ANALYSIS: The Axis of Aggressors — Russia, China, Iran, North Korea: One Front?

ANALYSIS: The Axis of Aggressors — Russia, China, Iran, North Korea: One Front?

Introduction: when tyrants network

A book, a concept, a troubling reality

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies has just published a volume whose title alone demands attention: Axis of Aggressors. Not a poetic metaphor — a systematic analysis of the growing cooperation among four authoritarian regimes: Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, the ayatollahs' Iran, and Kim Jong-un's North Korea. Published as an analytical report dated June 25, 2026, this study arrives at a moment when concrete evidence of this cooperation is accumulating at a disturbing pace.

This is not a conspiracy theory. It is a mapping of real flows: North Korean weapons in Russia, Russian military technology in North Korea, Iranian drones over Ukrainian cities, Chinese economic intelligence serving Moscow. These four regimes have diverging interests on many points — but they share a common enemy: the liberal democratic West. And that is enough to constitute a formidable strategic convergence.

The symbolic date and recent signals

June 19, 2026 marked the second anniversary of the Russian-North Korean mutual defense treaty, signed in Pyongyang during Putin's historic visit. In two years, this treaty has translated into massive flows of munitions and North Korean troops to the Ukrainian front. Kim Jong-un delivered a speech at the Central Workers' Party Committee meeting of June 20-22, 2026 calling for a "destructive" military posture — rhetoric that takes on concrete meaning given what Pyongyang has already delivered to Moscow.

These developments do not occur in a vacuum. They are part of a logic of progressive integration of the military-industrial apparatuses of four states that have decided the liberal international order is their common enemy.

Russia and North Korea: an alliance of necessity turned strategic

Munitions by the millions, troops by the thousands

Zelensky declared at the end of June that 10,000 North Korean soldiers were currently in Russia, calling their presence "incredibly dangerous." The BBC estimates nearly 2,300 North Korean soldiers have been killed since their initial deployment. The first troops sent to the Kursk region fought in difficult conditions, with no familiarity with the terrain, sometimes unable to understand local orders — but they gave Putin a human resource his army was beginning to lack.

Beyond the soldiers, it is by the millions that North Korean shells have transited to Russia. 152mm shells, KN-23 ballistic missiles — systems whose reliability is not always guaranteed, but which allow the Russian army to maintain a rate of fire exceeding what its own factories can produce after sanctions and Ukrainian strikes.

What Putin gives in return

The FDD details what Russia offers North Korea in exchange: submarine propulsion technologies for North Korean submarines, air defense equipment (including a system closely resembling the Pantsir-M on a North Korean destroyer), electronic warfare systems, and — most concerning of all — direct combat feedback from the Ukrainian front. North Korean soldiers returning from Russia are veterans of modern combat: they have learned to use drones, to operate under precision fires, to maneuver in a dense electronic warfare environment. This experience is invaluable for Kim's army.

The most tangible result, according to the FDD, is the improved accuracy and range of the KN-23 missile — North Korea's enhanced version of the Russian Iskander. A short-range ballistic missile now capable of threatening precise military targets in South Korea, Japan, and American bases in the region.

Kim Jong-un accelerates: toward regional mutual assured destruction

The Central Committee plenum speech: alarm signals

The Second Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, held from June 20-22, 2026, produced a particularly aggressive speech from Kim Jong-un. He called for a "destructive" military posture and announced an acceleration of weapons tests with Russian assistance. The subtext: North Korea is actively integrating the lessons of the war in Ukraine to modernize its own offensive doctrine.

South Korea, for its part, responded to this escalation by announcing a strategy to train 500,000 "drone warriors", with a target fleet of 20,000 drones and technology transfers to accelerate domestic production. Seoul is watching the war in Ukraine as a laboratory — and drawing the lessons that will allow it to defend its own territory.

North Korean prisoners captured in Ukraine

An extraordinary development was reported at the end of June 2026: South Korea apparently agreed to receive North Korean prisoners of war captured in Ukraine — soldiers who would face severe punishment or worse upon returning to a country that regards them as liabilities. Negotiations between Seoul and Kyiv were scheduled for June 30. This development illustrates how the North Korean military presence on the Ukrainian front has become a concrete geopolitical reality — not an abstraction.

For Pyongyang, these prisoners represent an embarrassment and a complication. For Washington and Tokyo, they are documentary proof of the depth of the Russian-North Korean alliance. For Kyiv, they represent a potential diplomatic lever in future negotiations.

China: silent accomplice or leading actor?

The economic support that keeps the war going

China does not send troops to Russia. It does not officially export lethal weapons to the Kremlin. But it provides something equally valuable: dual-use goods that feed the Russian defense industry, electronic components that end up in missiles and drones, commercial relationships that offset part of the losses inflicted by Western sanctions. Without China, Russia's war economy would be in a significantly more difficult situation.

The figures speak for themselves: Russian-Chinese bilateral trade has reached record levels since 2022. Chinese companies have been sanctioned by the United States and the EU for exports to Russia of military technologies — proving both that the flow exists and that it is hard to stop. Beijing systematically denies any direct involvement in the war, while maintaining economic relations essential to Russia's war effort.

Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific front: the second potential front

While the war continues in Ukraine, Chinese military movements around Taiwan are intensifying. The AEI (American Enterprise Institute) published on June 26, 2026 its regular update on the China-Taiwan situation, reporting an increase in military incursions. The People's Liberation Army is multiplying naval patrols that analysts from the Washington Times (June 25, 2026) describe as "rehearsals for a blockade."

Taiwan responded by organizing five days of "combat readiness" exercises in June 2026. Analysts at Modern Diplomacy note that the response time to a Chinese attack is shrinking — Beijing deliberately reducing warning windows to complicate any defensive preparation. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany issued warnings regarding Chinese carrier movements.

Iran: drones over Ukraine, nuclear ambitions in suspension

The Shahed as a weapon of systematic terror

Iranian Shahed-136 drones have been, since the war began, one of the weapons Russia has used most to terrorize Ukrainian civilian populations. These cheap devices — produced in Iran and then in Russia under license — have struck Ukrainian cities thousands of times, hitting energy infrastructure, hospitals, markets. They are slow, loud, relatively easy to shoot down individually — but launched in swarms of dozens, they saturate defenses and cause real damage.

Iranian-Russian cooperation in this domain has deepened since 2022: Iranian technicians were present in Crimea to train Russian operators. Factories in Russia were equipped to produce Shaheds locally, reducing dependence on Iranian deliveries. This is a technology transfer in the opposite direction from what is observed with North Korea — but with the same logic: strengthening the war economy of an ideologically aligned partner.

The nuclear deal and its collateral effects

The situation with Iran is undergoing complex evolution in June 2026. An initial agreement between Washington and Tehran was reported, temporarily easing certain sanctions in exchange for nuclear commitments. US Vice President JD Vance referred to a "very good foundation." The IAEA demands "very strong" verification. But details are lacking, and the question of nuclear site inspections remains a major sticking point.

This partial US-Iran rapprochement must not obscure the fact that Tehran continues to supply munitions to Russia and weapons to proxies destabilizing the Middle East. A nuclear deal is not a peace deal — and as long as Iran remains a weapons supplier for the Russian army, it remains an actor in the war in Ukraine.

Technological convergence: when aggressors share their innovations

A network of cross-transfers

What characterizes the axis of aggressors in 2026 is the growing sophistication of technology transfers. Russia receives North Korean munitions and Iranian drones. It retransmits advanced military technologies to North Korea. China provides components and absorbs know-how. Iran tests its drones in real combat conditions in Ukraine and improves its designs accordingly. This is a mutual learning network that benefits all members at the West's expense.

North Korea's KN-23 ballistic missiles improved through combat experience in Ukraine — one concrete example. Shahed drones optimized through flight data collected on the Ukrainian front — another. These improvements benefit not only the current war in Ukraine: they strengthen the arsenals these regimes could deploy in future conflicts in their respective regions.

Electronic warfare: a domain where cooperation is particularly alarming

Electronic warfare may be the domain where cooperation within the axis is most concerning. Russian GPS jamming systems have been considerably improved during the war in Ukraine, through the accumulation of combat experience. These technologies are now potentially shareable with North Korea and Iran — which could neutralize certain precision advantages of American and Israeli forces in their respective regions.

Reports also suggest that Russia has provided North Korea with Pantsir-type air defense systems — which would significantly complicate any American or South Korean air operation over the peninsula in the event of conflict.

The West facing the axis: a fragmented response

The problem of simultaneous theaters

The great strength of the axis of aggressors — to the extent one can call it a coordinated strength — is that it forces the West to manage simultaneous crises on multiple theaters. Europe is focused on Ukraine and NATO's Eastern flank. The Asia-Pacific is tense from Chinese maneuvers around Taiwan and North Korean provocations. The Middle East remains unstable despite the partial deal with Iran. Western military, diplomatic, and financial resources are simultaneously solicited across all these fronts.

This is a reality that NATO planners are incorporating into their scenarios — and that partly explains the urgency of increasing defense budgets. A Europe capable of defending itself frees American resources for the Indo-Pacific. This is the logic of the "Asian pivot" Washington has been pushing for years — and which the war in Ukraine complicates by demanding sustained attention in Europe.

The ISW's response: mapping to understand

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) maintains daily assessments of the Ukrainian conflict, but also publishes regular analyses on Iran, North Korea, and related regional dynamics. These assessments allow real-time tracking of military developments and connecting events across different theaters. The ISW constitutes one of the most reliable analytical sources on these subjects — and its conclusions tend to confirm the reality of convergence among axis members, without asserting centralized coordination.

This point is important: the axis of aggressors is not a unified command like the Nazi Alliance was. It is a nebula of partially converging interests, bilateral exchanges, and opportunistic mutual support. Its strength lies precisely in its informality — difficult to target, difficult to dismantle.

North Korea in 2026: a military power in rapid transformation

500,000 drone warriors: Seoul's response

South Korea's response to North Korean escalation is revealing of how nations that feel directly threatened adapt their doctrines. Seoul announced the training of 500,000 "drone warriors" — military personnel specialized in the offensive and defensive use of drones. A target of 20,000 operational drones. Technology transfers from international partners to accelerate domestic production.

This is precisely the lesson of the war in Ukraine applied to the Far East: drones have revolutionized modern combat, and any country that does not invest massively in this technology risks being outpaced on tomorrow's battlefield. South Korea has understood this — and is doing it with the execution speed that characterizes its technology industries.

The US-South Korea partnership: a partnership under tension

Russia expressed its "concerns" about joint American-South Korean military activities — a statement reported by TASS on June 25, 2026. This is familiar rhetoric: Moscow instrumentalizes any defensive cooperation among its adversaries as evidence of "provocation." But behind this rhetoric lies a reality: US-South Korea cooperation genuinely worries North Korea, and therefore Russia, which has invested in that partnership.

Strengthening this cooperation — joint exercises, intelligence sharing, preventive deployments — is one of the most effective responses to North Korean escalation. But it requires an American political consistency that the Trump administration, with its shifting positions on North Korea, does not always guarantee.

Western resilience: positive signals, insufficient

Sanctions as an attrition tool

The West is not passive in the face of the axis of aggressors. Sanctions against Russia continue to bite — Urals oil at $44 per barrel, Russia's budget deficit, fuel rationing in 56 regions — these are signs of real economic deterioration. The 21st sanctions package also targets companies facilitating sanctions circumvention, including Chinese entities.

Sanctions against North Korea — though riddled with violations and difficult to enforce — reduce Kim's capacity to fund certain programs. Sanctions against Iran continue to weigh on its economy, even if the partial deal currently being negotiated could ease some of them. These imperfect instruments nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is not negligible.

The coherence challenge: not treating the axis in silos

The real weakness of the Western response is its lack of inter-theater coherence. The United States negotiates with Iran while sanctioning Russia for using Iranian drones. Europe trades with China while sanctioning Chinese companies that help Russia. These contradictions — inevitable in complex multilateral diplomacy — provide operational space for the axis.

The only answer to this is closer coordination among allies: between NATO and Indo-Pacific partners (Japan, Australia, South Korea), between foreign and finance ministries, between intelligence services. The Ankara summit should be an opportunity to advance on this coherence. Recent history suggests it will only do so partially.

Intelligence and information as a battleground

Disinformation as the axis's weapon

The axis of aggressors is waging a coordinated information war — even if coordination is not always explicit. Russian troll farms, Chinese state media, Iranian accounts on social networks, North Korean propaganda targeting diasporas — all feed similar narratives: NATO is the aggressor, Ukraine is an American puppet, the West is in decline. These narratives reinforce each other, even without explicit concertation.

For democracies, fighting this information war is particularly difficult: freedom of expression, media plurality, the absence of state control over social networks — all these attributes of democracy are exploited by authoritarian regimes to spread their messages. This is a paradox that democracies have not yet fully resolved.

Western intelligence: a real but insufficient advantage

The West has real intelligence advantages. The NSA, GCHQ, BND, allied services share information on Russian movements, North Korean arms transfers, Chinese activities. This intelligence has enabled advance warning of certain Russian operations and the documentation of arms transfers. The early release of classified information about Russian plans, initiated by the Biden administration in 2022, was an effective tactical innovation — it deprived Moscow of the element of political surprise.

But intelligence alone is not enough to counter the axis. It also requires the political will to act on that information — and this will is sometimes insufficient, for electoral, diplomatic, or economic reasons.

Scenarios: where is the axis of aggressors heading?

The scenario of gradual escalation

The most likely scenario, in the short term, is a gradual escalation of cooperation within the axis — not a great leap forward, but an accumulation of small steps. More North Korean soldiers in Russia, potentially deployed outside Kursk. More technologies transferred to Pyongyang. An increasing Chinese military presence around Taiwan. A Russia using its relationship with the axis as a diplomatic lever in peace negotiations.

This scenario is the hardest to counter for the West, precisely because there is no precise moment when "the axis attacks." It is a progressive rebalancing of the global balance of power — which is already happening, which will continue, and which can only be countered by an equivalent, prolonged, multidimensional effort from the democracies.

The Taiwan crisis scenario

The most dangerous scenario is a crisis around Taiwan. If Xi Jinping decides that the West is sufficiently distracted by Ukraine — or sufficiently discouraged by the conflict's duration — to not react strongly to a blockade or military intervention against Taiwan, the temptation could become irresistible. Analysts diverge on the timeline: some say 2027, others 2030 or beyond. But the consensus is that Xi is preparing for an eventuality he did not want to exclude.

In this scenario, the axis of aggressors would take its most dangerous form: a Russia pinning down American forces in Europe, a North Korea threatening American bases in Asia, an Iran destabilizing the Middle East — and China attempting its great maneuver on Taiwan.

What to do: possible responses

Strategic coherence as a priority

The most urgent response is strategic: the West must stop treating different crises as separate problems and manage them as a coherent whole. This requires coordination between NATO and Indo-Pacific partners, between sanctions policies and trade policies, between intelligence agencies and foreign ministries. This is not new — but it is always insufficiently done.

The Ankara summit could be an opportunity to launch a NATO + Pacific dialogue on common threats. Countries like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand now regularly participate in NATO summits — an encouraging sign of this necessary strategic convergence.

Investment in fragile democracies

Another response is preventive: strengthening fragile democracies that are most vulnerable to destabilization attempts by axis members. The Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, Latin America — regions where Russia and China are investing massively in influence, economics, media, and political party funding. Countering this influence requires alternative investments — in development aid, civil society support, public diplomacy — that the West has neglected for too long.

This is a long-haul struggle that does not make headlines, but is as important as weapons deliveries to Ukraine for determining the outcome of this systemic competition between democracies and autocracies.

Sanctions as a response to the axis: limits and potential

Sanctioning axis members without becoming isolated

One of the most complex challenges for the West is to coordinate sanctions against axis members without triggering a solidarity reaction that would reinforce their cohesion. Sanctioning Russia pushed Moscow toward Beijing and Pyongyang. Harsher sanctions against China risk accelerating its economic alignment with Russia. Sanctions against Iran are circumvented through Russian-Iranian commercial networks. Every pressure measure produces systemic effects that must be anticipated.

The solution is not to abandon sanctions — it is to coordinate them intelligently with other pressure tools: positive economic diplomacy (offering commercial alternatives to countries tempted by the axis), strengthening energy resilience (reducing dependence on axis oil and gas), and supporting civil societies in axis countries themselves, where entire populations do not share their leaders' militarist ambitions.

The role of Global South countries: a contested terrain

The axis of aggressors is investing massively in Global South countries — sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, Latin America — to extend its diplomatic, economic, and media influence. Russian Wagners in Mali and Niger, Chinese investments in Ethiopia and Angola, discounted Iranian hydrocarbons — the axis offers alternatives to the Western order that some countries find attractive, especially when Western aid is conditioned on reforms.

At the United Nations, votes on resolutions condemning the Russian invasion reveal this reality: a majority of countries condemn the aggression, but a significant portion abstain. This abstention is a sign of an influence competition that the West is losing on certain fronts. Regaining that ground requires durable commitments — in development aid, educational exchanges, economic partnerships — that democracies have long neglected.

The Western military response: real advances under pressure

Investment in new capabilities

Facing the axis of aggressors, the West has accelerated its investments in new military capabilities. Drone programs, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence applied to military intelligence, offensive and defensive cybersecurity — these domains have seen their budgets multiplied since 2022. The lessons of the war in Ukraine have served as a catalyst for doctrinal reforms that conventional armies had been resisting for years.

The REFORGER 2.0 program — a return to the logic of rapid reinforcement of the Eastern flank — has been activated with regular exercises involving the deployment of American brigades from the United States to Europe in under thirty days. Pre-positioned stocks in Poland, Germany, and the Baltic states — all of this strengthens deterrence credibility by making response faster and less dependent on a US Congressional vote.

What remains insufficient: mass and duration

Despite this progress, two major gaps persist. The first is mass: European NATO still lacks the depth in manpower and materiel to conduct a prolonged war of attrition — precisely the kind of war that Russia has demonstrated it is capable of waging in Ukraine. The second is duration: defense budgets are rising, but democracies are subject to electoral cycles that can reverse these trends. A pacifist government in a major NATO member state could radically change the equation within a few years.

This is why the Ankara summit is so crucial: commitments formalized in national laws and multi-year budgetary processes are far more resistant to electoral vagaries than simple political declarations. The durability of the Western response to the axis of aggressors depends on its capacity to embed itself in institutions — not merely in momentary political will.

Conclusion: a single front, a fragmented response

The convergence is real, even if imperfect

The axis of aggressors is not a formal military alliance with a common command and shared objectives. It is a convergence of interests, reinforced by concrete exchanges of technologies, troops, munitions, and intelligence. This convergence is real, documented, and growing. It represents the most serious strategic challenge for democracies since the Cold War.

The West's response — sanctions, support for Ukraine, NATO reinforcement, Indo-Pacific partnerships — is moving in the right direction. But it is fragmented, incoherent, subject to electoral vagaries in each of the democracies involved. This fragmentation is the West's principal vulnerability in the face of adversaries who decide fast and act fast.

The urgency of coherence

Ankara is an opportunity. Not the last — but a concrete opportunity to move toward the strategic coherence the situation demands. If the 32 NATO nations, reinforced by their Indo-Pacific partners, arrive at Ankara with a common vision of the axis of aggressors and an integrated response, the message sent to Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran will be clear: your calculations about our disunity are wrong. If Ankara produces yet another declaration and non-binding promises — the message will be the opposite.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My biases and my positioning

I am resolutely pro-Western and pro-democratic. I consider that authoritarian regimes — Russia, China, Iran, North Korea — represent real threats to the liberal world order that the West built after 1945. My view of the axis of aggressors is not neutral: I believe it must be named, described, and combated. Proponents of more nuanced diplomacy might find my analysis too Manichean. I own that.

What I do not know

I do not have access to classified intelligence on actual technology transfers among axis members. I rely on public sources — FDD, ISW, AEI, dated press reports. The estimates on the number of North Korean soldiers, improved KN-23 capabilities, Chinese components in Russian missiles — these are estimates from serious analytical sources, not established certainties. Where uncertainty dominates, I try to signal it.

Sources

Primary sources

FDD — Kim pushes for faster North Korean defense buildup with Russia's help — June 25, 2026

AEI — China-Taiwan Update — June 26, 2026

ISW — Russian offensive campaign assessment — June 26, 2026

ABC News — Zelensky: 10,000 North Korean troops in Russia — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Kyiv Independent — Zelensky on North Korean presence in Russia — June 25, 2026

The Guardian — NATO's fears in the face of the authoritarian axis — June 27, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Polish FM warns of Russian provocation rhetoric — June 24, 2026