplying with documented results. I would like to note that the seven Belgian F-16s were the beginning of a dynamic, not its limit. For that, allied governments must continue making difficult decisions, resist deconfliction pressures with Moscow, and place the security of Ukraine — and therefore of Europe — at the top of their priorities. Ukrainian pilots in their F-16s are doing their part. It falls to us to do ours.

The final decision on additional Belgian transfers depends on NATO needs, said Francken. Very well. Let NATO make the serious calculation of what it needs — and let it integrate into that calculation that Ukraine, by resisting, protects its eastern flank better than any other defensive arrangement. The F-16s defending Kyiv's skies also defend Brussels' skies.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Sources and method

This editorial relies on the factual data of the file: confirmation in June 2026 by Belgium of the delivery of 7 F-16s (3 operational + 4 for parts) per Minister Francken's declaration; 6 Norwegian F-16s already delivered; formation of a "real fleet" per Francken; Ukrainian Su-27s armed with JDAM GBU-62J bombs per ISW of June 24; F-16 effectiveness against missiles and drones confirmed by Belgium; final decision on further transfers conditional on NATO needs. All these facts come from the sources identified in the file.

This editorial expresses the columnist's position. It is explicitly partisan in favor of military support for Ukraine and the acceleration of equipment deliveries. This bias is assumed and declared: this is not a neutral analysis but an engaged editorial viewpoint, consistent with this publication's editorial line.

Limits and precautions

The author is not a military aeronautical expert. Technical comparisons between F-16 and Su-27 are generalizations based on open sources. For in-depth technical analyses of comparative aeronautical capabilities, specialized publications from the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) or Jane's Defence Weekly are more appropriate references. This editorial does not aim to substitute for those analyses — it seeks to make the political and strategic stakes accessible to a broad audience.

Projections on future F-16 deliveries (30 to 50 operational aircraft by end 2026) are estimates based on available announcements and do not constitute verified information on firm commitments.

Sources

Primary sources

YouTube — Belgian Minister Francken's statement on the delivery of 7 F-16s to Ukraine — June 23, 2026

ISW — Context of Ukrainian air power and operations analysis — June 22, 2026

Secondary sources

RBC-Ukraine — Ukrainian strike campaign, aerial context — June 24, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Multi-oblast strikes, air defense context — June 23, 2026

ISW — Aerial assessment and JDAM-armed Su-27s — June 24, 2026

Al Jazeera — Context of the Ukraine-Russia air war — June 19, 2026