OPINION: 60 Days to Save the Peace — How the Geneva Clock Is Deciding the World

A Memorandum Signed at a Distance, Between Paris and Tehran

On June 17, 2026, something unprecedented occurred: Donald Trump, from Washington, and Masoud Pezeshkian, from Tehran, each signed — digitally, separately — a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) designed to establish a framework for de-escalation and the launch of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. A few days later, on June 22, delegations convened in Lucerne, Switzerland, to open what was officially described as "the first round of high-level negotiations."

Since then, a clock has been ticking. Sixty days. That is the deadline set by this MoU to reach a final agreement. Not a complete and definitive agreement on the Iranian nuclear program — an agreement that will lay the path toward such a deal. The architecture is fragile. The stakes are vertiginous. And the world is holding its breath.

What the MoU Says — and What It Conceals

The 14-paragraph MoU text, according to diplomatic sources cited by Diplomatic Opinion, establishes a framework for de-escalation, provides for the gradual lifting of certain sanctions, and addresses regional security. U.S. Vice President JD Vance described it as "a very general document, whose specifics will need to be clarified in subsequent negotiations." This is therefore not an agreement — it is a promise to seek an agreement. The distinction is crucial.

Sixty days is so short. Ten years of escalation — sanctions, counter-sanctions, regional war, air strikes, uranium enrichment — and we hope to erase it in two months? I am willing to believe in diplomacy. But I am wary of deadlines that create the illusion of progress without guaranteeing the substance.

Negotiations That Started Badly From the Outset

The Lucerne talks got off to a difficult start. Tehran took offense at statements Trump made from social media, threatening attacks and urging the Iranian president to "watch what he says." These off-the-cuff interventions nearly derailed the negotiations before they had even begun. According to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, teams worked through the night to keep Iran at the table.

The Iranian delegation was led by parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. On the American side, Vice President JD Vance led. The mediators — Qatar and Pakistan — played a decisive role in keeping dialogue open during moments of tension.

The Three Unresolved Issues

At the end of this first session, the mediators announced "encouraging progress" and an "immediate start to technical discussions." Concretely: both sides agreed to invite IAEA inspectors back to Iran — which Vance called a "major milestone." They agreed to establish a communication mechanism to prevent incidents in the Strait of Hormuz. And the United States temporarily suspended — until August 21 — sanctions on Iranian oil.

But three fundamental issues remained unresolved. First: Iran's nuclear program itself — enrichment, stockpiles, centrifuge infrastructure. Second: the Strait of Hormuz — Iran declared it intends to retain control of it, which Washington cannot formally accept. Third: Lebanon, where fighting between Israel and Hezbollah continues, threatening to destabilize the entire process.

Hezbollah may be the most dangerous time bomb in this process. Neither Iran nor the United States fully controls Hezbollah's actions. And one poorly calibrated strike in Lebanon could send the Geneva negotiations into rubble.

Twenty Percent of Global Oil Through a Twenty-One-Mile Corridor

The Strait of Hormuz is the obligatory passage point for roughly 20% of global oil. China, Japan, South Korea, and India depend heavily on this supply. If this strait is blocked — even temporarily — the effects on global energy markets would be catastrophic: an oil price spike, a global economic crisis, destabilization of importing countries.

Iran knows this perfectly. And that is precisely why Tehran insists on maintaining its operational presence in the strait as a bargaining chip in negotiations. Vice President Vance said he had made progress on "opening the Strait of Hormuz" — but Iran immediately tempered these statements by declaring it intends to "oversee maritime traffic" in this zone.

The Risk of an Accidental Incident

Even if both parties are negotiating in good faith, the risk of an accidental military incident in or around the strait is real. The simultaneous presence of American, Iranian, and sometimes Chinese naval forces in highly constrained maritime spaces creates conditions conducive to miscalculation. The communication mechanism "to prevent incidents" agreed upon in Geneva is a first step — but it is only a first step.

The recent history of the Persian Gulf shows that such incidents can derail diplomatic processes far more advanced than this one. A drone shot down, a vessel seized, a strike incorrectly attributed — and the 60 days become a countdown toward escalation. Nobody around the Geneva table wanted that outcome. But wanting peace and building it are two different things.

I have no certainty about what this process will yield. What concerns me most is not the bad faith of the parties — it is the unpredictability of peripheral actors: Israel, Hezbollah, the most radical Iranian factions that have no interest in seeing a deal succeed.

Years of Enrichment That Cannot Be Erased

Since the abandonment of the 2015 JCPOA agreement by Trump in 2018, Iran has substantially advanced its enrichment program. According to expert estimates, Tehran is now enriching uranium at levels close to weapons grade. The return of IAEA inspectors — agreed upon in Geneva — is a necessary but not sufficient condition: they must also have access to all facilities, including those that have never been declared.

Iran's supreme leader — identified in certain sources as Mojtaba Khamenei in the context of the MoU — publicly stated he had "in principle some reservations" about the agreement. This is an ambiguous signal reflecting internal tensions within the Iranian power structure. One faction wants sanctions lifted at any price. Another refuses to compromise what is presented as a "national deterrence capability."

What Success or Failure Actually Means

If negotiations succeed within the 60 days: Iran commits to a timeline for dismantling or drastically restricting its enrichment program, sanctions are progressively lifted, and the Strait of Hormuz remains open. That would be a historic diplomatic victory, comparable to the great non-proliferation agreements of the Cold War.

If negotiations fail: Iran resumes its program at full throttle. The United States — and perhaps Israel — considers military options. The Gulf ignites. Oil prices soar. And the world realizes, too late, what it had within reach at Geneva and failed to grasp. That is why these 60 days matter so much. And are so terrifying.

I have reread the great moments of nuclear diplomacy in the twentieth century. Every time, peace hung by a thread. Every time, it took a courageous decision from a handful of individuals to avert the worst. Let us hope that Vance, Araghchi, and the mediators from Qatar and Pakistan are equal to this moment.

An International Order Under Maximum Pressure

The Geneva negotiations are taking place in a world where the liberal multilateral order is under pressure from all sides. Russia has been attacking Ukraine for more than four years. China contests its neighbors' maritime rights. North Korea is developing a nuclear navy. The Middle East has been on fire for decades. In this context, a U.S.-Iran deal would not merely be a bilateral diplomatic victory — it would be a signal that diplomacy can still work, that states can still find peaceful solutions to seemingly insurmountable crises.

Perhaps it is naive to view things this way. But the alternative — a world where every regional actor develops its own nuclear capabilities for protection, where no one believes in agreements and institutions any longer — is so much more dangerous that it is worth trying. Even if the odds of success are slim. Even if the 60 days seem too small a box to contain such an explosive dossier.

Europe's Role: Spectator or Actor?

Europe was mentioned in this process — the leaders of the European G4 (Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom) welcomed the agreement in principle. But they are not at the negotiating table. It is the United States, Qatar, and Pakistan who are steering. Europe, which had played a central role in the 2015 JCPOA, is today marginalized in the most critical process for regional security.

This is a symptom of a Europe that has not yet found its own geopolitical voice. It supports, it applauds, it hopes — but it is not in the room when the major decisions are made. If these negotiations succeed, it will be a lesson worth reflecting on for the next crisis.

I end this opinion piece with a thought for all the populations living in the shadow of this clock: the Iranians exhausted by sanctions and war, the Gulf inhabitants watching tankers pass and praying it lasts, the Europeans who have been paying high energy prices for years because of conflicts played out far from them. They are the true hostages of these 60 days.

Israel, Anxious Observer of the Geneva Negotiations

Israel is not party to the MoU and was not at Lucerne. Yet its role in the equation is decisive. Tel Aviv has been conducting military operations for months against Iranian nuclear and military capabilities — and a potential resumption of Israeli strikes during the 60-day negotiation window could torpedo the entire process. The United States clearly signaled to Israel the importance of preserving the diplomatic window. But does Washington truly control Tel Aviv's decisions on these existential matters?

The honest answer is: not always. Israel has demonstrated on multiple occasions its capacity to act unilaterally when it considers its security demands it. If intelligence indicated an imminent threshold crossing in the Iranian nuclear program, Tel Aviv might decide to act without waiting for the outcome of negotiations. That scenario is the nightmare of every delegation working in Geneva.

The Houthis and the Red Sea: A Persistent Complication

Yemen's Houthis, backed by Iran, continued their operations in the Red Sea during the negotiations. Although a partial ceasefire was announced, the situation remains volatile. If attacks resume at large scale, the United States will find itself in the uncomfortable position of negotiating a nuclear deal with Tehran while simultaneously responding militarily to Iranian proxies in the Red Sea. This dual track — nuclear diplomacy and military operations against Iranian proxies — demands political calibration of extraordinary precision.

The Robert Schuman Foundation noted in its June 22 analysis that the MoU seeks to establish "a de-escalation framework following several weeks of Middle East tensions." This elliptical formulation covers months of fighting, strikes, counter-strikes, and a region in a state of near-permanent war. Transforming this context into a durable agreement in 60 days is a diplomatic feat.

I often think that the unsung hero of this process is Qatar — that tiny Gulf state mediating between Washington and Tehran, maintaining channels open that no one else could keep open. Qatar's discreet diplomacy deserves far more recognition than the headlines grant it.

Oil: The Most Reliable Barometer of Geopolitical Tension

Oil markets are the most reliable barometer of tensions in the Gulf. Since the signing of the MoU on June 17 and the temporary lifting of American sanctions on Iranian oil until August 21, crude prices have oscillated, simultaneously factoring in the hope of a deal and uncertainty about its outcome. If negotiations fail and sanctions return, markets could anticipate a renewed restriction in Iranian supply — with effects on pump prices that would ripple politically across all importing countries.

International oil companies are watching this situation with particular interest. If a nuclear deal materialized, Iran could progressively re-enter the global oil market with its 2 to 3 million barrels per day production capacity. That would shift the balance of global energy markets, affect OPEC revenues, and alter the region's energy geopolitics. The economic stakes of this deal far exceed the nuclear question.

European and Asian Economies: Silent Hostages

Europe, traumatized by the energy crisis triggered by the war in Ukraine in 2022, has a vital stake in Gulf stability. A U.S.-Iran agreement securing the Strait of Hormuz and allowing the resumption of Iranian oil exports would ease tensions on global energy markets. For Southeast Asian economies, Japan, and South Korea, which massively import their energy via Hormuz, an Iranian nuclear agreement would be an economic blessing.

These economic interests create indirect but real pressures on negotiators. Every week without an agreement is a week of energy markets under strain. Every military incident in the Gulf is a price spike touching billions of people around the world. This economic dimension should be at the heart of the discussions — and it probably is, in the corridors of Lucerne, even if official communiqués do not mention it.

We talk about nuclear deals, denuclearization, IAEA verification. But at bottom, for many governments around the world, the real question is this: will gas prices be lower next year? That is not cynical — it is simply honest about the forces shaping international politics.

Scenario A: Back to Square One

If negotiations do not succeed before August 21, 2026, sanctions on Iranian oil return automatically. Iran resumes its nuclear program at full throttle — accelerated enrichment, end of IAEA inspections, perhaps partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Oil prices soar. The atmosphere in the Middle East re-ignites. This is the scenario of returning to the pre-negotiation situation, only worse — because dashed hopes always generate more resentment than the absence of hope.

In this scenario, Israel finds itself in a position where a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities becomes an option actively discussed in security circles. Tehran would harden its posture, activating its proxy networks across the region. The probability of a direct military conflict rises. This is the scenario everyone — except perhaps a few hawks on both sides — is trying to avoid.

Scenario B: A Partial, Imperfect, but Sufficient Agreement

The other scenario — more probable according to observers who have followed these dossiers for years — is a partial agreement that does not resolve everything but maintains a positive dynamic. An Iranian commitment to freeze enrichment below weapons grade, modalities for IAEA inspection, lifting of certain economic sanctions. Not the total victory claimed by each side, but a JCPOA 2.0 — imperfect, fragile, contested — that keeps Iran on the side of diplomacy rather than confrontation.

That is not the ideal outcome. But in great-power diplomacy, "not ideal but functional" is often better than "perfect but nonexistent." The real question is not whether the agreement will be perfect — it will not be. The real question is whether both parties have the political will to sign something that allows each to go home claiming victory. Sometimes, that is all diplomacy can accomplish. And sometimes, that is enough.

I find myself hoping for an imperfect agreement rather than no agreement at all. That is an uncomfortable position for someone who values intellectual rigor. But it is also an honest one. Diplomacy is not an exact science — it is the art of the possible in a world that rarely is.

Hope, Nevertheless

I hope the 60 days will be sufficient. I hope that negotiators will find the formulas that allow each side to go home claiming victory. That is how diplomacy works — not on absolute truth, but on the useful fictions that allow adversaries to coexist. An imperfect agreement that functions is infinitely better than a perfect agreement that does not exist.

I fear bad faith, the unforeseen incident, the radical faction on either side that prefers confrontation to peace. I fear Trump's Twitter diplomacy, which can torpedo in a tweet what diplomats have built in weeks of overnight work. I fear Hezbollah, which did not sign the MoU and is not bound by it.

The Dignity of the Possible

But despite everything, I believe in diplomacy. Not because it is perfect — it is not. But because it is the only alternative to war. And war, in this region, with these actors, these weapons, and these global energy dependencies, would be a catastrophe of a scale we have barely begun to imagine. Sixty days to prevent that: the world has known worse investments.

I end this opinion piece with this thought: the 60 days of Geneva are an opportunity to prove that diplomacy can still work in a fragmented world. If it fails, it is not merely one fewer agreement — it is a signal that major crises can no longer be resolved through negotiation. That signal would have consequences far beyond Iran.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

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