COMMENTARY: Europe reforms in disarray — without shared vision or strategic direction

COMMENTARY: Europe reforms in disarray — without shared vision or strategic direction

Introduction: a Europe consumed by its own courts and its own crises

Friday June 26, 2026: a summary of all European discontents

On June 26, 2026, was an emblematic day for what Europe is going through. In Spain, the lower house of parliament withdrew its confidence from the prime minister after a corruption scandal had weakened his government. In Italy, electoral law reform was advancing, with a clause designed to raise the entry threshold for new parties — a maneuver critics read as an attempt to shield the ruling party from a "rising challenger." In Germany, a court was delivering its verdict in the attack on the Magdeburg Christmas market in late 2024, which had left six dead.

Meanwhile, at the community level, member states were busy with the "return hubs" migration reform, approved by the European Parliament on June 17, and the Turnberry commercial deal with the United States had just been ratified — only to be immediately threatened by Trump with 100% tariffs on digital taxes. A Europe that reforms without stopping, but always in disarray, without common architecture, without a unified strategic vision.

The sum of the parts does not make a whole

This is the fundamental paradox of contemporary Europe. Each member state reforms, legislates, adapts, and survives its internal political crises. The European Union produces texts — on migration, trade, defense — at an impressive pace. But the sum of all these reforms does not produce a coherent grand strategy. It does not produce a vision of what Europe wants to be in ten years in the face of China, Russia, or Trump's United States.

According to The Rio Times, the continent on this June 26 was "turned toward its own institutions" — toward its courts, its governmental crises, its internal reforms. This is understandable. It is human. It is also potentially fatal for Europe's long-term geopolitical relevance.

The asylum reform: a historic decision in a strategic void

The "return hubs": a controversial migration revolution

The adoption by the European Parliament on June 17, 2026 of the new Return Regulation represents the most radical shift in European migration policy in decades. By 418 votes to 218, MEPs approved the creation of "return hubs" — detention centers outside EU territory — for rejected asylum seekers. Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece are already exploring partnerships with third countries like Rwanda or Uzbekistan.

This text is a response to internal political pressure: far-right parties have advanced across Europe by capitalizing on migration insecurity sentiment. Centre-left and centrist governments decided to act on this terrain. Human rights organizations are concerned about conditions in these centers and the absence of sufficient legal guarantees. The return rate for rejected migrants, currently around 29%, was insufficient — but the chosen solution raises international law questions that no one has fully resolved yet.

A reform without internal consensus

The June 17 vote — 418 to 218, with 30 abstentions — reflects a deep divide within the European Parliament. This division is not trivial: it signals that the European Union is adopting a migration policy that more than a third of its elected representatives consider unacceptable. France and Spain, according to diplomatic sources, resisted certain aspects of the return hubs implementation — illustrating the divergences between southern member states (more exposed to immigration) and northern ones (more inclined toward tougher measures).

This reform may solve a short-term political problem — showing voters that the EU is acting on immigration. But it does not address the structural problem: why are millions of people fleeing toward Europe? What about the root causes — wars, climate change, extreme poverty? Europe treats the symptoms without tackling the causes. This is a partial response to a total crisis.

National political crises: Spain, Italy, and democratic fragility

Spain plunges into uncertainty

The vote of no confidence against the Spanish prime minister on June 26 — a day after he declared his intention to continue — adds another layer of instability to an already fragile country. Spain's GDP growth in the first quarter of 2026 was limited to 0.6%, under pressure from a weakening export sector. And Spanish defense companies had suffered heavy losses on contracts due to a standoff with Washington — a direct illustration of the effects of Trump's erratic trade policy on European allies.

Spain's political instability is not merely an internal problem. Spain is the eurozone's fourth-largest economy, a founding EU member, and one of the countries most exposed to Mediterranean migration issues. A prolonged political crisis in Spain weakens the Union's ability to speak with one voice on these files.

Italy between electoral reform and Franco-Italian integration

In Italy, the situation is even more complex. The government is advancing an electoral law reform that would increase the entry threshold for new parties — a measure that consolidates existing formations while reducing political competition. Simultaneously, according to The Rio Times, Rome and Paris signed a series of agreements on defense, space, and maritime affairs, with a joint roadmap running to the end of the decade. These Franco-Italian bilateral agreements are positive — they deepen cooperation between two EU pillars.

But they also illustrate a problematic trend: major initiatives are increasingly being made bilaterally, between certain member states, rather than at the community level. Europe advances in clusters, in shifting coalitions, rather than as a bloc. This is pragmatic. It is also a subtle fragmentation that weakens the Union's ability to project coherent power.

European defense: in disarray in the face of common threats

Poland does the work, others watch

Poland has decided to double its investments in defense, nuclear energy, and space. This is a remarkable effort, justified by geographic proximity to Russia and Ukraine, and by a clear understanding of the risks the war in Ukraine represents for the entire eastern flank of NATO. Poland is on track to become one of Europe's most powerful armies.

But this is not a common European policy — it is a state investing for its own survival. Germany has walked back its spending commitments with less clarity. France, under budgetary pressure, struggles to maintain the pace. Spain — as we just saw — is paralyzed by internal crises and commercial standoffs with Washington. The ideal of a "European Defense Union" remains a horizon, not a reality.

The institutional architecture: slow and fragmented

The EU has adopted a series of important defense initiatives since 2022: the European Defense Fund, the Strategic Compass, joint ammunition procurement projects. These initiatives represent real progress. But they all run up against the same fundamental limit: defense remains a national competence. The EU can fund, encourage, coordinate — but it cannot command. And without unified command, there is no real European military power.

The paradox is cruel: the war in Ukraine demonstrated that Europe needs an autonomous defense capability — the United States under Trump is no longer a reliable protector. And yet this same war has absorbed the resources and political attention that could have been devoted to building this autonomy. Europe is running on multiple urgencies simultaneously, without a clear hierarchy among them.

The Turnberry deal: a victory undermined from birth

Ratify and tremble

The ratification of the Turnberry trade deal by member states on June 25 was an unquestionable victory of European diplomacy — months of hard negotiations, painful concessions, a parliamentary vote of 440 to 151. And twenty-four hours later, Trump was threatening to torpedo it with his 100% tariffs on digital taxes.

This episode illustrates one of Europe's fundamental vulnerabilities in its relationship with Washington: the asymmetry of predictability. Europe negotiates rigorously, honors its institutional commitments, submits to complex parliamentary processes. And on the other side, a post can undo in twenty-four hours what months of work have built. This asymmetry is unbearable. It undermines the credibility of European institutions.

The European response: conditional firmness

The European Commission responded to Trump's threats with the standard formulation: the taxes are "non-discriminatory by design," the EU will respond "swiftly and decisively" to unilateral measures. These formulations are the right ones. Their repetition without concrete results ends up emptying them of meaning. Europe needs to show, not just say.

The Turnberry deal's suspension clause offers leverage — but activating it would mean setting fire to a painstakingly negotiated agreement. This is Europe's permanent dilemma: having retaliation tools but not wanting to use them because the costs would also be its own. Trump knows this. And he plays on it.

What Europe needs: a grand strategy

From crisis management to vision

Europe has been managing crises for years — the euro crisis, migration, Brexit, the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the rise of the far right. It has shown remarkable resilience in managing each of these crises. But crisis management is by definition reactive. What Europe needs now is a vision: what does it want to be in 2040? What place does it want to occupy in the multipolar world that is taking shape? How does it reconcile its economic dependence on China with its democratic values? How does it assume its own defense without bending to the whims of Washington?

These questions are not resolved by ratifying a trade deal, adopting a migration reform, or signing bilateral Franco-Italian defense agreements. They are resolved by collectively deciding on a direction — and devoting the necessary resources, political attention, and institutional will to it. The grand strategy is what is missing. This is what Europe has not yet found.

Europe: actor or spectator?

The central question of our era for Europe is simple: does it want to be an actor or a spectator of the world order being reshaped? An actor takes risks, makes choices, pays costs. A spectator reacts, adapts, endures. Europe, for too long, has chosen the comfort of the spectator, hoping that the actors — the United States, China, Russia — will respect its interests without it having to actively defend them.

This bet was risky before the second war in Ukraine and the Trump presidency. It is now frankly dangerous. Europe must choose to be an actor. That begins with having a strategy. Not ten strategies, not twenty-seven national strategies, but one. Common. Coherent. Ambitious.

Europe's legitimacy crisis

Eurosceptics fed by disorganization

Every European governance crisis — every time the EU seems incapable of responding coherently to a major challenge — reinforces the Eurosceptics' arguments. Marine Le Pen in France, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, Viktor Orbán in Hungary — the entire European nationalist right draws on the Union's coordination failures to feed its narrative: Brussels is incompetent, nation-states are more efficient, integration is a mistake.

This narrative is partially grounded in realities — the bureaucratic slowness of the European Commission, compromises that dilute every ambition, common positions that reflect the lowest common denominator rather than a bold vision. But the remedy proposed by Eurosceptics — disintegration and a return to national sovereignty — would produce far worse results. Twenty-seven small, separate nation-states facing China, Russia, and Trump's United States is the definition of strategic weakness.

European youth and the integration project

One factor that offers hope despite the crises: European youth. Polls consistently show that 18-35 year-olds have a stronger sense of European belonging than previous generations. They grew up in the Schengen area, studied in other countries through Erasmus, work in multinational teams. For them, Europe is not an abstract political project — it is their daily reality. This generation could be the driver of a renewal of European ambition.

But this human resource will be wasted if political institutions remain unable to translate this aspiration into solid governance architectures. Pro-European youth is not infinitely patient. If the Union continues to disappoint on the major issues — climate, defense, economy, migration — even the most convinced will eventually wonder whether integration is producing the expected results. Young Europeans' trust is a capital not to be squandered.

The strategic priorities Europe must set for itself

European defense: from ambition to concrete capabilities

The war in Ukraine has forced Europe to take defense seriously in a way it had avoided since 1945. Military spending has increased in almost all member states. Initiatives like the European Defense Fund and the arms production coordination mechanism have been created. Serious discussions are happening for the first time about a European army — or at least a common defense architecture not entirely dependent on the United States and NATO.

But between the stated ambitions and the real capabilities, the gap remains immense. European armies are fragmented into incompatible national systems. Defense industries remain largely national and competitive rather than complementary. Logistics chains for high-intensity warfare do not exist at a European scale. Building a real European defense capability will take decades — and will require a level of political coordination the Union has never yet achieved on any subject.

The European economy facing the global bifurcation

The global economy is bifurcating into two spheres — one gravitating around the United States and its allies, the other around China and its growing bloc. Europe is caught between the two. It is deeply integrated into the American economy, but also significantly dependent on China for raw materials, batteries, solar panels, and other strategic components. This cross-dependency makes it vulnerable on both sides and limits its strategic options.

The European response must be twofold: diversify its supply chains to reduce Chinese dependence in critical sectors, and strengthen its own industrial base in strategic areas. These objectives are embedded in the Green Deal, the Critical Raw Materials Act, the Net-Zero Industry Act. But their implementation remains too slow, too fragmented, too subject to internal political compromises. The ambition is there. The execution must follow.

Conclusion: reforming is not enough

The price of the absence of vision

The Europe of June 26, 2026 is reforming everywhere and does not know where it is going. It adopts migration policies without internal consensus. It ratifies trade deals that explode the next day. It produces defense initiatives without common architecture. It survives national political crises without structurally resolving them. This is a busy Europe — but not necessarily an effective one.

The risk in this situation is not immediate collapse. It is progressive erosion. Every reform adopted without strategic coherence is a missed opportunity to build something more solid. Every crisis managed in isolation is an additional fragmentation of a collective project that needs unity to survive. Europe can reform as much as it wants — without a shared vision, it will go around in circles.

The opportunity in crises

Every great crisis is also an opportunity. The Ukrainian crisis has accelerated defense spending that had stagnated for decades. The commercial crisis with Trump forces a rethinking of strategic autonomy. The migration crisis pushes toward long-overdue institutional reform. Europe can transform these pressures into architecture. This is not a certainty — it is a possibility. And it is on this possibility that our best hopes for a coherent strategic future rest.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am Maxime Marquette, columnist. I am a European who is convinced that the European integration project is both necessary and unfinished. My bias: I want Europe to be strong, united, and capable of acting as an autonomous world power. I critique the EU's weaknesses out of love for the project, not to destroy it.

What I do not know and my method

The internal decision-making processes of the EU and member states are complex and opaque. I do not claim to know all the behind-the-scenes negotiations. My analyses rely on sources dated June 26, 2026: The Rio Times, Le Monde, Euronews, DW, Reuters, the European Commission, and others.

Sources

Primary sources

The Rio Times — Europe Intelligence Brief: Europe faces its own courts — June 26, 2026

Le Monde — EU lawmakers approve migration reform allowing for creation of return hubs — June 17, 2026

Euronews — EU set to back return hubs in toughest migration crackdown yet — June 1, 2026

Secondary sources

European Commission — Commission welcomes political agreement on the Return Regulation — June 2, 2026

Deutsche Welle — EU reaches deal on return hubs for rejected asylum seekers — June 2, 2026

Le Monde — EU-U.S. trade deal to take effect before Trump's deadline — June 25, 2026