EDITORIAL: Turkey, NATO's Pivot — Ankara Claims Command of the Reaction Force

Introduction: Turkey's Hour has Struck for the Atlantic Alliance

A Minister who stands his ground, a posture that stands out

On June 19, 2026, from Brussels, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler didn't pull any punches. Speaking to journalists gathered after the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers and the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, he delivered a statement of almost uncomfortable clarity for Western capitals: "Today, there is a very clear reality: Turkey is not at the periphery of the security architecture, but at its center." This is not backroom diplomacy talking. It is a sovereign assertion, hammered home in public, just weeks before the Ankara NATO Summit, scheduled for July 7-8, 2026.

Güler delivered these words after participating in two crucial meetings: the NATO Defense Ministers' meeting and the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, in the presence of President Zelensky. He briefed his counterparts on Turkish contributions to the Alliance, on progress toward the 2% GDP target, on support for Ukraine, and on Summit preparations. This isn't a closing speech — it's a strategic roadmap articulated out loud.

An ambition rooted in concrete commitments

This verbal salvo is part of a coherent, methodical strategy that has been in place for several years. Ankara is no longer asking to be integrated — it is asserting that it already is, and even more so than most of its allies care to admit. Turkey is the second-largest army in the Alliance, it is in the top 5 of force contributors, it is preparing to take command of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) starting in 2028, and it is hosting the largest summit in NATO's recent history on its soil. All of this is happening in a strategic context shattered by the war in Ukraine, American inconsistency, and the rise of hybrid threats.

This isn't some improvised positioning. From the "Ankara Moment" conference in April 2026 to the Brussels meetings in June, and including Secretary General Rutte's visit to Ankara in April, every Turkish diplomatic and military act has converged toward the same message: the Atlantic Alliance cannot be conceived without a fully recognized and fully embraced Turkey. The Summit on July 7-8, 2026, will be the opportunity to see if the other members of the Alliance are ready to hear it.

The second-largest army in the Alliance: a reality in numbers

Personnel levels without equivalent among European allies

When Güler repeats that Turkey possesses the NATO's second-largest army, he isn't spinning a narrative fiction. The Turkish armed forces count approximately 355,000 active soldiers, a figure that finds no equivalent in Europe except in Cold War archives. This military mass is not decorative: it is operational, trained, and hardened by decades of real-world operations — from Afghanistan to Kosovo, from the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea. During exercise Steadfast Dart-26, Turkey deployed a joint force of 2,067 personnel accompanied by a naval group, 6,450 kilometers from its national territory, demonstrating a projection capability few Europeans can match.

The real scope of this military power goes beyond headcounts. Güler said it explicitly: Turkey is not "a country that settles for contributing forces to NATO missions", but "one of the main allies increasing the operational efficiency of the alliance in a wide range of fields, including training, joint planning, exercises, and command and control processes". Behind the military jargon, this is a claim for real influence over the Alliance's machinery.

The top 5 contributors: a rank that demands respect

Turkey systematically ranks among the top five force contributors to the Alliance, according to Güler's statements in Brussels on June 19, 2026. This means NATO concretely depends on Ankara to fuel its operations, exercises, and command missions. The Turkish share of the NATO military budget is set at 6.3% for the 2026-2027 period, according to data published by the Alliance itself — a substantial financial effort for an economy under inflationary pressure. In 2026, the Turkish defense budget reached 27.34 billion dollars, a 30% increase over the previous year.

This budgetary dynamism is not without limits. The defense spending/GDP ratio is hovering around 2.33% for 2026, still far from the 5% of GDP target that allies pledged to reach by 2035 at The Hague Summit. Ankara knows this and says it: Güler briefed his counterparts on the "decisive progress" made toward this goal, promising to reach 2.83% in 2027 and 3.2% in 2028. The trajectory is there. The slope is steep. But the political will is beyond doubt.

The Allied Reaction Force: the long-awaited command

A new structure, a major stake

The Allied Reaction Force (ARF) is the centerpiece of NATO's new force model, activated in July 2024 to replace the old NATO Response Force (NRF). Unlike its predecessor, the ARF is a multinational, multi-domain force, integrating land, maritime, air, special forces, cyber, space, logistics, and strategic communication components. It can be deployed "anywhere in the world within four to five days" on the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). It is, according to NATO's official definition, the "rapidly deployable strategic reserve" of the Alliance — its armed wing in the event of an acute crisis.

In 2026, Turkey is already exercising the command of the ARF air component for the July 2025 – June 2026 period, confirmed by NATO's official website. It also leads, for the first time in its history, the command of the ARF Amphibious Force and Landing Forces for this same period. The Anadolu naval task group set sail from Foça in January 2026 for a year-long mission across European maritime theaters, from the Mediterranean to Nordic waters, participating in exercises Steadfast Dart 2026, Northern Quadriga 2026, and Cold Response.

2028: Supreme command at stake

But it is the announcement of the overall command of the ARF starting in 2028 that constitutes the true strategic marker. Güler confirmed this during the "The Ankara Hour: Strategic Positioning for a Resilient Alliance" conference organized in April 2026 by the Turkish Presidency’s Directorate of Communications and the SETA think tank. Turkey will hold this supreme command for two years, from 2028 to 2030, from Istanbul via the 3rd Corps — a NATO-certified unit, at a high level of readiness, fully mobile and capable of leading multinational operations. Only four countries in the Alliance were technically qualified for this command: the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Turkey.

Preparation and the handover of command will run through 2027, with the formal transfer occurring in 2028. NATO will fund part of the necessary infrastructure, including ports and airstrips. For Güler, this command is "a concrete indicator of Turkey's reliability and strategic importance within the Alliance". He is right. An Alliance that entrusts its rapid-reaction arm to Ankara can no longer pretend to treat Turkey as a peripheral ally.

The Ankara Summit: much more than a meeting of heads of state

The second time in twenty years the Alliance meets in Turkey

On July 7-8, 2026, Ankara will host the leaders of the 32 NATO member countries at the Beştepe Presidential Complex. This will be the 36th NATO Summit and the second time Turkey has hosted Allied leaders, after Istanbul in 2004. Some 6,000 participants are expected. Secretary General Mark Rutte called the event the "largest defense industry forum in NATO history", referring to the Defense Industry Forum to be held alongside the Summit. For Güler, hosting this "is not just a geographical choice or diplomatic protocol" — it is the natural reflection of Turkish military contributions, its operational experience, and its ability to produce security.

Secretary General Rutte visited Ankara on April 21-22, 2026, meeting with Erdoğan, Fidan, and Güler, and visiting the technological facilities of ASELSAN. His statement — "Turkey has achieved a revolution in its defense industry" — is not protocol flattery. It is a strategic assessment. Rutte sees in the Turkish industrial base a collective asset for the Alliance at a time when ammunition supply chains are under intense pressure.

A heavy agenda, existential stakes

The Ankara Summit agenda will focus on the most burning issues of the day: defense spending targets (the first progress report since the 5% target set in The Hague), support for Ukraine (allies reaffirmed their commitments during the Contact Group on June 18, 2026, in the presence of President Zelensky), and the modernization of Alliance capabilities. Rutte put it bluntly: "Money is crucial, but you can't stop a missile or a tank with a dollar or a euro. We must turn money into operational capabilities, and fast." This is the message that will be carried to Ankara.

Ankara will also push the issue of Article 5 — the collective defense clause — as the founding axis of its summit mandate. Güler wants the allies to solemnly reaffirm their commitment to mutual defense, in a context where doubts about American reliability feed European anxieties. Turkey, as host country, intends to play the role of unity cement — and that, in itself, is a remarkable mutation for a country that some saw until recently as the Alliance's troublesome child.

The Turkish defense industry: from buyer to exporter

A twenty-year transformation that commands respect

Until the 1980s, Turkey depended almost entirely on foreign suppliers for its military equipment. Today, it designs, produces, and exports its own systems. The SAHA 2026 Forum, the defense industry exhibition held in Istanbul in May, illustrated this rise in power: Bayraktar combat drones, armored vehicles, naval platforms, long-range missiles — including the Yıldırımhan project, an intercontinental ballistic missile presented with a range of 6,000 kilometers. Güler summarizes the Turkish philosophy in a few words: "The Turkish defense industry must maintain a mass production capacity at a level that can also meet the needs of its friends."

This industrial transformation is not anecdotal — it is strategic for the entire Alliance. Three defense ministers from NATO member countries explicitly highlighted, during the Brussels meetings in June 2026, the importance and necessity of expanding cooperation with the Turkish defense industry. ASELSAN, the sector's flagship company, is now a benchmark for weapon systems interoperability. As Güler said: "Our national systems support the interoperability capacity of the allies and contribute to the global deterrence of the Alliance. A strong defense industry means strong deterrence and a strong NATO."

The NATO Defense Industry Forum: a signal to be seized

Holding the NATO Defense Industry Forum on the sidelines of the Ankara Summit is more than just a side event. According to Secretary General Rutte, it will be the "most comprehensive industrial gathering in the history of the Alliance". Governments, defense companies, startups, investors, and innovators will meet to accelerate cooperation and strengthen the transatlantic defense ecosystem. The fact that Ankara is the site of this historic event sends an unambiguous political signal: Turkey is no longer just a market, it is a top-tier supplier and industrial partner.

In a world where the production of ammunition, drones, and armored vehicles determines the outcome of conflicts — as the war in Ukraine proves every day — Turkish industrial capacity is a real strategic asset. Turkey produces fast, at scale, at competitive costs, and to NATO standards. This is precisely what the Alliance needs to fulfill the rearmament goals set in The Hague. Ignoring this asset for political reasons would be a strategic error.

The commitment toward 5% of GDP: ambition and real constraints

A confirmed upward trajectory but persistent economic challenges

At The Hague Summit in June 2025, NATO allies pledged to bring their defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 — including at least 3.5% for strict defense spending and 1.5% for infrastructure related to resilience and military mobility. This is a historic commitment, two and a half times higher than the previous 2% target. Turkey endorsed it without reservation. Güler briefed his counterparts on the "decisive progress" made in this direction, stating that Turkey is already above the 2% threshold and presents a programmed trajectory: 2.33% in 2026, 2.83% in 2027, 3.2% in 2028.

But Turkish economic reality demands caution. The national economy is under intense inflationary pressure, with high external debt and a constantly stressed lira. A Turkish Minute study points out that to reach 5% of GDP, Turkey would have to bring its defense spending beyond 66 billion dollars per year — more than double current budgets. The 2026 military budget of 27.34 billion dollars already represents a 30% increase in one year. This dynamic is impressive. But it is not sustainable indefinitely without painful trade-offs in other budget areas — health, education, civilian investment.

Alliance pressure and Turkish responses

In Ankara, in July, the Summit will be the first collective test of the Hague commitments. Rutte warned: "I expect allies to show they are on a clear and credible trajectory toward 5%." Turkey, by hosting this first assessment, puts itself in a delicate position: host of the collective judgment, it must lead by example while managing its own constraints. In 2025, NATO military spending reached 574 billion dollars, up 20% from the previous year — a pace unseen since the end of the Cold War. All allies now exceed the historic 2% threshold, according to the Atlantic Council.

In this context of collective emulation, Turkey must navigate between stated ambition and real sustainability. Güler knows it. The phrasing he chose — "decisive progress" rather than definitive figures — is that of a seasoned politician who measures his promises. This isn't deception; it's prudence in the face of a vulnerable economy. But the Ankara Summit will also be the moment when this prudence is tested by the allies.

Ambiguous partner: the gray areas no one can ignore

The Ukrainian question: real support but a balanced approach

Turkey claims to be pro-Ukrainian. It supplied Bayraktar TB2 drones to Kyiv as early as 2021, contributing to significant tactical successes in the early phases of the Russian invasion. It kept the Straits closed to warships by invoking the Montreux Convention, thereby limiting Russian naval reinforcements in the Black Sea. Güler participated in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and reaffirmed Ankara's support for Ukraine during the Brussels meetings in June 2026. Turkey is committed within the framework of the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine — a group of 33 countries preparing security arrangements for a post-war settlement.

But the reality is more nuanced. Ankara refuses to join Western sanctions against Russia. It maintains open communication channels with Moscow. It has sought to position itself as a mediator in the conflict — a role some allies view with skepticism, others with interest. Turkey is not anti-Putin in the sense that Warsaw or Tallinn understands it. It is pragmatically interested in regional stability, in its grain exports via the Black Sea, and in preserved economic interests with Moscow. This double game is real. It is admitted. It is, according to some analysts, an added value for the Alliance: NATO needs an interlocutor who can talk to Putin.

Sensitive issues: Cyprus, Greece, migration, rights

Bilateral tensions with Greece persist — in the Aegean, in Cyprus, on migration issues. Güler himself criticized, during the Brussels meeting in June 2026, the agreement between France and the Greek Cypriot Administration, calling it "illegitimate, unbalancing, and contrary to international law". The application of the EU's PESCO framework to non-member allies — including Turkey — remains a political minefield, with Greece and Cyprus using their veto power to block Turkish integration into European defense mechanisms. Turkey was notably blocked from joining the PESCO Military Mobility project.

On fundamental rights and the rule of law, Ankara has accumulated substantial criticism since the 2016 coup attempt — arrests of journalists, weakening of judicial independence, restriction of civil liberties. These realities cannot be erased by military contributions. A reliable strategic partner in military operations can simultaneously pose values-based problems for an Alliance that defines itself as democratic. The tension is real. It is not resolved by staying silent about it.

Turkish geography: an asset no one can duplicate

The bridge between two continents, two seas, two worlds

There are realities that the map won't let you ignore. Turkey controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits — the only maritime access route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Without the Montreux Convention and without Turkish cooperation, any NATO naval strategy in the Black Sea would be paralyzed. Turkey decides on the passage — or blocking — of warships. Since the 2022 Russian invasion, this geographical mastery has become a top-tier strategic lever, exercised with a precision that has weighed on the war.

Added to this is the Kürecik base in central Anatolia — a radar facility that provides missile early warning coverage much deeper than any Romanian or Balkan alternative. According to analyst Serhat Güvenç, "no European country can simply substitute for that". And then there is Incirlik, where approximately 50 American nuclear weapons are stored — a concrete security guarantee for Ankara which, in the other direction, makes Turkey an irreplaceable hub of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture. Geography is not negotiable. It is permanent.

The Black Sea and Ukraine: Ankara at the heart of the setup

Turkey is now playing a leading role in the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine, according to documents obtained by Nordic Monitor. Güler signed a letter, dated May 18, 2026, confirming the establishment of a Maritime Component Command in Istanbul, in the Beykoz district facing the Bosporus. This command would be responsible for maintaining regional stability and maritime security in the Black Sea, in compliance with the Montreux Convention. Fourteen countries have already indicated their intention to contribute to the command structure.

Güler insisted on the fact that this initiative remains under Turkish national command — "it is not a NATO project", he specified. But in practice, the main sponsors and participating countries are NATO allies, and British and French officers have already visited the proposed site in Beykoz. The line between national initiative and de facto NATO structure is thin. Güler knows it. The West knows it too. And Putin, certainly, is watching closely.

Exclusion from the EU: the strategic wound that lasts

PESCO as a mirror of European contradictions

Güler did not hide his irritation during the April 2026 conference. He warned that the European Union's exclusive approach toward Turkey and other non-member NATO allies "will cause more damage to Europe's security and resilience than the reduction of US forces in Europe". This is not a rhetorical threat — it is a strategic analysis. NATO and the EU theoretically defend the same values and share 23 common members, yet their cooperation architecture leaves major military allies at the door of the most ambitious industrial initiatives.

The PESCO framework (Permanent Structured Cooperation) operates by unanimity, which gives Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration an effective veto over Turkish participation. The European Defence Fund, endowed with several billion euros, is subject to the same rules. Turkey applied to join the Military Mobility project — blocked by Athens and Nicosia. Analyst Hüseyin Fazla summarizes lucidly: "Greece and Cyprus see Turkey's integration into the EU defense architecture not as a contribution to their own security, but as the collapse of their balancing strategy toward Turkey within the EU."

Strategic irrationality at the heart of Europe

Analyst Serhat Güvenç put it bluntly: "There is an irrationality here. Part of Europe refuses to put aside its cultural and civilizational objections even when a question like collective security is at stake." This irrationality has a real cost. If Europe builds an autonomous defense capability that structurally excludes the Alliance's second-largest army, it is building on a blind spot. This isn't geopolitics — it's ideology dressed up as security architecture.

The Turkish strategic logic, on the other hand, is crystal clear: if the Americans reduce their presence in Europe and if the EU continues to close its doors, then Europe and Turkey will need each other more. This is exactly what Güler implies when he says: "The truth is that Turkey, with its solid defense capabilities and industry, can contribute even more to the security and defense of Europe." He isn't threatening. He is offering. And Europe, too often, refuses the gift.

Support for Ukraine: real, instrumentalized, indispensable

Bayraktars, grain, and Zelensky

The Turkish contribution to Ukrainian resistance is documented and substantial. Bayraktar TB2 drones played a crucial tactical role in the early weeks of the Russian invasion in February 2022, destroying armored columns and demoralizing invasion forces. The grain deal — negotiated by Ankara and the UN in 2022 — allowed for the resumption of Ukrainian exports via the Black Sea, helping to avoid a global food crisis. Güler participated in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group on June 18 and 19, 2026, in Brussels. Turkey also supports the framework of the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine, that group of 33 nations preparing security arrangements for the post-war period.

But this support is instrumentalized — and it must be said. Ankara simultaneously preserves its economic relations with Moscow, refusing Western sanctions. It buys Russian gas, it maintains commercial corridors that partially bypass the Western blockade. This doesn't make Turkey an enemy of Ukraine — but it makes it an actor whose motivations are complex, mixing real solidarity with Kyiv and its own geopolitical calculations. Zelensky, who understands better than anyone that every ally counts, has maintained direct and frank relations with Erdoğan. Pragmatism obliges.

The Black Sea after the war: Ankara in a position of strength

If the war in Ukraine one day leads to an agreement, the Black Sea will be the theater of security reconstruction. Turkey is a littoral state there, possesses the largest fleet among NATO allies there, controls maritime access there, and is now establishing a maritime command based in Istanbul. Güler said it: stability in the Black Sea is "an inseparable part of Euro-Atlantic security". It is a statement of fact as much as a claim for a role. Who else among the allies can claim this position? Romania? Bulgaria? With all due respect, their strategic weight in the Black Sea doesn't compare to Ankara's.

The maritime command currently being formed in Beykoz is the concrete expression of this ambition. Certainly, Güler insists that it remains under national command. But the 14 contributing countries, the coordination with NATO structures, and the presence of Franco-British reconnaissance missions on the site tell a different story. Turkey is becoming the de facto architect of security in the Black Sea. The West, which needs this security, should recognize it frankly.

Trump, Rutte, and the realignment of the Alliance

NATO 3.0 in the Trump era: Turkey as pivot

The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States plunged European allies into deep strategic anxiety. Trump questions American security guarantees, presses Europeans to pay for their defense, and sends contradictory signals about Article 5 itself. In this context, Turkey occupies a paradoxically comfortable position. It has the largest non-American army in the Alliance. It is industrially autonomous. It does not depend on the United States like other allies who have under-invested for decades.

Rutte formulated the project of "NATO 3.0" — an alliance refurbished for the modern era. His speech to Defense Ministers in Brussels on June 18, 2026, emphasized that European allies and Canada must take on more responsibility, "supported by American power". In this equation, Turkey is an obvious resource. It can partially fill the void left by a less committed America. It can train, equip, and deploy on a large scale. Trump, that necessary evil for the West, will at least have pushed Europeans to look their own defense in the face — and in that mirror, Turkey is larger than they thought.

Secretary General Rutte and the Ankara-NATO axis

Rutte, whose style contrasts with Stoltenberg's through an sometimes abrupt frankness, chose Ankara as his first major trip in preparation for the 2026 Summit. The April 21-22, 2026, visit was not protocol — it was a political investment. By visiting ASELSAN and saying publicly that Turkey has achieved a "defense industrial revolution", Rutte sent a signal to reluctant European capitals: NATO recognizes Ankara's value, even if Brussels still hesitates. This is a form of institutional validation that Turkey has been waiting for for a long time.

The fact that the NATO Defense Industry Forum — the largest in the history of the Alliance — is being held in Ankara alongside the Summit illustrates this validation. This is not a geographical coincidence. It is a political choice that says: Turkey is a world-class defense producer. If you want to strengthen NATO, you need them. Allies who refuse this reality for short-term political calculations risk finding themselves with a weaker Alliance — and a more frustrated Turkey.

The objective limits of Turkish ambition

Economy under tension, uncertain sustainability

Turkish strategic ambition faces serious macroeconomic constraints that no staff speech can erase. Inflation has plunged the Turkish lira into recurring zones of turbulence. The defense budget of 27.34 billion dollars for 2026 — up 30% — is expressed in a devalued currency, meaning its real value in international acquisition capabilities is less than nominal figures suggest. Ministry of Finance projections (2.83% of GDP in 2027, 3.2% in 2028) rely on growth assumptions that may be disproven by markets. A Turkish Minute analysis reminds us that Turkey would have to exceed 66 billion dollars annually to reach the 5% target — in a country where social budget trade-offs are already painful.

The political and social sustainability of this military effort is a question that outside observers rarely ask — and that the Turks themselves face. Increasing the defense budget by 165% in real terms in a few years, as government plans project, requires either robust economic growth or cuts in other sectors. In a country where economic inequalities are significant and where social tensions can be expressed quickly, this tension is real. Güler knows it. Erdoğan knows it. The West, if it wants Turkey to succeed in this effort, should support it rather than just making demands.

Strategic ambiguity as an assumed choice

Turkey is an ambiguous partner — and it is assuming this more and more openly. Güler formulated it with precision: "Turkey's critical role within NATO is based on a balanced and principled strategic approach that allows us both to fulfill our responsibilities as an ally and to make independent decisions." This means: we are in NATO, we accept collective obligations, but we retain our freedom of movement. This positioning irritates some allies. But it's not that different from the one practiced by France or Hungary, in their respective ways.

Turkish ambiguity is an asset as much as a problem. It allows Ankara to be an interlocutor with Moscow when the West no longer has one. It allows for negotiations that less flexible allies could not conduct. But it also imposes constant vigilance regarding operational reliability: will Ankara be there when things get serious? Exercise Steadfast Dart-26, the assumed commands, the naval deployment across Europe — all these concrete acts partially answer this question. But the complete answer will only be given in future crises.

Russia, Putin, and deterrence: what Turkey changes

Deterrence in the Black Sea without Ankara would be unthinkable

Since February 24, 2022, Russia has proven it is ready for a total war of conquest in Europe. Vladimir Putin has committed his country to the largest military aggression on European soil since 1945 — and he continues, despite colossal losses, sanctions, and growing diplomatic isolation. Faced with this reality, NATO deterrence must be credible, robust, and cover the Alliance's entire eastern flank. Turkey is the southern pillar of this flank. Without it, the deterrence line has a gaping hole between the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Ankara's control of the Straits has deprived the Russian Black Sea fleet of significant reinforcements from the Pacific or the Baltic. Turkey has thus contributed to the weakening of the Russian naval position in the Black Sea without firing a single shot — by scrupulously applying the Montreux Convention. This is a form of strategic contribution to the Ukrainian resistance that is poorly measured but real. And the maritime command project in Istanbul, oriented toward security in the Black Sea, extends this logic into the post-war period.

The Iranian threat and Turkish strategic depth

The Kürecik radar facility in central Anatolia is a key element of NATO's ballistic missile defense system. It provides early warning coverage against Iranian missiles which, from Anatolia, is substantially more effective than what Romania or the Balkans can offer. Analyst Güvenç formulated the reality with precision: "Without Kürecik, European ballistic missile defense against Iranian missiles would start from Romania. Starting from Turkey offers substantially improved early warning and intercept opportunities." This capability is not interchangeable. It is Turkish, or it doesn't exist.

Iran, in Güler's vision — and in geopolitical reality — constitutes a direct threat to Turkey itself, independent of its position within NATO. Its growing ballistic capabilities, its support for regional proxies, its nuclear program maintained in ambiguity: all these factors reinforce Ankara's interest in anchoring itself in an Alliance that provides advanced deterrence capabilities. Incirlik with its American nuclear arsenals is an existential security guarantee for Ankara. This is not a detail — it is the heart of the relationship.

Conclusion: Central Ankara, neither idol nor scapegoat

A centrality based on facts, not narratives

Turkey is central in NATO — and this isn't an invention of Erdoğan or a piece of flattery from Güler. It's the conclusion drawn from a sober reading of the facts: the Alliance's second-largest army, top 5 of force contributors, ARF command starting in 2028, current command of the air component and ARF amphibious forces, mastery of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, the Kürecik radar facility, the Incirlik base, a booming defense industry recognized by the Alliance's Secretary General, and hosting the Summit and the largest Industrial Forum in NATO history. These elements, taken together, paint the portrait of a major ally — not a marginal or peripheral one.

But centrality is not perfection. Turkey carries real ambiguities on Ukraine, bilateral tensions with Greece, internal democratic deficits, and an economic fragility that threatens the sustainability of its defense commitments. These realities are objective limits to an ambition that, without them, would be fully convincing. The question asked at the Ankara Summit is therefore not: "Does Turkey deserve its place?" — it has it. The question is: "How will the West manage a partner that is both indispensable and uncomfortable?" The answer requires realism, not naivety — in both directions.

The Atlantic Alliance needs a strong and anchored Turkey

The NATO of 2026 is not that of 1990. It faces an imperialist Russia that has violated the European order since 2014, a China that has challenged the world order for decades, an Iran that is multiplying armed proxies, and a North Korea that is supplying ammunition to Moscow. In this environment, every ally capable of carrying military weight counts double. Turkey is that ally. It weighs, it commits, it aspires. Its limits are real — but they do not erase its contributions. Reducing Ankara to its points of friction amounts to weakening the Alliance one claims to defend.

The Summit on July 7 and 8, 2026, will be a rare opportunity: the Alliance gathered on the soil of an ally that challenges it to fully embrace itself, that wants to carry the weight of operational command, that presents its defense industry as a collective good. If the allies seize this opportunity — by reaffirming Article 5, by moving forward on defense spending, by opening the EU's industrial doors to Ankara — they will have made a lasting strategic investment. If they waste it on short-term calculations, they will pay the price in the next crisis which, in this world, will not be long in coming.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

Anadolu Agency — Ankara NATO Summit to Mark Turning Point for Alliance: Turkish Defense Minister Güler — June 19, 2026

Anadolu Agency (FR) — OTAN : le sommet d'Ankara sera un « tournant » pour l'Alliance selon le ministre turc de la Défense — June 19, 2026

Hürriyet Daily News — Ankara NATO Summit to Mark Turning Point for Alliance: Defense Minister Güler — June 19, 2026

Secondary Sources

Daily Sabah — « Ankara Moment »: Türkiye Touts Steadfast Role in NATO — April 9, 2026

NATO.int — Allied Reaction Force (ARF) — updated February 17, 2026

Atlantic Council — NATO Defense Spending Tracker — updated April 9, 2026

Euronews — NATO, Ukraine and the Battle over Europe's Future Budget — June 18, 2026

Defense News — Turkey Pushes for Larger Role in Europe's Defense as Trump Questions NATO — April 13, 2026