REPORTAGE: Kostiantynivka, the Siege to Come — Infiltration, Pokrovsk-Style

Introduction: The City Holding Out, for Now

A Doorway to the Abyss

Kostiantynivka, a city of 67,000 pre-war residents in the Ukrainian Donbas, is experiencing something its defenders know all too well: the start of a siege that dares not speak its name. Moscow is not preparing a frontal offensive. This is a progressive absorption, methodical and calculated. It is a tactic refined on the ruins of Pokrovsk, now applied to this strategic crossroads that serves as the gateway to the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, the last major Ukrainian bastion in Donetsk.

According to the battlefield monitoring group DeepState, Russian forces have reached the positions necessary to launch what it describes as a gradual absorption of Kostiantynivka, modeled on the tactics used around Pokrovsk. The situation is unfolding according to its most difficult scenario, DeepState specifies. This is no idle statement from these Ukrainian analysts who have shown, over the months, a formidable accuracy in their field assessments.

What the Numbers Reveal — and What They Hide

Brigadier General Oleksandr Bakulin, commander of the 19th Army Corps, stated on June 15, 2026, during the national news broadcast that his intelligence services estimated the enemy presence inside the city at around 123 Russian soldiers. He was careful to specify that this figure came with a margin of 20 to 30 fighters in either direction, due to the inherent difficulty of urban intelligence — double-counting between sources, undetected groups, and continuous movements. Bakulin described estimates circulating around 250 to 300 men as somewhat exaggerated, while acknowledging he could not rule them out with absolute certainty.

The newspaper Hromadske, after gathering testimonies from three officers on the ground, reported that at least 100 Russian soldiers had infiltrated Kostiantynivka, with one officer estimating the real figure could be closer to 250. In other words, even the Ukrainians fighting inside the city do not agree on the exact scale of the enemy presence. This ambiguity is not accidental — it illustrates precisely the nature of this ghost war now playing out in the city's ruins.

The Lesson of Pokrovsk: How to Devour a City in Silence

The Absorption Model, Decrypted

To understand what is happening in Kostiantynivka, one must look back at Pokrovsk. This city in western Donetsk became the laboratory for a tactic that Moscow subsequently exported. Rather than a massive frontal assault — costly in men, visible, and resistible — Russian forces adopted an approach of multi-directional gradual pressure: infiltrating small groups into peri-urban areas, establishing firing and drone-guidance positions, systematically targeting logistical routes, and progressively reducing the Ukrainian defensive perimeter without ever proclaiming a definitive victory.

According to DeepState, even small groups of Russian infantry can establish ambush positions and guide drone strikes, placing roads under permanent fire control without formally encircling the city. This is the essence of the strategy: making Ukrainian logistics unsustainable while leaving the city apparently non-encircled. No official blockade, no formal surrender — just the slow, invisible, inexorable strangulation.

Pokrovsk Has Fallen. Can Kostiantynivka Escape the Same Fate?

The Russian campaign against Kostiantynivka began in August 2025, after the capture of Toretsk and most of Chasiv Yar, according to an assessment by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) published on June 10, 2026. The first Russian infiltrations into the city were recorded as early as October 2025. In November 2025, General Bakulin himself recalls that about fifty enemy soldiers had managed to infiltrate — some sources mentioned up to 200 at the time — before the situation was brought under control. The current problem resurfaced about six weeks prior to the June 15 statement, around early May 2026.

What distinguishes the current situation from November 2025 is the scale and persistence. Russian forces have now, according to the ISW, penetrated about 12.69% of the urban territory of Kostiantynivka. Two Russian tactical groups are operating simultaneously: the Bakhmut group, built primarily around the 3rd Army Corps, which has progressed from Stupochky via Novodmytrivka toward the northeast of the city and along the T-0504 route toward the railway station; and the Dzerzhinsk group, operating in the area of the 8th Combined Arms Army, which has advanced from Illinivka toward areas ranging from the northwest to the southwest of Kostiantynivka.

The Geography of the Siege: Three Choke Points

Novodmytrivka, Berestok, Illinivka — The Three Broken Gates

Russian pressure on Kostiantynivka is being exerted from several simultaneous directions, which is precisely the signature of the absorption tactic. According to DeepState, Russian infantry has already been spotted entering the eastern part of the city via Novodmytrivka. Additional pressure is coming from the directions of Berestok and Illinivka. This is no accident: these three axes allow them to simultaneously test Ukrainian defensive cohesion on distinct fronts, forcing commanders to dilute their resources.

The immediate objective of the Russian forces, according to DeepState analysis, is likely to reach the narrow northern corridor that connects Kostiantynivka to its rear supply lines. Without this corridor, the city is cut off. And a city cut off is a city whose countdown has begun. Like Pokrovsk. Like Avdiivka before it.

The Keys to the City: The Station, the North Interchange, the Central Market

Sources analyzed by Ukrinform identify specific Russian targets inside Kostiantynivka: Belhiiska Street, the northern overpass, and the area around the central market. If the enemy succeeds in establishing positions along these lines and cutting off the interchange, it could effectively separate a large part of the industrial zone from the rest of the city. This is not a theoretical scenario — it is the logical progression of what the ISW describes as a Russian attempt to isolate the industrial zone of the city.

The Kostiantynivka railway station is also a priority target. The Bakhmut group has advanced toward it but has not yet succeeded in seizing it, according to the ISW as of June 10. Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops managed to drive Russian infiltrators out of Dovha Balka, southwest of the city — a rare defensive success in a context of constant pressure.

Logistics Under Drones: A Road of Death

When Vehicles Can No Longer Move

The road from Kramatorsk to Kostiantynivka is, in 2026, the symbol of what this war has become. A report by the Kyiv Independent published on June 4, 2026, based on two trips by photojournalist Serhii Korovaynyi to Kostiantynivka in the spring of 2026, describes a terrifying reality: most brigades fighting in the city have stopped using motorized vehicles for everything except the most urgent missions. Even unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), supposed to be a solution for heavy loads, are spotted and destroyed more often than not by drones.

Result: Ukrainian soldiers are conducting their rotations and resupplies on foot. On foot, in an area saturated with Russian FPV drones. Dozens of rusted carcasses of destroyed UGVs line the road like a macabre accounting of aborted resupply attempts. And among these ruins of metal, civilians who have not yet evacuated still try to move — at the risk of their lives. A Ukrainian soldier, quoted by the Kyiv Independent, recounted seeing a Russian FPV drone dart from a field and strike a man pedaling a bicycle toward Druzhkivka: he died instantly.

Anti-Drone Nets and the War of the Roads

Along the lifeline to Kostiantynivka, Ukrainian teams are constantly repairing sections of anti-drone nets. Some were destroyed by Russian drones, others by the anti-drone spikes fixed to Ukrainian vehicles themselves, and still others by the weather. This road is protected by dozens of mobile firing teams deployed to shoot down approaching drones — a constant war, day and night. The Khyzhak national police brigade, whose teams take three hours to reach their position on foot, describes this daily life as a slow-motion game of hide-and-seek with drones and gunfire.

The city is now cut off from all emergency and humanitarian services, making any precise count of the remaining civilians impossible. The about 2,000 civilians estimated at the start of the year are likely fewer today, but no one can say for sure. One woman, Yevdokiia, who works at the local military hospital, summarizes the situation both simply and tragically: a Russian glide bomb hit her street a month earlier, she and her son nearly died, but she stays because she has a job.

Field Intelligence: What Bakulin Is Willing to Admit

A General Who Speaks Straight — and That is Rare

In a war where propaganda from both sides filters every official statement, the remarks of General Bakulin on June 15, 2026, stand out for their unusual frankness. He did not downplay the situation, nor did he dramatize it beyond verifiable facts. He said what his intelligence services estimated — around 123 Russian soldiers present in the city — while immediately specifying the limits of that assessment: possible double-counting between sources, undetected fighters, and a figure accompanied by a margin of 20 to 30 men. This is military intellectual honesty. And it is precious.

Bakulin also said something crucial: the Ukrainians have learned the lessons of Pokrovsk. The situation in Kostiantynivka is not identical, according to him. The defense forces are mounting a stronger response; they have adapted their counter-infiltration methods. He recalled that in November 2025, a similar situation — about 50 infiltrated Russian soldiers, up to 200 according to some sources — had been successfully brought under control. But he also admitted that the current problem, which appeared six weeks ago, has not yet been resolved.

What Russian Commanders Have Already Told Their Superiors

A revealing detail, reported by General Bakulin himself: Russian commanders have reportedly already announced the capture of Kostiantynivka to their military hierarchy, and are now trying to make the reality on the ground match their reports. This is a well-known dynamic in the Russian army, whose culture of upward reporting — "telling the higher level what it wants to hear" — has been documented for decades. The pressure to deliver concrete results after promising victory can push units into suicidal assaults.

This internal Russian pressure partly explains why the ISW documented, on June 15, 2026, the circulation of videos probably generated by intelligence artificial showing Russian soldiers planting flags on the western outskirts of Kostiantynivka and in the village of Dovha Balka, which the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have captured. Manufactured videos to illustrate an announced victory not yet achieved — a characteristic Kremlin information operation.

The Fortress Belt: What Kostiantynivka Protects

Four Cities, One Common Fate

To grasp the true stakes of the battle for Kostiantynivka, one must widen the perspective. The city is the southern gate of what analysts call the fortress belt of the Ukrainian Donbas — a defensive arc formed by four major cities: Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka. These four cities are linked by roads and railway lines that constitute the backbone of any Ukrainian defense in the region. Losing Kostiantynivka means exposing this entire system to cascading degradation.

DeepState puts it clearly: if Kostiantynivka falls, Druzhkivka would likely become the next Russian objective, due to its key logistical role, before pressure intensifies on Kramatorsk. Control of Kostiantynivka would allow Russian drone operators to operate deeper behind Ukrainian lines, making movements throughout the area much more dangerous. The Russian forces' domination of the surrounding heights — already a reality according to analyses — gives them an observation and strike advantage that complicates every rotation, every convoy, and every Ukrainian movement.

The T-0504 Route and the Railway Hub, Keystones of the Defense

Kostiantynivka is a point of convergence of two national routes essential: the T-0504 and the T-0514, the latter running directly up toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. The city's railway station constitutes another strategic hub. Whoever controls these axes controls the military logistics of the entire northern Donetsk sector under Ukrainian control. The Russian Bakhmut group specifically aims to advance along the T-0504 toward the station — not yet reached, according to the ISW as of June 10, but under constant pressure.

According to United24 Media, citing the ISW, Russia shifted the main axis of its 2026 spring-summer offensive to Kostiantynivka after the stalling of its push toward Sloviansk. This strategic pivot is in itself an admission: Moscow cannot advance on several axes simultaneously with the required efficiency. It has chosen Kostiantynivka as a single and costly bet — with probable tactical gains this summer according to the ISW, but without the capacity for an operational breakthrough against the Ukrainian fortress belt.

Shadow Tactics: How the Russians Blend Into the City

Three-Man Groups, Invisible and Devastating

The Russian infiltration doctrine in Kostiantynivka relies on very small groups — sometimes only two or three fighters — who seek to slip between Ukrainian positions, establish themselves discreetly, and then guide drone strikes or serve as an anchor point for additional elements. This tactic was refined on the Pokrovsk front, then systematized. General Bakulin himself confirmed it: the Russians are employing small-group infiltration tactics similar to those previously used near Pokrovsk.

According to Hromadske, the Ukrainian command knows the routes by which the Russians enter the city — they often pass through sectors held by the 156th brigade. But there is a lack of permanent drone surveillance on these axes, and the distribution of drone resources is not optimal. This is a real Ukrainian problem, documented by the officers themselves with a frankness that speaks to an army that self-examines — a necessary condition for improvement.

Drone Warfare as a Force Multiplier

In this context, Russian FPV drones serve not only to strike targets — they serve to control the terrain without being physically present. A small group of three infiltrated Russian soldiers, equipped with a remote drone operator, can deny an entire street to Ukrainian passage, force rotations to be done on foot, and slow down reinforcements. This is the definition of fire control without ground control — a nuance the Russian army has learned to exploit with increasing efficiency.

Militarnyi reported on June 17, 2026, that in the Sloviansk sector, the Russians continue to combine infiltration tactics and direct assaults with armored vehicles, military trucks, and motorcycles, all supported by artillery, aviation, and drones. A combination that illustrates current Russian tactical versatility — and which also applies to Kostiantynivka, just a few kilometers to the south.

Russian Losses: The Price of Progress by Accumulation

A Machine for Sacrificing Its Own Soldiers

DeepState is explicit on this point: Moscow accepts high infantry losses in exchange for progressive territorial gains. The same dynamic characterized the campaign for Pokrovsk, where Russian losses were considered very significant but where the approach ultimately allowed for the city's capture. It is a cynical calculation but consistent with Russian doctrine since Bakhmut: constant attrition, however costly, eventually erodes the opponent's defensive capacity.

An Ukrinform analysis published on June 10, 2026, quotes a Ukrainian serviceman describing the situation around Kostiantynivka as a true meat grinder for the most capable Russian formations. The same testimony indicates that the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and 3rd Army Corps are now fighting with their second and third rotations — they have suffered extremely heavy losses. Reinforcements have been drawn from other sectors: elements of the Russian 3rd, 18th, 51st, 49th, and 58th armies.

When Reinforcements Are No Longer Enough

According to data compiled by United24 Media based on ISW reports, Russia had missed its deadline to capture the city by May 2026, despite the redeployment of elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division to the area in December 2025 and the reported replacement of 80% of assault units by June 6. These figures tell a story: an army injecting massive resources into a specific objective and failing to achieve it according to the planned schedule. The paradox of Kostiantynivka, according to a Ukrainian soldier quoted by Ukrinform, is that the usual Russian formula — more resources equals more results — simply does not work here.

Overall, in May 2026, Russia reportedly gained only 20 net km² of territory along the entire front, according to an assessment cited by Ukrinform — its worst monthly result in three years according to DeepState. This global data point must be read alongside the specific pressure on Kostiantynivka: it is there that Moscow is concentrating its most intense efforts, and even there progress remains meager considering the sacrifices made.

The Information War: Virtual Flags and Fictional Victories

AI in the Service of War Propaganda

On June 15, 2026, the ISW documented the circulation of videos probably generated by intelligence artificial showing Russian soldiers planting flags on the western outskirts of Kostiantynivka and in the village of Dovha Balka — which the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have captured. The ISW estimated it had serious grounds to conclude these videos were manufactured, as their style was consistent with previous information operations using AI to support claims of territorial advances.

This informational dimension is not secondary — it is at the heart of Russian strategy. By claiming to control Kostiantynivka even before actually doing so, Moscow seeks to crack the confidence of the Ukrainian population, discourage defenders, and condition international opinion to accept a Ukrainian defeat as inevitable. The ISW warns that this campaign aims to reinforce the narrative that Ukrainian defenses are on the brink of collapse and that the capture of the rest of Donetsk is only a matter of time.

Why the Russians Lie to Their Own Hierarchy

Bakulin revealed an internal Russian mechanism as fascinating as it is dangerous: Russian commanders have reportedly already reported the capture of the city to their hierarchy and are now seeking to make reality match their report. This behavior is not isolated in Russian military history — it is systemic. Officers who overestimate progress to satisfy their superiors find themselves forced to take reckless risks to justify their previous statements.

This top-down pressure from the Kremlin to field commanders creates documented perverse effects: units launched into premature assaults, increased losses, and positions held at all costs even when a tactical withdrawal would be wiser. This is one of the reasons why Russian losses around Kostiantynivka remain so high despite limited progress — commanders do not have the right to fail even when failure would be smarter than obstinacy.

Ukrainian Resistance: Adaptation and Counter-Infiltration

Lessons of Pokrovsk Applied in Real Time

While the situation in Kostiantynivka is serious, it is not catastrophic — and this is largely due to the adaptability of Ukrainian forces. The 28th Mechanized Brigade, the Knights of the Winter Campaign, repelled a coordinated Russian attack in March 2026 from four simultaneous directions, including two decoy tanks from Toretsk, three infantry groups on different axes, and a special forces unit approaching via the railway. The attack failed: Ukrainian forces destroyed one of the decoy armored vehicles, eliminated two infantry groups with FPV drones, and captured one prisoner — the sole survivor of this attempt.

General Bakulin said it bluntly: Ukrainian forces have learned the lessons from their mistakes around Pokrovsk. Counter-infiltration methods have been improved, and surveillance, drones, and multi-layered defenses have been strengthened to identify and neutralize enemy groups before they establish points of support. This capacity for institutional learning, in a war evolving at extraordinary speed, is perhaps the Ukrainian army's most precious comparative advantage.

The Lack of Continuous Surveillance: The Persistent Flaw

But not all lessons have been fully applied. Hromadske, citing its sources on the ground, identified a specific problem: Russian infiltration routes often pass through sectors where surveillance permanent drone is insufficient, notably in areas held by the 156th brigade. There is no optimal distribution of surveillance drone resources. This is not a criticism — it is a factual observation reported by Ukrainian officers themselves, proof of a culture of self-assessment that is in itself a form of resilience.

The Ukrainian Air Force, represented by the 81st Airmobile Brigade separated from the 7th Air Assault Corps, repelled a two-day Russian mechanized assault in the Sloviansk sector on June 17, 2026 — involving 28 motorcycles, one tank, three armored combat vehicles, seven military vehicles, and more than 50 assault infantry. A real defensive success in a sector directly linked to the global pressure on the fortress belt. These local tactical victories are crucial for maintaining overall coherence.

The Northern Corridor: Kostiantynivka’s Jugular Vein

Cutting the Road Is Winning Without Fighting

Among the immediate Russian objectives identified by DeepState, the most critical is undoubtedly reaching the narrow northern corridor that connects Kostiantynivka to its rear supply routes. This corridor is the jugular vein of the city's defense. If the Russians manage to place it under fire control — even without physically cutting it — they make resupply so dangerous and costly that it becomes unsustainable in the long term. This is the very definition of a modern siege: no walls, no formal encirclement, just the gradual strangulation of logistical flows.

The Kyiv Independent accurately describes how this reality has already materialized on the Kramatorsk-Kostiantynivka road. Vehicles no longer dare venture there except at high speed — up to 120 km/h — and for the most urgent missions. Soldiers end up on foot, carrying their equipment for miles under the constant threat of drones. This is a road that the 24th Mechanized Brigade monitors with teams whose role is to protect convoys, hunt FPVs, and spot watcher-drones — these machines parked on the roadside waiting for a target, nicknamed zhduny (the waiters) by the soldiers.

Druzhkivka in the Crosshairs

If Kostiantynivka falls, Druzhkivka becomes the next logical target. This is DeepState's assessment, consistent with the military geography of the region. Druzhkivka is a logistical hub whose loss would dramatically complicate support for Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. And once these two cities are under intensified direct pressure, we would be in a scenario few analysts want to consider out loud: the questioning of the entire Ukrainian defensive setup in northern Donetsk.

DeepState also does not rule out that Russia might try to open an additional axis toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, south of Lyman, along a stretch from Mykolaivka to Malynivka, where some Ukrainian brigades are facing manpower shortages. It would be a double pincer: pressure on Kostiantynivka from the south, pressure on Sloviansk from the northeast. A scenario that would explain the constant redeployment of Russian reinforcements from other sectors of the front to this area.

The Human Factor: Soldiers, Civilians, and Lasting Resistance

Holding On Without Blinking

Behind the numbers and tactical analyses, there are men and women living and dying in this war for over four years. The Kyiv Independent report on the Kostiantynivka road captures this humanity with a gentle brutality: Django, the Khyzhak brigade team leader, answering his wife’s call from Chernivtsi at 8 a.m. after a night in a dugout under drones, showing the bunker’s kitten to his son Makar. Mammoth and his team playing Wild West sheriffs while hunting FPVs on the road. Vitalii, at his post since November 2025 without a possible relief, watching civilians get killed on bicycles.

These soldiers are holding. They are holding with everything they have — and sometimes with less than that. The 28th Mechanized Brigade repelling an attack from four simultaneous directions, the 81st Airmobile Brigade defeating 50 Russian infantry and their armor in two days in the Sloviansk sector — these are stories of real resistance in a context of real exhaustion. Ukraine is not in a comfortable position. But it is holding.

The ISW and the Reality of Breakthroughs: A Nuanced Prognosis

The ISW maintains a prognosis that deserves to be quoted precisely: Russian forces will likely achieve additional tactical gains around Kostiantynivka during the summer of 2026. But the ISW estimates it remains unlikely they will achieve a rapid operational breakthrough capable of capturing the entire network of fortified Ukrainian positions in the region. Translation: local, painful, costly advances — but not collapse. Not yet. Not if Ukraine receives the support it needs, not if resistance continues to adapt as quickly as threats evolve.

The fact that Russia missed its deadline of May 2026 to capture the city, despite a massive concentration of forces, is in itself a strong signal. It is not a definitive Ukrainian victory — but it is proof that Moscow is not invincible, that its schedules can be disrupted, and that every extra week of resistance changes the strategic calculations in Moscow, Kyiv, and Washington.

The Western Dimension: What Kostiantynivka Means for NATO

The Fortress Belt, Symbol of Western Credibility

The battle of Kostiantynivka is not just being played out between Ukrainians and Russians. It is also being played out in Western chancelleries, in NATO discussions, and in the budget deliberations of the U.S. Congress. Because what Kostiantynivka represents is the viability of the Ukrainian resistance model that the West decided to support since 2022. A city that holds is proof that Western military aid produces results. A city that falls is an explosive political issue in Washington, Paris, Berlin, and London.

The ISW has warned that Russian rhetoric around Kostiantynivka specifically aims to create a sense of inevitability in Western capitals — "Ukraine is going to lose Donetsk anyway, why keep investing?" It is a war of perception as much as a war of ground. And in this war of perception, every honest analysis that distinguishes probable Russian tactical gains from unlikely Ukrainian operational collapse is an act of informational resistance.

What the West Must Understand — and Do

The situation in Kostiantynivka also reveals concrete and urgent needs. The insufficient drone surveillance on certain infiltration axes — mentioned by Hromadske — is a resource problem, not just a doctrinal one. The convoys on foot, the destroyed UGVs littering the Kramatorsk road, the mobile firing teams relying on individual heroism as much as technology — all this says that Ukraine needs continuous support in anti-drone systems, ammunition, and surveillance equipment. Western support is not a moral luxury — it is the material condition for resistance.

The lessons of Kostiantynivka must also be studied by every NATO staff. Urban infiltration warfare by small groups guiding drones, logistics under FPV saturation, counter-infiltration in dense urban environments — these are the tactical challenges of 21st-century warfare. What is happening in the Donbas is a laboratory whose lessons will last decades. And Ukraine is its involuntary teacher, paying for every lesson with blood.

Conclusion: A "Matter of Time" That Demands an Answer Now

DeepState Spoke the Words No One Wanted to Hear

DeepState concluded its analysis with a phrase its analysts do not utter lightly: the fall of Kostiantynivka is "a matter of time" if current trends continue. This is not a surrender — it is a warning. These same analysts, who have followed every centimeter of the front since 2022, issued similar warnings before cities that subsequently resisted far longer than expected. But they have also been right about cities that fell.

The situation as of June 19, 2026, is as follows: Russian forces estimated at around 123 soldiers according to the Ukrainian 19th Army Corps are present inside Kostiantynivka, with a margin of uncertainty acknowledged by General Bakulin himself. The city is not under Russian control — Bakulin said it clearly: it would be premature and exaggerated to say the enemy controls any part of the city. The fight continues. But the pressure is real, multi-directional, and documented by converging independent sources.

Ukraine Is Holding On — and That Is No Small Thing

What is happening in Kostiantynivka in June 2026 is Ukraine paying the maximum price to defend what remains of its territory in the Donbas. With soldiers marching under drones, brigades repelling assaults from four axes, and generals admitting they don't know everything but fighting with what they have. The fortress belt holds. The city holds. The northern corridor holds, for now.

The question this report poses is not "Will Kostiantynivka fall?" — no one knows for sure. The question is: how long can Ukraine hold on without increased support? The answer belongs as much to Western democracies as to the Ukrainian soldiers who, at this very moment, stand guard on a road littered with destroyed UGVs between Kramatorsk and a city that refuses to die.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Sources primaires

Euromaidan Press — "A matter of time": Kostiantynivka now faces slow Pokrovsk-style siege, DeepState warns — June 18, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Commander of 19th Army Corps: Russia does not control any part of Kostiantynivka (Bakulin) — June 15, 2026

United24 Media — Russia Shifts Donetsk Offensive to Kostyantynivka After Slovyansk Push Stalls, ISW Says — June 11, 2026

Sources secondaires

The Kyiv Independent — Road to the kill zone: With Ukrainian troops on the lifeline from Kramatorsk to Kostiantynivka — June 4, 2026

United24 Media — Russia Turns to AI Videos to Fake Battlefield Success Near Kostiantynivka, ISW Says — June 16, 2026

Militarnyi — Ukrainian Air Assault Forces Repel Two-Day Russian Mechanized Assault in Sloviansk Sector — June 17, 2026

Ukrinform — A Spring Campaign in Ruins: How Russia's Record Losses Threaten Its Summer Offensive — June 10, 2026

Hromadske — Чи встоїть Костянтинівка до кінця літа? (Will Kostiantynivka hold out until the end of summer?) — June 12, 2026