OPINION: Belarus Complicit: Lukashenko Locks His Country Into the War

OPINION: Belarus Complicit: Lukashenko Locks His Country Into the War

Internal Repression and Belarusian Political Prisoners

More Than 1,400 Political Prisoners in Relative Silence

While the world watches troop movements along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, another crisis unfolds in the relative silence of Belarusian prisons. According to data from Viasna Human Rights Center, a Belarusian organization in exile whose founder Ales Bialiatski received the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize, there are currently more than 1,400 political prisoners in Belarus — activists, journalists, teachers, and lawyers who had the misfortune of expressing opposition to the Lukashenko regime after 2020. Reports document physical torture, sleep deprivation, prolonged isolation, and denial of access to lawyers and families. This systematic repression is a deliberate state policy aimed at eliminating all internal resistance.

Ales Bialiatski himself has been imprisoned since 2021, sentenced to 10 years in prison in a trial that every international human rights organization has condemned as politically motivated. The Nobel Prize did not earn him his freedom. The Lukashenko regime ignored that signal just as it systematically ignores every international injunction. This impunity is directly linked to the protection Russia provides: Lukashenko knows that as long as Putin needs Belarus as a strategic satellite, no Western economic or diplomatic pressure will be sufficient to bring him down. The complicity with Moscow in the war of aggression against Ukraine buys Lukashenko impunity for his domestic crimes.

The Belarusian Opposition and the Project of a Free Belarus

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya: Building Institutions in Exile for What Comes Next

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya continues, from her exile in Vilnius, Lithuania, to build the institutions of an alternative Belarusian government. The former presidential candidate whose 2020 victory was stolen now leads a Coordination Council recognized by several Western governments and the European Parliament as the legitimate representation of the Belarusian people. Her diplomatic travels have taken her to meetings with leaders of the EU, the United States, and several NATO member states. Tsikhanouskaya knows she will not be able to return to Belarus until the Lukashenko regime falls. And she continues — the kind of patience and determination she shows deserves concrete political and financial support from Western democracies.

The Kastus Kalinouski Belarusian Legion, which fights within the Ukrainian armed forces, has become one of the most powerful symbols of Belarusian-Ukrainian democratic solidarity. These men — mostly Belarusians in exile — fight not only to defend Ukraine, but to demonstrate that Belarusians choose the side of freedom. Every military victory of the legion is also a political statement about what Belarus could be. It is essential that Ukraine's Western allies explicitly recognize and support the political dimension of this legion — Zelensky has met Tsikhanouskaya and expressed support for the Belarusian democratic movement.

Sanctions Against Belarus and Their Structural Limits

Five EU Sanctions Packages — Mixed Results Against Russian Compensation

The European Union has adopted five sanctions packages against Belarus since 2020, targeting hundreds of regime individuals and entities as well as key economic sectors like potash — Belarus's primary export — and petroleum products. These sanctions have had real effects on the Belarusian economy: GDP declined, foreign exchange reserves fell, and access to Western financial markets was severely restricted. But these effects have not been sufficient to force a change in regime behavior. The main reason is simple: Russia compensates for Belarusian losses caused by Western sanctions through preferential loans, discounted energy prices, and access to Russian markets.

The real long-term solution to the Belarusian problem therefore runs through solving the Russian problem. If Russia loses its war in Ukraine, if its economy deteriorates sufficiently to no longer be able to fund Lukashenko's satellites, if Putin's own regime is weakened — then the conditions for change in Belarus become possible. In that sense, Ukrainian victory is also the condition for Belarusian liberation. That link between the two causes deserves to be explicitly recognized in Western support strategies. Abandoning Ukraine to a capitulation peace would also be a death sentence for the Belarusian democratic movement. If Putin wins in Ukraine, Lukashenko stays indefinitely. These two causes are inseparable.

Introduction: The Man Who Sold His Country to Stay in Power

A Satellite That Can No Longer Pretend to Be Neutral

There was a time — a distant time, almost mythical today — when Belarus presented itself as a neutral state, a buffer space between NATO and Russia, a country with its own interests distinct from those of Moscow. That time is over. Under Alexander Lukashenko, Belarus has become the active and unabashed accomplice of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Not by constraint alone — by choice. The choice of a man who needs Putin to stay in power, who opened his military bases, his roads, his borders, and who continues to deepen this complicity with a cynicism that surpasses all measure.

On June 25, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly warned that the construction of military infrastructure along the Belarus-Ukraine border "is approaching completion." This infrastructure — military roads, ammunition and fuel storage depots — "has no other purpose than military," he declared. That is not a metaphor. It is the concrete announcement that Belarus is preparing for the possibility of direct entry into the conflict.

The Opposition in Exile Draws Up the List of Preparations

On June 22, 2026, the Belarusian opposition in exile handed Zelensky a list of warning signals indicating that Belarus is progressively shifting into a wartime posture. This list identifies "internal political indicators showing Lukashenko's transition to a wartime posture": official speeches, military reorganizations, troop movements, logistical infrastructure construction. These signals, taken individually, are each "explainable." Together, they form a coherent picture of deliberate preparation.

These warnings from the opposition in exile must be taken seriously. These are the same circles that in 2021 were raising the alarm about the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory — warnings that proved well-founded. Lukashenko had indeed allowed Putin to use Belarus as a launching pad for the initial attack on Kyiv in February 2022, contributing to the armored column that came close to taking the Ukrainian capital.

The History of Progressive Submission

2020: The Turning Point of Repression

To understand where Belarus is today, one must go back to the summer of 2020. The Belarusian presidential elections give victory to the opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, according to every independent estimate. Lukashenko refuses the results, savagely represses the demonstrations, arrests hundreds of thousands of people. It is Putin who throws him a political and economic lifeline — with a price: a progressive submission to Moscow unprecedented in Belarusian history since independence in 1991.

Since 2020, Lukashenko has abandoned one after another the instruments of Belarusian sovereignty. He ceded military bases to Russia. He allowed Russian soldiers to train on Belarusian territory. In 2022, he authorized the use of Belarus as a launching platform for the initial attack on Kyiv. In 2023, Russia announced the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil — a decision that transformed Belarus into a potential target in any nuclear escalation scenario, without Lukashenko having had any consultation with his population.

Drone Relays Cut and the Ukrainian Response

On June 22, 2026, according to Zelensky's chief of staff cited by various Ukrainian sources, drone relays placed by Russia on Belarusian territory were "cut" or neutralized — an operation whose details remain classified but which reveals that Ukraine is taking active steps to prevent the use of Belarus as an additional drone launching platform against its territory. These Belarusian drone relays would have allowed Russia to extend the range of its drone attacks against Ukraine by using Belarusian territory as a transit and electronic relay zone.

If confirmed, this information reveals that Ukraine's northern border is already, in practice, an active front of electronic warfare and drone operations — even without a massive deployment of Belarusian troops. Belarus is already in the war. Not yet at the same level as a direct belligerent. But no longer in the position of a non-combatant country by any measure.

The Threat of the Northern Front

Why a Second Front from Belarus Would Change Everything

The prospect of Belarus actively entering the conflict represents a strategic nightmare for Ukraine. Kyiv sits approximately 80 kilometers from the Belarusian border. In 2022, Russian columns launched from Belarus nearly reached the capital within days. The only reason they failed was the fierce resistance of Ukrainian forces and the disastrous logistics of the Russian troops. If a second offensive were launched from Belarus with better logistical preparation — including the roads and fuel depots whose near-completion Zelensky flagged — the threat would be of extreme gravity.

Ukraine's current forces are largely concentrated on the eastern front — Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson. An active northern front would force a massive redeployment of limited military resources, potentially easing pressure on the axes where Ukraine has regained the initiative. That is precisely the Russian strategic logic: create simultaneous pressure on multiple fronts so that Ukraine can never concentrate its forces sufficiently on any single axis.

The Warning Signals the West Must Take Seriously

Too many warnings have been ignored in this war. NATO and Western governments were slow to respond to the signals of Russian troop buildup at the Ukrainian border before February 2022. The Belarusian opposition in exile and Ukrainian intelligence services are today sending similar signals about Belarusian preparations. Zelensky himself — who has access to first-hand intelligence — is sounding the alarm publicly.

These signals deserve a concrete response. NATO has reinforced its presence on the eastern flank in Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland. These deployments constitute a deterrent against a Belarusian military adventure that could spill onto Alliance territory. But Ukraine's northern border itself is not protected by Article 5. Deterrence there rests entirely on Ukraine's ability to defend its own territory — an ability that depends directly on the weapons and funding NATO provides through mechanisms like PURL.

The Belarusian People: Hostage and Victim

Belarusians Did Not Choose This War

This must be said clearly: the Belarusian people did not choose this war. In 2020, hundreds of thousands of Belarusians took to the streets to reject Lukashenko. They were repressed, imprisoned, tortured. Their leaders are in exile. The civic resistance movement — one of the most remarkable in Europe since the revolutions of 1989 — was crushed by systematic state violence, with the direct and assumed support of Russia.

These Belarusians — who wanted Europe, freedom, democracy — are today the hostages of a regime committing their country to a war of aggression against their Ukrainian neighbors. Thousands of young Belarusians fled the country to avoid being mobilized to fight in Ukraine. Others volunteered on the Ukrainian side, joining formations like the Kastus Kalinouski Belarusian Legion that fights for Ukraine. These men risk their lives to defend a country that, symbolically, represents the freedom their own has lost.

The Question of Post-War Accountability

If Belarus actively enters the conflict, the question of post-war accountability will be complex. The Lukashenko regime bears the moral and political responsibility for this complicity. The Belarusian people — who did not vote for these decisions and have no means of contesting them — should not pay the same price. That distinction between the regime and the people is essential for building, when the time comes, a way out of the crisis that allows Belarus to reconnect with its neighbors and with Europe.

Belarusian democrat Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, from her exile, maintains that distinction. She continues to build an alternative political project for a post-Lukashenko Belarus, grounded in European anchoring and democratic values. That project deserves the support of Western democracies — not for romantic reasons, but because a democratic and sovereign Belarus would be a considerable factor of regional stability.

Belarusian Complicity in the Regional Context

Hybrid Threats Against the Baltic States and Poland

The threat emanating from Belarus is not limited to a possible direct military intervention against Ukraine. Belarus also serves as a platform for Russian hybrid operations against neighboring countries — forced migrations used as a weapon, infrastructure sabotage, disinformation operations. Latvian intelligence warned in June 2026 about Russian "provocations" against the Baltic states and Poland — with Belarus as a potential transit territory for these operations.

Russia's SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) accused Latvia of hosting Ukrainian drone bases — an accusation rejected by Riga and NATO allies, but which reflects the logic of Russian narrative escalation: building a pretext to justify strikes against the Baltic states by presenting them as "terrorist accomplices." Belarus is essential to this hybrid threat architecture — it is the only country bordering Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland that is not a NATO member and is controlled by a regime actively collaborating with Moscow.

BALTOPS 2026 and NATO's Response

NATO is not ignoring these threats. The BALTOPS 2026 exercises — with 20 vessels, 6,000 personnel, and 15 nations — demonstrated the Alliance's capacity to project forces into the Baltic region. The permanent German brigade in Lithuania and reinforcements in the Baltic states send a clear message about the Alliance's determination to defend its eastern flank. But these deployments protect NATO members. Ukraine's northern border remains the Ukrainians' sole responsibility.

That is why maintaining and strengthening military support for Ukraine — particularly systems that enable monitoring and defense of the northern border, such as reconnaissance drones, portable air defense systems, and long-range artillery — is directly linked to preventing a second Belarusian front. If Ukraine can credibly defend its northern border, Putin's incentive to push Lukashenko into direct action is reduced. Deterrence works here too.

Conclusion: Lukashenko Has Chosen His Prison

A Choice with Irreversible Consequences

Lukashenko has made choices since 2020 that have progressively eliminated all his alternative options. He can no longer rely on popular legitimacy — he lost it at the 2020 ballot box. He can no longer claim neutrality — he sacrificed it in 2022 by letting Putin use Belarus as a base of attack against Kyiv. He can no longer present himself as a potential intermediary between Russia and the West — he burned all those bridges. He has only one option left: to keep serving Putin, to hope Russia survives its own war, and to hope his people never find a way to bring him down.

That much, at least, is not in dispute. The record is written in actions, not in intentions. History will judge the choices made here — not the speeches delivered, but the decisions taken, the weapons sent or withheld, the alliances honored or abandoned. That is the standard that applies.

Belarus Deserves Better

That conclusion must not be Belarus's conclusion. The country deserves better than the trajectory imposed on it by a man whose sole priority is his own political survival. Ukraine, if it survives this war, will have the opportunity to reach out to a new generation of Belarusian leaders. The EU, if it maintains its support for democrats in exile, will have the tools to help rebuild a sovereign and free Belarus. This opinion piece can end with a hope, however cautious: the Belarusian people exist. They resist. And they deserve to be free.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Position on Belarus

I am clearly supportive of the Belarusian democratic movement and opposed to the Lukashenko regime. That bias is assumed. It rests on fundamental convictions about democracy and popular sovereignty. I consistently distinguish between the Lukashenko regime and the Belarusian people, which strikes me as both morally right and analytically correct.

Readers are entitled to weigh that context when assessing this piece. Transparency about where a columnist stands is not a disclaimer — it is a condition of intellectual honesty. I hold these positions publicly and consistently, and I do not expect every reader to share them.

Factual uncertainties

The information about Belarusian military infrastructure and the neutralized drone relays comes from Ukrainian sources — Zelensky and the Kyiv Independent. These sources have an obvious interest in presenting Belarus as a threat to justify continued Western support. I cite them because they come from a source with access to intelligence, but they must be considered as assessments rather than absolute certainties.

These limits do not invalidate the analysis. They define its perimeter. Every judgment I make here is grounded in verifiable public sources, cited in the section below. Where I speculate or infer, I say so. Where I assert, the evidence is in the record.

Sources

Primary sources

Kyiv Independent — Zelensky warns about Belarusian military infrastructure at the border — June 25, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Polish FM: Putin's rhetoric is a provocation announcement — June 24, 2026

ISW — Lavrov threatens Belarus by invoking the union treaty — June 23, 2026

Meduza — Putin on negotiations and regional dynamics — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

The Guardian — Russia prepares provocations against the Baltic states and Poland — June 26, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Zelensky on northern front risks and the diplomatic window — June 1, 2026

Al Jazeera — Russia and Belarus: the dynamics of the authoritarian axis — June 25, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Putin on negotiation conditions and conflict expansion — June 23, 2026