DECODING: Chinese Chips via Singapore and Malaysia — The Bypass Worrying Washington

Introduction: controls that leak from below

A map of the bypass through Southeast Asia

On June 20, 2026, researcher Jing Ge of the East Asia Forum published an analysis that passed almost unnoticed in the noise of the week's geopolitical crises. His subject: how US export controls targeting semiconductor manufacturing equipment for China are being bypassed via Singapore and Malaysia. His conclusion: direct US semiconductor equipment imports into China have fallen, but imports from these two countries have risen through compliant channels linked to components, services, packaging, and mature-node tools. The letter of the law is respected. The spirit of the policy is bypassed.

This analysis, relayed by The Asia Cable on June 22, 2026, fits into a trend documented since 2022: the architecture of US export controls, however sophisticated, cannot completely stop the flow of technology to China if its allies and commercial partners do not maintain equivalent controls. And some of them — like Singapore and Malaysia — are caught in a tension between their role as global commercial hubs and growing US pressure to tighten their enforcement of export controls.

The geography of the bypass: Singapore as the pivot

To understand the bypass mechanism, you need to understand Singapore's position in global semiconductor supply chains. The city-state is one of the world's five major semiconductor hubs, hosting factories and R&D centers from GlobalFoundries, Micron, Infineon, STMicroelectronics and dozens of other players. It is also a world-class logistics hub, facilitating component transfers, maintenance services, and complex subsystem imports.

US semiconductor manufacturing equipment barred from direct export to China can legally transit Singapore if a Singaporean company purchases it for its own legitimate needs. If parts of that equipment are then sold or exchanged with entities linked to Chinese manufacturers, traceability becomes extremely difficult. The number of intermediaries, the complexity of transactions, and the volume of trade in such an active logistics hub as Singapore make systematic control practically impossible.

The Nikkei Asia data: the escalation of the bypass

2025: Chinese purchases via Malaysia and Singapore surpass those from the US

An analysis by Nikkei Asia published in April 2026 had provided precise data on this trend. In 2025, Chinese purchases of semiconductor manufacturing equipment from Malaysia and Singapore had seen "a significant increase, surpassing imports from the United States, which had fallen to their lowest level in eight years". This statistical shift is revealing: US controls are not reducing China's total access to equipment. They are geographically displacing it.

US companies remain important suppliers — the most advanced equipment cannot be easily replaced by non-US equivalents. But mature-node equipment (older, less advanced but still useful technologies), spare parts, maintenance services, and components can transit via intermediaries in third countries without triggering the strictest US controls. It is in these categories that growth in Chinese imports via Southeast Asia is most visible.

Applied Materials, Lam Research, ASML: suppliers under pressure

The major semiconductor equipment makers — US-based Applied Materials, US-based Lam Research, and Dutch ASML — each have significant operations in Singapore. These companies are subject to US and/or equivalent Dutch export controls. But their presence in Singapore means that parts, components, and services associated with their equipment can be available in Singapore's secondary market legally.

The question is one of end-user entities. When a component of Lam Research equipment is sold to a Singaporean company that resells it to a Malaysian company that provides services to a Chinese chip maker, each individual transaction may be legally compliant. It is the cumulative effect that creates the bypass. And that cumulative effect is extremely difficult to prosecute legally.

Singapore caught between two fires: strategic value and political exposure

A hub that cannot afford to choose too quickly

According to Jing Ge's analysis of June 20, 2026, Singapore and Malaysia "are gaining strategic value as nodes in US-linked technology systems." But this position exposes them "to export control policy, dependence on multinationals, and pressure from US-China semiconductor competition." This dual exposure is the central dilemma for Singapore and Malaysia in the Sino-American tech war.

Singapore generates approximately 28% of its GDP from manufacturing, with a significant portion linked to semiconductors. Cutting its ties to China exports to fully comply with US control logic would be economically painful. On the other hand, repeatedly appearing in reports about bypassing American controls damages the city-state's reputation as a reliable partner of Western economies. It is an extremely delicate balance.

Malaysia: a packaging hub and service node

Malaysia plays a different but complementary role in this architecture. It is one of the world's major centers of semiconductor assembly, testing, and packaging (ATMP) — final manufacturing stages not covered by the strictest controls on advanced lithography equipment. Giants like Intel, Texas Instruments, Micron, and Infineon have major operations in Malaysia. Chinese companies can legally access Malaysian packaging and testing services and integrate chips whose earlier fabrication stages were bypassed.

In 2025, the US government had sent formal warnings to several Malaysian companies identified as potential facilitators of export control bypass. In June 2026, US senators Jim Banks and Andy Kim had called for stricter rules for foundries like TSMC to prevent advanced chips from reaching foreign subsidiaries of Chinese companies. Political pressure is mounting. Controls must adapt.

US export controls: an architecture that adapts

EAR, the Entity List, and control mechanisms

The US export control architecture rests primarily on the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Department of Commerce. This architecture includes an Entity List of persons and companies subject to additional restrictions, a Military End User list, and technology- and destination-based restrictions using precise technical classifications.

In October 2022, then October 2023 and again in 2024, the BIS issued increasingly restrictive rules on advanced semiconductors, manufacturing equipment, and AI chips destined for China. These rules have effectively delayed China's access to the most advanced chips. But they also accelerated bypass engineering on the part of Chinese companies and their intermediary suppliers.

The Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR): its extension and limits

One of the most significant innovations in US controls is the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR), which subjects products manufactured abroad using US technology to US licensing requirements. This is the tool that allowed the US to restrict exports by TSMC (Taiwanese) and Samsung (South Korean) to specific Chinese entities. But the FDPR does not cover all products, and its scope is contested by some allies who see it as an extraterritorial projection of US law.

Extending the FDPR to mature-node tools and packaging services is under discussion in Washington. Senators and representatives are demanding stricter rules. Companies like TSMC are lobbying for exemptions in certain segments. And allies like Singapore and Malaysia are navigating between compliance and competitiveness. It is a permanent political and economic negotiation, never finished, always under tension.

China's response: accelerated self-sufficiency

SMIC, Huawei, and the domestic 7nm

China's response to US controls is twofold: short-term bypass (through Singapore and Malaysia intermediaries) and long-term self-sufficiency. On this second front, progress has been recorded. In 2023, Huawei launched its Mate 60 Pro smartphone equipped with a Kirin 9000S chip manufactured by SMIC at 7nm — a feat many Western analysts considered impossible given the export controls. This technical achievement revealed that controls, however strict, do not completely stop Chinese technological development.

But SMIC's 7nm chip is not manufactured with the efficiency and scale of TSMC. Its yield is lower, its cost higher, its power consumption greater. These handicaps mean China can produce advanced chips in small quantities, but not at the scale needed to compete with Taiwanese, Korean, and US chip suppliers in global AI chip markets. Controls delay and cost. They do not prevent.

The MIIT plan and industrial internet: using what you have

Facing the impossibility of acquiring the most advanced chips in sufficient quantities, China is adopting a pragmatic strategy: maximizing the use of chips it can obtain or manufacture domestically. The MIIT plan of June 2026 — targeting large-scale deployment of AI agents and industrial platforms — must be read in this context. If the most advanced chips are unavailable in large quantities, using less advanced but available chips in mature-node industrial applications remains possible. And that is precisely what Beijing is trying to do.

This strategy is rational but has its limits. The most demanding AI applications — training large language models, autonomous weapons systems, advanced simulation — require the most advanced chips. For these applications, China remains constrained by US controls. For mass industrial applications — automation, production optimization, manufacturing data analysis — less advanced chips suffice. This is where the bypass via Singapore and Malaysia makes a real difference.

Singapore and Malaysia under Washington pressure: a question of alignment

US warnings and Singapore's response

Since 2023, the US has engaged in direct dialogue with Singapore and Malaysia on export control enforcement. This dialogue is diplomatically sensitive. Washington cannot accuse important commercial allies of explicitly facilitating bypass without solid evidence and without risking damage to precious economic relationships. But inaction in the face of growing evidence of bypass damages the credibility of the control regime.

Singapore has established its own export control regime — the Strategic Goods (Control) Act — which is technically one of the most robust in Southeast Asia. But rigorous enforcement of this regime for every transaction in one of the world's busiest ports is a colossal undertaking. And companies seeking to bypass controls are not stupid — they structure their transactions to fall below verification thresholds.

Malaysia and its strategic ambivalence

Malaysia has a more strategically ambivalent relationship toward the Sino-American tech war. It has strong economic ties with China (its first commercial partner) and equally important economic ties with the US (a major customer for its semiconductors). It hosts massive investments from US multinationals in its semiconductor sector. And according to Nikkei Asia analyses, it has seen its exports of semiconductor components and services to China increase significantly in 2025.

In June 2026, the US was exerting growing pressure on Malaysia to strengthen its own export controls and improve traceability in its semiconductor sector. Bilateral meetings on the subject had taken place. But translating this political pressure into real operational changes in Malaysia's semiconductor ecosystem takes time and runs into powerful economic interests.

Implications for the global semiconductor supply chain

Fragmentation into two technological spheres

The trend documented by Jing Ge's analysis of June 20, 2026 fits into a broader dynamic: the progressive fragmentation of the global semiconductor supply chain into two partially separated spheres — a Western sphere (US, EU, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) and a Sino-centric sphere. This fragmentation is painful and costly for both sides, but accelerating under the effect of policies on both sides.

Industry analysts estimate that complete fragmentation of semiconductor supply chains could cost several hundred billion dollars in economic inefficiency globally. Others argue that this cost is necessary to prevent the strategic risk represented by single dependence on a potentially hostile China for critical technologies. The debate between economic cost and strategic necessity is at the heart of global semiconductor policy.

TSMC caught between two fires

Few actors embody this tension better than TSMC. The Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturer is the only one capable of producing the world's most advanced chips — the 2nm and 3nm chips that Nvidia, Apple, and AMD GPU chips depend on. It is subject to US controls. It is under pressure from the US to diversify its production (hence the new factories in Arizona and Japan). And it is physically located on an island that China regularly threatens militarily.

In June 2026, US lawmakers had asked TSMC to further restrict its sales to foreign subsidiaries of Chinese companies. TSMC faces growing political pressure to act as a national security actor as much as a commercial enterprise. This tension between its US regulatory obligations, its global commercial interests, and its Taiwanese geopolitical situation is unprecedented in the history of the global semiconductor industry.

The role of US multinationals in the Singapore chain

Applied Materials, KLA, Lam Research: the "Big Three" under control

The US dominates the semiconductor equipment market through three main players: Applied Materials (deposition and etch equipment), KLA (inspection and metrology), and Lam Research (dry etch and chemical vapor deposition). These three companies together represent a dominant share of the global advanced semiconductor equipment market. All have operations in Singapore.

These companies are also subject to the strictest export controls and must verify their end users. But their networks of distributors, resellers, and service partners across Southeast Asia are complex and numerous. Export controls apply directly to US companies. They do not automatically apply to all companies that interact with their products in third countries. This is where the bypass chain inserts itself.

Mature-node tools: the least protected segment

The strictest US export controls target advanced-node technologies (5nm, 3nm, 2nm). Equipment used for mature-node technologies (28nm, 40nm, 65nm) is less restricted. Yet these mature technologies remain useful for a wide variety of applications: semiconductors for automotive, industrial, medium-complexity military equipment, and precisely the industrial internet applications that the June 2026 MIIT plan seeks to deploy at scale.

The influx of mature-node equipment to China via Singapore and Malaysia is therefore directly relevant to Beijing's industrial strategy. These are not needed for the most advanced AI chips — for those, controls are more effective. They are needed for the broad industrial base that Beijing is trying to build. And for that base, current controls are insufficiently restrictive.

Solutions: tighten, harmonize, compensate

Multilateral harmonization of controls: an unfinished project

The structural solution to bypass via third countries is harmonization of export control regimes among allies. If the US, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan all applied equivalent controls on semiconductor equipment and technologies, bypass opportunities via third countries would be significantly reduced. This harmonization project is underway in several multilateral forums.

The Netherlands has, since 2023, restricted exports of its ASML EUV lithography equipment to China — a decision taken under US pressure but contributing to plugging a critical leak in the control regime. Japan took similar measures. Multilateral coordination is advancing. But it advances slowly, and countries like Singapore and Malaysia are not major providers of advanced equipment — they are part of the supply chain at the component and service level, less well covered by existing control agreements.

What the West must do now

Three measures are required short-term. First, extend US controls to mature-node tools and packaging and testing equipment transiting via third countries to China. Second, engage Singapore and Malaysia in substantive discussions on strengthening their own export control regimes, with compensatory economic incentives. Third, invest in traceability capacity for semiconductor equipment and components through enhanced identification and tracking systems.

None of these measures is technically simple. All involve economic costs and diplomatic tensions. But the alternative — watching export controls be hollowed out by systematic bypass — is strategically more costly. The control regime is a strategic asset. If it is not maintained, it degrades.

SMIC and the 7nm node: the technical feat that embarrasses Washington

How SMIC reached 7nm without EUV lithography equipment

At the heart of the debate on export control bypass lies a technical fact that stunned analysts in 2022: SMIC, China's largest semiconductor manufacturer, managed to produce chips at 7 nanometers without access to EUV (Extreme Ultraviolet) lithography equipment from ASML, which the Dutch government banned for export to China since 2019. SMIC used a technique called SADP (Self-Aligned Double Patterning) — two consecutive exposures with DUV (Deep Ultraviolet) lithography equipment available in China — to achieve equivalent 7nm etching fineness. This approach is slower, more costly, and produces lower yields than TSMC or Samsung using EUV. But it proves the viability of a technological bypass strategy. The Nikkei Asia April 2026 data on bypass via Singapore and Malaysia fit this context: SMIC and other Chinese makers need not only exposure equipment but a vast range of auxiliary equipment — chemical etch, atomic layer deposition, chemical-mechanical polishing, metrology — produced by Applied Materials, Lam Research, KLA and others subject to export controls. This equipment continues reaching China through intermediaries in Singapore and Malaysia. SMIC's 7nm capability is proof that partial bypass works and delivers results.

The technological feat of SMIC has fueled a lively debate among export control and technology policy experts. One school of thought argues that controls don't work — if SMIC reaches 7nm despite the EUV ban, controls merely delay the inevitable at considerable economic cost to US companies. Another school argues that controls work precisely because SMIC has not yet reached 5nm or 3nm, and that every generation of delay for China is a strategic advantage for the US and its allies in the military AI race. The Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown published an analysis in 2025 concluding that controls have slowed — but not stopped — SMIC's technology upgrade trajectory.

Applied Materials, Lam Research, ASML: companies at the center of the debate

The semiconductor chain's dependence on US and Dutch equipment makers

To understand why the bypass via Singapore and Malaysia is so significant, you need to understand the global semiconductor equipment supply chain structure. Three players dominate critical segments: ASML (Netherlands) is the world's sole manufacturer of EUV lithography systems, an absolute monopoly on the most advanced technology. Applied Materials (US) is the global leader in deposition and etch equipment, present at every step of the manufacturing process. Lam Research (US) specializes in dry etch and chemical vapor deposition, two indispensable processes at every advanced technology generation.

These three companies, along with KLA (metrology), Tokyo Electron (Japan, multiple segments) and a few others, supply the bulk of equipment needed by any advanced semiconductor foundry. The concentration of this market in a handful of players is both a strength — it facilitates export control coordination — and a weakness — it creates nodal points that actors seeking to bypass controls have strong incentives to target. Nikkei Asia's April 2026 data indicate that equipment produced by these companies continued reaching Chinese foundries through Singapore and Malaysia intermediaries despite US export controls. The problem is not the equipment itself — it is the traceability of its final destination.

US pressure on equipment makers: compliance and commercial dilemmas

US authorities have exerted growing pressure on equipment makers to strengthen their export compliance programs. The BIS has issued warnings and opened investigations into potential bypass cases involving subsidiaries or commercial partners in Singapore and Malaysia. Several companies have strengthened their know-your-customer procedures and end-use verification for exports to intermediaries in those countries.

But equipment makers face a real commercial dilemma. China represents a significant share of their global revenues: before the 2022-2023 restrictions, China represented 30-35% of Applied Materials and Lam Research revenues. Restrictions have reduced these shares, at the cost of billions of dollars in lost revenue. In this context, relaxing vigilance on transactions that appear to pass through legitimate Singapore intermediaries represents a real commercial temptation. Export controls function durably only if the companies concerned have the resources, incentives, and traceability tools to apply them rigorously.

Malaysia as secondary hub: analysis of a bypass geography

Penang and the Malaysian semiconductor ecosystem

If Singapore is the primary financial and commercial hub of the bypass, Malaysia — and notably the island of Penang — plays a distinct but complementary operational role. Penang has been one of the world's major centers of semiconductor assembly, test, and packaging (ATMP) since the 1970s — chips manufactured elsewhere are encapsulated, tested, and packaged at Penang before being shipped to their final destinations. Dozens of international companies — Intel, Infineon, Bosch, Renesas — have assembly and testing facilities in Penang. This industrial concentration creates a web of subcontractors, specialized logistics providers, and service companies that can be used to obscure the final destination of equipment in transit.

Nikkei Asia's April 2026 data indicate that certain shipments of semiconductor equipment originating in the US or the Netherlands transited through Malaysian entities before reaching Chinese foundries. Malaysia, not a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement on dual-use technology export controls, is not formally bound by the same multilateral commitments as member countries. This does not mean the Malaysian government actively facilitates bypass — but it means the regulatory framework is less constraining than in countries like the Netherlands, Japan, or South Korea. Export controls are only as solid as the weakest link in their geographic chain.

US diplomatic pressure on Kuala Lumpur

The Nikkei Asia data intensified US diplomatic pressure on Malaysia. Both the Biden and Trump administrations engaged in direct conversations with Kuala Lumpur on compliance with the objectives of US export controls, even though Malaysia is not formally bound by them. The US argument is commercial as much as security-based: US companies like Intel, which has major operations in Penang, have every interest in Malaysia not becoming a bypass hub that would compromise overall US-Malaysian commercial relations.

Malaysia finds itself in a delicate position. Its semiconductor ecosystem is an essential component of its economy and industrial development strategy. Too cooperative with Washington on export controls, it risks losing contracts and investments from clients and commercial partners seeking to serve the Chinese market. Not cooperative enough, it risks US restrictive measures that would weaken its economic relationship with Washington. This uncomfortable pivot position is precisely what Beijing seeks to exploit — and what Washington seeks to resolve through positive incentives rather than punitive sanctions.

Chinese self-sufficiency in equipment: trajectory and obstacles

The NAURA, AMEC strategy and the domestic ecosystem project

Facing export controls and bypass risks, China is investing massively in developing an entirely domestic semiconductor equipment ecosystem. Companies like NAURA Technology Group, Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment (AMEC), Kingsemi, and SMEE (Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment) receive significant state subsidies under the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund — the "Big Fund" — whose third phase raised approximately 344 billion yuan (approximately $47 billion) according to Chinese government sources cited in 2024. The stated objective is to achieve 40% self-sufficiency in critical equipment by 2025 and 70-80% by 2030.

Progress is real but incomplete. AMEC has developed etch equipment compatible with 7nm nodes, validated in Chinese foundries. NAURA produces deposition and annealing equipment used in NAND and DRAM memory manufacturing processes. But in the most critical categories — notably EUV lithography and high-precision inspection equipment — Chinese equivalents remain far behind the capabilities of ASML and KLA. China can domestically produce a significant portion of mature-node equipment. It cannot yet produce those needed for the most advanced nodes.

The self-sufficiency timeline: optimistic or realistic?

The self-sufficiency targets set by the Chinese government are viewed differently depending on the analyst. The most skeptical point out that developing a semiconductor equipment ecosystem is a decade-long undertaking, not one of years: ASML began developing EUV technology in the 1990s and only delivered its first commercial systems in 2018. The trajectory from mature-node equipment to leading-edge equipment is marked by materials, optical, software, and process control obstacles that took decades of collaborative international R&D to overcome. The most optimistic about Chinese capabilities point out that virtually unlimited state resources, a pool of internationally trained engineers, and still-partial access to Western equipment and technical literature have enabled much faster progress than the historical model would suggest.

The reality likely sits between these two positions. China will progress toward partial self-sufficiency in semiconductor equipment faster than pessimistic projections, but slower than official government targets. The bypass via Singapore and Malaysia documented by Nikkei Asia plays a precise role in this trajectory: it fills the gaps during the transition period toward self-sufficiency, reducing the economic cost of controls for Chinese foundries and giving them the time needed to develop domestic alternatives. The bypass is not a permanent victory — it is a bridge strategy toward self-sufficiency.

Systemic solutions: reforming controls to make them effective

Multilateral harmonization: necessary but not sufficient

Export control policy experts largely agree on a diagnosis: as long as US controls are not harmonized with those of other major semiconductor equipment producers — Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany — their effectiveness will remain limited. This is precisely what the trilateral agreements between the US, Japan, and the Netherlands in 2023 sought to do: create policy alignment between the three countries concentrating the most critical equipment — EUV and advanced DUV lithography (ASML), deposition and etch equipment (Tokyo Electron), advanced memory (SK Hynix, Samsung under partial Seoul influence). These agreements produced additional Japanese and Dutch restrictions in 2023.

But multilateral harmonization has its own limits. Every country joining the control regime does so with its own commercial interests, its own relationship with China, and its own internal political constraints. The Netherlands, where ASML represents a significant fraction of GDP and whose policy is subject to coalition government pressures, cannot adopt US restrictions without considerable commercial consequences. South Korea, where Samsung has significant manufacturing operations in China, must calibrate its restrictions to avoid undermining those investments. Multilateral harmonization is the necessary but insufficient condition of an effective control regime — the political will of each partner is the determining variable.

New approaches: end-to-end traceability and compliance incentives

Beyond harmonization, experts propose innovative approaches to strengthen export control effectiveness against bypass via Singapore and Malaysia. The first approach is end-to-end technological traceability: equipping controlled equipment with digital markers or sensors that allow verification of their actual location and use, making it difficult to conceal their final destination in complex transactions. Several US companies are studying such systems under BIS impetus.

The second approach is a positive incentive system for transit countries like Malaysia and Singapore: rather than threatening sanctions, Washington offers commercial advantages — preferential US market access, technology partnerships, investments in local semiconductor ecosystems — in exchange for active cooperation in combating bypass. This approach is politically more durable and more effective than pure coercion. Trusted Foundry Programs — which certify non-US foundries as trustworthy for certain sensitive government orders — are an example of this incentive logic. Export compliance is built better with carrots than sticks — especially in non-formal ally countries.

Conclusion: the chip battle is also won in Singapore's ports

The bypass as symptom of an incomplete strategy

The bypass of US export controls via Singapore and Malaysia is the symptom of an incomplete strategy. Controls on leading-edge technologies are necessary and effective at the most advanced nodes. But they are not sufficient if they do not cover mature nodes and are not accompanied by robust diplomatic and economic engagement with transit countries. The chain is only as strong as its weakest link. And currently, the Singapore-Malaysia link is too weak.

China knows this. It documents it. It exploits it. And it simultaneously plans its long-term self-sufficiency — as shown by the June 2026 MIIT plan. Washington faces an adversary playing two tables simultaneously: short-term bypass and long-term self-sufficiency. The response must match: controls tightened immediately and massive Western investment in semiconductor R&D to maintain the technological lead over the long term.

The window of opportunity: narrow but still open

The Western technological lead in the most advanced semiconductors is real but not permanent. China is investing massively to close it. Every year that export controls buy — delaying Beijing's access to the most advanced technologies — is a year during which democracies can consolidate their lead. This lead is a non-renewable strategic resource: used now, it protects. Squandered through inaction, it disappears.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial positioning

This decoding supports Western democratic export control policies on technology facing China and argues for their strengthening and harmonization among allies. The author considers China's access to advanced semiconductors a strategic risk that justifies the economic constraints associated with controls. This positioning is consistent with the documented facts and publicly available data.

Methodology and sources

This decoding draws on Jing Ge's analysis (East Asia Forum, June 20, 2026) relayed by The Asia Cable of June 22, 2026, the Nikkei Asia April 2026 analysis, and open data on the semiconductor supply chain. Zero fabrication. Figures are sourced precisely.

Nature of the analysis

The author is a columnist-analyst. Policy recommendations are analytical opinions based on documented facts. Projections on semiconductor market trends are cautious estimates based on publicly available data.

Sources

Primary sources

The Asia Cable — Asia Daily June 22, 2026 (China chipmaking supply chain runs through Southeast Asia, citing Jing Ge, East Asia Forum, June 20) — June 22, 2026

Nikkei Asia — China snaps up US chip tools via Southeast Asia amid supply chain shift — April 2026

The Wire China — Taiwan Mulls Curbs on AI Chip Exports to China — June 9, 2026

Secondary sources

South China Morning Post — Pentagon: 188 Chinese companies on military list (Alibaba, Baidu, BYD) — June 23, 2026

Nikkei Asia — China targets 70% advanced domestic silicon wafer use by 2026 — May 2026

Institute for the Study of War (ISW) — China and Taiwan Update June 5, 2026 — June 5, 2026

The Asia Cable — Asia Daily June 10, 2026 (US lawmakers urge tighter rules on chipmakers) — June 10, 2026