ANALYSIS: The UK Misses the NATO Target — The British Link Falters Against the Russian Threat

A High-Tension Ankara Summit

On June 18, 2026, NATO defense ministers met in Brussels for their last major meeting before the Ankara summit, scheduled for July 7 and 8. The atmosphere was charged: Mark Rutte, the Alliance's Secretary General, demanded clear, concrete, and credible commitments. Pete Hegseth, the U.S. Secretary of War, warned that the era of “free-riding”—where some allies benefit from the American umbrella without paying their share—had to end. And in the midst of this growing transatlantic pressure, the United Kingdom arrived almost empty-handed: without a finalized defense investment plan, without definitive figures, and without a seasoned minister to champion them.

Dan Jarvis, just appointed Defense Secretary to replace John Healey—who resigned the previous week in a significant political stir—himself declared he was arriving in Brussels “facing a challenge.” That’s an understatement. According to reports by ITV News on June 18, Healey’s resignation letter reveals that the British Defense Investment Plan (DIP) would only provide an additional £13.5 billion, while military leaders estimated £28 billion was necessary to transform the country’s armed forces. Worse: this plan would only bring defense spending to 2.68% of GDP by 2030—far, far from the 3.5% in base military spending that NATO requires from its members by 2035.

The Historical Pillar That Falters

The United Kingdom is not just any member of the Alliance. It is one of only two nuclear powers in Western Europe, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a nation that has long considered itself the indispensable bridge between Europe and the United States. Its relative decline in defense spending is therefore not a simple accounting anecdote—it is a political signal of real gravity, at a time when Moscow continues to threaten the European security architecture.

This crisis reveals a deep tension at the heart of Keir Starmer’s Labour government: between the stated desire to make the UK a leader in European defense and the refusal of the Treasury, under Rachel Reeves, to open the budgetary tap to the level required. The result is a public fracture, a sensational resignation, and national credibility put to a severe test in the halls of NATO.

What I read in this crisis is first the confirmation of a ruthless law: you cannot claim to want to defend democracy against Putin while haggling over pennies with your own generals. Healey chose honesty. Starmer chose fiscal caution—and he’ll pay the political price for it, I’m certain.

A Public Break with the Prime Minister

John Healey resigned on June 11, 2026. This was not a resignation of convenience or career—at 66, the man had no ambition to succeed Starmer. It was an act of conscience, a deliberate political gesture intended to alert the country to what he considered a capitulation to national defense requirements. According to reports by ITV News, in his resignation letter, Healey explicitly wrote that the Prime Minister was “unable” to provide the necessary resources, and that the Treasury was “unwilling” to allocate them. A formulation of rare brutality in British political culture.

According to the Washington Times and several other corroborating sources, Healey had requested approximately £18 billion in new funding over four years. He only obtained, according to available information, an offer of £13.5 billion—part of which, according to the Financial Times, actually consisted of budget reallocations that military chiefs called “treasury trickery”—“Treasury trickery” in the terms reported by the Financial Times.

The Figure That Indicts: 2.68% of GDP in 2030

The heart of the crisis lies in one number. According to Healey’s resignation letter, as reported by ITV News and confirmed by Al Jazeera, the Defense Investment Plan (DIP) as submitted would only bring British spending to 2.68% of GDP in 2030. Yet the UK will already reach 2.6% by 2027 thanks to previous commitments. This means that over three additional years—from 2027 to 2030—the real effort would represent an increase of only 0.08 percentage points. In a context where Starmer himself has publicly warned that Russia could attack a NATO member by 2030, this budgetary inertia borders on the absurd.

Healey drew the logical conclusion: without a credible trajectory toward 3% of GDP by 2030, and then 3.5% in 2035, the United Kingdom arrives at this historic juncture without the means for its ambition. “By 2030, a vast majority of NATO members will be spending 3% or more,” he stated before the Commons during his resignation statement, according to the BBC. “When allies look for British leadership, we cannot afford to be lagging behind.”

I have to admit: what Healey did takes guts. Telling the truth to a prime minister from your own party, in an open letter, knowing it’s going to explode in the media—that’s rare. And in the world's current state, that rarity deserves to be acknowledged.

What the Ministry of Defense Requested

The figure of £28 billion is not a Healey invention. It is the amount that the Ministry of Defense (MoD) had estimated was necessary to properly fund the Defense Investment Plan and transform the British armed forces into a force fit for combat—what official doctrine calls “warfighting readiness.” According to sources cited by Philippe Lagassé’s Substack and other analysts, the Prime Minister, the Treasury, and the MoD had initially discussed a settlement around £17 billion—before Starmer finally stopped at £13.5 billion.

According to Breaking Defense, the head of the British armed forces, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, confirmed before the Lords committee on June 16, 2026, that even this amount left a gaping hole in the day-to-day operational finances of the armed forces. “What I’m most worried about is the funding of the day-to-day operational activities,” he stated. Without additional corrections, “those areas will be under pressure.”

Fuel 88% More Expensive: The Concrete Reality of Underfunding

The budget crisis is not abstract. It has immediate and measurable consequences. Sir Richard Knighton revealed to the Lords that the cost of aviation fuel had increased by 88% in one year. For an air force, this surge is not just one budget line among others—it is the difference between planes that fly and planes that are grounded. Fewer flight hours mean less training, less preparation, and less deterrence capability.

According to Army Technology, the programs at risk are considerable: the sixth-generation GCAP fighter, the Challenger 3 tank, and the modernization of land forces in small arms and mobility vehicles. The British Army could even lose all of its Warrior infantry fighting vehicles with no planned replacement. In a world where Ukraine has demonstrated that intensive land warfare is back, this prospect is alarming.

When a military chief says out loud that his planes risk staying on the ground for lack of fuel, something has fundamentally malfunctioned in the political decision-making chain. It’s no longer a matter of fiscal orthodoxy—it’s a matter of strategic responsibility.

A Document Months in the Making

The Defense Investment Plan was initially expected in the fall of 2025. It has still not been published as of the Brussels summit on June 18, 2026. The reasons for this delay are now public: an intense tug-of-war between the Ministry of Defense and the Treasury over allocated amounts, a Chancellor Rachel Reeves reluctant to validate commitments exceeding £12 billion, and a Prime Minister caught between pressure from the military and the constraints of public finances.

According to the UK Defence Journal, the DIP is expected to be published before the Ankara summit of NATO heads of state on July 7 and 8—a promise Starmer made personally to Mark Rutte during a phone call on June 13, according to Reuters as cited by Internazionale. The stakes are high: appearing in Ankara without a credible plan, while NATO requires from its members a “clear, concrete, and credible trajectory” toward 5% of GDP by 2035, would be an additional diplomatic humiliation.

Dan Jarvis, a New Minister Without a Net

Dan Jarvis was appointed Secretary of State for Defense on June 11, 2026, the same day as Healey’s resignation. A former career soldier—he served in the British Parachute Regiment in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone—he enjoys real personal credibility on defense issues. But his starting position is delicate: he inherits a fractured portfolio, an unfinalized DIP, and allies who are waiting for quantified commitments.

According to the BBC, Jarvis stated in Brussels that he was working “tirelessly” to finalize the funding plan. He however refused to confirm whether he would seek additional funding beyond the contested settlement that had pushed Healey to resign. In other words: there is no guarantee, for now, that the trajectory will change. The UK could find itself in Ankara with an officially published but financially insufficient DIP—a veneer of compliance over a core of persistent fragility.

Jarvis is facing a Herculean choice that few politicians would envy: either he accepts the settlement Healey refused, betraying his predecessor's words through his actions; or he fights for more, entering into direct conflict with the Treasury in his very first week. I hope he chooses the fight—but I also understand why some doubt he has the means for it.

The Alliance's New Financial Architecture

Since the The Hague summit in July 2025, the rules of the game within NATO have changed. Allies have committed to spending 5% of GDP on defense and security-related expenditures by 2035. This overall figure breaks down into 3.5% for base military spending (according to the NATO definition) and 1.5% for related spending—transport infrastructure, civilian resilience, and protection of critical infrastructure.

In light of this target, the British trajectory is particularly insufficient. According to the Institute for Government, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) estimated that reaching 3.5% of GDP by 2035 would require approximately £40 billion an additional per year in real terms. The DIP, even in its most generous version (£13.5 billion over four years), is therefore of a much smaller scale than what would be necessary for real compliance with the Alliance’s ambition.

The International Comparison That Condemns London

Meanwhile, other member nations are accelerating. According to the Atlantic Council tracker, updated in April 2026, all NATO members now exceed the previous 2% target. In 2025, European countries and Canada increased their defense spending by more than $90 billion—a 20% increase in one year. Norway has even surpassed the United States in defense spending per capita—a first in NATO history.

Germany aims to reach its target of 3.5% of base military spending as early as 2029. Pologne, motivated by its geographical proximity to Russia, already exceeds 4%. In this context, the United Kingdom—which only plans for 2.68% in 2030—risks being among the laggards in a club of nations that, for once in the Alliance’s recent history, are taking their commitments seriously.

There is something strange and unsettling about the fact that nations without a strong military tradition—the Baltic States, Poland, Finland—are now leading the way in NATO spending, while one of Europe's oldest military powers is counting its pennies. History has its bitter ironies.

American Pressure on European Allies

Pete Hegseth arrived in Brussels with an unambiguous message. According to reports by ITV News, the U.S. Secretary of War stated that “some of the largest economies in NATO still seem to believe that the era of free-riding is here”—and that the American contribution would henceforth be conditioned on how allies held up their commitments. This is a major paradigm shift: for decades, the United States tolerated the Alliance's imbalances. That tolerance is officially over.

Hegseth also announced a review of the U.S. force posture in Europe—a veiled threat that countries not respecting the 5% of GDP trajectory risk seeing American personnel reduced on their soil. In this context, the United Kingdom—which accounted for 6% of the total NATO budget between 2020 and 2024, according to the Institute for Government—cannot afford to be perceived as a burden on the Alliance.

Rutte: “clear, concrete, and credible plans”

Mark Rutte, for his part, applied pressure with less flash but just as much firmness. He stated he expected every member state to present “clear, concrete, and credible” plans to raise their spending toward the 5% of GDP target. He also recalled the scale of the progress made—$90 billion additional in Europe and Canada in 2025—while insisting that this progress must continue and deepen before the Ankara summit.

According to available reports from the meeting, Rutte also announced that President Zelensky will personally participate in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group session during this ministerial meeting—signaling that support for Kyiv remains a central priority, and that failures in defense spending have direct consequences on the Alliance’s collective ability to support Ukraine.

Rutte is one of the few Western leaders to have understood that diplomatic softness and budgetary firmness are not mutually exclusive. He says things politely but bluntly. Facing him, the absence of the British DIP looked like a student's bad excuse on exam day.

Moscow at the Alliance’s Gates

The justification for the British defense effort—and its insufficiency—is inseparable from the Russian threat. Starmer himself has publicly stated that Russia could launch an attack against a NATO member by 2030. Germany has estimated at three years the time frame within which Russian forces could be ready for such an aggression, according to sources cited by The Independent. Sir Richard Knighton described the current environment as the most dangerous period for the United Kingdom in decades.

Vladimir Putin has transformed the Russian war economy into a productive machine: factories are running at full capacity, tens of thousands of soldiers are trained every month, and the arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones is being replenished. Zelensky, meanwhile, holds his ground with resources that depend directly on the generosity of Western Allies. In this context, every billion pounds that London refuses to invest in its own defense is also an indirect weakening of the collective support for Ukraine.

The Starmer Paradox: Warning and Braking Simultaneously

There is a fundamental contradiction in Keir Starmer’s position. He has built much of his international image on unwavering support for Ukraine, on firmness toward Putin, on unapologetic Atlanticism. He stated—and Healey cited him in his resignation letter—that Russia could attack NATO by 2030. And yet, his government has refused to allocate the resources that his own generals estimate are essential to prepare British forces for that eventuality.

This contradiction has not gone unnoticed. According to The Guardian, the Guardian analyst commenting on Healey's resignation noted that “the major Western European powers—notably the UK, France, and Italy—are hesitant to invest enough, fearing it would weaken creditor confidence in their national finances.” Fiscal solvency is taking precedence over strategic solvency. It is a dangerous trade-off.

I can't help but think of Churchill saying that democracies always do the minimum necessary, but always too late. Starmer is no Chamberlain—but he's playing with the same psychological constraints as those who, in their time, preferred negotiating over numbers rather than facing the geopolitical obviousness.

Sir Richard Knighton Before the Lords

On June 16, 2026, before the Lords committee on international relations and defense, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, the UK's Chief of the Defence Staff, spoke words that have no recent precedent in British defense history: without additional funding, the British armed forces will have to “dial back”—reduce their training activities and operations. This is not a general playing politics: it is an operational reality.

Knighton was precise in his diagnosis. According to Breaking Defense, he stated: “What I’m most worried about is the level of funding for day-to-day operational activities.” These activities include exercises, training, ongoing missions—the elements that ensure soldiers, sailors, and airmen are “facing the challenge as ready as possible with the equipment they have today.” Without budgetary correction, all of this will be “under pressure.”

Acquisition Programs in the Balance

The problem does not stop at daily operations. According to Army Technology, Knighton also signaled that the DIP would likely lead to cuts or delays in major acquisition programs. He specified that savings would primarily target future programs—what you haven’t bought yet, not what you already own—which amounts to delaying the modernization of the armed forces at the precise moment when such modernization is most urgent.

Potentially affected programs include GCAP (sixth-generation fighter developed jointly with Japan and Italy), the Challenger 3, and the entire modernization of the Army. Yet, the war in Ukraine has precisely demonstrated that nations that delay modernizing their arsenal pay for that delay in human lives and lost ground. The United Kingdom, if it stays this budgetary course, risks entering the next decade with forces increasingly ill-suited for high-intensity combat.

A military chief who publicly says “we will have to reduce our operations”—it’s a sign that something has broken in the normal civil-military decision-making process. Normally, these warnings are voiced behind closed doors. That they are coming out publicly means the closed doors didn't work. And that should scare everyone.

From Lion to Mouse: A Decade of Disinvestment

To understand where the UK stands in 2026, one must look at the path traveled—or rather, not traveled. In 2014, of NATO's 32 members, only 3 spent 2% of GDP on defense. By 2024, there were 23. The UK went through this period somehow maintaining its formal commitments but gradually reducing the substance of its military power. Decisions like scrapping the HMS Ark Royal, reducing Army personnel, cuts to the Royal Air Force—so many choices that “eviscerated” the British armed forces, according to Knighton's own phrasing.

According to the Institute for Government, the United States accounted for 68% of the total NATO budget between 2020 and 2024, compared to only 6% for the UK. This is less than what the size and status of the country would lead one to expect from an ally that presents itself as a “leader in European defense.” The reality of the numbers is brutal: London has benefited from the American umbrella for too long without proportionally bearing the cost.

The “khollow force”: A Concept Haunting Strategists

The concept of a “hollow force”—an army that looks imposing on paper but whose operational substance is hollow—is at the heart of the fears expressed by Knighton. In 2024, the United Kingdom spent 2.3% of GDP on defense, according to NATO figures cited by the Institute for Government. This rate is expected to reach 2.6% in 2027—and would only reach 2.68% in 2030 according to the contested plan. Such a flat trajectory over seven years is incompatible with the stated ambitions.

The context must be remembered: the war in Iran—which broke out in 2026—has considerably increased the operational obligations of British forces, particularly regarding the securing of the Strait of Hormuz. Healey himself cited this additional pressure in his resignation letter. The British armed forces are simultaneously called upon on several fronts—the Middle East, support for Ukraine, NATO missions in Eastern Europe—with resources that have not followed the same pace of expansion.

An “eviscerated” army is not a rhetorical metaphor—it is an operational reality that the West’s adversaries know and exploit. Putin reads these parliamentary debates carefully, I’m sure. Every pound sterling refused for British defense is a piece of intelligence he records.

Germany Accelerating, Poland Surpassing

While the UK struggles with its budgetary dilemmas, its European partners are accelerating. Germany—long criticized for its post-Cold War pacifism and chronic under-investment in defense—has made a spectacular turnaround since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It now aims for 3.5% of base military spending by 2029, six years ahead of NATO's target date. This is more and sooner than what London is planning.

Poland, for its part, is already spending more than 4% of GDP on defense—the highest level in the entire Atlantic Alliance. Motivated by their direct neighborhood with Russia and Belarus, the Poles have made the political choice—difficult but owned—to prioritize national security over other public expenditures. Finland, newly integrated into NATO, and the Baltic countries are following similar trajectories. The idea that the UK, a nuclear power and founding member of the Alliance, would find itself behind these nations in the defense spending race would have seemed improbable ten years ago.

France and Italy: The Other “hesitators”

The United Kingdom is not alone in its uncomfortable position. According to The Guardian, France and Italy are also on a trajectory that would only lead them to about 2.5% of GDP by the end of the decade. These major European economies share a common fear: that massive defense spending commitments will weaken financial market confidence in their national finances. Sovereign solvency versus collective security—a trade-off that previous generations, who lived through world wars, would never have dared to formulate this way.

But where France can rely on one of the most powerful national defense industries in Europe—and a Gaullist culture of sovereignty that gives it a form of symbolic immunity in NATO negotiations—the United Kingdom is in a more fragile position. After Brexit, London lost part of its structural influence within European Union mechanisms. In NATO, British credibility now rests more than ever on its real military capabilities. And those capabilities are threatened.

France can afford a certain delay in its spending because it has the nuclear deterrent, the Dassault industry, Naval Group, KNDS—and a doctrine of strategic autonomy that gives it a particular legitimacy. Post-Brexit UK doesn't have that luxury. Its only remaining capital in the Alliance is its military reliability. And that is exactly what it is currently jeopardizing.

What NATO Expects from the UK in July

The Ankara summit on July 7 and 8, 2026, will be the moment of truth. All heads of state and government of the Alliance will meet in Turkey with one question in mind: who is delivering, and who is not? Mark Rutte was explicit: he expects every member state to present “a clear trajectory” toward 5% of GDP by 2035. Starmer promised that the DIP would be published before this meeting. But promising to publish a document is not the same as promising that the document will meet expectations.

If the DIP is finally published with the contested £13.5 billion as the main package, and a trajectory that does not exceed 2.68% of GDP in 2030, the UK will arrive in Ankara with a document in hand but without the substance that should accompany it. It would be, as London Loves Business headlined, a “khumiliation”—a founding power of the Alliance appearing at the summit with the bare diplomatic minimum to avoid shame, but without the conviction that should characterize a leader.

The Ukrainian Stake in the Equation

Ukraine will also be at the heart of the Ankara discussions. Zelensky was already participating in the Brussels Contact Group meeting on June 18. The UK announced—through Jarvis in Brussels—a support package of £750 million for Ukraine, funded by the sale of seized Russian assets via the ERA loan program, including 150,000 Ukrainian drones and more than 350 missiles and air defense radars to be delivered before the end of the year. This is good. But in the context of an insufficient DIP, these announcements look like an optical illusion: visible and valuable on the diplomatic level, but unrelated to the structural lack of funding for the armed forces themselves.

I look at these figures—750 million for Ukraine, 13.5 billion for the DIP over four years—and I wonder if British foreign policy is becoming a substitute for defense policy. We show the gesture, the symbol, the Ukrainian flag on social media. But we don't fund the foundations. It's courage in the window.

A Structurally Less Influential United Kingdom

It would be reductive to limit the British defense crisis solely to the internal budget debate. There is a structural dimension that Brexit has accentuated: by leaving the European Union, the United Kingdom lost its place in European defense cooperation mechanisms—PESCO, EDIRPA, common acquisition agencies. It must now negotiate its industrial and military cooperation agreements on a case-by-case basis, with less institutional leverage.

This structural fragility is recognized even by its allies. In an Atlantic Council article from May 2026, analysts noted that France and the UK had a complementary role to play in Central and Eastern Europe, but that “France is currently punching below its weight in the Baltic zone and could take on more.” The formulation is diplomatic, but the implication is clear: London is not compensating for its absence from European structures with a sufficient military presence on the Alliance's eastern flank.

The British Defense Industry: An Under-Exploited Asset

The UK nevertheless possesses a top-tier defense industry—BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, Babcock, MBDA UK—and technological capabilities in cyber defense and military artificial intelligence that are among the best in the world. The GCAP, developed jointly with Japan and Italy, is an ambitious project for the future. But all of this requires regular, predictable, and credible funding. The uncertainty surrounding the DIP, the delays, the resignations—all of this sends a negative signal to industrial partners and allies.

There is a painful irony in this situation: the United Kingdom has one of the best defense industries in Europe, and yet it is unable to decide to give it the orders it needs to thrive. It's like having a Formula 1 engine and running at idle because you refuse to buy gas.

Remaining Budgetary Options

Prime Minister Starmer is not without options, but they are all politically costly. The first would be to impose a revision of the DIP budgetary trajectory on Rachel Reeves—by agreeing to raise the envelope beyond the £13.5 billion currently envisaged, ideally toward the £28 billion demanded by the MoD. This is politically difficult in a context of strained public finances, but it is the only way to give Jarvis the means for his mandate.

The second option would be to carry out massive budget reallocations from other departments—an approach mentioned by Starmer himself, but which faces resistance from other portfolio holders. The third option—the one Healey was calling for—would be to engage in a multilateral dialogue with European allies to find common funding mechanisms, based on the model of what some Nordic countries are already doing. This path is the most creative but also the slowest to produce effects.

The Political Signal from Downing Street

At this stage, Downing Street has maintained a defensive line of communication. The No. 10 spokesperson insisted that the UK “constantly meets its commitments” to the Alliance, and that Starmer “was clear that Europe must play a larger role in NATO.” These formulations, reported by ITV News, do not answer the central question: is the government ready to go beyond the £13.5 billion to meet the requirements of its own generals?

When a government starts defending its defense decisions with PR arguments rather than figures, it's because the figures don't support them. Starmer must decide if he wants to be the Prime Minister of fiscal stability or the one who protected the West at the critical hour. He can't be both—not at the same time, not in this context.

An Alliance Pillar at the Crossroads

The United Kingdom is at a historic turning point in its defense policy. The resignation of John Healey, the warnings from Sir Richard Knighton, the imminent publication of an under-funded DIP, and arriving at the Ankara summit without a credible trajectory toward 3.5% of GDP—all of this paints the portrait of a power that has not yet resolved the fundamental tension between its geopolitical ambitions and its budgetary reality. NATO needs a strong, reliable, invested United Kingdom. What the events of the last two weeks suggest is that London is still deciding whether it really wants to be.

Allies are watching. Zelensky is waiting for the capabilities that the DIP should have funded. Putin—make no mistake—is recording every signal of weakness. And British soldiers deployed around the world deserve a political response worthy of their commitment. History will not be kind to those who chose fiscal orthodoxy at the precise moment when the collective security of the West was at stake.

What the Ankara Summit Will Say About Europe

The Ankara summit will be more than a meeting of heads of state: it will be a test of Western cohesion in the face of a Russian adversary betting on fragmentation. If the UK arrives with a credible DIP, a convincing trajectory, and a strong political commitment from Starmer, it will be a signal that the Alliance holds—even in its moments of internal crisis. If, on the contrary, Jarvis appears with a window-dressing document and vague promises, the signal sent to Moscow will be more worrying than any diplomatic statement could compensate for. NATO is only as strong as its weakest link. For now, that link risks being called the United Kingdom.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.