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The ColumnEditorial· No. 145

EDITORIAL: Ukrainian Ballistic Missiles Will Change Everything—Fedorov’s Gamble

On June 16, 2026, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Defense, launched a sentence over the airwaves of TSN that resonated like a

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Key takeaways
  1. On June 16, 2026, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Defense, launched a sentence over the airwaves of TSN that resonated like a
  2. Introduction: A Minister Who Talks Like a Strategist, Not a Bureaucrat
  3. The Statement That Changes Everything
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Facts, quotes, and cited links remain in the body. Interpretations are framed as analysis or opinion according to the format.

Introduction: A Minister Who Talks Like a Strategist, Not a Bureaucrat

The Statement That Changes Everything

On June 16, 2026, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Defense, launched a sentence over the airwaves of TSN that resonated like a cannon shot: “Ukrainian ballistics will change everything in this war. It will fundamentally change Ukraine’s status in the world.” This isn't some hollow promise. This isn't political marketing. This is a declaration from a strategist who knows exactly where he’s going—and who, for the first time since the start of the total war, can say without lying that funding is secured.

In the same interview, Fedorov quoted his president: “Ukrainian ballistics will exist. And it will strike Russia.” Two sentences. No conditionals. No maybes. Zelensky and Fedorov are now talking about ballistic sovereignty as a fait accompli currently being delivered. “There is absolutely no problem on the financial side,” the minister added. This level of clarity is unprecedented since the start of the conflict.

Why This Announcement Is Historically Significant

Since 2022, Ukraine has been forced to ask for every weapon, every missile, every shell—with the delays, hesitations, and political conditions that follow. The national ballistic program represents a break from this structural dependence. Fedorov and Zelensky have understood that true sovereignty begins with the ability to strike without permission. This announcement places Ukraine in another strategic category—no longer the country begging for weapons, but the one manufacturing them.

This shift isn’t just military—it’s psychological, diplomatic, and industrial. Ukraine’s allies will no longer be able to exert the same type of pressure on Kyiv if they no longer hold the keys to its offensive capability. It is a fundamental rebalancing of the power dynamics within the Western coalition itself. And Fedorov knows it. That is precisely why he is announcing it publicly, clearly, and without ambiguity.

Fedorov, the Architect of a Ukrainian Military Revolution

A Minister Unlike the Rest

Mykhailo Fedorov is not a general fresh out of a Soviet military academy. He entered the Ukrainian government as the Minister of Digital Transformation, the man behind civilian drones turned war drones, the man who transformed a 20th-century army into a 21st-century tech force. Appointed Minister of Defense in January 2026, he immediately changed the rules of the game. He introduced competitive bidding, a data-driven logic in acquisitions, and the conviction that war is now won in the lab before it is won on the front lines.

His tenure at the helm of Defense has already produced measurable results. The ePoints system delivered 181,000 drones and combat equipment to frontline units in 2026. He launched the “Logistics Lockdown” program to systematically destroy Russian logistics in the rear. He held closed meetings with journalists to present numerical results—an exercise in transparency and accountability rare in a wartime context.

The Transformation in Numbers: What Fedorov Has Accomplished Since January 2026

The results are documented. In a few months, Fedorov has reformed acquisition procedures, halted purchases of short-range shells to concentrate resources on long-range artillery (over 30 km), launched the first major tender for large-scale drones, and initiated an army reform with a budget of 60 billion hryvnias—funded entirely through internal savings at the ministry. This isn't a speech. It's a roadmap being executed.

For the future, Fedorov announced that Ukraine will maintain its advantage on the battlefield for at least six months. This statement, made on June 16, 2026, on TSN, is based on real data: the improved quality of drones, the transformation of weapon logistics, and the introduction of a new combat reality favorable to the Defense Forces. Behind every number, there is a human fighting—and Fedorov seems never to forget that.

Fire Point: The Startup That Could Change Geopolitics

A “Made in Ukraine” Missile Ecosystem

At the heart of Fedorov's gamble is a company: Fire Point. Founded in 2022, at the start of the full-scale invasion, this Ukrainian firm has developed a complete family of war munitions in less than four years—from light drones to ballistic missiles capable of striking Moscow. The Flamingo (FP-5) cruise missile, with its 3,000 km range and 1,150 kg warhead, has already struck a military factory in Cheboksary, over 900 km from the Ukrainian borders. This is no longer research—it is real combat action.

On the night of June 17–18, 2026, a Fire Point FP-1 drone struck the Moscow oil refinery, while the FP-7 and FP-9 were being exhibited at the Eurosatory 2026 trade show in Paris. Video of the attack played on a loop on the stand's giant screen. This coincidence, noted by EDR Magazine journalist Paolo Valpolini, “generated even greater interest” around the company's products. When your sales demonstration doubles as a live attack against the enemy, the product's credibility no longer needs proving.

Co-founder Shtilerman: The Voice of the Engineer Who Doesn't Bluff

Denys Shtilerman, co-founder and chief designer of Fire Point, is not a marketing man. In an interview with Army TV, he presented the specifications of the FP-9 without artifice: an 855 km range, 2,200 m/s top speed, 800 kg warhead, 70 km flight altitude, and 20-meter precision. And a target explicitly named after the first successful test flight: Moscow. Shtilerman also mentioned that Vladimir Putin’s birthplace, Saint Petersburg, falls within the operational range of the FP-9. This wasn't a rhetorical threat. It was technical data.

The FP-9 has “absolutely everything except the engine,” according to Shtilerman in June 2026. Engineers are finalizing the development of the propulsion system—a solid-fuel engine with a thrust of 37,000 kgf, a propellant mass of 4,700 kg, and a burn time of about ten seconds. This engine was, in fact, physically present at Eurosatory 2026, on display for defense professionals from around the world. Not a lab prototype—a production engine being finalized.

The FP-9: Characteristics of a Strategic Game-Changer

Technical Specs That Reconfigure the Power Balance

The figures released during the Eurosatory 2026 show are staggering. The FP-9 is a ballistic missile 9.5 meters long and 1.1 meters in diameter. It is designed to deliver an 800 kg warhead over an operational range of 800 to 855 km, at speeds exceeding 1,200 m/s—which is more than 7,500 km/h. With a precision of 20 meters. Its range puts Moscow and Saint Petersburg within direct reach of Ukrainian territory. This weapon, if it enters service, is a strategic paradigm shift.

Its 855 km range is nearly twice that of the Russian Iskander-M. Its 800 kg payload makes it one of the heaviest in its category. Its 70 km apogee makes interception extremely difficult for conventional anti-missile systems. To counter the FP-9, only the Russian S-400 and S-500—rare systems in limited numbers—could technically attempt an interception. And even they, according to experts, do not have a dense enough network to protect the entire Russian territory against multiple, simultaneous strikes.

The Solid-Fuel Engine: An Engineering Challenge Solved

The propulsion of the FP-9 relies on a solid-propellant rocket motor whose characteristics were unveiled at Eurosatory 2026. The thrust reaches 37,000 kgf. The critical nozzle diameter measures 190 mm. The casing is manufactured using continuous filament winding of carbon fiber and epoxy resin—a precision engineering technique normally reserved for major space powers. The total length of the motor is 5,102 mm, with a total mass of 5,270 kg, including 4,700 kg of propellant. The burn time is approximately ten seconds—enough to give the payload the necessary velocity.

This level of industrial precision, achieved by a company founded in 2022 in a country at war, is truly remarkable. It testifies to the depth of the Ukrainian engineering pool—a legacy of the Soviet space industry that Kyiv never lost and which today constitutes one of its major strategic assets. This engine is not imported. It is not developed with foreign aid. It is entirely Ukrainian.

The FP-7: The Operational Missile Already in the Starting Blocks

From Ukrainian ATACMS to Anti-Ballistic Interceptor

While the FP-9 finishes its engine development, the FP-7 has already entered its final phase. This operational-tactical ballistic missile performed its first controlled test flights in February 2026. With a declared range of 200 to 300 km (depending on the payload configuration), a precision of 14 meters, and a top speed of 1,500 m/s, it constitutes the direct Ukrainian alternative to American ATACMS missiles. During its launch, it performs trajectory corrections—meaning the flight is fully controlled. Fire Point didn't wait for Washington's permission to replicate, improve, and deploy this type of capability.

According to EDR Magazine, the FP-7 is technically based on the Russian S-400 missile—a biting irony. Ukraine is using the enemy's technology as the basis for a weapon intended to strike back at them. With a 200 kg payload, a 250 km range, a 50 km apogee, and a flight time of 250 seconds, it gives the Ukrainian army an immediate deep-strike capability—without depending on American or European stockpiles.

The Freyja: Anti-Ballistic Ambition at One-Third the Price of the Patriot

What makes the FP-7 even more remarkable is its dual purpose. The true final goal for the FP-7 is to become an interceptor missile—capable of intercepting incoming aerial threats at a distance. It will be the primary munition for the Freyja system, the Ukrainian anti-ballistic shield developed in partnership with Diehl Defence (Germany) and MBDA (France/Europe). Fire Point’s ambition is explicit: to create a system equivalent to the American Patriot, but at a third of the cost. The first launch in interceptor configuration is planned by the end of 2027.

For the anti-missile version of the FP-7, Fire Point is exploring the integration of a thrust vectoring system to allow for better maneuverability in the first phase of flight. The payload could be reduced to 150 kg to increase acceleration and interception capability. The partnership with Hensoldt (Germany) on the FREYJA system was formalized by a memorandum of understanding—the first brick of a future European anti-ballistic shield co-developed with Ukraine.

Zelensky, Fedorov and the Doctrine of Sovereignty Through Strike

A Doctrine That Breaks With Dependence

There is deep logic behind what Fedorov is announcing. It’s not just a matter of armament—it’s a state doctrine. Since 2022, Ukraine has learned the hard way about the mortal danger of dependence on Western supplies. Every delay in shell delivery, every Washington hesitation before the ATACMS, every ally's veto on deep strikes has cost Ukrainian lives. The response from Zelensky and Fedorov is clear: never again. Ukraine must be able to strike on its own, with its own weapons, according to its own strategic logic.

General Syrskyi approved a Concept for the Development of Missile and Artillery Forces in June 2026, officially enshrining this doctrine. This document plans for the development of national ballistic and cruise missiles capable of hitting targets up to 2,000 km away. Combined with unmanned systems, this capability will allow for the destruction of targets deep within Russian territory. It is the end of the era of begging—and the beginning of the era of strategic sovereignty.

Zelensky as the Political Architect of the Break

Volodymyr Zelensky laid the political groundwork for this break long before June 2026. As early as late May 2026, he stated that Ukraine was “advancing the idea of its own ballistics and a European anti-ballistic system,” despite resistance from some states and competition in the defense sector. At the Ramstein meeting on June 18, 2026, he hammered home a message to the allies: “We must strengthen the defense against ballistics before winter.” Zelensky is no longer waiting. He is instructing. He is demanding. He is delivering.

This transformation of the Ukrainian president—from a leader seeking aid to a leader dictating terms—is one of the greatest geopolitical surprises of these four years of war. His moral strength, supported by real military results and largely favorable global opinion, now gives him a strategic authority that few world leaders can claim. Fedorov is the operational tool of this vision. And together, they are moving forward.

Funding Secured: A Major Political Signal

Putting Money Where Their Mouth Is

Fedorov isn't just making promises—he’s delivering concrete guarantees. “There is absolutely no problem on the financial side of developing Ukrainian ballistics,” he told TSN. And to support this statement, the numbers follow: the 2027 budget includes lines dedicated to the development of long-range weaponry. At the Ramstein summit on June 18, 2026, Ukraine secured a global aid package of about $4 billion, including $1 billion for the PURL program (anti-ballistic missiles), $500 million for long-range artillery (30+ km), and the 700 Ruta cruise missiles promised by the Netherlands.

This isn’t just foreign aid—it’s a strategic investment in a growing Ukrainian industrial ecosystem. The agreement signed at the same Ramstein meeting between Fedorov and his German counterpart Boris Pistorius provides for the joint Ukrainian-German development of anti-ballistic systems. Germany is funding the production of thousands of TerMIT unmanned ground vehicles. Ukraine provides its real-time combat expertise. This model of war-industry co-development is unprecedented in recent military history.

Ramstein, June 18, 2026: The Meeting That Confirms the Trend

Fedorov arrived at NATO headquarters in Brussels with concrete field data on deep-strike operations. Not promises—real numbers, measurable results. “We showed concrete results in numbers on deep-strike operations,” he stated after the meeting. This data-driven approach, applied to military diplomacy, produced one of the largest aid packages announced since the start of the invasion. Allies are no longer giving out of solidarity—they are investing because Ukraine demonstrates its effectiveness.

The Ramstein dynamic in June 2026 marks a qualitative turning point: partners are directing their support toward exactly Fedorov's three priorities—anti-ballistics and missile defense, long-range artillery, and Ukrainian drones. “It's a qualitative shift in our partners' support,” the minister summarized. The convergence between Ukrainian needs and ally commitments is now nearly perfect. That wasn't the case a year ago.

Eurosatory 2026: Ukraine Redefines the Military Industrial Standard

From 10 to 80 Defense Companies in One Show

The Eurosatory 2026 show in Paris became a powerful symbolic moment. Ukraine was present there with 80 defense companies—up from 10 at the last edition. Fire Point created a sensation by exhibiting its FP-5 Flamingo, FP-7, and FP-9 missiles side-by-side before professionals from all over the world. The Ukrainian stand also hosted a 3,000 km missile and a drone with a 1,600 km range. The progress is dizzying: a company born in 2022 exhibiting a complete family of world-class weapon systems in Paris by 2026.

Day 4 of the show took on a special dimension: on the night of June 17–18, a Ukrainian FP-1 drone struck the Moscow oil refinery. Video of the attack ran on a loop on the large screen behind the exhibited missiles. The coincidence, says the EDR Magazine journalist, “generated even greater interest in the stand.” When your sales pitch is coupled with real warfare against the designated enemy, the product's credibility is beyond question.

The Strategic Message of Eurosatory: Ukraine Is No Longer a Defense Customer

This moment perfectly embodies the new reality: Ukraine no longer comes to Eurosatory as a country asking for weapons. It comes as a producer, an innovator, and a full-fledged industrial partner. Its systems are already tested in real combat conditions—no other exhibitor can make that claim with such legitimacy. The phrase from EDR Magazine is telling: “time-to-market expression is translated into time-to-frontline”. In Ukraine, the delay between design and combat deployment is measured in months, not years.

The partnerships announced at Eurosatory confirm Ukraine's new position. MBDA is assisting Fire Point in missile development. Diehl Defence is exploring cooperation for the production of Flamingo missiles. Hensoldt is collaborating on the FREYJA system. These names—flagships of the European defense industry—are not signing partnerships with a country in distress. They are signing with an innovation hub that has proven its value on the ground. The power balance in the European defense industry is being rewritten.

The Oreshnik and the Russian Ballistic Challenge: Why Ukraine Must Retaliate

May 23, 2026: The Most Destructive Night of the Year

To understand the urgency of the Ukrainian ballistic program, one must look squarely at what Russia is doing. On the night of May 23–24, 2026, Russia launched the most massive attack of the year against Ukraine: 90 missiles (including 36 ballistic) and 600 drones. Among them was an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile—used for the first time against Kyiv. This device, equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), with each cluster carrying six kinetic rods, struck Bila Tserkva. Ukraine shot down 91.5% of the drones and 81.5% of the cruise missiles—but only 36.7% of the Iskander-M ballistic missiles.

The Oreshnik itself is almost uninterceptable with current means. Its intermediate ballistic trajectory, its speed, and its multiple warheads exceed available defense capabilities. Fedorov is clear on this point: “Massive ballistic strikes on central Kyiv indicate the weakness of the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin personally,” he told TSN. But clarity doesn't protect a city. The reality is that Russia possesses an asymmetrical ballistic capability that Ukraine cannot yet counter or replicate. The FP-9 program is the direct response to this asymmetry.

The Ukrainian Response: Symmetrical Deterrence and the Resilience of Russian Industry

Russia can produce between 60 and 100 missiles per month according to experts, despite sanctions and Ukrainian strikes on its military industry. It even uses missiles with export markings—normally destined for India—to strike Kyiv. “These missiles were meant for export, but Russia didn't send them to India. It sent them to hit our cities,” a military analyst summarized. This resilience of the Russian war industry makes Ukraine's dependence on foreign anti-missile deliveries structurally dangerous.

The solution, for Fedorov, is symmetrical deterrence: showing Moscow that every ballistic strike on Ukraine will lead to a Ukrainian ballistic strike on Russian territory. This principle, well understood by Putin, has historically always functioned as a brake on escalation. A ballistically sovereign Ukraine isn't more dangerous to peace—it is more deterrent. And deterrence is the least bad option available when facing a regime that only understands force.

The Western Coalition: From Support to Shared Investment

Ramstein and the Qualitative Pivot of Allied Aid

The 35th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ramstein format) at NATO headquarters in Brussels on June 18, 2026, marks a qualitative turning point. Fedorov arrived there with concrete field data on deep-strike operations—numbers, results, a demonstration of the effectiveness of previous investments. The meeting produced one of the largest aid packages announced since the start of the full-scale invasion. For the first time, allies are massively directing their support toward the three technological priorities defined by Kyiv: anti-ballistics, long-range artillery, and Ukrainian drones.

The Netherlands announced 700 Ruta cruise missiles. Germany is funding the anti-ballistic co-development agreement with Fire Point. Great Britain committed to 150,000 drones. These figures no longer represent emergency aid—they represent a structural redirection of the European defense industry toward Ukrainian needs. Fedorov predicted that allies would align their support with these three priorities. He was right.

The Danish Model: Sovereign Purchase That Changes Everything

Among the financing mechanisms, the “Danish model” has become the structural framework for Ukraine's industrial transformation. This mechanism allows partner nations to purchase capabilities directly from the Ukrainian defense industry, thereby funding the ramp-up of producers like Fire Point, but also manufacturers of drones, artillery, and electronic warfare equipment. Canada has contributed about $190 million to it. Ukraine doesn't just receive funds from this—it gains in production volume and industrial competitiveness.

This model is fundamentally different from traditional aid. When a country buys a Ukrainian missile via the Danish model, it isn't giving—it is buying a combat-proven capability at a competitive cost. Ukraine is becoming an official defense supplier for NATO nations. The circle is complete: the most threatened country in Europe is becoming one of its primary armament producers. It is a silent but profound revolution in the continent's security architecture.

The PAC-3 Dependence: The Crisis Accelerating Sovereignty

90% of Anti-Ballistic Capabilities Come From Abroad

Here is the paradox at the heart of Fedorov's strategy: today, Ukraine receives more than 90% of its anti-ballistic capabilities via the PURL mechanism—mainly PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles for Patriot batteries. This means that a break in the Western supply chain can immediately disarm the country's most critical defenses. This dependence is not theoretical—it was documented during discussions between Fedorov and his Canadian counterpart David McGuinty on June 16, 2026, specifically concerning the shortage of PAC-3s and ways to address it via the JUMPSTART mechanism (funded by Germany).

France was also approached. Fedorov met with French Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin on June 11, 2026, to accelerate the delivery of Aster-30 missiles and radars. “One of the urgent priorities for strengthening air defense,” he summarized. Ukraine is searching everywhere, urgently, to reduce a vulnerability that Putin deliberately exploits. But for Fedorov, the final solution isn't in external deliveries—it's in national production. Imported PAC-3s are a bandage; the Freyja and the FP-9 are the cure.

JUMPSTART and Transatlantic Financing Mechanisms

The JUMPSTART mechanism, funded by Germany, is specifically structured to support PAC-3 missile deliveries to Ukraine. On February 4, 2026, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified a $105 million foreign military sale to Ukraine, funded by JUMPSTART capital, structured around upgrading M901 launchers to the M903 standard compatible with PAC-3 MSE missiles. This complex financial architecture—Germany funds, USA delivers, Ukraine operates—illustrates both the strength of the coalition and its structural fragility in the event of a political break in any of the three links.

This is precisely why the Ukrainian Freya program is not competition for the Patriot—it is a strategic life insurance policy. Ukraine is building its own capability not because it rejects Western support, but because it can no longer afford to depend on it exclusively. Fedorov says it with clarity: three priorities, the first of which is anti-ballistics, and the long-term goal is for Ukraine to produce for itself what it receives from the outside today. It’s a ten-year vision. But the foundations are being laid now.

The Syrskyi Concept: The 2,000 km Vision

A Military Doctrine Focused on Autonomous Strike

General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, approved a Concept for the Development of Missile and Artillery Forces in June 2026 that gives a sense of the scale of Ukrainian ambition. This official document plans for the completion of development and mass production of domestic ballistic and cruise missiles. In combination with unmanned systems, Ukraine is aiming for the ability to destroy targets 2,000 km from its territory. The Flamingo FP-5, with its declared 3,000 km range, already theoretically exceeds this bar.

This doctrine carries an unofficial but telling name: sovereignty through strike. It posits that a country can only be truly sovereign if it is capable of deterring an adversary through the credible threat of a deep strike—without depending on a third party's authorization. For Ukraine, surrounded by a nuclear and conventionally superior Russia, it is a matter of structural survival. And this Concept isn't staying theoretical—it is budgeted, organized into concrete work programs, with milestones and identified funding lines.

The Political Significance of the Syrskyi Concept

This official document also sends a strong political message to the allies: Ukraine isn't asking for perpetual protection—it is asking for the time and resources to build its own protection. This posture is both more credible and more sustainable than that of an eternally dependent country. It shows Western partners that their investments will lead to a strategically autonomous Ukraine—a security partner, not a permanent burden. This is exactly the type of argument that resonates in Brussels, Berlin, and Washington.

The Syrskyi Concept also provides for the development of domestic long-range artillery and missile artillery capable of integrating into the Ukrainian deep-strike system. The goal isn't just to strike far—it's to create a strike continuum from the front lines to a depth of 2,000 km. This kind of coverage, if realized, radically transforms Moscow’s strategic calculation. Putin will no longer be able to rely on the depth of his territory as a shield.

Ukraine, a New Defense Power: A Change in Global Status

From Military Customer to Tech Partner

What Fedorov understood—and what the West is slowly beginning to digest—is that Ukraine is experiencing a military industrial revolution in real time. In less than four years, this country has developed strike drones capable of reaching Moscow (FP-1), a 3,000 km cruise missile (FP-5 Flamingo), a 300 km operational ballistic missile (FP-7), and an 855 km strategic ballistic missile in final testing phase (FP-9). No Western country has developed such a complete range in so little time. Ukraine has transformed an existential emergency into an industrial competitive advantage.

This change is recognized by the most serious industrial players. MBDA, the European missile consortium, is now assisting Fire Point. Diehl Defence is exploring cooperation on the Flamingo. Hensoldt is working on the Freyja. These partnerships are not acts of charity—they are industrial investment decisions based on the rigorous assessment of a competent partner. Ukraine has moved out of the "aided country" category and into the “collaborating country” category.

The New “League” Fedorov Talks About: Ukraine as the Reference Standard

When Fedorov says that Ukrainian ballistics will place his country in “another league,” he isn't using the expression out of vanity. He uses it in a precise sense: powers capable of striking autonomously at more than 800 km belong to a very select club—the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Israel. If Ukraine enters it, its diplomatic credibility, its value to NATO, and its position in eventual peace negotiations are transformed from top to bottom. A country that can strike Moscow without permission is no longer treated as a supplicant.

This status transformation is already underway. Ukraine is now recognized as a global pioneer in combat drones, an innovator in anti-drone systems, and soon as a producer of ballistic missiles. This journey over four years has no precedent in modern history. It is the result of the combination of existential urgency, an exceptional pool of engineers, unwavering political will—and men like Fedorov, who knew how to turn a crisis into a motor for innovation.

Conclusion: Fedorov Is Right—And That’s Where Everything Changes

The Gamble Is Bold, the Foundations Are Real

Mykhailo Fedorov is no dream-seller. He is the minister of a country at war that has learned to transform every constraint into a competitive advantage, every shortage into forced innovation. When he says that “Ukrainian ballistics will change everything,” he isn't talking about some distant hypothesis. He’s talking about a program that is funded, documented, already partially tested, exhibited before the entire world at Eurosatory 2026, backed by an interstate agreement with Germany, and integrated into a national military concept approved by the commander-in-chief. The convergence of these elements is rare in history. This time, it is real.

The real stake of the Ukrainian ballistic program isn't just military—it’s civilizational. The path to sovereignty through strike is also the path to national dignity for a people who refuse to let others decide when and how they can defend themselves. Zelensky summarized it once: “Ukrainian ballistics will be here. And it will strike Russia.” These words are no longer a promise—they are a schedule. And Fedorov, with an engineer's rigor and a strategist's vision, is delivering on it.

The End of Dependence—The Beginning of a New Era

A Ukraine capable of striking autonomously, of defending its skies with its own interceptors, of deterring without asking for permission from Washington or Brussels, is a Ukraine that has changed categories in the concert of nations. This is precisely what Fedorov means by “another league.” And it is precisely what Putin fears most: not a Ukraine armed by the West, but a Ukraine armed by itself, with its own industry, its own financing, and its own doctrine. This scenario—sovereignty through strike—is now in motion.

The Russia can occupy territories. It can terrorize populations. It can launch Oreshniks at Kyiv. But it cannot erase what Ukraine is building in its labs, its factories, its engineering workshops. The FP-9 to be tested this summer won't just be a missile—it will be living proof that Ukrainian resistance has crossed an irreversible threshold. And nothing, absolutely nothing, can stop it.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

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Cite this article

Maxime Marquette (2026). EDITORIAL: Ukrainian Ballistic Missiles Will Change Everything—Fedorov’s Gamble. MadMax. https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-les-missiles-balistiques-ukrainiens-changeront-tout-le-pari-de-fedorov-2

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Maxime Marquette
Independent columnist

Maxime Marquette writes most of the analyses and columns published on MadMax — geopolitics, technology, and current events, no filler.

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Editorial4889 words31 min read