OPINION: Israel refuses to leave Lebanon: the pebble in the accord

OPINION: Israel refuses to leave Lebanon: the pebble in the accord

Introduction: a paper agreement sitting on a volcano

Washington signs, Israel stays put

In June 2026, Israel and Lebanon found themselves once again in Washington, attempting to negotiate a way out of the crisis. Delegations exchanged positions, communiqués were politely worded, and the outcome arrived: no substantial progress. The joint text published by the United States, Israel, and Lebanon conditions any cessation of hostilities on a complete halt to Hezbollah fire and the withdrawal of its members from the southern sector of the Litani River. Not a single word about a timeline for Israeli withdrawal beyond the buffer zone that the IDF occupies at a depth of 5 to 10 kilometers.

The paradox is striking: a complete disarmament of Hezbollah is demanded while Israel retains its total operational freedom in the south of the country. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are supposed to take control of pilot zones, but no one says when the Israeli military will vacate the ground it occupies. We face an equation in which one of the unknowns is deliberately left unaddressed.

A ceasefire that is not a ceasefire

The truce of April 17, 2026 officially held for a few weeks before collapsing. The intensification of fighting and Israeli ground advances in southern Lebanon confirmed the failure of that first attempt. By early June, negotiators returned to the table, but without tangible results. New political and security discussions were announced for the week of June 22 — pushing the horizon of real peace further out still.

What is euphemistically called a "minimalist agreement" actually pushes back the prospect of a lasting ceasefire. Lebanon is exhausted, its institutions weakened. Israel seeks to preserve a maximum of operational freedom. And meanwhile, Lebanese civilians pay the price of a war with no visible end.

The Israeli logic: security first, law second

The doctrine of "pilot zones"

Israel has proposed a gradual approach: the creation of "pilot zones" over which the Lebanese Armed Forces would take exclusive control, excluding Hezbollah. On paper, that is reasonable. In practice, this mechanism allows the IDF to withdraw only where it deems conditions safe — and to remain everywhere else. It amounts to a conditional withdrawal, managed by the occupying force itself, at its own pace and according to its own security criteria.

The United States have committed to reinforcing the LAF's capabilities to assist in this mission. That is a useful gesture — the Lebanese Armed Forces are desperately short of equipment and training — but it does not resolve the fundamental question: who decides when Israel leaves Lebanese territory? The implicit answer is: Israel itself. And that is precisely where the shoe pinches.

The Hezbollah drone file: the ultimate pretext

The June 2026 agreement also fails to settle, for the Jewish state, the question of drones operated by Hezbollah. Israel has reaffirmed that its security can only be guaranteed by the complete disarmament of Hezbollah and respect for its territorial integrity. This condition is both legitimate in principle and practically unachievable within the required timeframe — which guarantees that the IDF will remain present indefinitely in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah's drones, real and worrying, thus become a permanent trump card in Israeli hands. As long as they exist — and they will exist for a long time — Israel has an ironclad argument for maintaining a military presence that international law would otherwise condemn unambiguously. The legitimate security of a nation is being instrumentalized here as a tool for non-withdrawal.

Hezbollah: weakened but not eliminated

A drained organization, not a destroyed one

Israeli military operations since 2024 have heavily damaged Hezbollah's infrastructure. Commanders have been eliminated, weapons depots destroyed, communication networks disrupted. The Shia organization is no longer what it was at the peak of its power. But it is not dead. It adapts, reconfigures, recruits — and still benefits from the logistical and financial backing of Iran, even a weakened Iran.

The question, therefore, is not whether Hezbollah has been weakened — it has — but whether its weakening indefinitely justifies Israeli presence in Lebanon. A presence which, according to analysts, in turn fuels resentment among the local population and hands Hezbollah its best recruitment argument: resistance to the occupier.

The LAF's dilemma in the face of dual pressure

The Lebanese Armed Forces are caught in a vice. On one side, Israel asks them to deploy effectively in the South, to control the pilot zones, and to block Hezbollah. On the other side, their capacity to fulfill that role depends on international financial and material support that remains insufficient. The Lebanese army has neither the manpower nor the equipment needed to control a border stretching dozens of kilometers against a seasoned paramilitary organization.

The United States commit to strengthening the LAF — but at what pace and with what concrete resources? The American promise is genuine, but it does not compensate for years of disinvestment in the Lebanese army. And as long as the LAF lacks credibility on the ground, Israel will readily maintain its positions by arguing that no viable substitute yet exists.

Iran behind the curtain: a formidable diplomatic obstacle

Tehran finances and watches

Iran remains the funder and strategic inspiration behind Hezbollah. Despite sanctions, despite tensions over its nuclear program, and despite a nascent deal with Washington in June 2026, Tehran has no intention of loosening its grip on Lebanon. Hezbollah is too valuable as a regional lever to be abandoned as part of a simple bilateral Israeli-Lebanese negotiation.

Discussions between Washington and Tehran on the nuclear issue, described by JD Vance as a "very good foundation" on June 22, 2026, could theoretically open space for a comprehensive solution that includes Lebanon. But that is a very distant horizon. Iran will not sacrifice its Lebanese influence in exchange for nuclear sanction relief — those are two files it is careful to keep separate.

The US-Iran deal: a window cracked open

The initial agreement between the United States and Iran announced in late June 2026 is presented as a first step toward ending direct hostilities and easing sanctions. Washington agreed to unblock approximately 24 to 25 billion dollars in frozen assets and pave the way for 300 billion dollars in reconstruction. It is a strong signal — but it says nothing about the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

For this deal to genuinely serve peace in Lebanon, it would need to include an explicit clause on Hezbollah's disarmament or at minimum the neutralization of its Iranian backing. No serious source confirms that this condition is on the table. Iran treats Hezbollah as a strategic investment, not as a negotiable concession. As long as Tehran holds that thread, Beirut will remain under tension.

Resolution 1701: the letter and the spirit

A text everyone invokes and nobody applies

UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted in 2006, provides for the deployment of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon and the disarmament of armed groups — Hezbollah included. Twenty years later, this resolution is still cited in every communiqué, every framework agreement, every diplomatic statement. And still just as poorly respected in its essential provisions.

Israel invokes 1701 to justify its operations: Hezbollah violates the text by remaining armed south of the Litani. True. But Israel also violates this resolution by maintaining a military presence on Lebanese territory without authorization from the Security Council. The double standard is blatant — and it undermines the credibility of the entire international law framework in the region.

UNIFIL: powerless observers

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) counts approximately 10,000 troops deployed in the south of the country. It observes, documents, reports — but can neither disarm Hezbollah nor compel the IDF to withdraw. Its mandate is limited, its rules of engagement cautious, and its effectiveness contested by all parties. It is a symbolic presence in a very real conflict.

In June 2026, UNIFIL continued to document incidents in the blue line zone without being able to impose anything on Israel or Hezbollah. Its existence reassures Western chancelleries and provides political cover, but it has not changed the reality on the ground since 2006. The cruel truth is that no international mechanism currently has the means to enforce an Israeli withdrawal or a Hezbollah disarmament.

Lebanon in pieces: a state brought low by its own paralysis

Lebanese institutions on their knees

Lebanon in 2026 is a drained country. After years of economic crisis, the explosion at the port of Beirut in 2020, the pandemic, war with Israel, and the persistence of a corrupt sectarian political system, its institutions are on the brink. The Lebanese state does not truly control its own territory — part of it is under Hezbollah's influence, another part under de facto Israeli occupation.

This institutional paralysis is a windfall for all those seeking to avoid a solution. Israel can argue that without a strong state, no effective control is possible — justifying its presence. Iran can maintain its influence through Hezbollah in the absence of a credible state alternative. And ordinary Lebanese — Christians, Sunnis, Shia, Druze — pay the bill for a geopolitical game in which they are not the players.

The Lebanese economy: a prolonged catastrophe

The Lebanese pound is worth nothing. The banking system has been paralyzed since 2019. Banque du Liban operates in opacity. International aid trickles in, conditioned on reforms that the Lebanese political class is structurally incapable of undertaking. According to recent estimates, Lebanon's GDP per capita has fallen by more than 70% in under a decade.

In this context of economic devastation, the absence of a peace agreement makes things worse still. Investments flee, talent emigrates, and the populations that remain live in total uncertainty. Every new round of failed negotiations is another bloodletting for a country that has no blood left to lose. Peace in Lebanon is not only a matter of international law — it is a humanitarian emergency.

International pressure: between posturing and powerlessness

Europe: firm declarations, weak levers

The European powers — France, Germany, the United Kingdom — continue to call for respect for Resolution 1701 and an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. These declarations are sincere, but their diplomatic weight is limited. Israel faces no European sanctions. Trade relations between the EU and Israel, despite tensions, remain solid. And Washington provides Israel political cover for its operations.

The European Union finds itself in an uncomfortable position: it finances part of the humanitarian aid to Lebanon, contributes to UNIFIL, verbally champions Lebanese sovereignty — but has no real leverage to change the behavior of either Israel or Iran. This is the structural limit of a European diplomacy that is not yet sovereign vis-à-vis the region's major powers.

Washington: the paralyzed grand arbiter

The United States remains the indispensable power in this file. They are the only actor capable of applying real pressure on Israel — and they have systematically refused to do so decisively. The Biden administration in its time, the Trump administration today, have both shielded Israel from the legal and diplomatic consequences of its actions in Lebanon. Washington negotiates with Tehran on the nuclear issue while covering the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon — a permanent balancing act.

This is not bad faith: it is realpolitik. The United States has strategic interests in the region that far exceed the Lebanese question. But the result is that Lebanon has no real protector — only observers, donors, and allies who look away when things truly burn.

The humanitarian dimension: civilians held hostage to an endless conflict

Displaced populations with no prospect of return

In southern Lebanon, civilian populations who had fled the fighting in 2024 had still not been able to return home in June 2026. The villages bordering the buffer zone controlled by the IDF remain inaccessible. Tens of thousands of South Lebanese are living in makeshift camps or with relatives in Beirut and other regions, in a state of total uncertainty. No one tells them when they can go back — because no one knows when Israel will withdraw.

The UNHCR and various humanitarian organizations have documented the degraded living conditions of these internally displaced persons. Without agricultural land, without access to their properties, without stable incomes, they represent a social time bomb. The humanitarian crisis in southern Lebanon is directly tied to the absence of a political resolution — and every additional month of Israeli occupation irreversibly worsens their situation.

Destroyed infrastructure and suspended reconstruction

The bombings of 2024–2025 left deep scars in the villages of southern Lebanon. Houses, roads, water and electricity infrastructure were destroyed. Reconstruction cannot begin in earnest as long as security uncertainty persists and civilians cannot return to oversee the work. International aid promised — notably by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union — is conditioned on a stabilization that the diplomatic impasse indefinitely delays.

This destructive cycle — conflict, partial reconstruction, new conflict — has exhausted the resilience of communities in southern Lebanon. Some families have fled three or four times since 2006. What they are being asked to do today is wait yet again: for diplomats to find a formula, for militaries to agree on pilot zones, for politicians to stop stalling. That wait has a human cost that diplomatic communiqués never adequately acknowledge.

Conclusion: a pebble that blocks the entire road

The agreement that goes nowhere

In June 2026, the Israeli-Lebanese agreement remains an unfinished document, built on calculated ambiguities. Israel maintains its military presence in southern Lebanon with the tacit blessing of the United States. Hezbollah is weakened but not disarmed. The LAF has promised to deploy, but without the necessary means. And civilian Lebanon continues to bleed, slowly, inexorably.

This Israeli refusal to withdraw is, objectively, the pebble in the shoe of all regional diplomacy. Not the only one — an armed Hezbollah with Iran behind it constitutes a symmetrical problem — but as long as Israel does not withdraw from Lebanese territory, no lasting peace architecture can be built. The texts signed in Washington will be nothing more than fine paper.

A people who have waited too long

The Lebanese deserve better than this perpetual cycle of war and false agreements. They deserve a functioning state, a viable economy, a sovereign territory. Neither Israel nor Hezbollah nor Iran nor the great powers seem prepared to give them that today. This columnist's opinion piece can only acknowledge the failure and hope that the next round of negotiations — probably in the fall of 2026 — produces something tangible. Hope is slim. But it persists.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am Maxime Marquette, a columnist specializing in Middle Eastern geopolitics and international relations. I am pro-democracy, pro-international law, and committed to the idea that the rules apply to everyone, including Western allies. I have an acknowledged pro-Western bias — I believe that liberal democracies are a better model than autocracies — but that does not prevent me from criticizing democracies when they betray their own principles. On the Israeli-Lebanese conflict, I recognize the legitimacy of Israeli security concerns while maintaining that the prolonged occupation of southern Lebanon is unacceptable under international law.

What I do not know and my method

I have no direct contacts in Beirut, Tel Aviv, or Washington. I work from published sources — international press, organizational reports, expert analyses — which I compile, group, and critique. I may be wrong about the interpretation of intentions of the parties, about internal dynamics within the Israeli government or within Hezbollah. This piece reflects my reading of the situation as of June 27, 2026, based on information available on that date. The situation is constantly evolving and some analyses could quickly become outdated.

Sources

Primary sources

Le Monde — Israel-Lebanon agreement: a minimalist accord — June 4, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Polish FM warns Putin's retaliatory rhetoric — June 24, 2026

The Guardian — Vance: "very good foundation" for Iran deal — June 22, 2026

Secondary sources

Al Jazeera — The Baltics urgently need a de-escalation mechanism — May 27, 2026

ISW — Iran Update Special Report — June 21, 2026

Ground News — US-Iran initial agreement, ceasefire and sanctions — June 23, 2026