EDITORIAL: The Starmer Plot and 192 Attacks — Putin Declares War on Europe

EDITORIAL: The Starmer Plot and 192 Attacks — Putin Declares War on Europe

Introduction: Two men convicted, a signal that must change how we think about the Russian threat

London, June 19, 2026 — the day "El Money" entered British judicial history

On June 19, 2026, a British court convicted two men for having set fire to properties belonging to Prime Minister Keir Starmer. What could have been an ordinary criminal case took on a strategic dimension when prosecutors revealed that this conspiracy was directed by a Russian-speaking figure known as "El Money" — an intermediary who had recruited the executors and coordinated the operation from outside the United Kingdom. The former head of the Metropolitan Police's counterterrorism unit was explicit: the case matched the documented pattern of Russian state sabotage. This is not an opinion. It is a professional diagnosis rendered by someone who has spent decades studying these methods.

I want to be precise about what this means. Two men convicted in the United Kingdom for attempting to intimidate the Prime Minister of an allied democracy on the alleged orders of a Russian-speaking operative. Simultaneously, a 48-year-old man born in Belarus arrested in Toulouse for filming a Delair drone prototype. Simultaneously, an attempted sabotage of an SNCF electrical transformer. And behind all of it, the figure that should finally wake us up: at least 192 documented Russian attacks in Europe since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Four years. 192 attacks. Nearly one per week. It is time to call it what it is: a war.

What the Starmer affair reveals about Russia's doctrine of intimidating Western leaders

Targeting a Prime Minister's home is not an act of ordinary criminality. It is an act of political warfare. It sends a calculated message to the entire Western political leadership: your support for Ukraine has personal consequences for you. This is the same logic that drove the poisoning of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018: demonstrating that Russia can reach its enemies even on Western territory. The difference is the escalation. In 2018, they targeted a former Russian spy. In 2026, they went after the properties of a sitting head of government. The impunity Moscow perceives grows with each operation that democracies leave without a proportionate response.

British prosecutors referred to "El Money" as the Russian-speaking coordinator of the conspiracy. This type of intermediary — maintaining distance between local executors and Russian principals — is the classic operational signature of the GRU and the FSB in their active operations in Europe. Plausible deniability is built into the very architecture of the operations: always enough distance between Moscow and the acts for Russia to deny officially, while ensuring the message is clearly received. This operational model has been documented in dozens of cases. There is nothing hypothetical about it.

192 attacks — the number Europe still refuses to truly hear

What 192 attacks in four years concretely mean for our democracies

The Associated Press has documented at least 192 Russian attacks in Europe since the Ukrainian invasion of 2022. This figure is not a geopolitical abstraction. Each unit of that counter represents a concrete action: an arson, a sabotage, an attempted assassination, a cyberattack on critical infrastructure, a coordinated disinformation campaign, a local agent recruited for collection or intimidation purposes. 192 actions. Four years. On the territory of nations nominally at peace. Targeting political leaders, defense industrialists, critical infrastructure, media outlets, embassies.

For context: during the Cold War, Soviet active operations in Western Europe were meticulously documented and triggered major diplomatic crises. The discovery of a single Soviet agent provoked collective expulsions of Russian officers operating under diplomatic cover. Today, 192 attacks in four years produce essentially diplomatic communiqués, sporadic expulsions, and debates in specialized journals. The scale of responses no longer matches the scale of the aggression. This mismatch is itself a message sent to Moscow: you may continue.

The geography of the attacks — no country is spared

The 192 documented attacks cover the entire territory of European NATO. The United Kingdom is struck — from the Salisbury of 2018 to the conspiracy against Starmer in 2026. France is targeted — with its defense industries and rail infrastructure. Germany sees its defense companies spied upon. The Baltic states face relentless influence operations. Poland is the scene of what investigators suspect to be a targeted killing of Russian origin. Scandinavia sees its undersea cables sabotaged. This geographic ubiquity reveals a deliberate strategy: leave no ally feeling safe, force every government to concentrate resources on its own protection rather than on collective support for Ukraine.

This geography also reveals Russian priorities. The most significant attacks target the nations most active in supporting Kyiv: the United Kingdom (supplier of Storm Shadow missiles and military training), France (supplier of SCALP missiles, Caesar howitzers, and diplomatic support), Poland (the main logistics hub for aid to Ukraine), the Nordic countries (major donors as a proportion of GDP). Putin does not strike at random. He punishes his most effective opponents — and he sends a signal to the hesitant: joining this active camp has consequences.

Russia's "escalate to de-escalate" doctrine — and why it will not work

How Putin uses the escalation of hybrid attacks to try to discourage Western support

The strategy behind those 192 attacks — and particularly the most visible operations like the conspiracy against Starmer — is known in Russian military doctrine as "escalate to de-escalate." The idea is simple: raise the perceived cost of supporting Ukraine high enough that Western leaders, under pressure from their publics, reduce their commitment. This calculation rests on a foundational assumption: that democracies are intrinsically less resilient than autocracies when confronted with pain and uncertainty.

Putin has cultivated this assumption for years. He applied it in Chechnya, in Georgia, in Syria, in the early phases of the war in Ukraine. And each time, democracies were slow to respond with the necessary firmness, giving apparent validation to his bet. But the war in Ukraine has revealed a limit to that theory: when the stakes are sufficiently clear, when the values at stake are sufficiently explicit, democracies can and do demonstrate a resilience that autocrats fail to anticipate. Four years of war. Ukraine is still standing. NATO is more unified than in 2022. European defense budgets have risen. Putin's bet is beginning to fail.

The structural limits of Russia's hybrid strategy

Russia's hybrid war carries inherent limits that an accumulation of operations cannot overcome. First, plausible deniability erodes with each public attribution — every prosecutor's press conference that names the Russian pattern makes Moscow's denials less credible. Second, the intimidation effect reverses: where a well-targeted attack might cause retreat, an accumulation of attacks generates collective determination. The United Kingdom did not reduce its support for Ukraine after the conspiracy against Starmer — it maintained it. France did not withdraw its Caesars or its SCALP missiles after the espionage operations. Third, every operation leaves traces that counterintelligence services use to improve their capabilities — the DGSI of 2026 is far more effective against Russian methods than the one in 2022.

These structural limits do not mean the threat is negligible — 192 attacks testify to real operational capabilities. They mean that Russia's strategy has an effectiveness ceiling that democracies can reach if they respond with consistency and firmness. The question is not whether Putin will continue his hybrid operations. He will. The question is whether Western democracies will maintain their support for Ukraine and their resistance to intimidation despite those operations. So far, the answer is mostly yes. That majority must become unanimity.

The institutional response — what democracies are doing and what they still must do

The available tools being used insufficiently against Russia's hybrid war

Faced with 192 documented attacks, Western democracies have an arsenal of responses that remain partially underused. Diplomatic expulsions — declaring personae non gratae the Russian officers operating under diplomatic cover — have been used, but not in a sufficiently coordinated way among allies to maximize their impact. A cycle of simultaneous expulsions across 20 NATO countries would have a far more dissuasive effect than individual national expulsions. Targeted sanctions against Russian intelligence entities involved in hybrid operations have been adopted — but could be significantly expanded and above all better enforced.

Documented public attributions of Russian methods and networks — like what British prosecutors did in the Starmer case by explicitly naming the pattern of Russian state sabotage — are among the most effective tools available, because they strip operations of their cover. When a public tribunal attributes an arson conspiracy to a Russian-speaking operative, Moscow's denials become derisory. Multiplying these coordinated, documented public attributions in the judicial prosecution of hybrid cases is a proportionate response that does not provoke military escalation but imposes a real reputational and political cost on Russia.

What the Starmer affair demands of British policy — and by extension of all allies

The conspiracy against Keir Starmer places the British government before a foreign policy choice. The minimum response — national judicial proceedings, perhaps some diplomatic expulsions — has already been activated. A proportionate response to the gravity of the act would demand something more ambitious. It would demand that the United Kingdom coordinate with its allies a collective political response to this escalation of Russian hybrid operations — within NATO, within the G7, and in multilateral forums where Russia can still be held to account.

More concretely, it would demand that London intensify its support for Ukraine further — arms deliveries, military training, intelligence sharing — as a direct response to the intimidation attempt. To show Moscow that the conspiracy against Starmer produced the opposite effect from the one intended: more determination, not less. This is the only response that lends credibility to deterrence. If an attempt to intimidate a Prime Minister leads to maintaining the status quo or, worse, to a softening of support for Ukraine, then Russia's strategy has partially succeeded. If it leads to an intensification of support, it fails.

Putin and the axis of autocracies — the geopolitical context of the 192 attacks

Why hybrid attacks are intensifying now — the pressures Putin faces

To understand why Russian hybrid operations seem to be intensifying in 2026, one must look at Putin's situation from his own vantage point. On the Ukrainian front, his initial objectives of rapid victory have failed spectacularly. The war has become a costly war of attrition bleeding the Russian economy despite oil revenues. The Russian army has suffered considerable losses in equipment and personnel. Western sanctions, though imperfectly enforced, are beginning to bite on Russian industrial and technological capabilities. Putin is not operating from a position of strength — he is in a position where hybrid escalation is a way of masking real military and economic weakness.

The axis he has built with Iran, North Korea and, to a degree, China, supplies him with additional resources — Iranian drones, North Korean shells, Chinese technology and financing — but also a growing dependence that shrinks his freedom of action. Every month that passes without decisive victory in Ukraine reinforces the position of those within the Russian elite who question the strategy. Russia's hybrid operations in Europe thus also serve a domestic purpose: they allow Putin to show his domestic audience that he is acting, that the West is also suffering, that Russia is not powerless before its adversaries.

China, silent observer and accomplice — its role in Putin's calculation

An essential element of the geopolitical picture of the 192 attacks is the role of China. Beijing does not organize Russia's hybrid operations in Europe. But its benevolent neutrality — its refusal to condemn Russian aggression, its massive purchases of Russian oil that partially circumvent sanctions, its transfers of dual-use components — creates the economic conditions that allow Russia to sustain its war machine and keep its intelligence services active. China watches Europe wrestle with the 192 Russian attacks and calculates the lessons for its own potential strategy vis-à-vis Taiwan.

This link between the 192 attacks in Europe and China's strategy in the Indo-Pacific is not speculation. It is a calculation explicitly discussed in Beijing's strategic circles. If Russia succeeds in intimidating and eroding Western support for Ukraine through hybrid operations, the lesson for China is clear: democracies can be discouraged from supporting their allies if the cost is raised high enough. If the West holds firm despite the 192 attacks, the lesson is the inverse: democratic solidarity resists hybrid pressure. This strategic test plays out in Europe, but its implications reach all the way to the Taiwan Strait.

What the sequence of events tells us about Russia's summer 2026 strategy

The temporal convergence — why June 2026 is marked by a visible intensification

The month of June 2026 stands out for an unusual concentration of incidents and information on Russian hybrid operations in Europe: the conviction in the Starmer case on June 19, the indictment of the Toulouse suspect the same day, warnings from EU Commissioner Kubilius on expected escalation on June 23, reports of an incident in Poland suspected to be a Russian targeted killing. This concentration may not be a coincidence. It could reflect either a genuine intensification of Russian operations, or an intensification of allied services' detection and communication capabilities — or both simultaneously.

On the Russian side, June 2026 is a period of pressure on the Ukrainian front. Ukrainian forces are holding their ground, Western aid continues to flow, European ammunition production is increasing. For Putin, ramping up hybrid pressure in June 2026 could reflect the calculation that G7 and NATO summits in the summer could be occasions for Westerners to reaffirm and amplify their support for Ukraine. The hybrid operations aim to create counter-pressure — to fuel internal debates within democracies about the cost-benefit ratio of Ukraine support ahead of these crucial diplomatic milestones.

The symbolic importance of targeting Starmer — the attack against a new Prime Minister

Keir Starmer has been Prime Minister of the United Kingdom since July 2024. His government has maintained and in some areas reinforced British support for Ukraine inherited from the Johnson-Sunak governments. His targeting in the arson conspiracy reveals that Russia seeks to test his resolve and signal that even a change of government provides no protection against Russia's punitive operations. It is a message to all potential successors: no matter who governs the United Kingdom, if they support Ukraine, they will be targeted.

This message should produce the opposite effect from the one intended. In any functioning democracy, threatening an elected leader reinforces the popular determination to resist intimidation. British opinion polls on support for Ukraine did not fall after the Starmer affair — if anything, they consolidated a public opinion that is increasingly viscerally aware that the Russian threat is not abstract. This is precisely where Putin's strategy reveals its deep limits: he does not understand democracies. He believes they are weak. He confuses their tolerance for governance and debate with an inability to resist. This confusion is his most fundamental strategic error.

What Europe must change now — an editorial with face uncovered

Three urgent structural changes to address Russia's hybrid war

I write this editorial with the conviction that the usual diplomatic responses are no longer sufficient. Three structural changes are urgently needed. First: a NATO-wide coordinated response to hybrid operations, with a mechanism for collective attribution and joint response — an equivalent of Article 5 for hybrid war, which would automatically trigger a coordinated response when a Russian operation is collectively attributed. This response could include simultaneous expulsions, additional targeted sanctions, and coordinated public revelations about Russian methods.

Second: a massive reinforcement of counterintelligence capabilities in the countries whose defense industries supply Ukraine — notably France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This reinforcement must include dedicated teams for the protection of sensitive industrial zones, enhanced surveillance protocols around test facilities, and systematic training of defense company employees on the risks of proximity espionage. Third: a legislative adaptation enabling earlier intervention against proximate intelligence actors, before they have transmitted the collected information — a reform of espionage legislation to adapt it to the operational realities of twenty-first-century hybrid war.

Support for Ukraine as the best defense against the 192 attacks

There is a direct connection, which few dare to state plainly, between the 192 hybrid attacks in Europe and the level of support for Ukraine. The more Europe supports Ukraine, the more Russian hybrid operations intensify — precisely because this support is effective. But paradoxically, the more Europe supports Ukraine, the better it protects itself in the long run. A Ukraine that wins ends the current conflict and significantly reduces Russia's capacity and will to conduct costly hybrid operations in Europe. A Ukraine that loses or negotiates an unequal peace leaves Russia with the resources, motivation, and confidence to intensify its operations against allied democracies.

Supporting Ukraine is therefore not only a moral obligation — as real and imperative as that is. It is also the most effective defensive strategy against the 192 attacks and those to come. Every shell delivered to Kyiv, every Delair drone protected from Russian espionage, every SCALP missile fired against Russian logistics depots — all of it is also a defense of our own societies against hybrid war. This link between supporting Ukraine and protecting ourselves is the most important strategic truth that our governments and our publics must fully internalize.

The future targets of hybrid operations — what Moscow is probably planning

The industries that will supply Ukraine tomorrow are today's espionage targets

Understanding Russia's hybrid strategy requires anticipating its next targets. The defense industries developing systems that will equip Ukraine in the coming months — drones, precision munitions, anti-drone systems, secure communications — are priority targets for espionage and sabotage. The logistics infrastructure channeling military aid toward Ukraine — ports, airports, rail lines — remains exposed to disruption attempts. European energy networks, already targeted through undersea cables, are vulnerable to strategic cuts that could destabilize allied economies during a prolonged conflict.

The lesson of June 2026 — with its multiple simultaneous incidents — is that Russia is capable of conducting operations in several countries simultaneously. It is not limited to a single front in its hybrid war. This capacity for parallel operations imposes on allied counterintelligence services a distributed vigilance that current resources struggle to cover completely. Addressing this reality requires reinforced cooperation among services, real-time information sharing, and investment in automated detection capabilities that would allow identification of Russian activity patterns before they crystallize into completed operations.

Protecting political figures — an unprecedented challenge for our liberal democracies

The Starmer affair raises a question that liberal democracies are not accustomed to asking: how to protect their leaders against foreign hybrid operations without establishing a level of security incompatible with the standards of accessibility and transparency that these same democracies cultivate? Prime Ministers, Presidents, and Defense Ministers who actively support Ukraine are now potential targets — no longer only of direct assassination (as in the poisoning cases), but of intimidation operations, property sabotage, and coordinated disinformation campaigns designed to discredit them.

The answer to this challenge cannot be to turn every elected leader into an inaccessible fortress. It must combine discreet reinforced security, cooperation with the private sector for the protection of properties and communications, and transparent public communication about intimidation attempts — as British prosecutors did in the Starmer case. Transparency is not weakness in this context. It is a weapon: it reveals the adversary's methods, strengthens public cohesion, and affirms that our institutions do not yield to intimidation.

Conclusion: Europe at the mirror of its values — time to choose

The historic choice that our democracies can no longer defer

The conspiracy against Keir Starmer, the 192 documented attacks, the spy from Toulouse, the warnings from Kubilius — all of it converges toward a conclusion I want to state without equivocation in this editorial: Europe is at war. Not a war with trenches on its soil. Not yet. But a real war, targeting its leaders, its industries, its infrastructure, its values. And in this war, neutrality does not exist. Maintaining one's own security by reducing support for Ukraine is not an option — it is an illusion that, if chosen, would allow Ukraine to fall, strengthen Putin, and cause the pace of hybrid attacks on our soil to explode.

The choice is therefore clear: either European democracies choose to support Ukraine with all the determination and resources necessary for it to win, or they choose the gradual capitulation to intimidation — and the foreseeable consequences that will follow. This is not a choice between war and peace. It is a choice between two visions of the future: a Europe that defended its values and its allies, or a Europe that yielded to fear. I have made my choice. I trust our democracies to make the right one.

Trust in institutions — the last rampart against Russian intimidation

I close this editorial with a word about trust in institutions. The DGSI arrested the spy from Toulouse. British prosecutors pursued the executors of the conspiracy against Starmer. European counterintelligence services identified and documented the 192 attacks. These institutional successes do not make headlines the same way the attacks themselves do — that is the nature of effective counterintelligence: invisible when it works. But they testify to real institutional resilience in our democracies. A resilience that deserves to be recognized, supported, and reinforced.

Putin's hybrid war seeks to erode this trust — to make us believe our institutions are powerless, that our governments are not protecting us, that the threat is insurmountable. This is false. The spy from Toulouse is in custody. The conspiracy against Starmer resulted in convictions. The sabotaged undersea cables have been repaired. The cyberattacks have been deflected. Our democracies are holding. Ukraine is holding. And as long as it holds, with our support, Putin has not won. This reality deserves to be stated, repeated, celebrated — not to deny the threats, but to remember that we are, collectively, stronger than he thinks.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial positioning and sources for this editorial

This editorial is written from a clearly stated editorial position: pro-liberal democracy, pro-Ukraine, and in favor of robust Western resistance against Russian aggression. I am convinced that Vladimir Putin represents an existential threat to democratic values and that the 192 documented attacks constitute a real hybrid war against allied democracies. This position influences my analytical angle, and the reader must take that into account. I defend these positions with conviction but remain open to debate on means and tactics — less so on the fundamental facts of Russian aggression.

The factual data — the Starmer conviction, the Associated Press figure of 192 attacks, the Toulouse arrest, Kubilius's warnings — come from the sources cited at the end of the article. The strategic and geopolitical interpretations are my own, based on four years of intensive monitoring of the war in Ukraine and Russian hybrid operations. I have no confidential sources in intelligence services and all my analysis is based on publicly available information.

Conflicts of interest and limits of this editorial

I have no financial ties to any government, intelligence service, or defense organization. My income comes exclusively from MadMax readers. This editorial does not claim to be exhaustive — it is an editorial reaction to a series of converging events, not a comprehensive analysis of Russia's hybrid war. For deeper analysis, I refer to the work of the CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis), the IISS, and allied intelligence service reports that are periodically made public. The opinions expressed here are mine alone.

I acknowledge that some of my formulations — notably regarding the Starmer affair and Russian responsibility — rely on declarations from British prosecutors and former security officials, not on definitive judicial findings. Journalistic caution requires maintaining the distinction between probable attributions and established certainties. I have attempted to maintain this distinction throughout the text. Where I may have overstepped it in editorial ardor, I own it as the deliberate choice of a columnist taking a position, not a neutral news reporter.

Sources

Primary sources

India Today — The Starmer arson plot: two men jailed, "El Money" and the Russian sabotage case — June 19, 2026

Le Monde — Russia's shadow looms behind several sabotage and espionage attempts on French soil — June 20, 2026

El País — Putin's invisible front: drones, sabotage, and hybrid warfare test Europe — June 5, 2026

Secondary sources

Euronews — Kubilius: Europe should prepare for more attacks — June 23, 2026

The Guardian — Russian provocations in the Baltic states and Poland — June 26, 2026

Asym-Intel — European Strategic Autonomy weekly brief — June 17, 2026