INVESTIGATION: Post-Maduro Venezuela — Who Really Controls the Oil After the Regime's Fall?

Introduction: The World's Largest Oil Windfall Under American Tutelage

A palace revolution orchestrated from Washington

On January 3, 2026, an American operation captured Nicolás Maduro during a raid on Caracas. This geopolitical coup reshaped the face of the Western Hemisphere within hours. Former vice-president and oil minister Delcy Rodríguez immediately seized power, inaugurating what she calls "the right path" for Venezuela. Washington restored diplomatic relations with Caracas. Sanctions began lifting in rapid succession. And multinational oil companies started returning to a country that holds the world's largest proven petroleum reserves.

But behind the official communiqués and televised signing ceremonies staged at the Miraflores Palace, one fundamental question remains without a clear answer: who really controls Venezuelan oil today? PDVSA, the state company, remains under government control. Yet Washington exercises de facto tutelage through its licenses and executive orders. Multinationals negotiate under American conditions. And the post-Maduro institutional vacuum creates grey zones that this investigation attempts to illuminate.

The scale of the institutional vacuum

Venezuela currently produces 1.179 million barrels per day, according to OPEC data for May 2026 — a rise of 3.8% from April and 10.6% year-on-year. That is the highest level in several years. But this spectacular recovery conceals a catastrophic structural reality: the country must restructure a debt of 240 billion dollars — the largest in world sovereign history — and rebuild oil infrastructure whose rehabilitation cost is estimated at more than 180 billion dollars. In this context, the question is not only political. It is existential.

PDVSA: The State Monster to Rebuild

Twenty years of nationalization, ten years of free fall

The history of PDVSA is one of systematic destruction through incompetence and corruption. Under Hugo Chávez, progressive nationalization transformed the company into a machine for financing the Bolivarian revolution. Tens of thousands of experienced engineers and technicians were dismissed or fled. Billions of dollars in oil revenues were diverted toward social programs and geopolitical allies — Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran. Production, which had exceeded 3 million barrels per day in the late 1990s, collapsed to approximately 582,000 barrels per day in May 2021.

Under Maduro, conditions deteriorated further. American sanctions cut off access to financing and technology. The remaining skilled personnel left the country en masse. Wells were abandoned, pipelines leaked, refineries burned for lack of maintenance. The Central Bank of Venezuela estimates that oil revenues for the first quarter of 2026 reached 5.5 billion dollars — a slight improvement, but far from pre-sanctions levels. Rebuilding PDVSA is not a technical challenge. It is a fundamental institutional and human overhaul.

The reforms of January 2026: a legal revolution

From the end of January 2026, the Rodríguez government, under pressure from the White House, passed major hydrocarbon law reforms. The National Assembly approved legislation reversing the 2007 nationalizations and eliminating PDVSA's monopoly over energy resources. Foreign private companies can now independently manage oil operations in Venezuela. Royalties and taxes have been lowered to attract investors. International arbitration of disputes is now permitted — a crucial guarantee for companies traumatized by the expropriations of the Chávez era.

These reforms are historic. They represent the most radical transformation of the Venezuelan oil regulatory environment since Hugo Chávez. But they are imperfect: PDVSA remains under government control, American OFAC licenses remain revocable at any time, and 60 billion dollars in unresolved arbitration claims — notably from ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips — constitute a major barrier to massive investment.

The Architecture of American Control: Licenses, Decrees, and Total Oversight

OFAC: the American regulator of Venezuelan oil

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury Department has become, de facto, the supreme regulatory authority of the Venezuelan oil industry. General License No. 52, issued in January 2026, formally authorized operations with PDVSA. On June 10, 2026, OFAC considerably expanded the scope of general licenses covering oil, gas, and mineral extraction. According to Signal Ocean data, this expansion immediately accelerated export volumes.

The conditions attached to the licenses are clear and unambiguous: contracts must be governed by American law; royalties and taxes must be deposited into a Foreign Government Depository Fund in accordance with Executive Decree 14373 of January 9, 2026; any incident must be reported within ten days and then every 90 days. New joint ventures are prohibited. These licenses are revocable at any time. It is explicit tutelage — and companies establishing themselves in Venezuela accept it with full knowledge.

Decree 14373: when Washington becomes a shareholder of the nation

Executive Decree 14373 of January 9, 2026 is the founding document of the new American-Venezuelan relationship in the oil sector. It establishes that Venezuelan oil revenues must flow through accounts designated by the United States until a "representative government" is established. This is an extraordinary formulation: Washington reserves the right to define what constitutes a legitimate government and to control revenues pending that legitimacy.

In practice, this mechanism means that the United States exercises financial control over Venezuelan oil revenues. Caracas may produce as much oil as it wishes — but a significant portion of revenues passes through accounts that Washington supervises. This is an unprecedented form of financial protectorate, officially justified by the need to protect Venezuelan resources from the former corrupt elites. In practice, it gives the United States considerable political leverage over the Rodríguez government.

The Multinationals Return: Who Signed What?

Shell, BP, Chevron, Repsol, Eni: the return of the five majors

On June 11, 2026, at a ceremony broadcast on state television, interim president Delcy Rodríguez and representatives of Shell signed five formal agreements covering the offshore Loran gas field (a reservoir of 7 trillion cubic feet), the North Monagas oil operations, and flare reduction. BP separately signed agreements to participate in the Loran project as well as the Cocuina-Manakin field. In April 2026, Chevron had expanded its stake in the Petroindependencia joint venture to 49% and secured rights over the Ayacucho 8 field in the Orinoco Belt.

Repsol concluded a memorandum of understanding with the Venezuelan government and PDVSA to triple production at the Petroquiriquire field within three years. The Spanish company is targeting a 50% increase in its gross production in Venezuela over the next 12 months. Eni, which co-owns the Perla gas field with Repsol, is also continuing its commitments. According to OFAC, licenses were granted on June 22, 2026 to these five multinationals to resume their operations across the entire sector.

ExxonMobil in negotiations: the most improbable reconciliation

ExxonMobil presents the most complex case. The Texas major had been brutally expropriated in 2007 during the Chávez nationalizations, and a multibillion-dollar arbitration dispute remains unresolved. Yet, according to sources cited by OilPrice.com, ExxonMobil is in discussions to acquire rights to six Venezuelan oil fields. If this return materializes, it will be the ultimate symbol of the country's transformation — the major that suffered most from the expropriations returning to the arena.

The complication remains: arbitration claims exceeding 60 billion dollars arising from the Chávez-era expropriations constitute a direct barrier to massive capital reinvestment. These claims are now folded into the 240-billion-dollar debt restructuring process. But resolution will not come quickly. The Atlantic Council estimates that a debt reduction of at least 50% will be necessary for the restructuring to be viable — a process that could stretch into 2027.

The Debt Restructuring: The Greatest Financial Challenge in Sovereign History

240 billion dollars: the arithmetic of the impossible

The figure is staggering: Venezuela is preparing to acknowledge a total debt of nearly 240 billion dollars, according to the Financial Times. This amount surpasses all market estimates, which had ranged between 150 and 200 billion. It even eclipses Greece's historic default in 2012, making this restructuring the largest in world sovereign history. The composition of this debt is complex: approximately 60 billion in sovereign and PDVSA bonds, plus 40 billion in accumulated interest since the 2017 default, along with oil company claims, Chinese and Russian receivables, and expropriation compensation.

The Rodríguez government has hired Centerview Partners as financial adviser and Cleary Gottlieb as legal counsel — two of the most reputable firms in major sovereign restructurings. A viability plan is due for publication in early July 2026. The Venezuelan economy now represents only 100 billion dollars — barely a third of its Chávez-era level in 2012. A debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 200% makes the repayment trajectory extremely difficult.

China and Russia: problematic creditors in a new world

One particularly complex dimension of the restructuring concerns Chinese and Russian receivables. Beijing and Moscow had extended massive loans to the Maduro regime, partly in exchange for oil. These receivables are part of the stock to be restructured — but in a context where Washington controls oil revenues and where China has not purchased a single barrel of Venezuelan oil since January 2026.

According to Signal Ocean data, the destination of Venezuelan exports has shifted radically: the United States now receives 44.7% of exports in 2026, India 17.8%, and China zero. This spectacular reversal illustrates the geopolitical regime change in Venezuela. But it also creates a difficulty: how do you repay Chinese creditors when their oil purchases have been blocked by American decision? The question remains open in restructuring negotiations.

Production by the Numbers: A Real Recovery, Immense Structural Challenges

A seven-year high — but infrastructure in ruins

Venezuelan production reached 1.179 million barrels per day in May 2026, according to OPEC — the highest level in seven years. Growth of 27.6% from the 924,000 barrels per day of January, representing six consecutive months of gains. Maritime cargo volumes have exploded: exported volumes more than doubled since January, rising from approximately 620,000 barrels per month to 1.5 million by mid-June, a rise of 144% in six months.

But behind these spectacular figures lurks a troubling reality: the infrastructure is in an advanced state of deterioration. Wellheads, pipelines, and reservoirs are so corroded that many installations are inoperable. A complete rebuild could cost between 100 and 220 billion dollars and take more than a decade, according to estimates from Rystad Energy. SLB (formerly Schlumberger) has signed a long-term framework agreement with PDVSA to support modernization — a meaningful commitment, but far short of what the scale of the challenge demands.

Production targets: realism or excessive optimism?

PDVSA is targeting 1.37 million barrels per day by year-end 2026, according to S&P Global data. Chevron aims to increase its production by 50% within 18 to 24 months, reaching 375,000 barrels per day. More optimistic projections speak of 1.5 million barrels per day by 2027. A 2.25-billion-dollar SPAC from Lionheart Capital is actively negotiating the acquisition of Venezuelan oil fields with 1.5 billion in financing from Clear Street. JPMorgan and Jefferies are planning their first trips to Caracas since the sanctions era.

These figures underscore a growing consensus in the financial sector: Venezuela is a real opportunity. But warnings are mounting. Rystad Energy experts estimate that returning to 1990s production levels — over 3 million barrels per day — would cost more than 180 billion dollars and take a decade. The Atlantic Council identifies three signals needed to confirm a genuine investment cycle: settlement of arbitration claims, demonstrated judicial independence, and sustained production above 1.5 million barrels thanks to new capital.

Post-Maduro Governance: Transition or Substitution?

Delcy Rodríguez: continuity of the system or genuine break?

Delcy Rodríguez was Maduro's vice-president and loyal ally. Her rise to power after the former president's capture represents institutional continuity, not a revolutionary break. She has, admittedly, pursued a policy of economic opening and reform — but she has also consolidated her power by replacing Maduro's allies with her own loyalists. According to the Stratfor report, she has "consolidated power by replacing several of Maduro's allies with her loyalists."

In the oil sector, she has adopted the posture of a pragmatic reformer, signing agreements with Shell, Repsol, Chevron, and General Electric Vernova for the reconstruction of the electrical grid. Cooperation with the CAF (Development Bank of Latin America) has been strengthened. The IMF held its first formal consultation in years in June 2026. These signals are real. But the question of deep governance — judicial independence, anti-corruption efforts, civil liberties — remains open. There have been no elections, nor any announced schedule for holding them.

The absence of elections: the great unanswered question

Washington is applying pressure for democratic reforms, but it is not conditioning its oil licenses on the holding of elections within a specific timeframe. The formulation of the American decrees — revenues controlled until the establishment of a "representative government" — leaves the entire decision to the Trump administration to unilaterally determine when that condition is met. For the Venezuelan opposition in exile, this represents an abandonment of democracy in favor of economic interests. For pragmatists, it is the only realistic path toward a transition.

This dilemma is not resolved. And it will not be resolved quickly. The 60 billion dollars in unresolved arbitration claims, the 240-billion debt, the reconstruction of a crumbling infrastructure — all of this will take years. In this context, what democratic transition is possible, and at what pace? The honest answer is: no one knows. And that uncertainty is the most significant systemic risk for investors betting on Venezuela.

The Geopolitical Stakes: Venezuela on the Great American Chessboard

Oil as an instrument of Trump's foreign policy

For Donald Trump, Venezuela is a laboratory for his worldview: natural resources in exchange for adherence to the pro-American model. From January 2026, he expressed optimism that major American oil companies would invest "tens of billions of dollars" in the Venezuelan energy sector. His administration is targeting 100 billion dollars in energy investment in Venezuela. This is an ambitious project that serves both American economic interests and a broader geopolitical ambition: pulling Venezuela out of the Chinese and Russian orbit.

The reorientation of Venezuelan oil exports is telling: from a country that primarily exported to China, Venezuela has become a primary exporter to the United States and South Korea. Beijing has received no barrels since January 2026. This radical change in destination is not the result of market forces. It is the product of a deliberate policy, imposed through OFAC licenses and contract conditions. Energy resource warfare is rarely this visible.

The risk of excessive dependence and the Iraqi precedent

Recent history teaches that countries which have seen their oil industries placed under foreign tutelage — even well-intentioned — have often paid a high price in long-term sovereignty. Iraq after 2003, Libya after 2011, offer discouraging precedents. In each case, forced opening to foreign companies preceded decades of political instability.

Venezuela has its own specificities: a literate population, democratic traditions (though battered), a competent diaspora community. These assets could enable a smoother transition than the Middle Eastern precedents. But the risk of creating a rentier economy whose benefits accumulate primarily in the coffers of foreign multinationals and the American state — rather than in the pockets of ordinary Venezuelans — is real and documented by the economic history of oil states.

The Secondary Players: ONGC, Repsol, and the Hedge Funds

India seeks its place in the new Venezuela

India presents a fascinating case in this new Venezuelan landscape. Its foreign oil investment arm, ONGC Videsh, holds a 40% stake in the San Cristóbal field and stakes in the Carabobo-1 field. The company is in negotiations to acquire PDVSA's interests in both fields — but to do so it must obtain an American license. This dependency illustrates the new paradigm: even non-American companies must seek Washington's authorization to operate in Venezuela.

India is in a delicate position: it maintains relations with Russia (buying discounted oil since the 2022 sanctions) while seeking to establish itself in the new pro-American Venezuela. This dual stance is reflected in the negotiations: New Delhi is seeking American approval for its Venezuelan operations while resisting Washington's pressure to reduce its purchases of Russian oil. The influence trade is complicated.

Wall Street in Caracas: a 21st-century gold rush?

JPMorgan and Jefferies are planning their return to Caracas — their first formal engagement with Venezuelan counterparts since the sanctions era. A 2.25-billion-dollar SPAC is in active negotiation to acquire Venezuelan oil fields at valuations of 150 to 400 million per field. Formentera Partners and the Intrepida fund are positioning themselves among the first entrants. It is a characteristic rush — financial predators sensing opportunity before the regulatory landscape has stabilized.

This rush is not without risk. Venezuelan field valuations are difficult to establish in a context where infrastructure is degraded, property rights remain uncertain, and the political situation can shift quickly. Investors banking on a linear recovery trajectory risk exposure to political reversals that Venezuelan history makes perfectly plausible.

Outlook: Three Scenarios for 2027

The optimistic scenario: the Venezuelan renaissance

In the best case, the debt restructuring is concluded by end of 2026 or early 2027. Investments accelerate. Production reaches 1.5 million barrels per day by 2027, in line with S&P Global projections. Institutional reforms advance. An electoral calendar is announced. The Venezuelan diaspora begins to return. Oil revenues finance the rebuilding of public services. This scenario is possible. But it requires a convergence of factors — political stability, investment flows, sustained oil prices — that no single actor fully controls.

Probability: possible, but not likely at this stage. The key question is the credibility of governance. Without genuine judicial independence and robust anti-corruption mechanisms, investments will always fall short of Venezuela's full potential.

The pessimistic scenario: a renewed cycle of dependence

In the worst case, the debt restructuring drags on until 2028 or beyond. Investments remain below the level needed to genuinely modernize the infrastructure. Structural corruption reclaims its place in Venezuelan institutions. Internal political tensions — Maduro's loyalists in the military, opposition figures in exile, Chavist factions — destabilize the Rodríguez government. The United States finds itself trapped between supporting imperfect governance and its stated principles of democratic promotion.

This scenario is not improbable. The absence of elections, the fragility of the rule of law, the weight of the debt — these factors constitute real systemic risks. And if Trump loses in 2028 and a new American administration were to question the entire architecture of American control in Venezuela, the whole edifice could be destabilized.

What the Numbers Don't Say: The Condition of Ordinary Venezuelans

An economic recovery that struggles to reach the street

Behind the barrels per day, the billions of dollars, and the restructuring agreements, there are 30 million Venezuelans whose daily lives remain shaped by decades of economic destruction. 7 million left the country between 2015 and 2025, forming one of the largest refugee crises in the history of the Americas. The economy now represents only 100 billion dollars — down from 370 billion in 2012. Poverty remains endemic, public services have collapsed, and insecurity is widespread.

The 23% growth in the first quarter of 2026 announced by official Venezuelan statistics is real but must be put in context: it starts from a historically low base and reflects mainly the oil recovery. The distribution of oil wealth remains unequal in an economy whose redistribution mechanisms have been dismantled. The real question for the coming years is not only "how many barrels does Venezuela produce" but "who benefits from that production."

The role of the international community in social reconstruction

Economic reforms without a social safety net risk generating a new wave of discontent that would feed political extremes. The World Bank and the IMF, which have resumed contact with Caracas, must condition their support on robust social protection programs. International aid — notably from Washington, which has the most to gain from Venezuelan stability — must go beyond immediate oil interests to include investment in education, health, and social infrastructure.

That is the difference between sustainable reconstruction and mere polished plunder. And that difference will be determined in the coming months, while the world's attention is still focused on Venezuela. Once markets are satisfied and the media have moved on to other crises, ordinary Venezuelans could find themselves facing the same structural inequalities — with new masters.

The Gas Sector: The Forgotten Opportunity

Loran and Dragon: the offshore future

Venezuela holds not only immense oil reserves but also considerable offshore gas resources. The Loran field, with its 7 trillion cubic feet of reserves, and the Dragon field, with its 4.2 trillion cubic feet, together form the backbone of Venezuela's future gas export program. Shell and BP are simultaneously positioned on both assets — a concentration of interests that testifies to their strategic value.

These offshore fields represent an opportunity to export liquefied natural gas to European markets hungry for diversification since the war in Ukraine. Europe, seeking to free itself from Russian gas, could find in Venezuelan gas a partial alternative. This creates an alignment of interests between Washington, Brussels, and Caracas — and gives the Rodríguez government additional leverage in its debt restructuring negotiations with European creditors.

The technical and environmental obstacles

Venezuelan offshore development poses considerable technical challenges. The reservoirs are complex, weather conditions are difficult, and the support infrastructure (ports, processing facilities, pipelines) must be built from scratch. At the same time, environmental problems in Lake Maracaibo and in the onshore oil zones — oil spills, soil and water contamination — constitute an inherited liability that the new operators will have to address or avoid.

The question of flaring — one of the targets of the agreements with Shell — illustrates this environmental challenge. Venezuela ranks among the countries that flare the most gas in the world, a economic waste and an environmental catastrophe. Reducing flaring is both an environmental obligation and an economic opportunity: the gas thus wasted could be captured and sold. That the multinationals have incorporated this objective into their agreements is a positive sign — but concrete results remain to be demonstrated.

The Environmental Impact: The Hidden Cost of Venezuelan Oil

Decades of industrial neglect

The Venezuelan oil industry leaves behind a catastrophic environmental legacy. The crude spills in Lake Maracaibo, the industrial flares burning continuously, the contaminated soils of the Orinoco Delta — all are scars on a territory that harbors exceptional biodiversity. Estimates speak of more than 50,000 documented oil spills since the 1990s, only a fraction of which have been cleaned up.

The new licenses granted to multinationals — Chevron, Repsol, Maurel et Prom — include stricter environmental remediation clauses than under the Maduro era. But the enforcement of these clauses will depend on the regulatory capacity of the transition state, which remains embryonic. Environmental organizations on the ground point to a fundamental tension: the economic pressure to produce quickly — to pay the debt, to fund the state — directly conflicts with the requirements of responsible exploitation.

Indigenous communities at the heart of the conflict

The indigenous nations inhabiting Venezuela's oil region — the Wayuu, the Yukpa, the Pemón — are the first victims of the oil expansion. Their lands, their water sources, their ways of life are directly threatened by the intensification of extraction. Under Maduro, any protest was repressed. Under the transition, spaces for expression are slightly more open — but the economic pressure to exploit resources remains overwhelming.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has called for all resumption of oil activity to be preceded by free, prior, and informed consultation with affected communities — in accordance with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This requirement is politically uncomfortable for governments that need the oil windfall immediately. The tension between human rights and economic imperatives will be one of the most acute fault lines of the Venezuelan transition.

The Venezuelan Diaspora: Six Million Exiles Facing the Question of Return

The largest displacement in Latin American history

More than six million Venezuelans have left their country since 2015 — the largest displacement crisis in the history of Latin America. These six million have settled mainly in Colombia (2.9 million), Peru, Ecuador, Chile, and the United States. They send vital remittances to their families remaining at home — but their absence has also deprived Venezuela of part of its most active workforce.

The political transition opens the door to return, but concrete conditions remain insufficient to trigger a massive influx. Destroyed infrastructure, persistent unemployment, political uncertainty, and fear of residual repression are holding back any desire to return. The transition government has launched a "dignified return" program — with economic incentives and security guarantees — but its real impact remains limited for lack of sufficient resources.

The diaspora's human capital as a driver of reconstruction

What few analysts emphasize: the Venezuelan diaspora represents exceptional human capital. Among the six million exiles are petroleum engineers, doctors, entrepreneurs, teachers — exactly the profiles that Venezuela desperately needs for its reconstruction. If favorable conditions for return are created, this diaspora could become the main engine of economic revival.

Host countries — notably Colombia and Peru — themselves have a stake in a stabilized Venezuela. The migration flow has created social and political tensions within their own borders. A stable and economically viable Venezuela would slow these flows and allow their own societies to recover the capacities they had to mobilize to welcome millions of refugees. The geopolitics of Venezuelan reconstruction thus extends beyond the country's own borders.

Conclusion: Who Controls Venezuelan Oil? The Honest Answer

A fragmented sovereignty between Caracas and Washington

After this investigation, the answer to the opening question is nuanced: Venezuelan oil is today controlled by a constellation of actors of which Washington is the ultimate arbiter. PDVSA operates formally, but under a revocable American license. The Rodríguez government signs agreements, but within the limits defined by American decrees. Multinationals invest, but conditionally. Revenues flow through American accounts. It is a nominal sovereignty — real in form, limited in substance.

Venezuelans: actors or spectators of their own renaissance?

The ultimate question of this investigation is not financial or geopolitical. It is human: will the 30 million Venezuelans be the true beneficiaries of this oil renaissance, or simply spectators of the negotiation between major powers over the control of their resources? The answer will depend on choices made in the coming months — on the debt restructuring, on revenue sharing, on the electoral calendar, on social protection. These choices have not yet been made. And it is in that space of uncertainty that the real story of post-Maduro Venezuela resides.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My method and my sources

This investigation rests exclusively on open sources: OPEC data, analyses from Stratfor, Signal Ocean, Yahoo Finance, Euronews, Ground News, Energies Media, Talento Petrolero, and other economic and financial publications. I have no internal source within the Venezuelan government or within any of the multinationals cited. I rely on publicly available, verifiable information.

My limits and my biases

I believe that economic freedom and liberal democracy produce better outcomes than left-wing or right-wing authoritarianisms. This conviction shapes my analysis of the Chávez-Maduro model as a catastrophic failure — a position defensible on the facts, but not neutral. What I do not know: the details of confidential agreements between Washington and Caracas, the real positions of PDVSA in the negotiations, and the internal political dynamics of the Rodríguez government.

Sources

Primary sources

BSS News/AFP — Maduro ouster put Venezuela on 'the right path': interim leader — June 23, 2026

Yahoo Finance — The Race to Revive Venezuela's Vast Oil Wealth Is Underway — June 22, 2026

Energies Media — Venezuela and Shell sign five energy agreements covering Loran — June 21, 2026

Euronews — Venezuela plans biggest debt restructuring in history after Maduro's fall — June 24, 2026

Secondary sources

Talento Petrolero — Venezuela Energy Monitor, June 2026 — June 20, 2026

Stratfor — Venezuela's Outlook and Implications for Strategic Sectors — June 23, 2026

Ghana Upstream — Venezuela's oil comeback lures majors into a $100 billion rebuild — June 23, 2026

Economic Times — ONGC in talks to acquire PDVSA stakes in two Venezuela oilfields — June 24, 2026