DECODING: Lithuania — Anti-Drone Ammunition at €2 Per Round to Hold NATO's Skies

DECODING: Lithuania — Anti-Drone Ammunition at €2 Per Round to Hold NATO's Skies

Introduction: A Lithuanian State Factory Invents the Answer to Kamikaze Drone Problem

The Silent Revolution at the Giraitė Plant in the Kaunas District

June 2026. In the Kaunas district, Lithuania, the state-owned Giraitė factory has launched production of ammunition that may seem unremarkable at first glance: cartridges in calibers 5.56mm and 7.62mm, the NATO infantry standard calibers. But what makes these cartridges extraordinary is their specific design for the neutralization of drones at distances of 50 to 100 meters. And their price: €2 per round. In a context where kamikaze drones threaten every military front and every civilian infrastructure in Europe, this quiet Lithuanian innovation deserves to be decoded in depth.

Lithuania developed this ammunition by drawing on the direct lessons of the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian soldiers discovered to their cost that standard infantry ammunition is poorly effective against small commercial drones repurposed for military use — the kind a Russian soldier can buy on Aliexpress for a few hundred dollars and transform into a guided bomb. Conventional ballistic trajectories are poorly suited to intercepting such small, mobile, and fast targets. Giraitė designed a specific solution to this precise tactical problem, at a revolutionary unit cost.

Why €2 Per Round Is a Strategic Number, Not Just an Economic One

The logic of economic asymmetry is at the heart of the drone problem on contemporary battlefields. An Iranian Shahed drone costs approximately $20,000. But a modified commercial drone can cost $500 to $2,000. Conventional defense systems — interceptor missiles, anti-drone guns — cost $50,000 to $500,000 per shot. The economic asymmetry is therefore catastrophic: to neutralize a $500 drone, you may end up spending 500 times more. Giraitė's €2 round partially reverses this equation for a specific category of drones — those operating at close range.

For defenders of infrastructure, forward military positions, logistics convoys, or artillery positions — which face close-range drones — having a dedicated anti-drone munition at a cost comparable to a standard cartridge transforms tactics. Every infantry soldier can become a front-line anti-drone defender without costly specialized equipment. This is the democratization of anti-drone capability at the lowest tactical level — and this is precisely what the war in Ukraine has shown to be necessary in the face of the proliferation of small reconnaissance and attack drones.

The Technology Behind Giraitė's Anti-Drone Munition — How It Works

The Specific Ballistic Design for Low-Altitude Aerial Target Neutralization

Standard infantry ammunition (5.56mm NATO and 7.62mm NATO) is designed for flat trajectories toward human targets at typical distances of 200 to 600 meters. The physics of their ballistic trajectory — projectile mass, form factor, muzzle velocity — is not optimized for intercepting small objects moving in three dimensions at short distances. Giraitė's munitions modify these parameters to improve the probability of neutralization in the 50–100 meter window specific to close-range drones.

Without entering into technical details that fall under industrial and military secrecy, possible modifications include a dispersal charge (multiple projectiles rather than one), a modification of projectile geometry to maximize impact surface against a target with low radar and infrared signature, or an adaptation of ballistic characteristics for a more effective rising trajectory. Compatibility with the standard 5.56mm and 7.62mm calibers means these munitions can be used in existing weapons — M16, FAMAS, G36, AK — without any equipment modification, which is a considerable logistical advantage.

Effectiveness at 50–100 Meters — A Specific and Crucial Tactical Window

The 50 to 100 meter window defines the operational domain of these munitions. Below 50 meters, a fast-approaching drone leaves little reaction time — the solution lies more in early detection and physical barriers. Beyond 100 meters, GPS jamming electronic systems or directed energy weapons become more appropriate. But within the 50–100 meter window, a drone approaching a defensive position is often still neutralizable by sharpshooters or well-trained infantry units — provided they have the adapted munition.

This tactical window is precisely the one that posed the most problems for Ukrainian forces in the early phases of the war. Small DJI Mavic or equivalent drones, modified to drop grenades on trenches, operate in exactly this range. Hundreds of videos from the Ukrainian front show soldiers desperately trying to shoot down these devices with conventional ammunition — often unsuccessfully. Giraitė's munition is a direct response to this field reality, designed by a nation that analyzed these videos and drew the appropriate operational conclusions.

The First Clients — Sweden and France, Then a Growing Waiting List

Initial Deliveries to Sweden and France — A Validation by Major Allied Armies

The significance of Giraitė's anti-drone munition's first clients goes beyond a simple commercial transaction. The fact that Sweden — a NATO member since 2024, with a rigorous army — and France — a major military power with a sophisticated defence industry — chose to be the first beneficiaries of this munition is a first-order technical and operational validation. These countries do not procure munitions lightly. They technically evaluated the product, tested its effectiveness, and concluded that the Lithuanian munition deserved to be integrated into their arsenal.

France in particular, whose army deploys units in varied operational contexts — from the Sahel to operations in Europe — is a particularly significant client. If the French army considers this €2 munition operationally useful, its cost-effectiveness is real. France has its own munitions industrial capabilities — Eurenco, Sofema, and others — and has no need to source from Lithuania by default. If it does so, it is because this specific product fills a genuine need at an unbeatable cost.

Ongoing Negotiations — Czech Republic, Estonia, Belgium, Israel, Denmark

The list of countries in negotiation with Giraitė for anti-drone munition supply is revealing of international interest in this solution. Czech Republic: a nation strongly committed to supporting Ukraine and simultaneously strengthening its own defence. Estonia: a Baltic country on the front line of the Russian threat, devoting more than 3 percent of its GDP to defence and seeking anti-drone solutions for its forces. Belgium: a NATO country modernizing its army after years of underinvestment. Israel: one of the countries with the most operational experience with the drone threat in real combat contexts.

Israel's interest is particularly significant. The Jewish state has one of the most sophisticated defence industries in the world and has direct experience with the drone threat in its recent military operations. If its acquisition teams are looking with interest at the Lithuanian munition, it is because it offers something that Israeli industry does not yet produce at the same cost conditions. This validation by Israel — in this specific domain — would be one of the strongest technological validations Giraitė could obtain.

The Objective of 5 Million Rounds Per Year — An Industrial Ambition to Decode

What 5 Million Units Per Year Represents in Defence Capacity Terms

The objective of 5 million anti-drone rounds per year set by Giraitė deserves perspective. 5 million units at €2 per unit represents an annual turnover of €10 million — modest on the scale of the international defence industry. But its operational value far exceeds its commercial value. With 5 million anti-drone rounds per year, one can substantially equip the armed forces of several medium-sized NATO nations, create operational stocks sufficient for a high-intensity campaign of a few weeks, or provide the basic equipment for tens of thousands of infantry soldiers.

In the context of the Baltic states — Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia — which total a population of approximately 6 million inhabitants and armies of some tens of thousands of soldiers, 5 million anti-drone rounds per year represent significant coverage of front-line defence. It is also an export capacity that would allow Giraitė to become a reference supplier for all Northern European NATO forces in this specific category. Lithuania is thus positioning itself as a high-value-added niche producer in the European defence ecosystem.

Scale-Up Constraints — Raw Materials, Personnel, and Certification

Reaching 5 million units per year from a launch in June 2026 requires an industrial scale-up that will not be without challenges. Raw materials — brass for casings, propellant powder, specific components of the anti-drone payload — must be sourced stably and in volume. NATO certification of munitions is a rigorous process that can take time for new calibers or design modifications. Specialized personnel for munitions production — a trade combining pyrotechnics, precision mechanics, and rigorous quality control — must be trained.

Lithuania has the advantage of having Giraitė, a state-owned factory with historical experience in munitions production. This is not a start-up starting from scratch. But even for an experienced producer, tripling or quintupling production capacity within a few years requires substantial investments in equipment and infrastructure. European programs like EDIP could play a role in financing this scale-up — a concrete example of how European financing could accelerate the expansion of a national defence industrial capacity in the collective interest of the alliance.

The Lessons From the War in Ukraine That Guided the Design

Ukrainian Field Reports as the Primary Source of Anti-Drone Doctrine

The genesis of Giraitė's anti-drone munition illustrates a military methodological approach that should be systematized throughout NATO: the direct integration of real-time field lessons into equipment development programs. Ukraine is the greatest high-intensity combat laboratory of the 21st century. The lessons learned there — on drones, missiles, electronic warfare, logistics under pressure — are available to any ally who takes the trouble to carefully listen to Ukrainian officers and soldiers.

Lithuania has proven particularly effective at drawing these lessons. Geographic and cultural proximity to Ukraine, acute awareness of the Russian threat, and a small size that facilitates rapid decision-making have allowed Vilnius to translate field observations into technical specifications more quickly than larger and more bureaucratic nations. The result — an operational anti-drone munition, tested, and already delivered to allies — in less than four years after the beginning of the full-scale war, is a performance that should serve as a model for others.

The Limits of the Anti-Drone Munition and the Drone Categories It Does Not Cover

An honest decoding of Giraitė's munition must also clearly define what it does not do. Effective in the 50–100 meter window, it is not a solution for Iranian Shahed drones operating at hundreds or thousands of kilometers. It is not an answer to high-altitude reconnaissance drones. It does not resolve the problem of coordinated drone swarms that saturate defenses. And it is not a substitute for electronic warfare systems that jam the communications and navigation of adversary drones.

These limits are important to understand to avoid seeing in Giraitė's munition a universal anti-drone panacea. It is a specific tool for a specific problem: small proximity drones that threaten infantry positions and lightly defended infrastructure. In this precise domain, it offers an accessible and economical solution. Complete anti-drone defence requires a multi-layer approach combining dedicated munitions like Giraitė's, electronic warfare systems, interceptor missiles for higher threats, and adapted training protocols. Lithuania has solved one layer of the problem. The other layers remain to be built.

Lithuania's Strategic Positioning in the NATO Defence Ecosystem

How a Country of 3 Million Inhabitants Becomes an Indispensable Defence Industrial Actor

Lithuania is a country of 3 million inhabitants, a NATO member since 2004 and an European Union member since the same year. Long considered a country to be defended rather than a producer of defence capabilities, it has undergone a remarkable transformation since 2022. The defence budget has been raised to more than 3 percent of GDP. Massive investments have been made in reservist training. And companies like Giraitė have received ambitious industrial mandates to contribute to the alliance's arsenal.

This transformation is not accidental. It reflects a deliberate strategy by Vilnius to no longer be merely a recipient of collective security but to become an active contributor — and therefore a valued partner rather than a burden to protect. Giraitė's anti-drone munitions, exports to Sweden, France, Denmark and soon others, are concrete manifestations of this strategy. Every signed contract strengthens Lithuania's position as an indispensable alliance partner — a more solid security guarantee than any diplomatic declaration.

The Baltic Defence Model — A Lesson for Europe

The three Baltic states have since 2022 developed a remarkably coherent national defence model. They have raised their defence budgets to levels that few NATO nations reach. They have developed their doctrines of total territorial defence, integrating civilians and military in systematic preparation for resistance. They have invested in specialized defence industrial capacities — anti-drone munitions in Lithuania, cyber-defence in Estonia, secure communications equipment in Latvia. And they have maintained remarkable political consistency in their support for Ukraine and their analysis of the Russian threat, when other European nations were wavering.

This model should inspire European nations far larger and far richer. France, Germany, Italy have incomparably larger defence budgets — but have shown strategic hesitations and execution delays that the Baltic states could not afford given their direct exposure to the threat. Sometimes geographic necessity is the best teacher of strategy. And Lithuania, with its €2 anti-drone munitions, teaches us that a country's size does not determine the relevance of its defensive innovation.

NATO Compatibility — The Key to the Lithuanian Solution's Scalability

Why Compatibility With NATO Standard Calibers Is a Decisive Advantage

One of Giraitė's anti-drone munition's most important assets is its compatibility with NATO standard calibers — 5.56mm and 7.62mm. This means no NATO country needs to acquire new weapons to use these munitions. Every assault rifle, every light or heavy machine gun in service in the alliance can fire these cartridges without modification. This is a considerable logistical and economic advantage for large-scale adoption by allied armies.

In the NATO ecosystem, caliber standardization is an absolute priority to guarantee interoperability between different member forces. NATO nations that use anti-drone munitions in proprietary calibers would face catastrophic logistical problems in combined operations. Giraitė's decision to rely on 5.56mm and 7.62mm calibers is therefore strategically astute: it maximizes the potential market (all NATO armies) and simplifies operational adoption (no additional weapons training required). This is engineering in service of alliance strategy.

Implications for NATO Group Purchasing — An Opportunity to Seize

If Giraitė's anti-drone munition is technically validated by several NATO members, there is a strong logic for a group purchase at alliance level. Precedents exist: NATO has already organized collective purchases for certain types of equipment, particularly through the NSPA (NATO Support and Procurement Agency). An NSPA contract for Giraitė's anti-drone munitions would generate even greater economies of scale on the unit price, guarantee Giraitė visibility on its demand that would facilitate scale-up investments, and standardize the close-range anti-drone response in all allied armies.

This NATO group contract opportunity is probably already in the ongoing diplomatic and industrial discussions. Negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Belgium, Israel, and Denmark mentioned in sources could form the basis of a buyers' coalition large enough to justify formalization through NSPA. If this materializes, Giraitė would transition from a Lithuanian national producer to a NATO-certified supplier — a considerable industrial status change that would open even broader markets.

The Future of Anti-Drone Warfare — What the Lithuanian Munition Foreshadows

The Technological Race Between Drones and Countermeasures — Where Do We Actually Stand?

Giraitė's anti-drone munition is a response to the drone threat of 2022–2026. But drones evolve rapidly. Inertial navigation systems independent of GPS are becoming more accessible, making GPS jamming less effective. Drones equipped with onboard cameras and AI can avoid obstacles in real time. More resistant composite materials can make drones harder to neutralize through munition fragments. The legitimate question is therefore: what will be the operational lifespan of Giraitė's solution before adversaries adapt their drones to resist it?

This is the reality of every technological race in defence: today's solutions become tomorrow's vulnerabilities if innovation is not continuous. Giraitė and its industrial partners must already be planning the next generations of anti-drone munitions, anticipating the technological evolutions of adversary drones. The Ukrainian lesson is here as well relevant: the actors who survive in this war are not those with the best technology at a given moment, but those who innovate most quickly and continuously. Lithuania has shown it can innovate fast. It must now show it can do so continuously.

Future Required Investments — Beyond 5.56mm and 7.62mm Munitions

To maintain its relevance in the anti-drone domain, Giraitė and the Lithuanian government will need to invest in next-generation solutions. Remote-controlled anti-drone munitions — projectiles that can adjust their trajectory after firing — are a technological pathway under development in several countries. Integrated detection-identification-neutralization systems — combining radar, AI, and munition in a complete portable solution — represent the horizon of front-line anti-drone defence. Portable low-power lasers for neutralizing drones at very short range could complement or replace munitions-based solutions.

The European EDIP ecosystem and NATO funding must support this development. Lithuania cannot alone finance the development of the next generation of anti-drone defence for the entire alliance. But it can design and produce these solutions if it has adequate funding. This is precisely the model of specialization and collective financing that the European Union and NATO must institutionalize to fully exploit the innovation capacities of their smaller but most motivated members.

Conclusion: Lithuania, Global Laboratory of Accessible Anti-Drone Defence

A Reproducible Model for All of NATO

Giraitė's initiative is, at its scale, a model of defence industrial policy: identify an uncovered operational need (low-cost short-range drone neutralization), develop a solution compatible with existing standards (NATO 5.56mm and 7.62mm calibers), test it drawing on the direct lessons of the war in Ukraine, produce it at a revolutionary cost (€2 per round), and market it to qualified allies. Each step in this process is reproducible by other nations, other industrialists, for other unmet needs.

Giraitė's real innovation may not be the munition itself — remarkable as it is. It is the process that produced it. A process centered on real field needs, rapid in execution, compatible with alliance constraints, and focused on economic accessibility. If NATO and the EU can institutionalize this process at scale — financing dozens of similar initiatives in member nations of all sizes — collective European defence will be incomparably stronger than if it limits itself to a handful of multi-billion programs developed over decades.

A Call to Ambition — Amplifying the Lithuanian Model

The 5 million anti-drone rounds per year targeted by Giraitė are an honorable industrial objective. But at the scale of NATO's needs as a whole — 32 members with millions of soldiers — it is still a drop in the ocean. The alliance needs ten, twenty Giraitės to emerge in different member countries, each specialized in a specific anti-drone defence niche. Short-range dispersal munitions manufacturers. Producers of portable GPS jamming systems. Designers of rapidly deployable anti-drone nets. Innovators of low-power lasers for silent neutralization.

This diversity of approaches and specializations — financed by common programs like EDIP and NSPA group contracts — is the systemic response to the drone problem in the European collective defence context. Lithuania has shown the way with €2 per round and 5 million units per year. It remains for Europe as a whole to have the humility and clarity to learn from this example and amplify it to the scale of the real threat.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial Positioning on the Defence of the Baltic States

I am in favor of strengthening the defence capacities of NATO member countries, particularly the Baltic nations facing the direct Russian threat. This position influences my analytical angle on Giraitė's initiative, and I freely acknowledge that I present it in a favorable light. The factual data — calibers, effective range (50–100m), unit cost (€2), production objective (5 million/year), clients (Sweden, France, negotiations with 5 other countries) — come from sources cited and are the best information publicly available at the time of writing.

I did not have access to the detailed technical specifications of Giraitė's munition, which are probably classified or protected by industrial secrecy. My analysis of possible technological mechanisms is speculative and based on general knowledge of ballistics and anti-drone munitions — not on internal company documentation. Cost estimates for adversary drones, competing defence systems, and usage rates in Ukraine are estimates published by third-party sources, whose exact accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Sources and Limits of This Analysis

This analysis is primarily based on specialized media sources and institutional publications on European defence. Direct access to Giraitė officials or the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence was not possible within the framework of this article. Additional information from these sources could modify certain aspects of the analysis, particularly on the technical details of the munition and the exact state of ongoing commercial negotiations. This article must therefore be read as an analysis based on available public information, with the inherent limitations of this approach.

I also acknowledge that my analysis of the technological competition in drone warfare is that of a journalistic observer, not a weapons systems expert. For a more technically rigorous analysis of the trends in military drone evolution and their countermeasures, readers are invited to consult publications by the IISS and specialized armament research institutes.

Sources

Primary sources

UA News — Lithuania begins production of anti-drone munitions — June 2026

Brussels Times — EU prepares €165M defence boost to modernise munitions production lines — 2026

EU Perspectives — Paris saw the future of defence: can Europe keep pace? — June 2026

Secondary sources

Euro-SD — Niewiadow/PGM: building Europe's next 40mm ammunition hub — June 2026

Industry Alarm — Niewiadow/PGM deepens 155mm ammunition production with French partner — 2026

Debug Lies Intel — European defence industrial surge: munitions boom amid rearm initiatives — June 2026