DECODING: Trump lifts Turkish sanctions, but not the F-35 law

Introduction: an announcement that changes everything except American law

One sentence, two possible readings

"We're going to lift the sanctions," Donald Trump declared on July 7, 2026, seated beside Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the presidential palace of Beştepe, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara. The brief, direct sentence was immediately interpreted by parts of the Turkish press as the end of six years of Turkey's exclusion from the F-35 program. But a careful decoding of the language used reveals a far more nuanced, almost contradictory reality between the displayed enthusiasm and the actual legal caution.

Two things that Trump himself carefully kept separate in his own remarks must be distinguished: the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, which he announced unambiguously, and the resumption of F-35 sales, which he presented as a mere possibility under review. "That's a decision we're going to make," he said on that second point, a choice of words that commits to nothing concrete in the near term.

This sentence should not be treated as just another diplomatic formality. Even a partial lifting of American sanctions redraws power dynamics that six years of freeze had failed to smooth over, and this Ankara summit will be remembered for this single sentence as much as for its official figures.

Why this file has dragged on for six years

To grasp the scale of this announcement, one has to go back to 2019, the year Turkey was formally expelled from the F-35 program after taking delivery of the Russian S-400 air defense system. In December 2020, the Trump administration itself imposed CAATSA sanctions against the Turkish defense agency, the SSB, over that purchase, deemed incompatible with membership in the Western security architecture. Six years later, it is that same Trump, back in the White House, who is now reversing course.

This historical loop is not trivial. It shows just how much American foreign policy toward its own allies can swing with the shifting priorities of a given administration, without the underlying problem, here the presence of Russian military hardware inside a NATO member state, ever really being resolved in the meantime.

I cannot help but note the irony: the same man who sanctioned Turkey in 2020 over its S-400 purchase is the one who, six years later, promises to lift those sanctions without Turkey having given up the Russian system. That does not make the lifting illegitimate, but it should at least make us cautious before declaring victory too fast.

The legal wall Trump cannot get around alone

The 2020 NDAA, a barrier with no presidential waiver

The central problem here is not Trump's political will, but the text of American law itself. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2020 explicitly bars the transfer of F-35s to Turkey as long as it still "possesses" the S-400 system, or any associated equipment, materiel or personnel. Congress deliberately wrote this clause with no presidential waiver to get around it.

This legal architecture means that even if Trump unilaterally lifts CAATSA sanctions, which does fall within executive power, he cannot, by simple decree, authorize the sale of F-35s as long as Turkey keeps its S-400s. The real lock, then, is not political, it is legislative, and it requires either a change in law by Congress, or a Turkish renunciation of the Russian system.

What Turkey has, and has not, done with its S-400s

Since their delivery, Turkey's S-400s have remained inactive, never officially and publicly integrated into the country's operational air defense setup. Some Western analysts have suggested Turkey could consider storing or handing over these systems to unlock its return to the F-35 program, but no official Turkish announcement to that effect has been made to date.

Without a concrete gesture from Ankara on this specific point, the American promise remains suspended in a legal vacuum. It is this reality, more than any political calculation, that explains why Trump chose his words with unusual caution on the specific question of F-35s, unlike his blunt statement on lifting sanctions.

A law passed by the U.S. Congress does not bend to a handshake filmed in front of the cameras, however warm it may be. This deserves repeating, because the media excitement surrounding this announcement risks obscuring this very real legal barrier, which does not disappear on command.

Erdoğan, the diplomatic victory he's wanted since 2019

"We received his personal commitment"

For Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, this announcement already represents, regardless of its final legal implementation, a first-order diplomatic victory. "Mr. Trump also gave us his personal word on this matter," the Turkish president said through his interpreter, adding that he believed a favorable decision on the F-35s would emerge from the summit. This statement, made in front of international cameras, politically commits Erdoğan to presenting this advance as secured to his domestic public.

The Turkish president also referenced an American commitment already made regarding five specific F-35 aircraft, noting that this matter had been discussed with Washington even before the Ankara summit. This detail suggests the technical discussions between the two countries are further along than public communications initially let on.

A pressing economic and industrial need for Turkish industry

Beyond national pride, the economic stakes for Turkey remain considerable. Turkish companies had already built roughly 900 parts destined for the F-35 program before the country's exclusion in 2019, and Ankara had originally planned to acquire around a hundred F-35A aircraft. The suspension of those contracts represented a substantial loss of revenue for Turkey's defense industry, which has spent years trying to regain its place in this international supply chain.

This industrial dimension partly explains Erdoğan's eagerness to publicly celebrate Trump's announcement, even before the legal details are settled. For Turkey's defense economy, every additional month of delay in resolving this file translates into frozen industrial contracts.

Erdoğan is right to push his diplomatic advantage as hard as he can, that is exactly what any leader in his position would do. But I note, with the same honesty, that celebrating a victory before it is legally locked in is as much a political bet as it is an acquired certainty.

Israel, the silent worry behind the negotiations

A strategic concern rarely named in public

One of the least publicly discussed but most real obstacles concerns Israeli worries over a Turkish return to the F-35 program. Some Western delegations present in Ankara raised, behind closed doors, Israel's concerns about Turkey's potential access to this cutting-edge technology, in a regional context where relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have deteriorated considerably in recent years.

This Israeli concern rests partly on the fear that sensitive F-35 components could be exposed, directly or indirectly, to a Turkish military architecture that continues to maintain ties with certain Russian systems, even if the S-400s themselves remain, according to available information, inactive.

A file that goes beyond the bilateral U.S.-Turkey relationship

This regional dimension is a reminder that the question of Turkey's return to the F-35 program is not limited to a bilateral negotiation between Washington and Ankara. It involves a broader balance that includes American regional allies in the Middle East, whose security concerns must be factored in before any final decision on the sale of such technologically sensitive aircraft.

It is this added geopolitical complexity, rarely highlighted in coverage centered solely on the Trump-Erdoğan relationship, that partly explains why this file, despite the spectacular Ankara announcement, remains far from a definitive conclusion.

No one wants to publicly name Israel in this equation, but everyone behind the scenes of this summit knows perfectly well that this file is not simply a matter between Washington and Ankara. We need the courage to name this regional dimension rather than leaving it floating in diplomatic silence.

The bigger picture: a summit under multiple pressures

Turkey hosting a summit where Ukraine dominates the agenda

This announcement on Turkish sanctions did not happen in a vacuum. It occurred on the sidelines of a NATO summit largely dominated by the Ukrainian question, where Trump also promised Volodymyr Zelensky a manufacturing license for Patriot interceptors for Ukraine. The fact that these two major announcements happened at the same summit, hours apart, illustrates the unusual diplomatic density of this Ankara gathering.

For Turkey, hosting a summit so loaded with strategic announcements already represented, in itself, a considerable diplomatic prestige gain, independent of the specific content of the decisions made on its own F-35 file.

Rutte, NATO, and the need to project unity

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte had, in the days before the summit, stressed the scale of European defense investments, calling them "money well spent," in an evident effort to convince Trump of the Atlantic Alliance's renewed solidity. This rhetorical insistence reflected a concern shared by several European capitals: preventing Trump from leaving Ankara with the impression that Europe was not doing its part.

In this context of a collective display of good faith, lifting Turkish sanctions, as an American gesture toward a NATO ally, also fit into this broader logic of reaffirming Atlantic cohesion, even though its origin was, above all, a bilateral calculation between Washington and Ankara.

This summit resembled a balancing act where every announcement had to serve several goals at once: reassure Ukraine, flatter Turkey, convince Trump of the Alliance's worth. This pile-up of simultaneous calculations explains why so many promises made in Ankara remain, a week later, still murky in their concrete implementation.

What this means for the naval and air balance in the Mediterranean

A Turkish return that would shift the regional balance of power

If Turkey does regain access to the F-35, the consequences would reach far beyond the bilateral U.S.-Turkey framework to affect the entire military balance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey already fields one of the region's largest air forces, and the addition of fifth-generation stealth aircraft would considerably strengthen its power-projection capability against regional rivals.

This prospect worries Greece in particular, with which Turkey maintains recurring territorial tensions in the Aegean Sea, as well as Cyprus, whose partition remains a constant diplomatic friction point between Ankara and the European Union. A significant strengthening of Turkish air capabilities could reignite these latent regional tensions.

A signal sent to Russia as much as to Turkey's neighbors

Beyond the Mediterranean regional dimension, this file also sends a signal to Moscow. Reintegrating a country that possesses Russian military hardware into the West's most advanced technological program could be read by the Kremlin as proof that Western sanctions, even on security matters this sensitive, remain negotiable under certain favorable political conditions.

It is this symbolic dimension, almost as much as the concrete military one, that makes this file particularly scrutinized by Western security analysts, worried that a Turkish precedent could weaken the coherence of the sanctions regime applied to other countries that have acquired Russian equipment.

I fully understand the American strategic calculation of wanting to anchor Turkey more firmly to the West rather than letting it flirt with Moscow. But we also have to look Greece and Cyprus in the eye and acknowledge that this gesture toward Ankara will not be received everywhere within the Atlantic Alliance as good news.

The U.S. Congress's position, an underrated obstacle

Bipartisan voices that remain wary of Ankara

Contrary to the image of an omnipotent presidential power that some media coverage sometimes conveys, the U.S. Congress retains significant oversight over this file, notably through the NDAA, which strictly governs the conditions for transferring F-35s. Several lawmakers, in both parties, have in the past expressed persistent reservations about Turkey's reliability as a security partner, particularly after the S-400 episode.

These reservations have not necessarily dissolved simply because Trump has expressed a wish to move on. Any legislative change allowing a way around the current ban would require a vote in Congress, a political process that could prove far slower and more uncertain than the spontaneous presidential declaration made in Ankara.

The precedent of other countries sanctioned under CAATSA

This Turkish file is not isolated in the recent history of CAATSA sanctions, a law primarily aimed at countries like Russia, Iran and North Korea. Any decision to lift these sanctions for a NATO ally that acquired Russian equipment could set a precedent that other countries, currently under similar sanctions regimes for different reasons, could invoke in their own negotiations with Washington.

It is this dimension of legal and diplomatic precedent that makes some American lawmakers particularly cautious on this file, regardless of their sympathy, or lack thereof, for the personal relationship between Trump and Erdoğan.

The U.S. Congress does not share television cameras' patience for applauding a handshake between two presidents. This institutional slowness, often frustrating for diplomats in a hurry, also serves as a necessary safeguard against decisions made in the emotional heat of an international summit.

The history of Turkey's S-400s, a necessary reminder

How Turkey ended up buying Russian hardware

To fully understand the scope of this file, one must remember why Turkey chose, in 2017, to order the S-400 system from Russia rather than an equivalent Western system. Ankara justified that choice at the time by cost considerations, faster delivery times, and a desire to assert growing strategic autonomy from its traditional Western partners.

This decision immediately raised concerns in Washington, which feared that integrating this Russian system into Turkey's defense architecture could compromise the security of the most sensitive Western technologies, particularly those embedded in the F-35, whose stealth capabilities could be compromised if the Russian system managed to analyze its radar signatures.

A decision that still weighs on mutual trust

Nearly a decade later, this Turkish decision continues to shape American distrust of Ankara on the most sensitive security matters. Even if Trump chooses to politically move on, the American national security apparatus retains a longer, more cautious institutional memory of the risks tied to a renewed integration of Turkey into the Alliance's most advanced technology programs.

This tension between short-term presidential political will and long-term institutional caution constitutes, quietly, one of the most important lessons of this file for understanding the real limits of American executive power on national security matters.

Turkey made a sovereign choice in 2017, buying Russian missiles instead of Western ones, and it continues paying the diplomatic price today, nearly a decade later. This kind of strategic decision has consequences that far outlast the term of any single American president, however well-intentioned he may be at the moment.

Possible repercussions for the American defense industry

Lockheed Martin, between commercial opportunity and strategic caution

Lockheed Martin, the maker of the F-35, is watching this file with obvious commercial interest. A Turkish return to the program would represent significant potential orders, at a moment when the company is trying to maximize production in the face of growing global demand for this aircraft, notably driven by heightened defense needs in Europe since Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

But the company also has to weigh the same security concerns as Congress and the Pentagon, particularly on whether Turkish reintegration could expose certain sensitive technological aspects of the aircraft to increased risk of exploitation by Russian intelligence services, through any residual connections to the S-400 system already present on Turkish soil.

A signal to the program's other international customers

How this Turkish file is ultimately resolved will also send a signal to other countries participating in the F-35 program, particularly the European partners who have invested heavily in this aircraft and who closely watch the consistency of the security criteria Washington applies to all its partners.

A resolution perceived as too lenient toward Turkey could, paradoxically, undermine the trust of allies who have been more disciplined in meeting American security requirements, and who might then wonder why their own rigor does not earn them equivalent preferential treatment.

There is something a little unfair, I must admit, about the idea that a country which bought Russian equipment could regain access to the F-35 faster than some allies who have always scrupulously followed American rules. This perception of unfairness, even if politically understandable, deserves to be named plainly.

The domestic Turkish electoral dimension of this announcement

Erdoğan, a need for visible diplomatic wins

Erdoğan is going through a period of domestic political strain marked by persistent economic challenges, notably inflation that continues to weigh on Turkish households' purchasing power. In this context, a diplomatic victory as visible as the lifting of American sanctions, secured directly from the U.S. president in front of international cameras, represents valuable political capital he can immediately convert into domestic popular support.

This electoral dimension partly explains the haste with which Erdoğan communicated on this announcement, stressing its personal and settled character, rather than waiting for the American legal process to actually conclude before publicly celebrating what he already presents as a major diplomatic success.

A political risk if the promise fails to materialize

This same haste, however, carries a real political risk for Erdoğan himself. If the actual sale of F-35s fails to materialize within a reasonable timeframe, because of the legal obstacles discussed above, the Turkish opposition could exploit the gap between the triumphant announcement and the lack of concrete results to criticize the government's handling of this file.

It is this risk of delayed political disappointment that could, over time, push Ankara to accelerate its own concrete gestures, particularly on the still-unresolved question of the operational status of its S-400 systems, in order to more quickly unlock a favorable conclusion to this file.

Erdoğan is playing a delicate game where every triumphant announcement today becomes a promise he will have to honor tomorrow before his own electorate. This domestic political pressure could, paradoxically, serve as a useful lever to finally unlock the S-400 file, should the Turkish public's patience run out before that of the U.S. Congress.

What this file reveals about the Trump method in diplomacy

Announcing before negotiating the technical details

This Turkish file illustrates, once again, a recurring feature of Donald Trump's diplomatic method: the public, spectacular announcement often comes before the detailed technical negotiation, rather than after it. We find the exact same pattern in his promise of a Patriot license made to Zelensky the same day, where the companies involved had not yet been informed of the presidential decision at the time of the public announcement.

This method offers an immediate political advantage, producing strong images and resounding headlines that serve presidential messaging, but it also carries a structural risk: creating expectations among foreign partners, here Turkey, that American legal and administrative reality cannot necessarily meet within the timeframe suggested by the enthusiasm of the moment.

A style that works for image, less so for implementation

This contrast between the communicative efficiency of Trump's method and the actual slowness of its administrative implementation constitutes, for America's allies, a recurring interpretive challenge. Should every presidential announcement be taken at face value, or should it systematically be weighed against known institutional obstacles that have historically often delayed or altered the concrete application of such spectacular promises.

It is this question of interpretation, crucial for both Ankara and Kyiv, that should guide a cautious reading of all the announcements made at the Ankara summit, without denying the real political value that, nonetheless, publicly expressed presidential will represents.

On the geopolitical level, I continue to think that Trump's presence at the table, even with his premature announcement effects, is worth more than a strategic vacuum that Russia or China would exploit without hesitation. But I refuse to confuse his spectacular style with a guarantee of results, and that distinction must remain at the heart of any serious analysis of his diplomacy.

The concrete next steps to watch

A legislative calendar worth watching closely

In the weeks following the Ankara summit, the most reliable indicator of this file's real progress will be American legislative activity, particularly any initiative to amend or clarify the NDAA's provisions concerning Turkey. The absence of such legislative movement within a reasonable timeframe would confirm that the Ankara announcement remained, essentially, a political gesture with no immediate legal translation.

At the same time, any concrete Turkish gesture regarding the operational status of its S-400 systems, whether formal deactivation, verifiable storage, or transfer to a third country, would constitute a far more significant signal than any additional presidential statement on this file.

The fate of the five F-35s already mentioned by Erdoğan

A more immediate indicator to watch concerns the fate of the five F-35 aircraft specifically mentioned by Erdoğan during the summit. If these aircraft, already built or under construction before Turkey's 2019 exclusion, are actually delivered in the months following the summit, that would constitute the first tangible proof that Trump's announcement translates into real movement rather than a mere statement of intent.

Conversely, if the fate of these five aircraft remains stuck in the same administrative limbo that has characterized the last six years of this dispute, then the Ankara announcement will join the long list of spectacular diplomatic promises never followed by concrete, verifiable implementation.

I will monitor this file not through the statements that follow, but through the concrete fate of these five aircraft already mentioned by Erdoğan. It is this kind of verifiable detail, far from grand diplomatic formulas, that will reveal whether this Ankara announcement was a real turning point or simply a well-orchestrated communications exercise.

The Chinese and Russian dimension of this Turkish-American rapprochement

Pulling Turkey away from Russia's sphere of influence

This rapprochement between Washington and Ankara over the F-35 file also fits into a broader geostrategic logic, that of durably pulling Turkey away from any temptation toward closer military ties with Russia. By offering Ankara a path back to the West's most advanced technological ecosystem, Washington is seeking to make any future dependence on Russia's defense industry structurally less attractive for Turkey.

This logic fits directly into the broader strategic line of the Trump administration, which views Russia, along with China, Iran and North Korea, as structural threats to be contained, including by consolidating existing Western alliances rather than letting them erode through bureaucratic neglect.

A precedent Beijing is watching closely

China, for its part, is watching this file with genuine strategic interest, insofar as it illustrates Washington's capacity to negotiate accommodations with allies that have flirted with Russia's defense industry, without permanently severing transatlantic ties. This kind of American diplomatic flexibility could, according to some analysts, be read by Beijing as an indicator of how Washington manages its relationships with strategically ambivalent partners.

It is this global dimension, often neglected in coverage centered solely on the bilateral Turkish-American relationship, that gives this file a reach far beyond the Eastern Mediterranean or the Atlantic Alliance alone.

I believe that anchoring Turkey firmly to the West, rather than letting it drift between two worlds, is a perfectly legitimate strategic objective against Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. But that objective should never justify turning a blind eye to the real legal and security conditions that must frame such a rapprochement.

What this file means for the future credibility of American sanctions

A precedent that could be invoked elsewhere

Beyond the Turkish case itself, this file raises a broader question about the future credibility of the American CAATSA sanctions regime. If one country can get sanctions lifted without formally renouncing the Russian equipment that triggered those sanctions in the first place, other countries currently under similar sanctions regimes could legitimately wonder whether their own negotiations with Washington might follow a comparable trajectory.

This question of the coherence and predictability of the American sanctions regime extends far beyond the Turkish case alone, and could have repercussions on how other capitals, including some close to Moscow, weigh their own room to maneuver against Western pressure.

A lesson for future partners tempted by Russian hardware

Paradoxically, this file could also be read as an implicit encouragement for other countries to consider buying Russian military equipment, betting on the possibility that a future American administration, for its own political reasons, might eventually choose to lift the associated sanctions without demanding a complete and verified renunciation of that equipment.

It is this dimension of international precedent, potentially destabilizing for the overall coherence of Western sanctions, that deserves particular attention from security analysts, regardless of one's judgment on the specific relationship between Trump and Erdoğan.

If this Turkish file concludes without Ankara ever having formally given up its S-400s, that sends a message I find deeply uncomfortable to everyone, elsewhere in the world, who is now considering buying Russian equipment. Sanctions are only worth something if they remain predictable, and that predictability is exactly what this file is testing.

Conclusion: a real promise, an implementation still far off

What we can say with certainty coming out of Ankara

What can be stated with certainty, at the end of this decoding, is that Donald Trump did indeed announce, on July 7, 2026, his intention to lift the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Turkey since 2020. That is a real political gesture, documented by multiple journalistic sources present on site, and one that already constitutes, for Erdoğan, a tangible diplomatic gain he can legitimately claim before his own public.

What cannot yet be stated with the same certainty is that this gesture will translate, within a reasonable timeframe, into an actual resumption of F-35 sales to Turkey. The legal wall erected by the National Defense Authorization Act remains fully intact, and nothing in the statements made in Ankara suggests it has been crossed, or even credibly circumvented.

A necessary lesson in journalistic caution

This file illustrates, once again, the need to carefully distinguish, in any coverage of international diplomacy, the political announcement from its actual legal implementation. The two can coexist harmoniously, but they are never guaranteed to align within the timeframe suggested by the excitement of an international summit.

It is this methodical caution, applied with the same rigor to this Turkish file as to the Patriot license promise made to Ukraine the same day, that allows us to gauge the real scope of the Ankara summit, beyond the catchy headlines it legitimately generated in the international press.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Nature of this text

This text is an analytical decoding based on facts sourced from Western media and direct reporting on the NATO summit in Ankara. The italicized passages constitute the columnist's personal commentary and never replace the facts attributed to a verifiable source in the body of the text.

Limits of this file

The exact timeline of a possible American legislative amendment or a Turkish gesture regarding the S-400s remains uncertain at the time of publication. The elements relating to Israeli concerns and the position of the U.S. Congress rest on dynamics reported by several media outlets, without a single detailed official confirmation.

Sources

Primary sources

Ukrainska Pravda — Trump announces lifting of Turkish sanctions, July 9, 2026

The Kyiv Independent — Zelensky lands in Turkey for NATO summit, July 7, 2026

Defence Ukraine — What the Ankara summit actually committed to, July 10, 2026

Secondary sources

Al Jazeera — Trump says he will lift sanctions on Turkey, July 7, 2026

Los Angeles Times — NATO unveils billions in arms deals, July 7, 2026

Afterburner MiGFlug — Trump to lift Turkish sanctions, considers F-35 sale, July 8, 2026

ABC News — Trump considers giving F-35 jets to Turkey, July 7, 2026

USA Today — Trump seeks to sell F-35 jets to Turkey, July 8, 2026