DECODED: The EU's Secret Channel to Moscow—Veiled Capitulation or Strategic Necessity?

Introduction: Europe Whispering in the Kremlin's Ear

A Fracture Visible in Plain Sight

Brussels, June 19, 2026. The European summit has just concluded, and the leaders of the twenty-seven emerge divided, faces grim, issuing contradictory communiqués. António Costa, President of the European Council, publicly admitted to ordering his office to establish direct contacts with the Kremlin to prepare for potential peace talks. Two phone calls, one high-ranking advisor, one discrete line. It’s little. It’s massive. The shockwave crossed the continent in hours.

The summit's outcome is unambiguous on one point: Europe is incapable of agreeing on the appropriateness of these contacts, on who should speak for the twenty-seven, or on what should be said to Moscow. Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš put it bluntly before the cameras: ‐Europe is incapable of agreeing even on whether there will be negotiations or who will lead them.‐ This single sentence summarizes the diplomatic governance crisis currently gripping the Union.

The Back-Channel, a Word that Burns

A back-channel—a parallel, informal, deniable line—is the classic instrument of back-room diplomacy. It allows two parties to test the waters without public exposure. Costa chose this mechanism to attempt to extract the EU from the marginalization to which Washington and Moscow have confined it since the 2022 invasion. According to Bloomberg, Costa’s chief advisor conducted two phone calls with a Russian official close to Putin with the aim of preparing for more substantive discussions in the future.

The problem isn't just technical. It's a problem of symbol. Since February 24, 2022, the EU’s central institutions have frozen all formal contact with Moscow. For the President of the European Council to pick up the phone—even indirectly, even modestly—marks a turning point. And in the context of a war that has lasted over four years, every diplomatic gesture is scrutinized, dissected, and weaponized.

Costa and His Initiative: Vague Mandate, Maximum Exposure

Two Calls That Changed the Game

According to Bloomberg, which broke the story on June 17, 2026, António Costa’s senior advisor held two telephone conversations with a high-ranking Russian official from Putin’s direct inner circle. The names of the interlocutors were not disclosed. Neither were the exact dates. What is clear is the stated objective: to pave the way for more substantive discussions in the future. Neither Costa’s entourage nor Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov wished to comment on the report.

Costa defended his initiative during a press conference in Brussels on June 19: “We must immediately establish this direct contact. We cannot depend solely on others to interpret Russian messages, and we must be able to transmit our own messages directly to Russia.” He insisted: the EU is not a mediator. It is on Ukraine's side. The channel is a communication tool, not a negotiation tool. Costa also stated that only President Volodymyr Zelensky has the legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of Ukraine.

The Structural Ambiguity of Costa’s Role

But therein lies the problem. Costa has no negotiating mandate. His role is to convene, coordinate, and represent the European Council. He did not receive explicit approval from the twenty-seven to open this line. By acting through his office, he took a personal—or institutional—initiative that several capitals had not authorized. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz carefully avoided validating the move: “Who speaks on behalf of the European Union is not something we need to decide today.”

Emmanuel Macron was barely warmer, stating that ‐Europeans are not mediators‐ and that Costa ‐will have a place when competencies are defined.‐ This phrasing—when competencies are defined—is a diplomatic red flag. It means they aren't yet. And in the meantime, Costa is acting in an uncomfortable gray zone, exposing the Union to accusations of haste and disorganization.

The Baltic and Nordic Hawks: Categorical Refusal

A Historical Memory That Speaks

In the Baltic and Nordic capitals, the reaction to Costa’s back-channel was cold, if not icy. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna put it bluntly: ‐Europe must not play the role of a neutral mediator.‐ For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—nations that have known Soviet occupation, that suffer Russian drone incursions on their territory, that know what proximity to Moscow means—any legitimization of the Kremlin in a diplomatic process is an unacceptable concession.

Latvian Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs was direct during an interview with Bloomberg TV: ‐Diplomatic channels with Russia are pointless if Russia does not want to engage in diplomacy.‐ Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda added: ‐I see no positive signal from Russia. So my question is: what do we want to accomplish?‐ These are the voices of the member states with the most to lose from a botched deal, and these are precisely the voices that any premature back-channel risks marginalizing.

Tsahkna’s Position: Strengthen Kyiv, Not Negotiate with Moscow

Tsahkna summarized a coherent and defensible vision: the goal of European engagement must not be to facilitate a dialogue with the Kremlin, but to strengthen Ukraine’s position to force Moscow into serious negotiations. These are not the same thing. In the first case, one assumes Putin is a good-faith interlocutor who just needs to be found. In the second, one recognizes that Russia will only negotiate if forced—by military, economic, and diplomatic pressure.

This is precisely the lesson of the Minsk Agreements. In 2015, Europe believed it had secured a lasting peace by negotiating with Moscow. The result: eight years of an armed freeze, during which Russia rearmed and prepared the 2022 offensive. The Baltic hawks do not forget. And they are right not to forget. Historical memory is a strategic tool, not a nostalgic sentiment.

The Pragmatists of the Center: The Non-Exclusion Argument

The Fear of a Diplomatic Vacuum

On the side of the back-channel supporters, the reasoning is different, though not without logic. The central argument is that of non-exclusion. Since Donald Trump re-established contact with Putin and Washington took the lead on the main diplomatic dealings regarding Ukraine, Europe risks being relegated to spectator status in a conflict playing out on its own continent. Opening a channel, however discrete or embryonic, ensures a seat at the table when things eventually move.

Costa said it clearly: “We cannot depend solely on others to interpret Russian messages.” Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin supported the initiative: ‐Opening a channel is not a mistake in our eyes, and I trust António Costa.‐ Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez agreed. These leaders represent a realist line: in diplomacy, absence is rarely a virtue. Not speaking does not mean resisting—it can simply mean not existing.

Von der Leyen and Institutional Legitimacy

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen lent her support to Costa’s approach with a strong statement: “Our entire continent is in danger, and that is why Europe must be one of the architects of a just and lasting peace.” She also announced that the twenty-seven had decided to renew sanctions against Russia for twelve months instead of six—a signal of firmness presented by the Commission as a strong message to Moscow.

This dual movement—strengthened sanctions AND a communication channel—is the political translation of a nascent European doctrine: maintain pressure while refusing total diplomatic isolation. Theoretically, it is coherent. But it assumes a political unity that the Brussels summit precisely revealed to be absent. When Merz says we will see who speaks for Europe ‐when negotiations arrive,‐ he isn't reassuring anyone—he is confirming that Europe is winging it.

Lavrov Slams the Door: ‐The Ultimatum is No Basis‐

Rejection of the June 7 European Proposal

While Europeans were debating among themselves the merits of a channel, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov slammed the door on June 19, 2026. In a text written for Politico Europe—which his ministry eventually refused to publish—Lavrov stated that trust cannot be restored with ultimatums like the one presented to Russia at the London summit on June 7. He characterized the Western proposal as an unacceptable ultimatum.

The June 7 European proposal, stemming from a summit between leaders of the UK, France, Germany, and Ukraine in London, demanded an immediate and verifiable ceasefire, robust security guarantees for Kyiv including the potential deployment of multinational forces in Ukraine, and the freezing of Russian assets until Moscow paid reparations to Ukraine. Lavrov responded that this proposal aimed to freeze the conflict without addressing its causes, while allowing European military contingents to establish themselves on Ukrainian soil. This phrasing reveals the Kremlin's bottom line: no Western military presence, no reparations, no symbolic surrender.

Russia ‐Open to Contact,‐ but on Its Terms

Simultaneously, the Kremlin stated on June 19 that it was “ready for contact” with Europe—provided the latter abandons its pretense of speaking from a position of strength. This is classic Moscow rhetoric: presenting the interlocutor's weakness as a prerequisite for any discussion. Lavrov added that the EU could not be an impartial mediator because the Europeans themselves had declared they wanted Russia’s defeat. This circular reasoning is a trap: if demanding guarantees for Ukraine forbids talking to Moscow, then dialogue can only exist under the condition of Ukrainian capitulation.

During a press conference in Moscow on June 16 with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan, Lavrov had already mocked the visit of the E3 format ambassadors (France, Germany, UK) to the Russian Foreign Ministry: ‐They said nothing new compared to what was declared in that document based on ultimatums signed in London. Words, words, words. Nothing more.‐ This is Moscow’s response to any engagement attempt that doesn't begin with Ukrainian territorial concessions.

The E3 vs. The Twenty-Seven Rift: Who Speaks for Europe?

The E3 Format and Its Jealous Peers

At the heart of the European diplomatic crisis lies an explosive institutional question: who has the right to speak for the twenty-seven? The E3 — France, Germany, United Kingdom format has progressively established itself as Ukraine's primary interlocutor for security issues. It was in this framework that the June 7 London proposal was drafted. It is in this framework that Merz, Macron, and the British Prime Minister coordinate their strategy. And it is this format that de facto excludes twenty-four other members of the Union.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni expressed her irritation at this marginalization. Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten said it was “far too early” to identify a single European negotiator. These tensions are not superficial. They reflect a structural fracture: Europe needs a single voice to carry weight in negotiations, but the EU's institutional architecture—and national egos—make this unity extremely difficult to build.

The Trap of Scattered Channels

The current situation is particularly dangerous: several European diplomatic tracks exist in parallel, not yet aligned. Costa's back-channel. The E3 format. The bilateral discussions of certain member states with Moscow. The Coalition of the Willing on security guarantees. As analyzed by EU Insider, several European channels opened in parallel can send contradictory messages to Moscow just as easily as a single channel. And Moscow is an expert in the art of exploiting divisions.

Putin has had a clear strategy from the start: isolate Ukraine, bypass Europe, speak directly to Washington. The fragmentation of European initiatives is a gift to him. While Merz says we will see much later who speaks for Europe, while Macron and Costa jockey for position, and while the Baltics block, Russia is still bombing—and it observes, with undisguised satisfaction, the democratic cacophony of its adversaries.

The Precedent of the Minsk Agreements: Lessons Unlearned

2015-2022: Diplomacy as a Facade Armistice

The question of the back-channel to Moscow cannot be analyzed without returning to the Minsk Agreements. In 2014 and 2015, Europe—essentially France and Germany in the Normandy format—negotiated directly with Moscow to freeze the conflict in the Donbas. The result: a signed agreement, never respected by Russia, and used as cover to methodically preparing for the full-scale 2022 invasion. Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel herself admitted that Minsk was an agreement intended to buy time for Ukraine to strengthen itself militarily—an explosive confession that shattered Kyiv's remaining trust in European diplomacy.

This precedent is not a historical anecdote. It is a burning warning. Any diplomatic initiative toward Moscow that is not accompanied by robust, verifiable execution guarantees risks replaying the same scenario: an apparent freeze, a legitimization of the Kremlin, and a resumption of hostilities on an even more catastrophic scale. Zelensky knows it. The Baltics know it. The question is whether Paris, Berlin, and Brussels have truly internalized it.

The Peace Architecture That Must Precede Any Dialogue

According to the simongros.org report of June 21, 2026, the Brussels summit reaffirmed that any peace settlement must be just and lasting, anchored in the UN Charter and international law, and that Ukraine's future cannot be decided without Ukraine. These are the right principles. But they must precede any dialogue, not be its conclusion. If Europe opens a channel without first defining these principles with Moscow as non-negotiable prerequisites, it repeats exactly the Minsk error.

The June 7 London Coalition proposal was a step in the right direction: verifiable ceasefire, security guarantees, reparations. Lavrov rejected it as an ultimatum. But if these requirements constitute an ultimatum in the Kremlin's eyes, it is precisely because they imply a form of Russian accountability. And that is exactly what Putin seeks to avoid. Lavrov's refusal is not an argument against the European proposal. It is proof that it was on the right track.

The Role of Washington: Europe in a Supporting Role

Trump, Witkoff, Kushner: The Negotiators Ignoring Brussels

While Europe was debating its back-channel internally, American representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were preparing a new visit to Moscow, according to Kremlin announcements. Washington is piloting the primary diplomatic process, and Europe is largely marginalized—even as Kyiv and Brussels plead for increased European involvement. It is precisely to avoid being excluded from a deal negotiated between Washington and Moscow that Costa's back-channel then makes perfect sense: it is insurance against total exclusion.

Lavrov said it explicitly in his June 15 statements: Russia remains committed to the American proposals on the cessation of hostilities but rejects the European conditions it perceives as incompatible. This asymmetry is telling: Moscow agrees to discuss with Washington and refuses European terms. This is no accident. Putin wants a bilateral Russian-American agreement that bypasses Europe and solidifies its strategic marginalization. By bickering among themselves over who can call Moscow, Europeans are facilitating exactly this scenario.

The Temptation of the Transatlantic Double Game

Trump’s position in all this is paradoxical. On one hand, his administration maintains economic pressure on Russia through sanctions and continues to arm Ukraine. On the other, Witkoff and Kushner are negotiating conditions that Moscow can accept—which means conditions Kyiv will find insufficient. Europe finds itself in a schizophrenic position: supporting Kyiv as a principle, but not wanting to miss the train of a potential US-Russia deal, however imperfect. This explains Costa’s back-channel. This is not a peace strategy. This is a presence strategy.

But presence without substance is dangerous. If Europe finds itself at the negotiating table without defensible prerequisites, without a clear mandate, without internal unity, it will be weaponized by Moscow to legitimize a deal it did not choose. Having a seat at the table can be worse than not having one—if that seat is used to validate a Ukrainian capitulation disguised as a diplomatic compromise.

Zelensky Facing Concessions: The Ukrainian Red Line

Negotiating Legitimacy Belongs to Kyiv Alone

Costa was clear on one fundamental point: only President Volodymyr Zelensky has the legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of Ukraine. This reminder is crucial. Since the beginning of the conflict, Putin has sought to bypass Kyiv—dealing directly with Washington, discussing Ukraine's future without Ukraine. Any European diplomatic initiative that does not explicitly place Zelensky at the center of the process plays into the Kremlin's hands.

Zelensky himself participated in the Brussels summit on June 18 and 19, where he met the twenty-seven leaders. He also mentioned during the G7 in France his availability for direct negotiations with Putin—in Geneva, Istanbul, or other locations—before next winter. This Ukrainian openness is significant: Kyiv is not against negotiations. Kyiv is against negotiations without guarantees, without a verifiable ceasefire, and without Russia paying for its destruction. These are requirements of international law, not political whims.

Ukraine and the EU: A Relationship to Consolidate Before Talking to Moscow

The Brussels summit took a historic step by officially opening Ukraine’s first EU accession cluster—the “fundamentals” cluster covering the rule of law, democratic institutions, and judicial reforms. It is a strong signal of Ukraine’s European anchoring. According to simongros.org, this is the first time since December 2024 that the conclusions on Ukraine were adopted unanimously by the twenty-seven. This unity is precious. It must precede any dialogue with Moscow, not follow it.

In other words: Europe should first solidify its Ukrainian flank—progressive accession, security guarantees, reinforced military support—before opening channels to the Kremlin. Talking to Moscow from a position of weakness and internal division is negotiating as a loser. Talking from a position of unity and strategic solidity is negotiating from a position of strength. The difference isn't semantic. It's decisive.

The Danger of Legitimization: To Speak to the Kremlin is to Recognize What?

The Symbolism of Contact as a Russian Political Resource

The big ethical and strategic question of the back-channel is this: what does it mean to dialogue with a power that bombs civilians, violates international law, and denies the right to existence of a sovereign state? Every contact with the Kremlin—even technical, even denied—can be used by Moscow as proof that Europe implicitly recognizes some legitimacy in its positions. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has become a master of this art: transforming every Western diplomatic gesture into a narrative of tacit recognition.

The precedent of Ambassador Chancellor Gerhard Schröder is telling. Putin himself had suggested that his former German friend could serve as a mediator between Russia and the EU. This isn't a diplomatic proposal. It's an invitation to normalize relations based on compromise. And the fact that this suggestion circulated in European circles without triggering a general outcry says a lot about the moral fatigue of a portion of the European establishment in the face of the war.

The Russian Narrative of “Neutrality” as a Trap

Moscow is not looking for a neutral mediator. It is looking for a partner that will agree to treat the war as a symmetrical dispute between two parties with comparable faults. But the reality is asymmetrical: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim. Any diplomatic framework that erases this fundamental asymmetry serves the Kremlin, whether intentionally or not. This is why Lavrov so vigorously rejected the London proposal: it maintains this asymmetry. It demands accountability from Moscow. It names the responsibility.

According to united24media.com, Lavrov stated on June 19 that the European conditions aimed to “freeze the conflict without addressing the root causes” while allowing European military contingents to establish themselves in Ukraine. This reading is deliberately deceptive: security guarantees for Ukraine are not a foreign military occupation. They are the minimum conditions so that Ukraine is not re-invaded in five years. Lavrov's refusal to accept them reveals the Kremlin's real agenda: a peace that prepares for the next war.

Sanctions: The Only Real Bargaining Chip

The Twelve-Month Renewal, an Underestimated Signal

The Brussels summit’s decision to renew sanctions against Russia for twelve months instead of six is perhaps the most concrete and significant measure to emerge. Von der Leyen presented it as a strong signal. She is right. In coercive diplomacy, the duration of a sanction signals the level of resolve. Moving from six to twelve months indicates that Europe is not resigned to a quick return to normalcy. It also closes a window of opportunity that some member states might have sought to exploit to lift sanctions in exchange for a precarious ceasefire.

The Commission is also working on a twenty-first sanctions package targeting the Russian military-industrial complex, its energy revenues, the shadow fleet, and propaganda networks. These concrete measures have a real effect on Russia's war-making capacity. They constitute the only real economic pressure available in the short term. This is where Europe’s true leverage lies, not in premature diplomatic back-channels.

The Economic Weapon as a Diplomatic Prerequisite

The reasoning is simple: you don't dialogue effectively with Moscow when Moscow thinks it can win. You dialogue when Moscow begins to perceive the unbearable cost of continuing the war. Sanctions, combined with military support for Ukraine, weapons deliveries, and the progressive integration of Kyiv into European structures, create conditions of cumulative pressure that can change the Kremlin's calculations. A back-channel opened in this context, if the EU maintains its pressure, can make sense. A back-channel opened as a substitute for that pressure is a disguised surrender.

This is the distinction that proponents of European pragmatism must make with greater clarity. Dialoguing while sanctioning, while arming, while integrating—that is a coherent strategy. Dialoguing in the hope of reaching an agreement before having created the conditions for a just agreement to be possible—that is diplomatic wishful thinking. And wishful thinking in the face of Putin has a name: Minsk.

China in the Wings: The Spectator Waiting for Its Time

Beijing is Watching Western Cohesion

One cannot analyze the European back-channel to Moscow without looking toward Beijing. China is closely watching the cohesion—or lack thereof—of the West in the face of Russia. A peace settlement that validates Russian territorial gains would send a devastating message to Beijing: armed resistance to an invasion is enough to secure concessions. This is precisely the calculation China is making regarding Taiwan. Every concession made to Putin is an encouragement for Xi Jinping.

The Brussels summit also touched on the Chinese commercial and technological threat, with von der Leyen highlighting that Chinese imports into the EU had increased by 45% in five years, generating the largest trade deficit ever recorded—approximately 360 billion euros, or one billion per day. Europe is fighting on two fronts simultaneously: the Russian military threat to the East and Chinese economic predation in the West. In this context, weakening its posture on Ukraine through premature diplomatic dialogue with Moscow would be a catastrophic signal for the entire Western security system.

The Moscow-Beijing Axis and the Temptation of Western Fragmentation

Russia and China share an interest in the same thing: a divided Europe, incapable of acting as a unified strategic power, dependent on the United States for its security and therefore easily manipulated. Every European summit that ends without a clear decision, every back-channel opened in institutional confusion, every statement by Merz or Macron that dodges the question of the mandate—all of this is recorded in Moscow and Beijing as confirmation of the fundamental strategic weakness of the Union.

The West is the center of the world. Not because it is a geographical or ethnic truth—it is a truth of values and institutions. Democracy, the rule of law, freedom of the press, the protection of minorities—these human achievements were built in Europe and North America, and they must be defended with a lucidity and vigor that Costa’s back-channel, as it stands, does not guarantee. Standing firm against Putin also means standing firm against Beijing.

Perspectives: What Scenario for the Next 7 Days?

Pressure Builds Before Summer

The next few days will be decisive. The announced new visit of Witkoff and Kushner to Moscow could produce a moment of truth regarding Trump's real intentions for peace in Ukraine. If Washington secures a bilateral agreement with Moscow without a clear European mandate, Europe will face a fait accompli that it must either endorse or reject—with the diplomatic and security consequences that entails. Costa's back-channel then makes perfect sense: it is insurance against total exclusion.

But this insurance is only useful if it is accompanied by a common position of the twenty-seven on what is negotiable and what is not. The June 7 London conditions—verifiable ceasefire, security guarantees, reparations—are the right starting point. Europe must defend these conditions with the same rigor in its discussions with Washington as in its potential contacts with Moscow. Without this consistency, the back-channel becomes an instrument for the gradual erosion of the principles it claims to defend.

What Ukraine Expects from Europe

Ukraine expects a Europe that is an amplifier of its position, not a substitute or a moderator. Ukrainians need weapons delivered faster, the opening of EU accession negotiations—which has just been enacted—and credible, verifiable security guarantees. What Zelensky cannot accept is a peace deal that validates Russian territorial acquisitions, leaves Ukraine without sufficient defenses, and is presented to the world as a balanced solution. It would be a surrender dressed up as a diplomatic victory.

Europe has a fundamental role to play in the coming weeks. But that role is not played by whispering behind the backs of the twenty-seven via unmandated informal channels. It is played by building a common, clear position, based on the principles of international law, defended with a single voice. Costa, Merz, Macron, and the twenty-four others have one week to decide whether they want to be actors in or spectators of peace in Europe.

Conclusion: Back-Channel or Capitulation—Europe Must Choose

The Moment of Strategic Definition

António Costa’s back-channel to the Kremlin is a symptom of a Europe that is waking up to its diplomatic marginalization and seeking an urgent remedy. It is not a crime. It may even be a necessity. But a necessity that, if poorly managed, can turn into a trap. The conditions for this channel to be useful and not toxic are clear: an explicit mandate from the twenty-seven, prior coordination with Kyiv, respect for the London conditions as a non-negotiable bedrock, and the simultaneous maintenance of economic and military pressure on Moscow.

Without these conditions, the back-channel is not a tool for peace. It is a tool for the Kremlin's legitimization. And Europe, after all these years of courageous support for Ukraine, cannot afford to be the involuntary instrument of a diplomatic capitulation. History will remember that it was here, in June 2026, that Europe decided what it wanted to be: a coherent strategic power, or a divided negotiating space serving Moscow’s revisionist ambitions.

The Responsibility of the Present Generation

There is no good war. There is no perfect peace. But there are acceptable peaces and peaces that prepare for the next conflicts. A peace that leaves Russia unpunished, Ukraine amputated, and Europe divided is not a lasting peace—it is an armistice. Europe has the responsibility to throw all its weight—economic, diplomatic, military—to ensure that any eventual agreement on Ukraine is just, lasting, and anchored in the principles that found the international order. This is the mission of this generation of European leaders. Costa’s back-channel will not be enough. There must be a plan, a mandate, a voice. A united Europe.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Sources primaires

Bloomberg — EU Chief Reaches Out to Moscow to Set Up Back Channel to Putin — June 17, 2026

Bloomberg — Russia's Lavrov Rejects European Push on Ukraine as 'Ultimatum' — June 19, 2026

United24 Media — Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Rejects Western Demands for Peace Plan — June 19, 2026

Sources secondaires

Los Angeles Times — EU leaders squabble over outreach to Moscow as Ukraine war rages on — June 19, 2026

Anadolu Agency — Costa's outreach to Kremlin sparks rift among EU member states — June 20, 2026

Simon Gros — Europe's Strategic Turn: Ukraine, China, Russia, and the New Architecture of EU Power — June 21, 2026

United24 Media — EU Reportedly Opens Backchannel Contacts With Moscow Amid Russia's War in Ukraine — June 18, 2026

Bloomberg / X (Business) — Europe's latest proposal for peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv amounts to an ultimatum, Russia's foreign minister says — June 19, 2026