COMMENTARY: Putin threatens Europe: the rhetoric of fear

COMMENTARY: Putin threatens Europe: the rhetoric of fear

Introduction: The master of permanent menace

Rhetoric calculated down to the last word

Vladimir Putin does not threaten by accident. Every speech, every statement, every ambiguous signal sent to Europe is the product of a precise political calculation. His rhetoric of threat — brandishing the nuclear weapon, evoking «proportional reprisals», suggesting that NATO is preparing to attack Russia — is a strategic tool serving clear objectives: paralyze Western resolve, divide allies, and maintain room for maneuver in Ukraine without triggering a direct military response.

In June 2026, as the NATO summit was being held in Ankara, Putin again reached for this rhetorical arsenal. Statements about an «appropriate response» to any attack against Russia, insinuations about Western complicity in Ukrainian strikes, and carefully dosed nuclear rhetoric. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski clearly described these speeches as potentially an «announcement of a provocation» — suggesting that Moscow might orchestrate a staged incident to justify escalation.

Fear as a weapon of war

Fear is the cheapest weapon there is. It costs no ammunition, requires no troop mobilization, and can cross borders at the speed of a televised statement. Putin understood long ago that a credible threat is sometimes worth as much as real action. By keeping Europe in a state of uncertainty about his true intentions, he complicates allied strategic planning and sustains an atmosphere of permanent psychological pressure.

But this strategy has its limits. Like any instrument of intimidation, it erodes over time. Europeans — and especially eastern flank countries — have progressively built immunity to these threats through acclimatization. What shocked in 2022 has become routine by 2026. And this erosion of impact is bad news for Putin — it forces him to escalate the rhetoric to maintain the same level of psychological pressure.

Concrete threats: between theater and reality

What Putin says and what he does

There is a systematic gap between Putin's rhetoric and his actual actions. He threatened «unprecedented consequences» if NATO supplied long-range weapons to Ukraine. The weapons were delivered, and the announced consequences did not materialize. He threatened nuclear reprisals if Ukraine struck Russian territory with Western weapons. The strikes happened, without nuclear retaliation. This pattern of threats not followed by action has progressively reduced the credibility of his rhetoric.

But this does not mean the threats are harmless. Even a threat not followed by action produces real psychological and political effects. It fuels internal debates in Western democracies between «hawks» who want to support Ukraine more strongly and «doves» who fear escalation. It gives arguments to political forces that wish to reduce support for Kyiv. It creates hesitation where a resolute response would be more effective.

Military exercises as a signal

Beyond words, Russia also uses military exercises as an intimidation tool. Exercises involving tactical nuclear forces, troop deployments near Baltic and Polish borders, incidents involving Russian military aircraft in neighboring airspace — all these acts are carefully calibrated to maintain military pressure without crossing the thresholds that would trigger a direct NATO response.

Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski warned that Putin's «appropriate response» rhetoric could be the prelude to an orchestrated provocation — a fabricated or simulated incident that would allow Moscow to justify escalation while presenting itself as the victim of Western aggression. This analysis is taken very seriously by the intelligence services of eastern flank countries.

Russia's hybrid strategy on the eastern flank

Sabotage, cyberattacks, and destabilization

Alongside the rhetoric, Russia is conducting an active hybrid war on NATO's eastern flank. Infrastructure sabotage — undersea cables damaged in the Baltic Sea, suspicious rail incidents in Poland and the Baltic states, disruptions to energy networks — is documented by Western intelligence services as presumed Russian operations. Russia systematically denies, but the patterns are too coherent to be random.

Russian cyberattacks against government infrastructure, defense companies, and media in NATO member countries are documented and increasing. These attacks aim to disrupt governance systems, steal sensitive information, and test vulnerabilities in critical networks. NATO has responded by strengthening its collective cyber defense capabilities and developing response protocols for hybrid incidents.

Influence operations and disinformation

Perhaps the most insidious component of Russian hybrid warfare is disinformation. Networks of fake accounts on social media, pro-Russian information sites disguised as local media, manipulation campaigns targeting extremist political parties in Europe — all of this aims to erode social and political cohesion in Western democracies from within.

These influence operations have had measurable effects in some countries: amplification of anti-NATO movements, spreading of false information about «Ukrainian provocations», support for political parties advocating accommodation with Moscow. The fight against disinformation is one of the most difficult battles of this hybrid war — because it is waged on the terrain of opinions and perceptions, where conventional weapons are useless.

NATO's responses and those of the Baltic states

Not allowing oneself to be paralyzed

In the face of Russia's rhetoric of threat, NATO has progressively adopted a posture of firm response without escalation. The guiding principle is simple: take threats seriously without being paralyzed by them. Continue to support Ukraine, to strengthen the presence on the eastern flank, and to develop collective defense capabilities — while maintaining open communication channels with Moscow to reduce the risk of accident or misunderstanding.

This posture is difficult to maintain, as it requires a constant balance between resolve and caution. Too much resolve without signals of de-escalation risks feeding the Russian rhetoric of «encirclement» and Western «provocations». Too much caution risks being perceived as weakness and encouraging further aggression. The diplomatic art consists in navigating this space with precision.

Baltic and Polish states: resilience forged in history

The countries that best resist Putin's intimidating rhetoric are those with the most experience of Russian pressure: the Baltic states, Poland, Finland (since joining NATO). These countries are not paralyzed by threats — they protect themselves from them, armor themselves against them, and respond to them through investments in their own defense.

This resilience is not arrogance. It is historical experience. These nations have lived under occupation, under constant pressure, under the permanent threat of an unpredictable and violent neighbor. They know that fear is exactly what Putin is trying to produce — and they refuse to hand him that psychological victory. It is a lesson all of Europe should learn.

The nuclear dimension: a threat to take seriously

Russia's revised nuclear doctrine

Russia revised its nuclear doctrine in 2024, officially lowering the threshold for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. These revisions were presented as a response to Western weapons deliveries to Ukraine and to the authorization given to Kyiv to strike Russian territory with long-range missiles. This doctrinal revision is not purely symbolic — it modifies the parameters of the deterrence calculation for all parties.

Analysts at the RAND Corporation and other specialized institutions estimate that the risk of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine — while low in absolute terms — has increased since the start of the war. This risk must neither be ignored nor minimized. But it must also not paralyze the West's capacity to support Ukraine, which would validate Putin's nuclear coercion strategy.

American extended deterrence

The key to responding to the Russian nuclear threat is the credibility of American extended deterrence. The United States has maintained a clear posture: any use of nuclear weapons by Russia in Ukraine would entail «catastrophic consequences» for Russia, without explicitly specifying the nature of those consequences. This calculated ambiguity aims to maintain deterrence without escalating rhetoric.

But uncertainty about long-term American commitment — fed by the contradictory signals of the Trump administration — weakens this deterrence. If Moscow comes to doubt American resolve, the psychological threshold for using a tactical nuclear weapon could lower. That is why maintaining the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence is an absolute strategic priority for NATO cohesion.

The Ukrainian response: courage as doctrine

Zelensky facing the threats

Volodymyr Zelensky has developed, in response to Russian threats, a reaction that combines analytical rigor with the force of moral conviction. Rather than being intimidated by Putin's rhetoric, he exposes it, contextualizes it, and demonstrates its contradictions. His direct communication — on social media, in international interviews, in speeches to foreign parliaments — has been one of Ukraine's most precious strategic assets in this war.

Zelensky has understood something essential: narrative is a weapon. By keeping world public opinion informed and engaged in favor of Ukraine, he creates political constraint on the governments of the democracies supporting Kyiv. When citizens of Europe and North America support Ukraine, it becomes politically difficult for their governments to reduce aid. This dynamic is one of the structural strengths of the Ukrainian camp.

Popular resistance as a shield

The resistance of the Ukrainian people itself is the most powerful response to Putin's intimidating rhetoric. Despite more than four years of war, despite city bombings, despite considerable human losses, support for the resistance remains strong in Ukrainian society. Available polls show a population determined not to capitulate — ready for sacrifices that few contemporary Western societies would accept.

This determination is the strongest refutation of the Putinist theory that Ukrainians have no distinct national identity and want to be reintegrated into Russian space. Every Russian bomb that falls on a Ukrainian city strengthens Ukrainian national identity — it crystallizes the boundary between Ukraine and Russia in a way that all the identity narratives could not accomplish.

Western support: responding to fear with resolve

Not letting rhetoric define policy

The main mistake the West made repeatedly in this conflict is letting Putin's rhetoric define the limits of its support for Ukraine. Every time a Western government delayed delivering a weapon because it feared «escalation», it was in effect rewarding Moscow's intimidation strategy. This logic had a real cost in Ukrainian lives — months during which effective weapons were not available at the front.

The lesson learned — progressively, painfully — is that resolve is the best response to the rhetoric of fear. When the West holds to its commitments firmly, when it delivers the weapons it promised, when it does not retreat in the face of threats, Putin's rhetoric loses its effectiveness. There is a direct correlation between Western firmness and the moderation of Russian behavior.

Building long-term resilience

Beyond immediate responses to each threat, the West must build long-term resilience against Russia's coercion strategy. This means diversifying energy supplies to reduce vulnerability to gas blackmail, strengthening critical infrastructure cyber defenses, developing robust counter-disinformation capabilities, and maintaining defense spending levels that make any military aggression prohibitively costly for Russia.

This resilience is a long-term investment. It produces no immediately visible dividends. But it transforms Putin's incentive structure: if the cost of aggression becomes too high and the benefits too uncertain, even a Russian strategic calculation can produce the conclusion that diplomacy and coexistence are preferable to permanent confrontation.

Media and the battle of narratives

Informing to resist

In the war of rhetoric waged by Putin, free and independent media are an essential line of defense. Media like Euromaidan Press, the Kyiv Independent, Ukrinform, and other pro-democracy Ukrainian and international outlets play a crucial role in maintaining a flow of factual and verified information that counterbalances the Kremlin's propaganda machine. Their work is essential — and dangerous. Journalists are being killed in Ukraine. Correspondents are targeted by intimidation operations in Europe.

Supporting free media — public and private funding, legal protection for journalists, fighting online censorship — is one of the most important investments democracies can make in their own security. A well-informed public is far more resistant to Russian disinformation than one disoriented by flows of contradictory false information.

The responsibility of digital platforms

Digital platforms — social networks, search engines, messaging services — have become the main battleground of the information war. Their content moderation policies, recommendation algorithms, and decisions on access to Russian state media have considerable political consequences. The European Union, with its Digital Services Act, has begun legally framing these responsibilities — but real enforcement remains uneven.

Moscow has also developed networks of influencers in European countries — political figures or media that repeat Russian narratives without appearing as agents of state propaganda. This approach is harder to counter than direct propaganda, because it camouflages itself in the domestic media landscape. Public awareness of these techniques remains the primary antidote.

Conclusion: The rhetoric will not win

The limits of the fear game

Putin's rhetoric of threat is powerful — but it has limits. It works on psychologically vulnerable targets: war-weary public opinions, elites who value stability above justice, governments that confuse caution with capitulation. It does not work on nations that have made their peace with fear — that have decided defending freedom is worth the risks it entails.

Ukraine made that choice. Poland made it. The Baltic states have made it for decades. Progressively, Germany, France, and other NATO members are making the same choice. And as this choice becomes widespread, Putin's rhetoric loses its grip. A world that is no longer afraid of Putin is a world where Putin loses his most powerful lever.

Truth as an antidote

The antidote to the rhetoric of fear is truth. The truth about Russian aggression, documented and undeniable. The truth about Ukrainian resistance, heroic and legitimate. The truth about Russian atrocities in Ukraine — not to exacerbate hatred, but to maintain a moral memory that prevents the normalization of the unacceptable.

Putin bet that time would work in his favor — that war fatigue, economic difficulties, and the rotation of Western governments would eventually reduce support for Ukraine. This bet was rational within its autocratic logic. But it underestimated democracies' capacity to renew their moral commitment in the face of patent injustice. Ukraine holds. And as long as it holds, the rhetoric of fear remains what it has always been — a threat without victory.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My declared biases

I am Maxime Marquette, a columnist and analyst. I firmly oppose Russian aggression and Putin's intimidation strategy. I support Zelensky and the Ukrainian people without reservation. I regard Western resolve in the face of Russian threat as a moral and strategic imperative. These positions are the foundation of my analysis in this article.

I acknowledge that the nuclear threat is real and must be taken seriously. I am not seeking to minimize the risks — I am seeking to demonstrate that they should not define Western policy at Ukraine's expense.

My sources

This article draws on reports from Euromaidan Press, The Guardian, Fox News, and analyses from specialized think tanks. Statements attributed to Sikorski and other officials are drawn from public sources. Analyses on Russian nuclear doctrine draw on publicly available academic and institutional publications.

I do not have access to the Kremlin's internal deliberations or classified intelligence reports on Putin's intentions. My analysis is based on observable statements and behavior, not direct knowledge of the internal motivations of the Russian regime.

Sources

Primary sources

Euromaidan Press — Putin promises a response; Sikorski warns of a Russian provocation — June 24, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Sikorski: Putin's rhetoric sounds like an announcement of a provocation — June 24, 2026

The Guardian — Russia: provocation against Baltic states and Poland — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Fox News — Russia preparing hybrid attacks on NATO's eastern flank, intelligence warns — 2026

Foreign Policy — Putin's nuclear rhetoric and NATO — June 25, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Russia's hybrid warfare escalation in the Baltic — 2026