COMMENTARY: Europe reforms in disarray — without shared vision or strategic direction

Friday June 26, 2026: a summary of all European discontents

On June 26, 2026, was an emblematic day for what Europe is going through. In Spain, the lower house of parliament withdrew its confidence from the prime minister after a corruption scandal had weakened his government. In Italy, electoral law reform was advancing, with a clause designed to raise the entry threshold for new parties — a maneuver critics read as an attempt to shield the ruling party from a "rising challenger." In Germany, a court was delivering its verdict in the attack on the Magdeburg Christmas market in late 2024, which had left six dead.

Meanwhile, at the community level, member states were busy with the "return hubs" migration reform, approved by the European Parliament on June 17, and the Turnberry commercial deal with the United States had just been ratified — only to be immediately threatened by Trump with 100% tariffs on digital taxes. A Europe that reforms without stopping, but always in disarray, without common architecture, without a unified strategic vision.

The sum of the parts does not make a whole

This is the fundamental paradox of contemporary Europe. Each member state reforms, legislates, adapts, and survives its internal political crises. The European Union produces texts — on migration, trade, defense — at an impressive pace. But the sum of all these reforms does not produce a coherent grand strategy. It does not produce a vision of what Europe wants to be in ten years in the face of China, Russia, or Trump's United States.

According to The Rio Times, the continent on this June 26 was "turned toward its own institutions" — toward its courts, its governmental crises, its internal reforms. This is understandable. It is human. It is also potentially fatal for Europe's long-term geopolitical relevance.

I see Europe as a giant dealing with its plumbing while the house is on fire. There is something vertiginous about watching the EU adopt a historic asylum reform, ratify a trade deal, manage national political crises — all at the same time that Ukraine is bleeding, China is pressing Taiwan, and Trump is torpedoing multilateralism. Europe is busy. But is it strategic?

The "return hubs": a controversial migration revolution

The adoption by the European Parliament on June 17, 2026 of the new Return Regulation represents the most radical shift in European migration policy in decades. By 418 votes to 218, MEPs approved the creation of "return hubs" — detention centers outside EU territory — for rejected asylum seekers. Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece are already exploring partnerships with third countries like Rwanda or Uzbekistan.

This text is a response to internal political pressure: far-right parties have advanced across Europe by capitalizing on migration insecurity sentiment. Centre-left and centrist governments decided to act on this terrain. Human rights organizations are concerned about conditions in these centers and the absence of sufficient legal guarantees. The return rate for rejected migrants, currently around 29%, was insufficient — but the chosen solution raises international law questions that no one has fully resolved yet.

A reform without internal consensus

The June 17 vote — 418 to 218, with 30 abstentions — reflects a deep divide within the European Parliament. This division is not trivial: it signals that the European Union is adopting a migration policy that more than a third of its elected representatives consider unacceptable. France and Spain, according to diplomatic sources, resisted certain aspects of the return hubs implementation — illustrating the divergences between southern member states (more exposed to immigration) and northern ones (more inclined toward tougher measures).

This reform may solve a short-term political problem — showing voters that the EU is acting on immigration. But it does not address the structural problem: why are millions of people fleeing toward Europe? What about the root causes — wars, climate change, extreme poverty? Europe treats the symptoms without tackling the causes. This is a partial response to a total crisis.

The return hubs worry me for a simple reason: we do not yet know whether these centers will uphold the human rights standards we claim to defend. Sending rejected individuals to countries with which they have no connection — like Rwanda or Uzbekistan — raises serious legal and moral questions the text does not fully resolve. Political pragmatism should not override the principles that make Europe's democratic singularity.

Spain plunges into uncertainty

The vote of no confidence against the Spanish prime minister on June 26 — a day after he declared his intention to continue — adds another layer of instability to an already fragile country. Spain's GDP growth in the first quarter of 2026 was limited to 0.6%, under pressure from a weakening export sector. And Spanish defense companies had suffered heavy losses on contracts due to a standoff with Washington — a direct illustration of the effects of Trump's erratic trade policy on European allies.

Spain's political instability is not merely an internal problem. Spain is the eurozone's fourth-largest economy, a founding EU member, and one of the countries most exposed to Mediterranean migration issues. A prolonged political crisis in Spain weakens the Union's ability to speak with one voice on these files.

Italy between electoral reform and Franco-Italian integration

In Italy, the situation is even more complex. The government is advancing an electoral law reform that would increase the entry threshold for new parties — a measure that consolidates existing formations while reducing political competition. Simultaneously, according to The Rio Times, Rome and Paris signed a series of agreements on defense, space, and maritime affairs, with a joint roadmap running to the end of the decade. These Franco-Italian bilateral agreements are positive — they deepen cooperation between two EU pillars.

But they also illustrate a problematic trend: major initiatives are increasingly being made bilaterally, between certain member states, rather than at the community level. Europe advances in clusters, in shifting coalitions, rather than as a bloc. This is pragmatic. It is also a subtle fragmentation that weakens the Union's ability to project coherent power.

The Franco-Italian defense agreement is good news. Poland doubling its military investments is good news. But bilateral good news does not replace a European defense grand strategy. Europe's defense cannot be a collection of bilateral deals — it must be a common architecture. We are not there yet.

Poland does the work, others watch

Poland has decided to double its investments in defense, nuclear energy, and space. This is a remarkable effort, justified by geographic proximity to Russia and Ukraine, and by a clear understanding of the risks the war in Ukraine represents for the entire eastern flank of NATO. Poland is on track to become one of Europe's most powerful armies.

But this is not a common European policy — it is a state investing for its own survival. Germany has walked back its spending commitments with less clarity. France, under budgetary pressure, struggles to maintain the pace. Spain — as we just saw — is paralyzed by internal crises and commercial standoffs with Washington. The ideal of a "European Defense Union" remains a horizon, not a reality.

The institutional architecture: slow and fragmented

The EU has adopted a series of important defense initiatives since 2022: the European Defense Fund, the Strategic Compass, joint ammunition procurement projects. These initiatives represent real progress. But they all run up against the same fundamental limit: defense remains a national competence. The EU can fund, encourage, coordinate — but it cannot command. And without unified command, there is no real European military power.

The paradox is cruel: the war in Ukraine demonstrated that Europe needs an autonomous defense capability — the United States under Trump is no longer a reliable protector. And yet this same war has absorbed the resources and political attention that could have been devoted to building this autonomy. Europe is running on multiple urgencies simultaneously, without a clear hierarchy among them.

European defense resembles a puzzle where each state holds a few pieces, but no one holds the box with the final image. Poland has its tanks. France has its nuclear submarines. Germany has its industry. But together, they do not yet form a coherent defense architecture capable of deterring Russia or projecting power in Asia. This is a titanic construction site whose urgency Europe has not yet fully grasped.

Ratify and tremble

The ratification of the Turnberry trade deal by member states on June 25 was an unquestionable victory of European diplomacy — months of hard negotiations, painful concessions, a parliamentary vote of 440 to 151. And twenty-four hours later, Trump was threatening to torpedo it with his 100% tariffs on digital taxes.

This episode illustrates one of Europe's fundamental vulnerabilities in its relationship with Washington: the asymmetry of predictability. Europe negotiates rigorously, honors its institutional commitments, submits to complex parliamentary processes. And on the other side, a post can undo in twenty-four hours what months of work have built. This asymmetry is unbearable. It undermines the credibility of European institutions.

The European response: conditional firmness

The European Commission responded to Trump's threats with the standard formulation: the taxes are "non-discriminatory by design," the EU will respond "swiftly and decisively" to unilateral measures. These formulations are the right ones. Their repetition without concrete results ends up emptying them of meaning. Europe needs to show, not just say.

The Turnberry deal's suspension clause offers leverage — but activating it would mean setting fire to a painstakingly negotiated agreement. This is Europe's permanent dilemma: having retaliation tools but not wanting to use them because the costs would also be its own. Trump knows this. And he plays on it.

The Turnberry deal sums up Europe's condition facing Trump: we exhaust ourselves negotiating, meeting deadlines, ratifying in proper form. And we end up in the same position as before, facing a new threat. At some point, Europe must ask whether this kind of deal costs more in political and institutional capital than it gains in commercial security.

From crisis management to vision

Europe has been managing crises for years — the euro crisis, migration, Brexit, the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the rise of the far right. It has shown remarkable resilience in managing each of these crises. But crisis management is by definition reactive. What Europe needs now is a vision: what does it want to be in 2040? What place does it want to occupy in the multipolar world that is taking shape? How does it reconcile its economic dependence on China with its democratic values? How does it assume its own defense without bending to the whims of Washington?

These questions are not resolved by ratifying a trade deal, adopting a migration reform, or signing bilateral Franco-Italian defense agreements. They are resolved by collectively deciding on a direction — and devoting the necessary resources, political attention, and institutional will to it. The grand strategy is what is missing. This is what Europe has not yet found.

Europe: actor or spectator?

The central question of our era for Europe is simple: does it want to be an actor or a spectator of the world order being reshaped? An actor takes risks, makes choices, pays costs. A spectator reacts, adapts, endures. Europe, for too long, has chosen the comfort of the spectator, hoping that the actors — the United States, China, Russia — will respect its interests without it having to actively defend them.

This bet was risky before the second war in Ukraine and the Trump presidency. It is now frankly dangerous. Europe must choose to be an actor. That begins with having a strategy. Not ten strategies, not twenty-seven national strategies, but one. Common. Coherent. Ambitious.

I end this commentary with a mix of frustration and hope. Frustration because Europe has all the resources to be a major actor and often chooses the comfort of the spectator. Hope because crises sometimes accelerate transformations. The Taiwanese exercises, the war in Ukraine, Trump's commercial threats — all of this should force Europe to look at itself in a mirror and finally decide what it wants to be. The moment is here. The question is whether the political will is too.

Eurosceptics fed by disorganization

Every European governance crisis — every time the EU seems incapable of responding coherently to a major challenge — reinforces the Eurosceptics' arguments. Marine Le Pen in France, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, Viktor Orbán in Hungary — the entire European nationalist right draws on the Union's coordination failures to feed its narrative: Brussels is incompetent, nation-states are more efficient, integration is a mistake.

This narrative is partially grounded in realities — the bureaucratic slowness of the European Commission, compromises that dilute every ambition, common positions that reflect the lowest common denominator rather than a bold vision. But the remedy proposed by Eurosceptics — disintegration and a return to national sovereignty — would produce far worse results. Twenty-seven small, separate nation-states facing China, Russia, and Trump's United States is the definition of strategic weakness.

European youth and the integration project

One factor that offers hope despite the crises: European youth. Polls consistently show that 18-35 year-olds have a stronger sense of European belonging than previous generations. They grew up in the Schengen area, studied in other countries through Erasmus, work in multinational teams. For them, Europe is not an abstract political project — it is their daily reality. This generation could be the driver of a renewal of European ambition.

But this human resource will be wasted if political institutions remain unable to translate this aspiration into solid governance architectures. Pro-European youth is not infinitely patient. If the Union continues to disappoint on the major issues — climate, defense, economy, migration — even the most convinced will eventually wonder whether integration is producing the expected results. Young Europeans' trust is a capital not to be squandered.

I am not naive about Europe. I know its flaws, its bureaucratic slowness, its compromises that dilute every ambition. But I look at the alternatives — Putin's Russia, Xi's China, Trump's America — and I tell myself that the European project, for all its imperfections, remains one of the most remarkable political constructions in human history. It deserves better than our collective resignation.

European defense: from ambition to concrete capabilities

The war in Ukraine has forced Europe to take defense seriously in a way it had avoided since 1945. Military spending has increased in almost all member states. Initiatives like the European Defense Fund and the arms production coordination mechanism have been created. Serious discussions are happening for the first time about a European army — or at least a common defense architecture not entirely dependent on the United States and NATO.

But between the stated ambitions and the real capabilities, the gap remains immense. European armies are fragmented into incompatible national systems. Defense industries remain largely national and competitive rather than complementary. Logistics chains for high-intensity warfare do not exist at a European scale. Building a real European defense capability will take decades — and will require a level of political coordination the Union has never yet achieved on any subject.

The European economy facing the global bifurcation

The global economy is bifurcating into two spheres — one gravitating around the United States and its allies, the other around China and its growing bloc. Europe is caught between the two. It is deeply integrated into the American economy, but also significantly dependent on China for raw materials, batteries, solar panels, and other strategic components. This cross-dependency makes it vulnerable on both sides and limits its strategic options.

The European response must be twofold: diversify its supply chains to reduce Chinese dependence in critical sectors, and strengthen its own industrial base in strategic areas. These objectives are embedded in the Green Deal, the Critical Raw Materials Act, the Net-Zero Industry Act. But their implementation remains too slow, too fragmented, too subject to internal political compromises. The ambition is there. The execution must follow.

I end this commentary with a mix of frustration and hope. Frustration because Europe has all the resources to be a major actor and often chooses the comfort of the spectator. Hope because crises sometimes accelerate transformations. The Taiwanese exercises, the war in Ukraine, Trump's commercial threats — all of this should force Europe to look at itself in a mirror and finally decide what it wants to be. The moment is here. The question is whether the political will is too.

The price of the absence of vision

The Europe of June 26, 2026 is reforming everywhere and does not know where it is going. It adopts migration policies without internal consensus. It ratifies trade deals that explode the next day. It produces defense initiatives without common architecture. It survives national political crises without structurally resolving them. This is a busy Europe — but not necessarily an effective one.

The risk in this situation is not immediate collapse. It is progressive erosion. Every reform adopted without strategic coherence is a missed opportunity to build something more solid. Every crisis managed in isolation is an additional fragmentation of a collective project that needs unity to survive. Europe can reform as much as it wants — without a shared vision, it will go around in circles.

The opportunity in crises

Every great crisis is also an opportunity. The Ukrainian crisis has accelerated defense spending that had stagnated for decades. The commercial crisis with Trump forces a rethinking of strategic autonomy. The migration crisis pushes toward long-overdue institutional reform. Europe can transform these pressures into architecture. This is not a certainty — it is a possibility. And it is on this possibility that our best hopes for a coherent strategic future rest.

Europe reforms. Europe debates. Europe adopts texts. But at what point do these texts become a vision? At what point does the sum of disparate reforms become a coherent architecture? This is the question European leaders must answer — not in ten years, not after the next crisis, but now. Because in the geopolitics of 2026, the absence of vision is already a vulnerability.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

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