COLUMN: The Turnberry accord approved June 25 — Trump torpedoes it all on the 26th

COLUMN: The Turnberry accord approved June 25 — Trump torpedoes it all on the 26th

Introduction: 48 hours to understand the diplomacy of destruction

June 25: the 27 capitals say yes

On June 25, 2026, in Luxembourg, the Council of the European Union formally adopted the two regulations implementing the trade agreement concluded between the EU and the United States at Turnberry, in Scotland, in July 2025. This text — laboriously negotiated over nearly a year, ratified by the European Parliament on June 16 with 440 votes in favor and 151 against — establishes that European exports to the United States will be subject to a 15% tariff cap, in exchange for the EU eliminating customs duties on American industrial goods. It is an asymmetrical agreement — Europe accepts more constraints than the United States — but Brussels approved it to offer stability to its businesses before the July 4 deadline set by Trump.

The European Council communiqué is sober and diplomatic. It "confirms the EU's commitment to a stable, predictable and mutually beneficial transatlantic relationship." The heads of government of the member states breathe a sigh of relief. After months of turbulence, threats of tariffs on cars, wine, steel and aluminum, the agreement is in force. Publication in the EU Official Journal is imminent. Brussels delivered. Now it is Washington's turn.

June 26: Trump posts on Truth Social

Twenty-four hours later, on June 26, 2026, US President Donald Trump publishes a post on Truth Social. The tone is the one we know — imperial, threatening, unequivocal. "Any country that imposes such a [digital] tax will immediately be hit with a TARIFF of 100% on all products sent to the United States of America." And the sentence that blows everything up: "This TARIFF will supplant trade agreements made with the country, whether they have been implemented, signed or not."

In one sentence, Trump conditionally cancels the agreement that his own negotiators concluded, that the White House supported, and that the 27 European capitals just ratified with iron discipline. The reason cited: digital services taxes — levies that several European countries are considering applying on the revenues of large American technology companies operating in their territory. These taxes are not part of the Turnberry agreement. But Trump says they would supplant it. This is the mechanism of systematic sabotage: signing an agreement while reserving the right to cancel it for reasons not mentioned within it.

What the Turnberry agreement is — and why Europe accepted what suits it poorly

An explicitly asymmetrical agreement

The Turnberry agreement, concluded between Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in July 2025 at Turnberry — Trump's Scottish golf resort — is deeply asymmetrical. The EU agrees to eliminate its customs duties on almost all American industrial products and to grant preferential access to certain American agricultural products (including lobster). In exchange, the United States commits to capping its tariffs on European exports at 15% — considerably less than the 30% threatened during the "Liberation Day" of April 2025, but still a structural disadvantage for European exporters.

Why did Brussels accept? Because the alternative — tariffs of 30% or more on European products — was even worse. And because European companies needed predictability to plan their investments and supply chains. The agreement includes important safeguards: a suspension clause allowing the Commission to revoke concessions if the United States does not comply with the terms; a sunset clause on December 31, 2029 (end of Trump's term); and a provision allowing suspension if Washington maintains its steel and aluminum tariffs beyond the end of 2026. These protections reflect Brussels' deep distrust of Washington's reliability — a distrust that June 26 amply confirmed.

The US Supreme Court and the tariff paradox

The situation is even more complex on the American side. The United States Supreme Court ruled shortly before June 26 to strike down Trump's "reciprocal" tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, finding that this law did not authorize this type of broad unilateral tariffs. In response, Trump signed an executive order imposing a global tariff of 10% under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — a provision that can last only 150 days and requires Congressional approval for renewal.

This legal situation creates additional uncertainty: the 15% tariff promised in the Turnberry agreement is technically illegal according to the Supreme Court in its original form. The administration must find an alternative legal basis to maintain it. And now Trump threatens a 100% tariff on countries imposing digital taxes — a tariff whose legal basis is also uncertain in the context of the Supreme Court ruling. This is a tariff architecture built on legal sand, with political bulldozers modifying it daily.

Digital services taxes — the real bone of contention

Why several European countries want to tax Google, Apple, Meta and Amazon

Digital services taxes (DST) are levies that several European governments wish to apply on the revenues of large American technology platforms in their jurisdiction. The logic is simple: companies like Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon and Microsoft generate billions of euros in revenues in Europe while minimizing their tax obligations through complex legal structures. DSTs aim to correct this fiscal asymmetry.

France was the pioneer with its GAFA tax of 3% on digital revenues. Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have similar mechanisms. In early June, Trump had already threatened France with a 100% tariff on wines and champagne if Paris did not scrap its digital tax. On June 26, this threat was extended to all European countries. The wording is absolute: any existing agreement — including Turnberry — would be supplanted by this 100% tariff if the digital tax is maintained.

Washington and the protection of Big Tech — the real engine of the policy

We need to call things by their proper name: Trump's policy on DSTs is industrial protection for American Big Tech. Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft are among the most profitable American companies in history. They operate worldwide with tax structures that minimize their contribution to the budgets of countries where they generate their revenues. DSTs are an attempt — imperfect, debatable in design — to correct this distortion.

A White House spokesperson, Kush Desai, stated the official position with unusual frankness: Trump is "clearly opposed to service taxes and other forms of extortion against American tech companies." The word "extortion" to describe a sovereign fiscal decision by a democratic government is revealing of the level of rhetorical aggression. And it also reveals the political calculation: Big Tech massively funds the American conservative sphere, and protecting its overseas profits is a policy that serves its electoral and financial interests.

The 440 European parliamentarians who voted yes — and what they think this morning

A vote under constraint, with insufficient guarantees

On June 16, 2026, 440 MEPs voted for the Turnberry agreement, 151 against, 50 abstentions. This vote was not enthusiasm — it was a calculation under constraint. Trump had set a deadline of July 4, threatening tariffs on European cars if the agreement was not ratified. MEPs concluded that the least bad scenario was to ratify, while obtaining minimal guarantees: the suspension clause, the 2029 sunset clause, the condition on steel and aluminum.

Ten days after this vote, Trump conditionally announces a 100% tariff that would supplant the agreement. These 440 parliamentarians — many of whom had swallowed their reservations to vote yes — now face a difficult reality: they ratified an agreement that the other signatory is ready to torpedo for a reason not even mentioned in it. German MEP Bernd Lange (S&D), one of the promoters of ratification, had highlighted the suspension clause as the main guarantee. This clause provides for a return to the previous tariff regime if the United States does not comply with the terms. But it had not been designed to respond to a threat on a subject entirely outside the agreement.

The European Commission facing the escalation

The European Commission, responsible for trade policy for the 27 member states, did not respond immediately to the June 26 declarations. This absence of an immediate response is itself a signal: Brussels does not want to trigger a rhetorical escalation that could accelerate the execution of the threats. The strategy is to let Trump speak, wait to see if the 100% tariff is actually imposed, and keep its options in reserve.

But this caution has limits. If Trump effectively imposes a 100% tariff on France for its DST, the other member states will demand a coordinated response from Brussels. The agreement's suspension clause — which would allow the Commission to revoke European concessions — will be invoked. And a cycle of escalation that the Turnberry agreement was supposed to prevent will be triggered precisely by the unilateral American threat.

The 2029 sunset clause — and what it says about mutual trust

Why the agreement expires at the end of Trump's term

A revealing detail of the Turnberry agreement: its sunset clause is set for December 31, 2029 — six months after the theoretical end of Trump's term (January 2029, if two full terms). This is not a coincidence. European negotiators explicitly tied the duration of the agreement to the duration of Trump's term, because they do not believe the agreement would survive a change of administration anyway, and because they have no guarantee about what would happen if Trump remained beyond 2029.

This sunset clause says something essential about the state of transatlantic relations in 2026: Europe no longer believes in the permanence of American commitments. It concludes time-limited agreements, with multiple exit clauses, because it knows that an agreement with this administration is not an agreement with the United States — it is an agreement with Trump, personal, revocable, and whose duration is tied to his presence in power. This is a revolution in transatlantic diplomatic culture, and it will have consequences well beyond trade.

Steel and aluminum — the time bomb of late 2026

The Turnberry agreement includes a provision allowing the European Commission to suspend the tariff concessions granted to the United States if Washington maintains its tariffs on European steel and aluminum (and their 407 derivative products) beyond December 31, 2026. These 50% tariffs were imposed under the guise of national security and are not part of the Turnberry tariff system. The Commission must deliver a report to Parliament on this matter in December 2026.

This provision creates a programmed time bomb for December 2026: if Trump does not lift the steel-aluminum tariffs by then, the Commission will be able to — and will be politically obliged to — activate the suspension clause. Which would trigger a trade war precisely on the industrial products where the agreement was supposed to bring stability. The cycle of systematic sabotage that Trump triggered on June 26 therefore has a second act scheduled six months later. Unless, in the meantime, a compromise on digital taxes emerges — which seems unlikely.

The real issue: Europe's fiscal sovereignty facing American Big Tech

Why Europe has the right to tax digital platforms

The fundamental question that the Trump-DST standoff raises is that of fiscal sovereignty. Every democratic state has the right to decide how it taxes economic activity on its territory. European DSTs target companies that generate billions in revenues in Europe from European users, while locating their tax profits in low-tax jurisdictions. Whether these taxes are well-designed or not (the debate is legitimate), they reflect a sovereign decision by democratically elected governments.

The alternative preferred by Washington — a global agreement on minimum taxation of multinationals under the aegis of the OECD — was itself undermined by the Trump administration, which suspended American participation in the negotiations. By blocking the OECD agreement on one side and threatening 100% tariffs on the other if countries tax unilaterally, Washington deprives Europe of any legal recourse while refusing to participate in the multilateral solution. This is a posture of complete fiscal impunity for its technology champions.

The European response that has not yet come

Europe has response tools available. It could accelerate the implementation of its own digital taxes, activate Turnberry's suspension clause, impose retaliatory tariffs on politically sensitive American products (soybeans, bourbon, Harley-Davidson — the classics). It could also accelerate the development of its own technology champions to reduce its dependence on American platforms.

None of this is easy. European economies are deeply integrated into American technology ecosystems. A trade war would hurt European companies as much as American ones. And the 27 member states do not all have the same appetite for escalation. But the alternative — accepting that European fiscal sovereignty is conditional on the goodwill of the American administration — is not tenable either. June 26, 2026 posed the question with a brutality that no longer allows it to be avoided.

The Supreme Court ruling and its consequences for the American tariff architecture

A legal void at the heart of Trump's trade policy

The US Supreme Court ruling striking down the reciprocal tariffs imposed via the IEEPA represents a major institutional shock for the Trump administration. For the first time, a federal court places a formal legal limit on presidential power in commercial tariff matters. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act was the main tool of Trumpist tariff policy since 2025 — its invalidation for this type of use creates a severe legal vulnerability. American importing companies could now claim reimbursement of tariffs paid illegally since the annulled texts came into force.

The replacement executive order signed by Trump under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 is a provisional solution with a built-in limit: maximum effectiveness of 150 days, after which Congress must approve its extension. With a Republican Congress increasingly less aligned with the tariff agenda while subject to pressure from importing businesses in their districts, this approval is by no means guaranteed. Europe and other trading partners are watching closely: if American tariffs become legally unstable, their coercive power is considerably reduced.

The impact on future negotiations with the European Union

For Brussels, the Supreme Court ruling opens a strategic window. If the legal bases for American tariffs are challenged, European negotiators can argue in bilateral negotiations that Washington's tariff threats rest on fragile legal foundations. A tariff of 100% on countries applying digital taxes — if imposed via the IEEPA or an analogous mechanism — could also be challenged through legal proceedings in the United States itself. American multinationals importing European components could contest these tariffs as contrary to their economic interests.

The European Commission has so far avoided publicly mentioning the Supreme Court ruling in its communications. But behind the scenes, its legal services are carefully analyzing the implications for the solidity of American commitments in the Turnberry agreement. If the 15% tariff promised in the agreement rests on fragile legal foundations in the United States, its contractual value for Europe is all the more uncertain.

The role of the European Parliament — between democratic oversight and powerlessness in the face of the unpredictable

A Parliament that ratified under pressure and pays the symbolic price

The European Parliament vote of June 16 — 440 for, 151 against — is a historic decision in an emergency context. MEPs were called upon to vote on a complex trade text, negotiated under extreme time pressure, with a deadline imposed by a foreign power. Parliamentary debate was shortened. Time for political groups to consult their economic constituents was reduced. The logic was: ratify or face punitive tariffs. This logic was legitimate in context. It is also deeply troubling in nature.

French MEP Marie-Pierre Vedrenne (Renew), one of the agreement's rapporteurs, emphasized at the time of the vote that the suspension clause and the institutional guarantees made the text acceptable. Twenty-four hours after ratification by the Council, Trump was already broadening his threats. The European Commission will have to answer to Parliament about developments in the situation. Democratic oversight of European trade policies — a hard-won advance in the 2010s after the controversies over TTIP — will once again come under strain.

What this crisis reveals about the limits of the European institutional architecture

The European Union has robust institutions — a Parliament that ratifies trade agreements, a Commission that negotiates on behalf of the 27, a Council that adopts implementing regulations. But these institutions were designed to interact with partners who respect the multilateral framework — who negotiate in good faith, respect signed commitments, and do not modify their positions on Truth Social 24 hours after a formal ratification. Facing a partner who plays by different rules, the European mechanisms show their limits.

The suspension clause, the 2029 sunset clause, the provisions on steel and aluminum — all these mechanisms are reactive responses to problems that have already occurred. They do not prevent crises. They give Europe tools to respond after the fact — which is useful, but insufficient. The real reform this crisis demands is a European capacity to exert preventive pressure on its partners — sufficient economic and technological power so that American threats are not unilateral but bilateral.

Conclusion: The agreement as hostage — and the lessons Brussels must retain

Turnberry is not dead — but it is on life support

At the time of writing, the Turnberry agreement is technically still in force. Trump threatened — he has not yet imposed. The French digital tax has not yet been finalized in its ultimate form. There is still room for negotiation, a diplomatic space where escalation can still be avoided. Washington and Brussels have active communication channels. The June 26 threat may still prove to be a pressure maneuver rather than an irrevocable decision.

But even if escalation is avoided in the short term, the symbolic damage is real. Europe ratified an agreement in an extraordinarily short timeframe, under the pressure of a unilaterally imposed deadline, with minimal guarantees obtained at the cost of considerable political discipline — and 24 hours later, the American president announced that this agreement could be supplanted by a 100% tariff for a reason not even mentioned in it. For America's allies around the world, this message was received loud and clear.

What Europe must do differently next time

The lesson of Turnberry is simple: never ratify an agreement under ultimatum without having defined in advance the response to post-ratification threats. Europe agreed to race against the July 4 clock without negotiating protection against lateral threats — digital taxes, steel-aluminum tariffs, the next Trump initiatives that were not in the text. The suspension clause is a useful tool. But it is reactive, not preventive.

Ultimately, the real answer is structural: the strategic autonomy that Europe has been discussing for years without truly building it. A Europe capable of threatening credible retaliation — not on bourbon and soybeans, but on technological, financial and regulatory stakes that truly matter to American companies — is a Europe negotiating on equal terms. That is not yet the case. And June 26, 2026 is a brutal reminder of what it costs to negotiate from a position of weakness.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My angle and my biases

I am in favor of the fiscal sovereignty of democratic states and critical of the Trumpist trade policy, which I consider destabilizing to the multilateral order. This bias shapes my formulations. This column is based on verified sources published on June 25–26, 2026 — reports from the NYT, Al Jazeera, CNBC, Bloomberg, Le Monde and Politico on the Turnberry agreement and the digital tariff threat.

What I do not know

I do not know whether Trump will actually carry out the 100% threat or whether it is a pressure maneuver designed to force negotiations on DSTs. I do not have access to the private diplomatic discussions between the Commission and Washington. The ultimate outcome of this episode — a revised agreement, tariff escalation, or the status quo — is uncertain at the time of publication.

Sources

Primary sources

Politico — Trump threatens additional tariffs on countries with DSTs, June 26, 2026

Le Monde — EU-US trade deal approved before Trump deadline, June 25, 2026

Bloomberg — EU gives US trade deal final approval ahead of July 4 deadline, June 25, 2026

Al Jazeera — Trump threatens 100% tariffs on DST countries, Turnberry agreement supplanted, June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

CNBC — 100% tariff on digital services, Trump Truth Social, Supreme Court tariffs, June 26, 2026

Euronews — MEPs ratify Turnberry agreement 440/151, suspension clause, steel aluminum, June 16, 2026

NYT — Trump threatens Turnberry agreement, DST, 100% tariff, June 26, 2026