ANALYSIS: Trump Admires "All Business" Xi — Flattery That Weakens the West

Introduction: When the Leader of the West Praises His Main Rival

A Statement That Hits Like a Slap in the Face

On June 19 and 20, 2026, in an interview with Axios, American President Donald Trump uttered words that should have sent a shockwave through Western capitals. When asked which world leaders he admires most, Trump named two men without hesitation: Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi. For Xi, the chosen phrase was unequivocal — "all business, no games" — a man of substance, no frills, who doesn't waste time talking about the weather. A quality, according to Trump. A danger signal, in my view.

The exact quote from Trump deserves to be cited in full, as it goes beyond simple diplomatic compliment: "He's strong. He's no games. He won't sit down and say, 'Oh what a beautiful day,'… It's like all business, which I like." Trump also added that he "gets along" with Xi and that their direct communication has allowed them to "manage geopolitical tensions." During the same period, he defended his "I'm the boss" retort thrown at G7 leaders as just a joke. But the real problem lies elsewhere.

The Trump Paradox: Tough on Some Issues, Complaisant with Beijing

Before going any further, I want to be clear about something I consider important: Trump is not an enemy of the West. He has real results — a hard stance on Iran, economic levers used brutally but effectively, a refusal to buckle under soft multilateralism. In these areas, he represents a force. But his public and repeated complaisance toward Xi Jinping — the leader of the nation that constitutes the West's primary strategic threat — is a systemic weakness that erodes the collective posture of democracies.

It is precisely this paradox that makes the character so difficult to analyze. Trump is a necessary evil for the West: we can acknowledge a useful brutality against certain adversaries while denouncing with equal vigor his tendency to publicly flatter the autocrat in Beijing instead of confronting him. Both things can be true simultaneously. And that is what this analysis will establish, fact by fact, source by source.

Xi Jinping "All Business": Decoding the Message Behind the Compliment

What Trump Is Really Saying by Admiring Xi's Style

When Trump declares that he "likes" Xi Jinping's style because it is "all business," he isn't just talking about professional efficiency. He is talking about a system of governance without democratic friction, without opposition, without a free press to thwart decisions. Xi can be "all business" because he has no Senate to convince, no Supreme Court to fear, no elections to lose. Trump admires, consciously or not, the byproduct of an authoritarian regime. This subtext cannot be ignored.

The Axios interview of June 19-20, 2026, is not an isolated incident. It follows the Beijing Summit of May 14-15, 2026, the first visit by a U.S. president to China since 2017. On that occasion, Trump had already told Sean Hannity that Xi was "a warm person, actually, but he's all business" and that there were "no games" in their exchanges. The pattern repeats. The admiration solidifies. And each public repetition sends a signal to Washington's allies: the American president is more comfortable with the autocrat in Beijing than with his democratic partners in the G7.

A Vocabulary That Reveals a Troubling Lens

The phrase "no games" is particularly revealing. In Trump's mind, "games" represent everything that slows down executive power: parliamentary debates, a critical press, oversight institutions, allies who negotiate. Xi doesn't have these "games" because he suppressed them. Trump sees them as obstacles. This convergence of perception between the elected president of a democracy and the general secretary-for-life of a single party is more than uncomfortable — it is structurally dangerous for the Western model.

According to analysis by Damien Ma for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on May 28, 2026, the so-called "principal-to-principal" model that Trump and Xi have adopted — where only the two heads of state decide major issues — carries a major risk: it "plays into Trump's tendency to improvise and be swayed by the last person he spoke to," which is "certain to worry his advisors on subjects as volatile as Taiwan." In other words, even analysts favorable to dialogue point to the structural fragility of this mutual admiration.

The Beijing Summit: Plenty of Symbols, Little Substance

The Staging of a "Historic" Meeting Without Concrete Victories

The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, May 14-15, 2026, was presented by both parties as a turning point. Xi called it "historic." Trump promised "fantastic trade deals" and claimed the two countries had "settled a lot of different problems that others wouldn't have been able to settle." The reality analyzed by experts was much less rosy. Rush Doshi, director of China strategy at the Council on Foreign Relations, was blunt: "It was more focused on symbolism than on concrete substance."

What Trump brought back from Beijing: an agreement for China to buy 200 Boeing aircraft immediately — the Chinese have not confirmed this figure —, promises of agricultural purchases in the "tens of billions," and Xi’s assurance that China would not provide military weaponry to Iran. What Trump did not get: no progress on Taiwan, no resolution of the Iranian conflict, no agreement on artificial intelligence despite the presence of the CEOs of Apple, Nvidia, BlackRock, and Goldman Sachs. No joint communiqu either. According to the Guardian, Trump "arrived, observed, and left with little to show."

"Constructive Strategic Stability": A Framework Imposed by Beijing

One of the most significant details of the Beijing summit, and one of the least covered, is this: Trump accepted the conceptual framework proposed by Beijing to define the bilateral relationship. Both countries signed on to the Chinese formula of "constructive strategic stability" — a concept defined unilaterally by Beijing, suggesting that both nations must "minimize competition, manage differences, and let stability serve as the foundation for their bilateral ties." In plain English: don't push China too hard. According to the New York Times of June 10, 2026, this formula "triggered concerns and uncertainties from Taipei to Delhi to Manila."

The Carnegie Endowment emphasizes that accepting this framework was "significant and politically perilous" for the American side. By adopting Xi's terminology, Trump didn't just make a diplomatic concession — he validated the Chinese lens of what the Sino-American relationship should be. This is not a victory for Washington. It is a victory for Beijing, presented with enough commercial glitter for Trump to sell it as a triumph to his base.

The G7 Fractured over China: Trump Plays Solo

Macron Wanted a Common Response, Trump Already Had His Agenda

The G7 in vian-les-Bains, June 15 to 17, 2026, should have been an opportunity for industrial democracies to present a united front against China. That is not what happened. According to Politico on June 15, 2026, Emmanuel Macron was pushing for a "common approach" to subsidized Chinese exports flooding world markets. The White House, meanwhile, hadn't even put China on its list of priorities for the summit. Trump had other plans: direct bilateral talks with Beijing, and a next Washington-Xi summit already scheduled for September 2026.

A senior U.S. administration official offered this telling remark aimed at European and Japanese allies: "The United States is not waiting for the world to hold hands and find a coordinated way to address China's behavior. We are acting now." The implication is clear: the allies can follow, but Washington decides. This isn't leadership — it's unilateralism. And American unilateralism toward China weakens precisely the collective power that constitutes the only credible long-term response to Chinese expansion.

The Trade Truce Expiring in November: A Sword of Damocles

While Trump was flattering Xi in interviews and downplaying differences at the G7, a silent countdown continued. The trade truce between the United States and China expires in November 2026. Both governments are conducting intense negotiations to extend it and avoid a return to the trade war that shook global markets in 2025. A "US-China board of trade" has been launched to manage tariffs on strategic sectors. But this dependence on the continuity of the Trump-Xi personal dialogue means that American trade policy is a hostage to the relationship between two men — not a system of durable institutions.

This fragility is analyzed with precision by the Carnegie Endowment: the durability of the "principal-to-principal" model depends entirely on the political strength of each leader. However, the 2026 American midterms could weaken Trump, especially if the Iranian conflict persists. And a politically weakened White House after the midterms will be a White House less capable of standing up to Beijing in the trade negotiations that follow. Xi knows this. Xi is waiting.

Modi Admired, But for the Wrong Reasons

Trump's Praise for Modi: Sincere, But Misaligned

In the same Axios interview of June 19-20, 2026, Trump named Modi among the leaders he admires most, calling him a "very tough cookie," a "great leader," and a man "who stays out of wars, which is smart." Trump also touched on the trade relationship with India, acknowledging that New Delhi once had better terms: "They used to really rip us off. I don't blame them for that." Now, according to Trump, the two countries are doing "fair business." India is not very happy with the new deal, but that's how it is.

Trump's admiration for Modi is different from the one he holds for Xi — and that must be stated clearly. India is a democracy, imperfect to be sure, but a democracy with competitive elections and a resilient press. Modi is not Xi. But the way Trump frames his compliments — putting Modi and Xi on the same pedestal of admiration in the same interview — creates a problematic equivalence. It suggests that what Trump admires in both is the same thing: the ability to govern strong, without being too slowed down by democratic "games."

Ranking Modi and Xi Together: An Unintentional Political Signal

According to India Today on June 19, 2026, Trump described Xi as someone who "means 'all business'" and Modi as a "very tough cookie" — two phrases that value toughness and efficiency over shared democratic values. Trump did not cite a single European leader. Neither Macron, nor Starmer, nor Scholz. The leaders of the democratic allies closest to Washington do not, in Trump's mind, deserve to be named among the men he admires. Only two leaders at the head of non-NATO allied states, including the United States' greatest strategic rival, belong to his "club of classics" — his word in the CNN News18 YouTube video from June 20, 2026: "Modi's great, President Xi is great. Classics, you know?"

This bias is worrying. It reflects a hierarchy of presidential values in which raw power and executive efficiency take precedence over ideological alliance with democracies. For a president who is supposed to embody the leadership of the free world, this is a posture that deserves to be questioned publicly and without indulgence.

"I'm the Boss": When the Joke Tells the Truth

The G7 Scene: A Moment That Went Around the World

On June 17, 2026, during the final day of the G7 in vian-les-Bains, Trump arrived late to the working session. Entering the room where the leaders of other countries were already seated, he quipped with a smile: "I'm the boss." Laughter followed. The moment went viral on social media and global news channels. The next day, on The Axios Show, Trump tried to reframe the episode: "I was trying to be funny. I wasn't trying to be the boss." He explained that he had simply reacted to the situation — the leaders all seated, him arriving — and that "it was done as a joke."

The joke was confirmed by the Associated Press (AP News, June 17-18, 2026) and by the Guardian, which published the video of the incident. Technically, Trump is telling the truth: the tone was light, the laughter was real. But a joke often says more than a prepared speech. When the President of the United States enters late into a room of allied democratic leaders and his first reaction is to say "I'm the boss" — even as a laugh — he reveals a lens through which he views power. He sees himself above. Separate. The boss, not the partner.

The Joke as a Revealer of a Systemic Posture

This is not the first time Trump has expressed this posture of supremacy toward his allies. What is troubling is the contrast: with Xi Jinping, Trump is respectful, admiring, almost deferential. With his democratic allies at the G7, he arrives late and greets them with "I'm the boss" — even jokingly. The dynamic is telling. The autocrat in Beijing receives deference. The elected heads of government receive condescension. Even dressed in humor, this asymmetry has consequences for the cohesion of Western alliances.

The Washington Post and several analysts pointed out that the vian summit highlighted deep fractures within the G7 on fundamental issues such as strategy toward China, support for Ukraine, and trade policies. Trump arrived with his own priorities — Iran, bilateral deals, trade agreement with India — and did not seek to build a consensus on China. The "I'm the boss" dynamic, even as a joke, is the synthesis of this approach.

China, the Primary Threat — and Trump Opening the Door

Beijing Builds Its Power While Trump Flatters

Let's be precise about what China is in 2026. It is the world's largest economy by purchasing power parity, the first in export volume, the first in military shipbuilding. It has developed one of the fastest-growing nuclear arsenals in the world. It maintains a systematic policy of industrial and technological espionage against the United States and Europe. It supports Putin's Russia — providing it with dual-use equipment, buying its oil to support its war economy, offering it diplomatic cover at the United Nations. It continues to threaten Taiwan, which Xi warned Trump that failing management could provoke "clashes and even conflict."

During this accumulation of power, Trump offers Xi one thing that autocrats cherish more than anything: international legitimacy. Every public compliment from the American president about Xi Jinping is weaponized by Chinese Communist Party propaganda. The Global Times and the Xinhua agency never fail to pick up and amplify these statements to distribute them to public opinion in developing countries, where the competition for influence between the West and Beijing is most intense. Trump is, involuntarily or not, an amplifier of Chinese soft power.

The Real Costs of Complaisance: Taiwan, Asian Allies, NATO

The strategic impact of Trump's posture toward Xi goes beyond the balance sheet of the Beijing summit alone. According to the New York Times of June 10, 2026, Trump's "sharp turn" toward China — embracing it as a peer power — has caused "concerns and uncertainties from Taipei to Delhi to Manila." Governments that had bet on American firmness to counterbalance Chinese pressure find themselves "reevaluating their strategies" in the face of an America that, at least rhetorically, seems to have chosen stability with Beijing over solidarity with its regional allies.

In the U.S. Congress, ten Democratic senators, led by Jeanne Shaheen and Chris Murphy, publicly accused Trump of failing to confront Xi on his support for Iran, on intelligence sharing contributing to attacks on U.S. forces, and on unfair trade practices. They called it a "clear failure of his duties as commander in chief." This is not an insignificant partisan critique — it is a signal that the Trump-Xi strategy is causing concern even beyond circles usually hostile to Trump.

The "Principal-to-Principal" Model: A Ticking Time Bomb

When Everything Rests on the Personal Relationship Between Two Men

The most lucid analysis of the Trump-Xi dynamic in 2026 is undoubtedly that of Damien Ma of the Carnegie Endowment, published on May 28, 2026. He describes a model where the two leaders settle major bilateral issues — trade, technology, Taiwan — themselves, bypassing usual institutional channels. This model has a logic: in a world where multilateral institutions are paralyzed and technical negotiations are bogged down, two heads of state can unblock situations that armies of diplomats cannot solve.

But this model has a fatal flaw: it is only as solid as the relationship between the two men, and nothing more. If Trump emerges weakened from the November 2026 midterms, Xi will no longer have the same reasons to make concessions to a politically weakened president at the end of his term. If an unforeseen incident — a Chinese military provocation around Taiwan, a massive cyberattack — forces Trump to toughen his tone, the entire "constructive stability" built on personal relations will collapse in a few tweets. Institutions last. Friendships between leaders do not.

Xi Plays the Long Game, Trump Plays the Present

This is where the fundamental asymmetry between the two men lies. Xi Jinping governs with a decade-long perspective — the Communist Party's centenary in 2049 as the horizon, the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" as the compass. His decisions are calculated over long cycles. Trump thinks in electoral cycles, in media cycles, in viral moments. The Beijing meeting, the compliments in interviews, the Washington summit scheduled for September 2026 — all of this fits into Trump's short-term agenda: showing victories before the midterms.

Xi, meanwhile, patiently harvests. Every summit with Trump validates his international legitimacy. Every compliment strengthens his domestic image as a leader capable of managing the American rival. Every adoption by Trump of Chinese terminology ("constructive strategic stability") is a victory in conceptual framing for Beijing. Trump believes he is making deals. Xi is building an architecture. The difference between these two time horizons is one of the reasons why, structurally, short-term democracies struggle to compete with long-term autocracies — except when they maintain a strategic coherence that Trump precisely refuses to build.

The West Needs a Narrative, Not One-Way Admiration

What a Western President Should Say When Facing Xi

The question is not whether Trump should dialogue with Xi. Dialogue is indispensable. Together, the two countries represent more than 40% of global GDP. Any total rupture would be catastrophic. The question is: how should this dialogue be conducted? With what public posture? With what signals sent to allies and global public opinion? A Western president can meet Xi, negotiate hard, and go home without praising him publicly before the world's cameras.

The difference between robust diplomacy and strategic flattery is precisely that. Angela Merkel met with Xi regularly — she was never heard calling the CCP General Secretary "all business" with admiration in an interview. French presidents, Japanese prime ministers, German chancellors maintain calibrated language that allows for dialogue without validating the authoritarian model. Trump, however, confuses negotiation with personal fascination. This is not weakness — it is a strategic negligence that has real costs for the cohesion of the free world.

What the West Risks if This Posture Becomes Normalized

The long-term danger is not Trump himself — he has a limited term. The danger is the normalization of this posture. If the "admire autocrats, shove allies" model becomes a viable political option in Western democracies — if other populist leaders in Europe or elsewhere adopt this model — then the collective cohesion that allows the West to have weight in the world will begin to crumble from within. Putin's Russia has been banking on this fragmentation for years. Xi's China contributes to it in more subtle but equally deliberate ways. Trump, unintentionally or not, accelerates this dynamic with every public compliment.

Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky holds a military and diplomatic front against an imperial army with a self-sacrifice that history will remember. Ukraine resists because it believes that the West represents something — a civilization of rights, laws, and freedoms worth defending. When Trump openly admires Xi Jinping, the president of the country that provides strategic cover to Putin, he sends a devastating signal to all those fighting in the name of Western values: the boss of the West is perhaps more fascinated by his enemies than by his allies.

The Iran-China Dynamic: What Trump Ceded Without Saying It

The Iranian Accord and Beijing's Ambiguous Role

On the sidelines of the vian G7 and the Beijing summit, another dossier has been developing silently: the conflict with Iran. Trump presented a ceasefire agreement with Tehran as one of his major victories of summer 2026. In this context, he said he had obtained from Xi that China would not provide military equipment to Iran — a "great statement," in his own words. He also said Xi showed willingness to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. These commitments are presented by Trump as gains from his direct dialogue with Xi.

But the reality is more nuanced. The Chinese version of the Beijing summit, according to the Guardian, does not mention Iran or its nuclear program. The Chinese Foreign Ministry merely said that the conflict "should never have happened" and called for the reopening of maritime routes — without endorsing the American approach. In other words, Xi offered verbal assurances to Trump, who publicly congratulated himself, without Beijing taking any binding commitment. Trump boasted of a victory. Xi managed a conversation. They are not the same thing.

Iranian Oil, China, and Sanctions: The Gray Zone That Persists

There is an element that Trump himself put on the table during his post-Beijing summit statements, and it deserves to be highlighted: to obtain Xi's cooperation on Iran, Trump considered lifting sanctions on Chinese companies that were buying Iranian oil. This is the nature of the transaction. China is the primary buyer of Iranian oil, which directly finances the mullahs' regime, their military program, and their support for armed groups in the region. By proposing to ease pressure on these Chinese companies, Trump offered a real concession to Beijing in exchange for a verbal commitment on Iran.

This logic of deal-making only holds if Xi's commitments are respected. Yet, Beijing's incentive structures have not fundamentally changed. China still depends heavily on Middle Eastern oil. Its economic ties with Iran are deep and long-term. A nice speech at the Zhongnanhai about "strategic stability" does not replace binding verification mechanisms — which the Trump-Xi agreement does not provide. Trump has once again bet on the goodwill of an authoritarian leader. History shows that this bet is rarely a winning one.

Democratic Senators Sound the Alarm, But Will They Be Heard?

The Letter from Ten Senators: An Act of Institutional Resistance

Ten U.S. Democratic senators, led by Jeanne Shaheen and Chris Murphy, released a scathing letter following the Beijing summit. They accused Trump of failing on five essential fronts: countering unfair Chinese trade practices, defending American technological and economic leadership, advancing human rights, strengthening deterrence on Taiwan, and confronting Beijing on its support for Iran and its intelligence benefiting attacks on American soldiers. Their conclusion: "a clear failure of his duties as commander in chief."

This bipartisan critique — well, led by opposition senators — had little echo in media outlets loyal to Trump. But it documents what the archives will remember: an administration that chose personal relationships with Xi at the expense of institutional power dynamics. American institutions — Congress, the Supreme Court, a free press — are precisely these "games" that Trump seems to find tedious. Xi doesn't have these "games." And Trump admires him for that. The circle is complete.

The Midterm Stakes and the Pressure on Trump

The Carnegie Endowment identified the November 2026 midterms as the primary domestic risk for Trump's China policy. The longer the Iranian conflict drags on, the more Trump will emerge from the midterms weakened. A weakened Trump cannot hold the same positions against Xi as a Trump in full force. This is not a guess — it is the mechanics of American politics. And Xi knows it, as his advisors have explained it to him in detail. The CCP General Secretary plays the American calendar with the precision of a clockmaker.

For the West, the stake for the coming months is therefore twofold. First, maintaining a coherent pressure on China despite the dissonances introduced by Trump's policy — which the Europeans are trying to do, with limited success. Second, building alliances and institutional mechanisms robust enough to survive a potential post-Trump period where American leadership would return to a more classic posture toward Beijing. The West cannot depend on the moods of one man — nor on his fascination with Xi Jinping.

What Trump's Flattery Reveals About the State of the West

A Deficit of Confidence in the Democratic Model

Trump's fascination with "strong" leaders — Xi, Modi, and in the past, other autocrats — is not a personality accident. It reveals something deeper: a growing uncertainty about the capacity of democracies to govern effectively. When Trump says he "likes" that Xi is "all business," he is implicitly pointing toward a perception that democracy is slow, loud, and ineffective. It is a sentiment shared by significant portions of public opinion in democracies themselves — and one that authoritarian regimes deliberately fuel.

This deficit of confidence is real and must not be ignored. Western democracies are facing simultaneous crises: growing economic inequality, institutional distrust, political polarization, wars on Europe's borders, technological competition with China. It is understandable that some citizens — and some presidents — look toward systems that seem to decide faster. But the solution to these crises is not to admire the autocrats who exploit them. It is to strengthen the institutions that allow democracies to reform themselves without destroying themselves.

The West Must Remain the Center of the World — But Not by Default

The West is not the center of the world by divine right or ethnic superiority. It is the center of the world because it has built, over centuries, systems that allow for the correction of errors, the peaceful transfer of power, and the protection of individual freedoms. These systems are imperfect. They are slow. Sometimes corrupt. But they are repairable — which the regimes of Xi and Putin are not. It is for this reason that millions of people around the world — from Ukrainians dying under Russian bombs to Uyghurs in camps, to Chinese dissidents in exile — look toward the West, not toward Beijing or Moscow.

For this West to remain a reference, its leaders must themselves believe in what it represents. An American president who publicly admires Xi Jinping and downplays the threat that Beijing poses to global freedoms is not just politically clumsy. He is narratively losing the war of ideas — the only war that truly lasts. Trump may win economic battles against China. But if he continues to flatter his primary adversary on the world stage, he loses something more precious: the moral credibility of Western leadership.

Trump, a Necessary Evil: A Fair Assessment of an Ambiguous President

What Trump Does Well: Firmness Where Others Buckle

Analytical honesty demands not reducing Trump to his complaisance toward Xi. He has results that his predecessors did not have. His aggressive trade policy of 2025 forced China to negotiate a trade truce — where years of polite multilateralism had produced nothing. His ceasefire agreement with Iran, presented at the G7, represents a bold diplomatic initiative that other administrations had avoided attempting. His loud posture at the G7 — "I'm the boss," even jokingly — has the merit of not pretending to a harmony that doesn't exist.

On the defense of Taiwan, Trump has maintained a calculated ambiguity — "There's only one person who knows [if the US would defend Taiwan], and it's me" — which, according to some analysts, preserves a strategic uncertainty useful for deterring Xi from acting. His Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed following the Beijing summit. These signals matter. They indicate that beneath the rhetoric of personal admiration, some red lines remain. This is why Trump remains a necessary evil rather than an enemy of the West.

What Trump Does Badly: Public Complaisance That Saps Cohesion

But the positive track record cannot erase the central problem of this analysis: Trump is systematically complaisant in form — in his public words, his interviews, his spontaneous declarations — toward the leader of the West's primary rival power. He can maintain red lines in private while offering Xi international legitimacy in public. These two things coexist. And the latter is dangerous precisely because it is visible, amplifiable, and weaponizable by Beijing's propaganda.

Diplomacy does not only happen in the closed rooms of the Zhongnanhai or the White House. It also happens in perceptions — what allies believe, what the populations of the Indo-Pacific think of American commitment, what Chinese opponents feel when they see the American president call their oppressor a "very smart man" and a "classic." Trump can be firm on certain issues and complaisant in form. These two realities coexist. And it is precisely this mixture that makes his track record on China so difficult to evaluate — and so important to dissect publicly.

Conclusion: Do Not Confuse Respect for a Rival with Capitulation of Leadership

Admiring the Enemy Without Giving Up Ground

One can respect Xi Jinping as a formidable adversary — he is. One can recognize that he governs with a coherence and discipline that few world leaders achieve. But there is a fundamental difference between respecting an adversary's power to better prepare for it, and admiring him publicly in a way that validates his model and erodes the posture of one's own allies. Trump regularly crosses this line. His Axios interview of June 19-20, 2026, is the latest demonstration. It will likely not be the last.

The West's response must not be to close its eyes to these statements, nor to wait patiently for the end of Trump's term hoping the next president will be more Atlanticist. The response is to build institutions, alliances, and narratives robust enough to resist the variations of American policy — regardless of the occupant of the White House. Europe must invest massively in its defense. Asian allies must strengthen their bilateral cooperation. And Western public opinion must be informed, with clarity and without complaisance, of what Xi Jinping's China truly represents.

The Last Word to Xi — and Why It Should Worry Us

There is a bitter irony in all this. Xi Jinping does not compliment Trump in public. He receives him with pomp and ceremony. He offers him walks in the gardens of Zhongnanhai. He accepts his invitations to Washington. He gives him the impression of being the "boss" — the only interlocutor who matters. But in his official speeches, in his communiqu s, in his domestic communication, Xi does not tell his people that he "admires" Trump. He says he is managing the relationship with the United States in China's interest. The difference between these two postures is the perfect illustration of the fundamental asymmetry of this relationship. Trump offers admiration. Xi receives power. They are not the same thing. And the West has every interest in not forgetting it.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

Moneycontrol — "All business, no games": Trump praises Xi Jinping as a smart and formidable leader — June 20, 2026

India Today — Trump names Modi among leaders he admires, calls him "very tough cookie" — June 19, 2026

Politico — Trump and G7 split on strategy toward China — June 15, 2026

Secondary Sources

NDTV — Trump clarifies "I'm the boss" joke at G7: "I was trying to be funny" — June 21, 2026

Associated Press — Trump declares "I'm the boss" upon late arrival at G7 — June 17, 2026

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — Trump and Xi bet on three years of stability — May 28, 2026

The Guardian — Pomp and ceremony, little substance: report on Trump's trip to Beijing — May 16, 2026

The New York Times — Trump's turnaround on China: embracing it as a peer power — June 10, 2026